GIFT  OF 
SEELEY  W.  MUDD 

and 

GEORGE  I.  COCHRAN     MEYER  ELSASSER 
OR.  JOHN  R.  HAYNES    WILLIAM  L.  BONNOLD 
JAMES  R.  MARTIN         MRS.  JOSEPH  F.  SARTORI 

to  the 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 
SOUTHERN  BRANCH 


JOHN  FISKE 


HISTOEY 


UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA 


DURING  THE   FIRST  ADMINISTRATION   OF 


THOMAS     JEFFERSON 


.  BY    HENRY    ADAMS 


VOL.  II. 


NEW  YORK 

CHARLES    SCRTBNER'S    SONS 
1921 


>  v  «'  >  „•  i    -s    .,  . 

3301 : 


Copyright,  1889, 
BY    CHAKLES   SCRIBNEK'S   SONS. 


Copyright,  1917 
BT,  HENRY  ADAMS 


E 
302, / 

/\Zi-L 

)3!r/ 
v.^ 

CONTENTS    OF   VOL.   II. 


CHAPTER  PAGE 

I.  RUPTURE  OF  THE  PEACE  OF  AMIENS      ...  1 

II.  THE  LOUISIANA  TREATY 25-. 

III.  CLAIM  TO  WEST  FLORIDA 51 

IV.  CONSTITUTIONAL  DIFFICULTIES 74 

V.  THE  LOUISIANA  DEBATE 94 

VI.  LOUISIANA  LEGISLATION 116 

VII.  IMPEACHMENTS 135 

VIII.  CONSPIRACY 160 

IX.  THE  YAZOO  CLAIMS 192 

Y.  TRIAL  OP  JUSTICE  CHASE 218 

XI.  QUARREL  WITH  YRUJO 245 

XII.  PINCKNEY'S  DIPLOMACY 264 

XIII.  MONROE  AND  TALLEYRAND 288 

XIV.  RELATIONS  WITH  ENGLAND 316  ' 

XV.  CORDIALITY  WITH  ENGLAND 342  »- 

XVI.  AN^HONY  MERRY 360 

XVII.  JEFFERSON'S  ENEMIES 389 

XVIII.  ENGLAND  AND  TRIPOLI  .                                     ,  410 


INDEX  TO  VOLS.  I.  AND  II.     .  .....         .    439 


\&PtMux  Assietes 


-    *"X    FISRES 
SEA  PVES  KEf! 
.OYSTER    BANK 


(From  Jeffery's  American  Atlas.  London,  1800.) 


from  88°35'         London 


Struthert  f  Co.,  Enyr't,  A'.  Y. 


HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES. 


/ 

CHAPTER   I. 


CONGRESS  expired  ;  Monroe  set  sail  March  8,  1803  ; 
Washington  relapsed  into  silence  ;  and  the  President 
and  his  Cabinet  waited  alone  in  the  empty  village, 
triumphing  for  the  moment  over  their  difficulties. 
Although  a  French  prefect  was  actually  in  New  Or 
leans,  and  the  delivery  of  Louisiana  to  Bonaparte 
might  from  day  to  day  be  expected,  not  an  addi 
tional  soldier  stood  on  the  banks  of  the  Mississippi, 
and  the  States  of  Kentucky  and  Tennessee  were  as 
quiet  as  though  their  flat-boats  still  floated  down  to 
New  Orleans.  A  month  passed  before  Madison  or 
Tefferson  again  moved.  Then  the  President  asked 
his  Cabinet  l  what  Monroe  should  do  in  case  France, 
as  he  expressed  it,  "refused  our  rights."  He  proposed 
an  alliance  with  England,  and  suggested  three  in 
ducements  which  might  be  offered  to  Great  Britain  : 
"  1.  Not  to  make  a  separate  peace.  2.  To  let  her 

1  Cabinet  Memoranda  of  Mr.  Jefferson,  April  8,  1803  ;  Jeffer- 
Bon's  Writings  (Ford),  i.  298. 


HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  1. 

take  Louisiana.  3.  Commercial  privileges."  The 
Cabinet  unanimously  rejected  the  second  and  third 
concessions,  but  Dearborn  and  Lincoln  were  alone  in 
opposing  the  first ;  and  a  majority  agreed  to  instruct 
Monroe  and  Livingston,  "  as  soon  as  they  find  that 
no  arrangements  can  be  made  with  France,  to  use  all 
possible  procrastination  with  them,  and  in  the  mean 
time  enter  into  conferences  with  the  British  govern 
ment,  through  their  ambassador  at  Paris,  to  fix  prin 
ciples  of  alliance,  and  leave  us  in  peace  till  Congress 
meets  ;  and  prevent  war  till  next  spring." 

Madison  wrote  the  instructions.  If  the  French  gov 
ernment,  he  said,1  should  meditate  hostilities  against 
the  United  States,  or  force  a  war  by  closing  the 
Mississippi,  the  two  envoys  were  to  invite  England  to 
an  alliance,  and  were  to  negotiate  a  treaty  stipulating 
that  neither  party  should  make  peace  or  truce  without 
consent  of  the  other.  Should  France  deny  the  right 
of  deposit  without  disputing  the  navigation,  the  envoys 
were  to  make  no  positive  engagement,  but  should  let 
Congress  decide  between  immediate  war  or  further 
procrastination. 

At  no  time  in  Talleyrand's  negotiations  had  the 
idea  of  war  against  the  United  States  been  suggested. 
Of  his  intentions  in  this  respect  alone  he  had  given 
positive  assurances.2  Above  all  things  both  he  and 
the  First  Consul  feared  a  war  with  the  United  States. 

1  Madison  to  Livingston  and  Monroe,  April  18  and  20,  1803; 
State  Papers,  ii.  555. 

2  Livingston  to  Madison,  Nov.  11,  1802;  State  Papers,  ii.  526. 


1803.       RUPTURE  OF  THE  PEACE  OF  AMIENS.  3 

They  had  nothing  to  gain  by  it.  Madison's  instruc- 
tions  therefore  rested  on  an  idea  which  had  no 
foundation,  and  which  in  face  of  the  latest  news 
from  Europe  was  not  worth  considering ;  yet  even  if 
intended  only  for  use  at  home,  the  instructions  were 
startling  enough  to  warrant  Virginians  in  doubting 
their  authenticity.  The  late  Administration,  British 
in  feeling  as  it  was  supposed  to  be,  had  never  thought 
an  alliance  with  England  necessary  even  during  actual 
hostilities  with  France,  and  had  not  hesitated  to  risk 
the  chances  of  independent  action.  Had  either  of 
Jefferson's  predecessors  instructed  American  minis 
ters  abroad,  in  case  of  war  with  France,  to  bind 
the  United  States  to  make  no  peace  without  Eng 
land's  consent,  the  consequence  would  have  been  an 
impeachment  of  the  President,  or  direct  steps  by 
Virginia,  Kentucky,  and  North  Carolina,  as  in  1798, 
tending  to  a  dissolution  of  the  Union.  Such  an 
alliance,  offensive  and  defensive,  with  England  con 
tradicted  every  principle  established  by  President 
Washington  in  power  or  professed  by  Jefferson  in 
opposition.  If  it  was  not  finesse,  it  was  an  act  such 
as  the  Republicans  of  1798  would  have  charged  as 
a  crime. 

While  Madison  was  writing  these  instructions,  he 
was  interrupted  by  the  Marquis  of  Casa  Yrujo,1  who 
came  in  triumph  to  say  that  his  Government  had  sent 
out  a  brigantine  especially  to  tell  the  President  that 
the  right  of  deposit  would  be  restored  and  contin- 
1  State  Papers,  ii.  556. 


HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  1. 

ued  till  another  agreement  or  equivalent  place  could 
be  fixed  upon.1  Yrujo  was  instructed  to  thank  the 
President  for  his  friendly,  prudent,  and  moderate  con 
duct  during  the  excitement.  He  sent  to  New  Orleans 
the  positive  order  of  King  Charles  IV.  to  the  Intend- 
ant  Morales,  that  the  right  of  deposit  should  be  im 
mediately  restored ;  the  western  people  were  told 
that  their  produce  might  go  down  the  river  as  before, 
and  thus  the  last  vestige  of  anxiety  was  removed. 
In  face  of  this  action  by  Godoy,  and  of  the  war  evi 
dently  at  hand  between  France  and  England,  the 
success  of  the  peace  policy  was  assured.  These 
events  in  some  degree  explained  the  extraordinary 
nature  of  the  new  instructions  of  April,  1803. 

Monroe  was  then  already  at  Paris.  In  order  to 
make  clear  the  situation  in  which  he  found  him 
self,  the  sequence  of  events  in  Europe  needs  to  be 
understood. 

Bonaparte's  expedition  to  Louisiana  was  to  have 
sailed  at  the  end  of  September,  1802.2  A  general  of 
division,  three  generals  of  brigade,  five  battalions  of 
infantry,  two  companies  of  artillery,  sixteen  pieces 
of  cannon,  and  three  thousand  muskets  were  to  be 
collected  at  Dunkirk  for  shipment  ;  but  as  fast  as 
regiments  could  be  named  they  were  consumed  by 
the  fiery  furnace  of  St.  Domingo.  Nevertheless,  all 

1  Yrujo  to  Madison,  Notes  of  April  19  and  20,  1803;  MSS. 
State  Department  Archives. 

2  Bonaparte  to  Decrea,  6  Fructidor,  An  x.  (Aug.  24,  1802); 
Correspondance,  viii.  4. 


1803.       RUPTURE  OF  THE  PEACE  OF  AMIEXS.          5 

the  orders  and  arrangements  were  gradually  made. 
Victor  was  to  command  the  forces  in  Louisiana ; 
Laussat  was  to  be  prefect,  charged  with  the  civil 
administration.  Both  received  elaborate  written  in 
structions  ;  and  although  Victor  could  not  sail  with 
out  ships  or  troops,  Laussat  was  sent  on  his  way. 

These  instructions,  which  were  never  published, 
had  extreme  value  for  the  decision  of  disputes  which 
were  to  perturb  American  politics  for  the  next  twenty 
years.  Although  Victor  was  forced  to  wait  in  Holland 
for  the  expedition  he  commanded,  a  copy  of  his  instruc 
tions  was  given  to  Laussat,  and  served  to  regulate 
his  conduct  as  long  as  he  remained  in  office.  Decres, 
the  Minister  of  Marine,  was  the  author  of  this  paper, 
which  unfolded  the  purpose  that  had  guided  France 
in  recovering,  and  was  to  control  her  in  administer 
ing,  this  vast  possession.  Nothing  could  be  simpler, 
clearer,  or  more  consistent  with  French  policy  than 
this  document,  which  embodied  so  large  a  part  of 
Talleyrand's  political  system. 

The  instructions  began,  as  was  natural,  by  a  care 
ful  definition  of  the  new  province.  After  reciting  the 
terms  of  the  retrocession  according  to  the  Third  Arti 
cle  of  Berthier's  Treaty,  Decres  fixed  the  boundaries 
of  the  territory  which  Victor,  on  the  part  of  the 
French  republic,  was  to  receive  from  the  Marquis  of 
Somoruelos,  the  Captain-General  of  Cuba.1 

1  Instructions  secretes  pour  le  Capitaine-General  de  la  Lou- 
isiane,  approuvees  par  le  Premier  Consul  le  5  Frimaire,  An  xi. 
(Nov.  26,  1802);  Archives  de  la  Marine,  MSS. 


6  HISTORY  OF  THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  1. 

"  The  extent  of  Louisiana,"  he  said,  "  is  well  deter 
mined  on  the  south  by  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.  But  bounded 
on  the  west  by  the  river  called  Rio  Bravo  from  its  mouth 
to  about  the  30°  parallel,  the  line  of  demarcation  stops 
after  reaching  this  point,  and  there  seems  never  to  have 
been  any  agreement  in  regard  to  this  part  of  the  fron 
tier.  The  farther  we  go  northward,  the  more  undecided 
is  the  boundary.  This  part  of  America  contains  little 
more  than  uninhabited  forests  or  Indian  tribes,  and  the 
necessity  of  fixing  a  boundary  has  never  yet  been  felt 
there.  There  also  exists  none  between  Louisiana  and 
Canada." 

In  this  state  of  things  the  captain-general  would 
have  to  relieve  the  most  remote  Spanish  garrisons, 
in  order  to  establish  possession  ;  in  other  respects  he 
would  be  guided  only  by  political  and  military  inter 
ests.  The  western  and  northern  boundary  was  of  less 
consequence  than  the  little  strip  which  separated  New 
Orleans  from  Mobile  ;  and  to  this  point  the  instruc 
tions  specially  called  Victor's  attention.  Quoting  the 
treaty  of  1763  between  Spain,  Great  Britain,  and 
France,  w^hen  Florida  was  to  become  a  British  posses 
sion,  Decres  fixed  its  terms  as  still  binding  upon  all 
the  interested  parties. 

"  'It  is  agreed,'"  said  the  seventh  article  of  this  treaty, 
"  '  that  in  future  the  boundaries  between  the  States  of 
his  Most  Christian  Majesty  and  those  of  his  Britannic 
Majesty  shall  be  irrevocably  fixed  by  a  line  drawn  down 
the  middle  of  the  Mississippi  River  from  its  source  to  the 
River  Iberville,  and  from  there  by  a  line  down  the  middle 


1803.       RUPTURE  OF  THE  PEACE  OF  AMIENS.          7 

of  that  river  and  of  the  lakes  Manrepas  and  Pontchar- 
train  to  the  sea.  New  Orleans  and  the  island  on  which 
it  stands  shall  belong  to  France.'  Such  is  still  to-day 
the  eastern  limit  of  Louisiana.  All  to  the  east  and  north 
of  this  limit  makes  part  of  the  United  States  or  of  West 
Florida." 

Nothing  could  be  clearer.  Louisiana  stretched  from 
the  Iberville  to  the  Rio  Bravo ;  West  Florida  from  the 
Iberville  to  the  Appalachicola.  The  retrocession  of 
Louisiana  by  Spain  to  France  could  restore  only  what 
France  had  ceded  to  Spain  in  1762.  West  Florida 
had  nothing  to  do  with  the  cession  of  1762  or  the 
retrocession  of  1800,  and  being  Spanish  by  a  wholly 
different  title  could  not  even  be  brought  in  ques 
tion  by  the  First  Consul,  much  as  he  wanted  Baton 
Rouge,  Mobile,  and  Pensacola.  Victor's  orders  were 
emphatic :  — 

"  There  is  therefore  no  obscurity  as  to  our  boundary 
on  this  side  any  more  than  as  to  that  of  our  allies  ;  and 
although  Florida  belongs  to  Spain,  Spain's  right  of  prop 
erty  in  this  quarter  will  have  as  much  interest  for  the 
Captain-General  of  Louisiana  as  though  Florida  were  a 
French  possession." 

After  thus  establishing  the  boundary,  as  far  as 
possible,  in  every  direction,  the  minister  treated  at 
some  length  of  the  English  claim  to  navigation  on 
the  Mississippi,  and  at  last  reached  the  general  sub 
ject  of  the  relation  between  Louisiana  and  the  world 
about  it,  —  the  subject  in  which  Jefferson  would  have 
found  acute  interest :  — 


8  HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  1. 

"  The  system  of  this,  as  of  all  our  other  colonies, 
should  be  to  concentrate  its  commerce  in  the  national 
commerce  ;  it  should  have  in  particular  the  aim  of  estab 
lishing  its  relations  with  our  Antilles,  so  as  to  take  the 
place,  in  these  colonies,  of  the  American  commerce  for 
all  the  objects  whose  import  and  export  is  permitted 
to  them.  The  captain-general  should  especially  abstain 
from  every  innovation  favorable  to  strangers,  who  should 
be  restricted  to  such  communications  as  are  absolutely 
indispensable  to  the  prosperity  of  Louisiana  and  to  such 
as  are  explicitly  determined  by  the  treaties." 

Commercial  relations  with  the  Spanish  colonies 
were  to  be  encouraged  and  extended  as  much  as  pos 
sible,  while  the  utmost  caution  was  to  be  observed 
toward  the  United  States :  — 

"  From  what  has  been  said  of  Louisiana  and  the 
adjacent  States,  it  is  clear  that  the  republic  of  France, 
being  master  of  both  banks  at  the  mouth  of  the  Missis 
sippi,  holds  the  key  to  its  navigation.  This  navigation 
is  nevertheless  a  matter  of  the  highest  importance 
for  the  western  States  of  the  Federal  Government.  .  .  . 
This  is  enough  to  show  with  what  jealousy  the  Fed 
eral  Government  will  see  us  take  possession  of  Louisi 
ana.  Whatever  may  be  the  events  which  this  new 
part  of  the  continent  has  to  expect,  the  arrival  of  the 
French  forces  should  be  marked  there  by  the  expres 
sion  of  sentiments  of  great  benevolence  for  these  new 
neighbors." 

Expression  of  benevolent  sentiments  was  a  pleas 
ing  duty  ;  but  it  was  not  to  interfere  with  practical  • 
measures,  both  defensive  and  offensive  :  — 


1803.       RUPTURE  OF  THE  PEACE  OF  AMIENS.          9 

"  The  greatest  circumspection  will  be  required  in  di 
recting  the  colonial  administration.  A  little  local  expe 
rience  will  soon  enable  you  to  discern  the  sentiments  of 
the  western  provinces  of  the  Federal  Government.  It 
will  be  well  to  maintain  sources  of  intelligence  in  that 
country,  whose  numerous,  warlike,  and  sober  population 
may  present  you  a  redoubtable  enemy.  The  inhabi 
tants  of  Kentucky  especially  should  fix  the  attention  of 
the  captain-general.  ...  He  must  also  fortify  himself 
against  them  by  alliance  with  the  Indian  nations  scat 
tered  to  the  east  of  the  river.  The  Chibackas,  Choctaws, 
Alabamas,  Creeks,  etc.,  are  represented  as  being  entirely 
devoted  to  us.  .  .  .  He  will  not  forget  that  the  French 
government  wishes  peace ;  but  that  if  war  takes  place, 
Louisiana  will  certainly  become  the  theatre  of  hostili 
ties.  .  .  .  The  intention  of  the  First  Consul  is  to  raise 
Louisiana  to  a  degree  of  strength  which  will  allow  him 
in  time  of  war  to  abandon  it  to  its  own  resources  without 
anxiety ;  so  that  enemies  may  be  forced  to  the  greatest 
sacrifices  merely  in  attempting  to  attack  it." 

In  these  instructions  not  a  word  could  be  found 
which  clashed  with  Jefferson's  pacific  views  ;  and 
partly  for  that  reason  they  were  more  dangerous  to 
the  United  States  than  if  they  had  ordered  Victor 
to  seize  American  property  on  the  Mississippi  and 
occupy  Natchez  with  his  three  thousand  men.  Victor 
was  instructed,  in  effect,  to  tamper  with  every  adven 
turer  from  Pittsburg  to  Natchez ;  buy  up  every  Indian 
tribe  in  the  Georgia  and  Northwestern  Territory ; 
fortify  every  bluff  on  the  western  bank  from  St.  Louis 
to  New  Orleans  ;  and  in  a  few  years  create  a  series 


10  HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  1. 

of  French  settlements  which  would  realize  Madison's 
"  sound  policy "  of  discouraging  the  United  States 
from  colonizing  the  west  bank. 

Fortified  by  these  instructions,  the  Citizen  Laussat 
set  sail  Jan.  12,  1803,  and  in  due  time  arrived  at  New 
Orleans.  Victor  labored  in  Holland  to  put  his  ships 
and  supplies  in  a  condition  to  follow.  As  Laussat 
sailed,  another  step  was  taken  by  the  French  govern 
ment.  General  Bernadotte,  a  very  distinguished  re 
publican  officer,  brother-in-law  of  Joseph  Bonaparte, 
was  appointed  minister  at  "Washington.1  The  First 
Consul  had  his  own  reasons  for  wishing  to  remove 
Bernadotte,  as  he  meant  to  remove  Moreau ;  and 
Washington  was  a  place  of  indirect  banishment  for  a 
kinsman  whose  character  was  to  be  feared.  Berna- 
dotte's  instructions  2  were  signed  by  Talleyrand  Jan. 
14,  1803,  the  day  after  Monroe  was  confirmed  as 
special  envoy  to  France  by  the  Senate  at  Washington, 
and  while  Laussat  was  still  on  the  French  coast.  Al 
though  Bonaparte  had  been  obliged  to  withdraw  a 
part  of  Victor's  force,  he  still  intended  that  the  expe 
dition  should  start  at  once  with  two  thousand  men ; 3 
and  its  departure  was  to  be  so  timed  that  Bernadotte 
should  reach  Washington  as  Victor  and  his  troops 
reached  New  Orleans.  Their  instructions  were  on  one 

1  Livingston  to  Madison,  Feb.  18,  1803;  State  Papers,  ii.  533. 

3  Talleyrand  to  Bernadotte,  24  Nivose,  An  xi.  (Jan.  14,  1803); 
Archives  des  Aff.  Etr.,  MSS. 

8  Correspondence,  viii.  145 ;  Bonaparte  to  Decres,  28  Frimaire, 
An  xi.  (Dec.  19,  1802). 


1808.       RUPTURE  OF  THE  PEACE  OF  AMIENS.        11 

point  identical.  News  of  the  closure  of  the  Missis 
sippi  by  Morales  had  reached  Paris,  and  had  already 
caused  an  official  protest  by  Livingston,  when  Talley 
rand  drew  up  the  instructions  to  Bernadotte  :  — 

u  Louisiana  being  soon  to  pass  into  our  hands,  with 
all  the  rights  which  have  belonged  to  Spain,  we  can  only 
with  pleasure  see  that  a  special  circumstance  has  obliged 
the  Spanish  Administration  to  declare  formally  [constater] 
its  right  to  grant  or  to  refuse  at  will  to  the  Americans 
the  privilege  of  a  commercial  entrepdt  at  New  Orleans ; 
the  difficulty  of  maintaining  this  position  will  be  less  for 
us  than  that  of  establishing  it.  ...  Yet  in  any  dis 
cussion  that  may  arise  on  this  subject,  and  in  every 
discussion  you  may  have  to  sustain,  the  First  Consul 
wishes  you  to  be  informed  of  his  most  positive  and  pro 
nounced  desire  to  live  in  good  understanding  with  the 
American  government,  to  cultivate  and  to  improve  for  the 
advantage  of  American  commerce  the  relations  of  friend 
ship  which  unite  the  two  peoples.  No  one  in  Europe 
wishes  the  prosperity  of  that  people  more  than  he.  In 
accrediting  you  to  its  Government  he  has  given  it  a  pecu 
liar  mark  of  his  good  disposition ;  he  doubts  not  that 
you  will  make  every  effort  to  bind  closer  the  ties  which 
exist  between  the  two  nations.  In  consequence  of  the 
firm  intention  which  the  First  Consul  has  shown  on  this 
subject,  I  must  recommend  you  to  take  every  care  to 
avoid  whatever  might  alter  our  relations  with  that  nation 
and  its  Government.  The  agents  of  the  French  republic 
in  the  United  States  should  forbid  themselves  whatever 
might  even  remotely  lead  to  a  rupture.  In  ordinary  com 
munication,  every  step  should  show  the  benevolent  dis 
position  and  mutual  friendship  which  animate  the  chiefs 


12          HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.        CH.  1. 

and  all  the  members  of  the  two  Governments  ;  and  when 
any  unforeseen  difficulty  rises  which  may  in  any  degree 
whatever  compromise  their  good  understanding,  the  sim 
plest  and  most  effectual  means  of  preventing  all  danger 
is  to  refer  its  solution  to  the  inquiry  and  direct  judgment 
of  the  two  Governments." 

Talleyrand's  language  was  more  elaborate,  but  not 
clearer,  than  that  which  Bonaparte  himself  used  to 
Victor.1 

"  I  have  no  need  to  tell  you,"  the  First  Consul  wrote, 
"  with  what  impatience  the  Government  will  wait  for  news 
from  you  in  order  to  settle  its  ideas  in  regard  to  the  pre 
tensions  of  the  United  States  and  their  usurpations  over 
the  Spaniards.  What  the  Government  may  think  proper 
to  do  must  not  be  judged  in  advance  until  you  have  ren 
dered  an  account  of  the  state  of  things.  Every  time  you 
perceive  that  the  United  States  are  raising  pretensions, 
answer  that  no  one  has  an  idea  of  this  at  Paris  (que 
I'on  n'a  aucune  idee  de  cela  a  Paris)  ;  but  that  you  have 
written,  and  that  you  are  expecting  orders." 

These  were  the  ideas  held  by  the  government  of 
France  at  the  moment  when  Jefferson  nominated 
Monroe  as  a  special  envoy  to  buy  New  Orleans  and 
West  Florida.  Jefferson's  hopes  of  his  success  were 
small;  and  Livingston, although  on  the  spot  and  eager 
to  try  the  experiment,  could  only  write : 2  "  Do  not 
absolutely  despair."  Whatever  chance  existed  of  ob- 

1  Correspondance,  viii.  146 ;  Bonaparte  to  Victor,  25  Frimaire, 
An  xi.  (Dec.  16,  1802). 

1  Livingston  to  Madison,  Dec.  20,  1802 ;  State  Papers,  ii.  528. 


1803.       RUPTURE  OF  THE  PEACE  OF  AMIENS.        13 

taining  New  Orleans  seemed  to  lie  in  the  possibility 
that  Addington's  peaceful  administration  in  England 
might  be  driven  into  some  act  contrary  to  its  vital 
interests  ;  and  even  this  chance  was  worth  little,  for 
so  long  as  Bonaparte  wanted  peace,  he  could  always 
keep  it.  England  was  thoroughly  weary  of  war  ;  and 
proved  it  by  patiently  looking  on  while  Bonaparte, 
during  the  year,  committed  one  arbitrary  act  after 
another,  which  at  any  previous  time  would  have  been 
followed  by  an  instant  withdrawal  of  the  British 
minister  from  Paris. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  world  could  see  that  Bona 
parte  was  already  tired  of  peace ;  his  role  of  beneficent 
shopkeeper  disgusted  him,  and  a  new  war  in  Europe 
was  only  a  question  of  months.  In  such  a  case  the 
blow  might  fall  on  the  east  bank  of  the  Rhine,  on 
Spain,  or  on  England.  Yet  Bonaparte  was  in  any 
case  bound  to  keep  Louisiana,  or  return  it  to  Spain. 
Florida  was  not  his  to  sell.  The  chance  that  Jefferson 
could  buy  either  of  these  countries,  even  in  case  of 
a  European  war,  seemed  so  small  as  hardly  to  be 
worth  considering  ;  but  it  existed,  because  Bonaparte 
was  not  a  man  like  other  men,  and  his  action  could 
never  be  calculated  in  advance. 

The  news  that  Leclerc  was  dead,  that  his  army 
was  annihilated,  St.  Domingo  ruined,  and  the  negroes 
more  than  ever  beyond  control,  reached  Paris  and 
was  printed  in  the  "  Moniteur  "  Jan.  7,  1803,  in  the 
same  active  week  when  Bernadotte,  Laussat,  and 
Victor  were  ordered  from  France  to  America,  and 


14          HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.        CH.  i. 

Monroe  was  ordered  from  America  to  France.  Of  all 
the  events  of  the  time,  Leclerc's  death  was  the  most 
decisive.  The  colonial  system  of  France  centred  in 
St.  Domingo.  Without  that  island  the  system  had 
hands,  feet,  and  even  a  head,  but  no  body.  Of  what 
use  was  Louisiana,  when  France  had  clearly  lost  the 
main  colony  which  Louisiana  was  meant  to  feed  and 
fortify  ?  The  new  ruler  of  France  was  not  unused  to 
failure.  More  than  once  he  had  suddenly  given  up 
his  dearest  plans  and  deserted  his  oldest  companions 
when  their  success  was  hopeless.  He  had  abandoned 
Paoli  and  Corsica  with  as  little  compunction  as  after 
ward  he  abandoned  the  army  and  the  officers  whom 
he  led  to  Egypt.  Obstinate  in  pursuing  any  object 
which  led  to  his  own  advancement,  he  was  quick  to 
see  the  moment  when  pursuit  became  useless  ;  and 
the  difficulties  that  rose  in  his  path  toward  colonial 
empire  were  quite  as  great  as  those  which  had  driven 
him  to  abandon  Corsica  and  Egypt.  Not  only  had 
the  island  of  St.  Domingo  been  ruined  by  the  war, 
its  plantations  destroyed,  its  labor  paralyzed,  and  its 
population  reduced  to  barbarism,  so  that  the  task  of 
restoring  its  commercial  value  had  become  extremely 
difficult ;  but  other  and  greater  objections  existed  to 
a  renewal  of  the  struggle.  The  army  dreaded  service 
in  St.  Domingo,  where  certain  death  awaited  every 
soldier  ;  the  expense  was  frightful ;  a  year  of  war 
had  consumed  fifty  thousand  men  and  money  in  vast 
amounts,  with  no  other  result  than  to  prove  that  at 
least  as  many  men  and  as  much  money  would  be 


1803.       RUPTURE  OF  THE  PEACE  OF  AMIENS.        15 

still  needed  before  any  return  could  be  expected  for 
so  lavish  an  expenditure.  In  Europe  war  could  be 
made  to  support  war ;  in  St.  Domingo  peace  alone 
could  but  slowly  repair  some  part  of  this  frightful 
waste. 

Leclerc  was  succeeded  at  St.  Domingo  by  General 
Rochambeau,  a  son  of  the  Comte  de  Rochambeau, 
who  twenty  years  before  had  commanded  the  French 
corps  which  enabled  Washington  to  capture  Corn- 
wallis  at  Yorktown.  A  brave  officer,  but  known  to 
be  little  fit  for  administration,  Rochambeau  was  in- 
competent  for  the  task  that  fell  on  him.  Leclerc 
had  warned  the  Government  that  in  case  of  his 
own  retirement  he  had  no  officer  fit  to  replace 
him,  —  least  of  all  Rochambeau,  who  was  next  in 
rank.  Rochambeau  wrote  to  inform  the  First  Con 
sul  that  thirty-five  thousand  men  must  be  sent  to 
save  the  island.1  Without  a  new  commander-in-chief 
of  the  highest  ability,  a  new  army  was  useless ; 
and  meanwhile  Rochambeau  was  certain  to  waste  the 
few  thousand  acclimated  soldiers  who  should  form 
its  nucleus. 

The  First  Consul  found  himself  in  a  difficult  and 
even  dangerous  situation.  Probably  the  colonial 
scheme  had  never  suited  his  tastes,  and  perhaps  he 
had  waited  only  until  he  should  be  firm  in  power  in 
order  to  throw  off  the  tutelage  of  Talleyrand  ;  but 
the  moment  had  arrived  when  his  tastes  coincided 

1  Rochambeau  to  Decres,  16  Frimaire,  An  xi.  (Dec.  7,  1802); 
Archives  de  la  Marine,  MSS. 


16  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  1. 

with  policy.  A  second  failure  at  St.  Domingo  would 
destroy  his  own  credit,  and  disgust  both  the  army 
and  the  public.  Abandonment  of  the  island  was 
equally  hazardous ;  for  it  required  the  abandonment 
of  French  traditions  and  a  confession  of  failure. 
Retirement  from  St.  Domingo  was  impossible,  except 
under  cover  of  some  new  enterprise ;  and  as  Europe 
stood,  no  other  enterprise  remained  for  France  to 
undertake  which  would  not  lead  her  armies  across 
the  Rhine  or  the  Pyrenees.  For  this  undertaking 
Bonaparte  was  not  yet  ready ;  but  even  had  he  been 
so,  it  would  have  offered  no  excuse  for  abandoning 
the  colonies.  The  ocean  would  still  have  been  open, 
and  St.  Domingo  within  easy  reach. 

Only  one  resource  remained.  Bonaparte  told  no 
one  his  plans ;  but  he  was  not  a  man  to  hesitate  when 
decision  was  needed.  From  the  day  when  news  of 
Leclerc's  death  arrived,  during  the  first  week  of  Jan 
uary,  1803,  the  First  Consul  brooded  over  the  means 
of  abandoning  St.  Domingo  without  appearing  to 
desert  intentionally  a  policy  dear  to  France.  Talley 
rand  and  Decres  were  allowed  to  go  on  as  before ; 
they  gave  instructions  to  Bernadotte,  and  hurried 
the  preparations  of  Victor,  whom  the  ice  and  snow 
of  Holland  and  the  slowness  of  the  workmen  held 
motionless ;  they  prepared  a  reinforcement  of  fifteen 
thousand  men  for  Rochambeau,  and  Bonaparte  gave 
all  the  necessary  orders  for  hastening  the  departure 
of  both  expeditions.  As  late  as  February  5,  he  wrote 
to  Decres  that  fifteen  thousand  men  had  been,  or  were 


1803.       RUPTURE  OF  THE  PEACE  OF  AMIENS.        17 

about  to  be,  sent  to  St.  Domingo,  and  that  fifteen 
thousand  more  must  be  ready  to  sail  by  the  middle  of 
August.1  Yet  his  policy  of  abandoning  the  colonial 
system  had  been  already  decided  ;  for  on  January  30 
the  "  Moniteur  "  produced  Sebastiani's  famous  Report  ^ 
on  the  military  condition  of  the  East,  —  a  publica 
tion  which  could  have  no  other  object  than  to  alarm 
England.2 

Livingston  was  quick  to  see  the  change  of  policy ; 
but  although  he  understood  as  much  as  was  known 
to  any  one,  he  could  not  count  with  certainty  on  the 
result.3  Not  even  Joseph  and  Lucien  knew  what  was 
in  their  brother's  mind.  Talleyrand  seems  to  have 
been  elaborately  deceived ;  even  as  late  as  February 
19  he  was  allowed  to  instruct  General  Beurnonville, 
the  French  ambassador  at  Madrid,  to  express  "  the 
warm  satisfaction  which  the  last  acts  of  sovereignty 
exercised  by  the  King  of  Spain  in  Louisiana  have 
given  to  the  First  Consul." 4  The  last  act  of  sov 
ereignty  exercised  by  Spain  in  Louisiana  had  been  x 
the  closure  of  the  Mississippi.  Before  Beurnonville 
could  obey  this  order,  Godoy,  hastening  to  antici 
pate  possible  interference  from  France,  promised 
Pinckney,  February  28,  that  the  entrepot  should  be  ' 

1  Correspondance,  viii.  201 ;  Bonaparte  to  Decres,  16  Pluvi6se, 
An  xi.  (Feb.  5,  1803). 

2  Lucien   Bonaparte  et  ses  Memoires,  Th.  Jung,  ii.  165,  n. ; 
Lanfrey's  Napoleon,  ii.  495. 

8  Livingston  to  Madison,  Feb.  18,  1803;  State  Papers,  ii.  533. 
4  Beurnonville  to  Talleyrand,  15  Ventose,  An  xi.  (March  6, 
1803);  Archives  des  Aff.  Etr.,  MSS. 

VOL.  II.  —  2 


18  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  1. 

restored.  King  Charles's  order  of  restitution  bore 
date  March  1,  1803 ;  Beurnonville's  note,  urging  the 
King  to  sustain  Morales,  bore  date  March  4,  and 
March  10  Don  Pedro  Cevallos  replied  to  Talleyrand's 
congratulation  in  a  tone  so  evasive  as  to  show  that 
Godoy  was  again  deceiving  the  First  Consul.1  Cev 
allos  did  not  say  that  the  right  of  deposit  had  ten 
days  before  been  restored ;  he  contented  himself  with 
mentioning  the  reasons  alleged  by  Morales  for  his 
act,  adding  at  the  close  the  empty  assurance  that 
"  in  every  way  his  Majesty  prizes  highly  the  applause 
of  the  French  government."  In  January,  only  a 
few  weeks  before,  Godoy  had  told  Beurnonville,  with 
unconcealed  satisfaction,  that  Bonaparte  should  not 
have  Florida,  —  although  without  Florida  the  town 
of  New  Orleans  was  supposed  to  be  of  little  value. 
In  February  he  snatched  away  what  he  could  of 
New  Orleans  by  replacing  the  Americans  in  all  their 
privileges  there. 

Livingston  plied  the  French  officials  with  argu 
ments  and  memorials  ;  but  he  might  have  spared  him 
self  the  trouble,  for  Bonaparte's  policy  was  already 
fixed.  The  First  Consul  acted  with  the  rapidity  which . 
marked  all  his  great  measures.  England  at  once  took 
Sebastiani's  Report  as  a  warning,  and  began  to  arm. 
February  20  Bonaparte  sent  to  the  Corps  Ldgislatif 
his  Annual  Report,  or  Message,  which  spoke  of  Great 
Britain  in  language  that  could  not  be  disregarded; 

1  Cevallos  to  Beurnonville,  March  10,  1803;  Archives  des  AS. 
Etr.,  MSS. 


1803.       RUPTURE  OF  THE  PEACE  OF  AMIENS.        19 

finally,  March  12,  Livingston  saw  a  melodramatic 
spectacle  which  transfixed  him  with  surprise  and 
excitement.1  The  scene  was  at  Madame  Bonaparte's 
drawing-room ;  the  actors  were  Bonaparte  and  Lord 
Whitworth,  the  British  ambassador.  "  I  find,  my 
Lord,  your  nation  want  war  again ! "  said  the  First 
Consul.  "  No,  sir,"  replied  Whitworth  ;  "  we  are  very 
desirous  of  peace."  "  /  must  either  have  Malta  or 
war!"  rejoined  Bonaparte.  Livingston  received  these 
words  from  Lord  Whitworth  himself  on  the  spot ; 
and  returning  at  once  to  his  cabinet,  wrote  to  warn 
Madison.  Within  a  few  days  the  alarm  spread 
through  Europe,  and  the  affairs  of  St.  Domingo  were 
forgotten. 

Bonaparte  loved  long-prepared  transformation- 
scenes.  Such  a  scene  he  was  preparing,  and  the 
early  days  of  April,  1803,  found  the  actors  eagerly 
waiting  it.  All  the  struggles  and  passions  of  the 
last  two  years  were  crowded  into  the  explosion  of 
April.  At  St.  Domingo,  horror  followed  fast  on  , 
horror.  Rochambeau,  shut  in  Port  au  Prince,  — 
drunken,  reckless,  surrounded  by  worthless  men  and 
by  women  more  abandoned  still,  wallowing  in  the 
dregs  of  the  former  English  occupation  and  of  a 
half-civilized  negro  empire,  —  waged  as  he  best  could 
a  guerilla  war,  hanging,  shooting,  drowning,  burn 
ing  all  the  negroes  he  could  catch  ;  hunting  them 
with  fifteen  hundred  bloodhounds  bought  in  Jamaica 
for  something  more  than  one  hundred  dollars  each  ; 

1  Livingston  to  Madison,  March  12,  1803;  State  Papers,  ii.  547. 


20  HISTORY  OF   THE  UNITED  STATES.       CH.  1. 

wasting  money,  squandering  men  ;  while  Dessalines 
and  Christophe  massacred  every  white  being  within 
their  reach.  To  complete  Bonaparte's  work,  from 
which  he  wished  to  turn  the  world's  attention,  high 
among  the  Jura  Mountains,  where  the  ice  and  snow 
had  not  yet  relaxed  their  grip  upon  the  desolate 
little  Fortress  and  its  sunless  casemate,  in  which 
for  months  nothing  but  Toussaint's  cough  had  been 
heard,  Commander  Amiot  wrote  a  brief  military 
Report  to  the  Minister  of  Marine : 1  "On  the  17th 
[April  7],  at  half-past  eleven  o'clock  of  the  morn 
ing,  on  taking  him  his  food,  I  found  him  dead,  seated 
on  his  chair  near  his  fire."  According  to  Tavernier, 
doctor  of  medicine  and  cJiirurgien  of  Pontarlier,  who 
performed  the  autopsy,  pleuro-pneumonia  was  the 
cause  of  Toussaint's  death. 

Toussaint  never  knew  that  St.  Domingo  had  suc 
cessfully  resisted  the  whole  power  of  France,  and 
that  had  he  been  truer  to  himself  and  his  color  he 
might  have  worn  the  crown  that  became  the  play 
thing  of  Christophe  and  Dessalines ;  but  even  when 
shivering  in  the  frosts  of  the  Jura,  his  last  moments 
would  have  glowed  with  gratified  revenge,  had  he 
known  that  at  the  same  instant  Bonaparte  was  turn 
ing  into  a  path  which  the  negroes  of  St.  Domingo 
had  driven  him  to  take,  and  which  was  to  lead  him  v 
to  parallel  at  St.  Helena  the  fate  of  Toussaint  himself 
at  the  Chateau  de  Joux.  In  these  days  of  passion, 

1  Amiot  to  Decres,  19  Germinal,  An  xi.  (April  9,  1803);  Ar 
chives  de  la  Marine,  MSS. 


1803.       RUPTURE  OF  THE  PEACE  OF  AMIENS.        21 

men  had  little  time  for  thought ;  and  the  last  subject 
on  which  Bonaparte  thereafter  cared  to  fix  his  mind 
was  the  fate  of  Toussaint  and  Leclerc.  That  the 
"  miserable  negro,"  as  Bonaparte  called  him,  should 
have  been  forgotten  so  soon  was  not  surprising ;  but 
the  prejudice  of  race  alone  blinded  the  American 
people  to  the  debt  they  owed  to  the  desperate  cour 
age  of  five  hundred  thousand  Haytian  negroes  who 
would  not  be  enslaved. 

If  this  debt  was  due  chiefly  to  the  negroes,  it  was 
also  in  a  degree  due  to  Godoy  and  to  Spain.  In  the 
new  shifting  of.  scenes,  Godoy  suddenly  found  him 
self,  like  Toussaint' eighteen  months  before,  face  to 
face  with  Bonaparte  'bent  on  revenge.  No  one  knew 
better  than  Godoy  the  dangers  that  hung  over  him 
and  his  country.  Aware  of  his  perils,  he  tried,  as 
in  1795,  to  conciliate  the  United  States  by  a  course 
offensive  to  France.  Not  only  did  he  restore  the 
entrepot  at  New  Orleans,  but  he  also  admitted  the 
claims  for  damages  sustained  by  American  citizens 
from  Spanish  subjects  in  the  late  war,  and  through 
Don  Pedro  Cevallos  negotiated  with  Pinckney  a  con 
vention  which  provided  for  a  settlement  of  these 
claims.1  Although  he  refused  to  recognize  in  this  con 
vention  the  spoliations  made  by  Frenchmen  within 
Spanish  jurisdiction,  and  insisted  that  these  were  in 
their  nature  claims  against  France  which  Spain  was 
not  morally  bound  to  admit,  he  consented  to  insert 
an  article  copied  from  the  expunged  Article  II.  of 

1  Claims  Convention,  Aug.  11,  1802;  State  Papers,  ii.  476. 


22          HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  1. 

the  treaty  of  Morfontaine,  reserving  to  the  United 
States  the  right  to  press  these  demands  at  a  future 
time. 

So  well  pleased  was  Jefferson  with  the  conduct  of 
Spain  and  the  Spanish  ministers,  that  not  a  complaint 
was  made  of  ill  treatment ;  and  even  the  conduct  of 
Morales  did  not  shake  the  President's  faith  in  the 
friendliness  of  King  Charles.  No  doubt  he  mistook 
the  motives  of  this  friendliness,  for  Spain  had  no 
other  object  than  to  protect  her  colonies  and  com-, 
merce  on  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  and  hoped  to  prevent 
attack  by  conciliation  ;  while  Madison  imagined  that 
Spain  might  be  induced  by  money  to  part  with  her 
colonies  and  admit  the  United  States  to  the  Gulf. 
In  this  hope  he  instructed  Pinckney,1  in  case  he 
should  find  that  Louisiana  had  not  been  retroceded 
to  France,  to  offer  a  guaranty  of  Spanish  territory 
west  of  the  Mississippi  as  part  of  the  consideration 
for  New  Orleans  and  the  Floridas.  The  offer  was 
made  with  a  degree  of  cordiality  very  unlike  the  simi 
lar  offer  to  France,  and  was  pressed  by  Pinckney  so 
zealously  that  at  last  Cevallos  evaded  his  earnestness 
by  a  civil  equivocation. 

"  The  system  adopted  by  his  Majesty,"  said  he,2  "  not 
to  dispossess  himself  of  any  portion  of  his  States,  de 
prives  him  of  the  pleasure  of  assenting  to  the  cessions 
which  the  United  States  wish  to  obtain  by  purchase.  .  .  . 

1  Madison  to  Pinckney,  May  11,  1802;  State  Papers,  ii. 
517. 

*  Cevallos  to  Piuckney,  May  4,  1803;  State  Papers,  ii.  557. 


1803.       RUPTURE  OF  THE  PEACE  OF  AMIENS.       23 

The  United  States  can  address  themselves  to  the  French 
government  to  negotiate  the  acquisition  of  territories 
which  may  suit  their  interest." 

Cevallos  knew  that  Bonaparte  had  bound  himself 
formally  never  to  alienate  Louisiana,  and  in  referring 
Pinckney  to  France  he  supposed  himself  safe.  Pinck- 
ney,  on  the  other  hand,  prided  himself  on  having 
helped  to  prevent  France  from  gaining  Florida  as 
well  as  Louisiana,  and  was  anxious  to  secure  West 
Florida  for  his  own  credit ;  while  he  had  no  idea 
that  Louisiana  could  be  obtained  at  all. 

Yet  nearly  a  week  before  this  note  was  written 
Louisiana  had  become  American  property.  So  com 
pletely  was  Godoy  deceived,  that  when  April  arrived 
and  he  saw  Spain  again  about  to  be  dragged  into 
unknown  perils,  he  never  divined  that  he  was  to  be 
struck  in  America ;  his  anxieties  rose  from  fear  that 
Spain  might  be  dragged  into  a  new  war  in  Europe,  in 
subservience  to  France.  He  could  expect  to  escape 
such  a  war  only  by  a  quarrel  with  Napoleon,  and  he 
knew  that  a  war  with  Napoleon  was  a  desperate 
resource. 

In  London  statesmanship  had  an  easier  game,  and 
played  it  at  first  simply  and  coolly.  Rufus  King 
watched  it  with  anxious  eyes.  He  wished  to  escape 
from  the  duty  of  expressing  a  diplomatic  policy  which 
he  might  not  approve,  to  a  Government  which  had 
other  and  heavier  tasks  than  that  of  listening  to  his 
advice  or  warnings.  The  British  Ministry  behaved 
well  to  America ;  for  their  advices  from  Thornton  led 


24  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  1. 

them  to  hope  that  the  United  States  would,  if  prop 
erly  supported,  seize  Louisiana  and  accept  war  with 
Bonaparte.  "  If  you  can  obtain  Louisiana,  —  well ! " 
said  Addington  to  Rufus  King ; l  "if  not,  we  ought 
to  prevent  its  going  into  the  hands  of  France." 

1  Rufus  King  to  Madison,  April  2,  1803;  State  Papers,  ii.  551. 


CHAPTER  II. 

MONROE  arrived  in  sight  of  the  French  coast  April  7, 
1803 ;  but  while  he  was  still  on  the  ocean,  Bonaparte 
without  reference  to  him  or  his  mission,  opened  his 
mind  to  Talleyrand  in  regard  to  ceding  Louisiana  to 
the  United  States.  The  First  Consul  a  few  days 
afterward  repeated  to  his  Finance  Minister,  Barbe" 
Marbois,1  a  part  of  the  conversation  with  Talley 
rand  ;  and  his  words  implied  that  Talleyrand  op 
posed  Bonaparte's  scheme,  less  because  it  sacrificed 
Louisiana  than  because  its  true  object  was  not  a  war 
with  England,  but  conquest  of  Germany.  "  He  alone 
knows  my  intentions,"  said  Bonaparte  to  Marbois. 
"  If  I  attended  to  his  advice,  France  would  confine 
her  ambition  to  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine,  and 
would  make  war  only  to  protect  the  weak  States 
and  to  prevent  any  dismemberment  of  her  posses 
sions  ;  but  he  also  admits  that  the  cession  of  Loui 
siana  is  not  a  dismemberment  of  France."  In  re 
ality,  the  cession  of  Louisiana  meant  the  overthrow 
of  Talleyrand's  influence  and  the  failure  of  those 
hopes  which  had  led  to  the  coalition  of  the  18th 
Brumaire. 

1  History  of  Louisiana,  Barb£  Marboia,  p.  277. 


26  HISTORY  OF  THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  2. 

Easter  Sunday,  April  10, 1803,  arrived,  and  Monroe 
was  leaving  Havre  for  Paris,  when  Bonaparte,  after 
the  religious  ceremonies  of  the  day  at  St.  Cloud, 
called  to  him  two  of  his  ministers,  of  whom  Barbe 
Marbois  was  one.1  He  wished  to  explain  his  inten 
tion  of  selling  Louisiana  to  the  United  States  ;  and 
he  did  so  in  his  peculiar  way.  He  began  by  expres 
sing  the  fear  that  England  would  seize  Louisiana  as 
her  first  act  of  war.  "  I  think  of  ceding  it  to  the 
United  States.  I  can  scarcely  say  that  I  cede  it  to 
them,  for  it  is  not  yet  in  our  possession.  If,  however, 
I  leave  the  least  time  to  our  enemies,  I  shall  only 
transmit  an  empty  title  to  those  republicans  whose 
friendship  I  seek.  They  ask  of  me  only  one  town  in 
Louisiana ;  but  I  already  consider  the  colony  as 
entirely  lost ;  and  it  appears  to  me  that  in  the  hands 
of  this  growing  Power  it  will  be  more  useful  to  the 
policy,  and  even  to  the  commerce,  of  France  than  if  I 
should  attempt  to  keep  it." 

To  this  appeal  the  two  ministers  replied  by  giving 
two  opposite  opinions.  Marbois  favored  the  cession, 
as  the  First  Consul  probably  expected  him  to  do ;  for 
Marbois  was  a  republican  who  had  learned  republican 
ism  in  the  United  States,  and  whose  attachment  to 
that  country  was  secured  by  marriage  to  an  Ameri 
can  wife.  His  colleague,  with  equal  decision,  opposed 
the  scheme.  Their  arguments  were  waste  of  breath. 
The  First  Consul  said  no  more,  and  dismissed  them ; 
but  the  next  morning,  Monday,  April  11,  at  daybreak, 

1  History  of  Louisiana,  Barb£  Marbois,  p.  263. 


1803. 


THE   LOUISIANA   TREATY.  27 


summoning  Marbois,  he  made  a  short  oration  of  the 
kind  for  which  he  was  so  famous  :  l  — 

"  Irresolution  and  deliberation  are  no  longer  in  season  ; 
I  renounce  Louisiana.  It  is  not  only  New  Orleans  that 
I  cede  ;  it  is  the  whole  colony,  without  reserve.  I  know 
the  price  of  what  I  abandon.  I  have  proved  the  impor 
tance  I  attach  to  this  province,  since  my  first  diplomatic 
act  with  Spain  had  the  object  of  recovering  it.  I  re 
nounce  it  with  the  greatest  regret ;  to  attempt  obstinately 
to  retain  it  would  be  folly.  I  direct  you  to  negotiate 
the  affair.  Have  an  interview  this  very  day  with  Mr. 
Livingston." 

The  order  so  peremptorily  given  was  instantly  car 
ried  out ;  but  not  by  Marbois.  Talleyrand,  in  an  in 
terview  a  few  hours  afterward,  startled  Livingston 
with  the  new  offer.2 

"  M.  Talleyrand  asked  me  this  day,  when  pressing  the 
subject,  whether  we  wished  to  have  the  whole  of  Louisi 
ana.  I  told  him  no ;  that  our  wishes  extended  only  to 
New  Orleans  and  the  Floridas  ;  that  the  policy  of  France, 
however,  should  dictate  (as  I  had  shown  in  an  official 
note)  to  give  us  the  country  above  the  River  Arkansas, 
in  order  to  place  a  barrier  between  them  and  Canada. 
He  said^that  if  they  gave  New  Orleans  the  rest  would  be 
of  little  value,  and  that  he  would  wish  to  know  .'  what  we 
would  give  for  the  whole.'  I  told  him  it  was  a  subject 
I  had  not  thought  of,  but  that  I  supposed  we  should  not 
object  to  twenty  millions  [francs],  provided  our  citizens 

1  Marbois'a  Louisiana,  p.  274. 

2  Livingston  to  Madison,  April  11,   1803;   State  Papers,  ii. 
552. 


28  HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.        CH.  2. 

were  paid.  He  told  me  that  this  was  too  low  an  offer,  and 
that  he  would  be  glad  if  I  would  reflect  upon  it  and  tell 
him  to-morrow.  I  told  him  that  as  Mr.  Monroe  would 
be  in  town  in  two  days,  I  would  delay  my  further  offer 
until  I  had  the  pleasure  of  introducing  him.  He  added 
that  he  did  not  speak  from  authority,  but  that  the  idea 
had  struck  him." 

The  suddenness  of  Bonaparte's  change  disconcerted 
Livingston.  For  months  he  had  wearied  the  First 
Consul  with  written  and  verbal  arguments,  remon 
strances,  threats,  —  all  intended  to  prove  that  there 
was  nothing  grasping  or  ambitious  in  the  American 
character;  that  France  should  invite  the  Americans 
to  protect  Louisiana  from  the  Canadians  ;  that  the 
United  States  cared  nothing  for  Louisiana,  but  wanted 
only  West  Florida  and  New  Orleans, —  "barren  sands 
and  sunken  marshes,"  he  said;  "a  small  town  built  of 
wood ;  .  .  .  about  seven  thousand  souls  ; "  a  territory 
important  to  the  United  States  because  it  contained 
"the  mouths  of  some  of  their  rivers,"  but  a  mere 
drain  of  resources  to  France.1  To  this  rhapsody, 
repeated  day  after  day  for  weeks  and  months,  Talley 
rand  had  listened  with  his  imperturbable  silence,  the 
stillness  of  a  sceptical  mind  into  which  such  profes 
sions  fell  meaningless  ;  until  he  suddenly  looked  into 
Livingston's  face  and  asked :  "  What  will  you  give 
for  the  whole  ? "  Naturally  Livingston  for  a  moment 
lost  countenance. 

1  Livingston  to  Talleyrand,  Jan.  10, 1803;  Livingston  to  Bona 
parte,  Feb.  27,  1803;  State  Papers,  ii.  531,  539. 


1803.  THE  LOUISIANA  TREATY.  29 

The  next  day,  Tuesday,  April  12,  Livingston,  partly 
recovered  from  his  surprise,  hung  about  Talleyrand 
persistently,  for  his  chance  of  reaping  alone  the  fruit 
of  his  labors  vanished  with  every  minute  that  passed. 
Monroe  had  reached  St.  Germain  late  Monday  night, 
and  at  one  o'clock  Tuesday  afternoon  descended 
from  his  postchaise  at  the  door  of  his  Paris  hotel.1 
From  the  moment  of  his  arrival  he  was  sure  to 
seize  public  attention  at  home  and  abroad.  Living 
ston  used  the  interval  to  make  one  more  effort  with 
Talleyrand : 2  — 

"  He  then  thought  proper  to  declare  that  his  proposi 
tion  was  only  personal,  but  still  requested  me  to  make 
an  offer ;  and  upon  my  declining  to  do  so,  as  I  expected 
Mr.  Monroe  the  next  day,  he  shrugged  up  his  shoulders 
and  changed  the  conversation.  Not  willing,  however,  to 
lose  sight  of  it,  I  told  him  I  had  been  long  endeavoring 
to  bring  him  to  some  point,  but  unfortunately  without 
effect ;  and  with  that  view  had  written  him  a  note  which 
contained  that  request.  .  .  .  He  told  me  he  would  answer 
my  note,  but  that  he  must  do  it  evasively,  because  Lou 
isiana  was  not  theirs.  I  smiled  at  this  assertion,  and 
told  him  that  I  had  seen  the  treaty  recognizing  it.  ... 
He  still  persisted  that  they  had  it  in  contemplation  to 
obtain  it,  but  had  it  not." 

An  hour  or  two  afterward  came  a  note  from  Monroe 
announcing  that  he  would  wait  upon  Livingston  in 

1  Memoir  of  James  Monroe,  1828;  Colonel  Mercer's  Journal, 
p.  55. 

a  Livingston  to  Madison,  April  13,  1803  ;  State  Papers,  ii. 
552. 


30  HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  2. 

the  evening.  The  two  American  ministers  passed 
the  next  day  together,1  examining  papers  and  pre 
paring  to  act  whenever  Monroe  could  be  officially 
presented.  They  entertained  a  party  at  dinner  that 
afternoon  in  Livingston's  apartments,  and  while  sit 
ting  at  table  Livingston  saw  Barbe'  Marbois  strolling 
in  the  garden  outside.  Livingston  sent  to  invite 
Marbois  to  join  the  party  at  table.  While  coffee  was 
served,  Marbois  came  in  and  entered  into  conversa 
tion  with  Livingston,  who  began  at  once  to  tell  him 
of  Talleyrand's  "  extraordinary  conduct."  Marbois 
hinted  that  he  knew  something  of  the  matter,  and 
that  Livingston  had  better  come  to  his  house  as 
soon  as  the  dinner  company  departed.  The  moment 
Monroe  took  leave,  Livingston  acted  on  Marbois's 
hint,  and  in  a  midnight  conversation  the  bargain 
was  practically  made.  Marbois  told  a  story,  largely 
of  his  own  invention,  in  regard  to  the  First  Consul's 
conduct  on  Easter  Sunday,  three  days  before.  Bona 
parte  mentioned  fifty  million  francs  as  his  price  for 
Louisiana ;  but  as  Marbois  reported  the  offer  to 
Livingston,  Bonaparte  said  :  "  "Well !  you  have  charge 
of  the  Treasury.  Let  them  give  you  one  hundred 
millions  of  francs,  and  pay  their  own  claims,  and 
take  the  whole  country."  The  American  claims  were 
estimated  at  about  twenty-five  millions,  and  therefore 
Marbois's  price  amounted  to  at  least  one  hundred  and 
twenty-five  million  francs. 

1  Livingston  to  Madison,  April  13,  1803;  State  Papers,  ii.  552, 
544. 


1803.  THE  LOUISIANA  TREATY.  31 

Yet  twenty-four  or  twenty-five  million  dollars  for 
the  whole  west  bank  of  the  Mississippi,  from  the 
Lake  of  the  Woods  to  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  and  in 
definitely  westward,  was  not  an  extortionate  price, 
especially  since  New  Orleans  was  thrown  into  the 
bargain,  and  indirect  political  advantages  which  could 
not  be  valued  at  less  than  the  cost  of  a  war,  whatever 
it  might  be.  Five  million  dollars  were  to  be  paid 
in  America  to  American  citizens,  so  that  less  than 
twenty  millions  would  come  to  France.  Livingston 
could  hardly  have  been  blamed  for  closing  with 
Marbois  on  the  spot,  especially  as  his  instructions 
warranted  him  in  offering  ten  millions  for  New 
Orleans  and  the  Floridas  alone ;  but  Livingston  still 
professed  that  he  did  not  want  the  west  bank.  "  I 
told  him  that  the  United  States  were  anxious  to  pre 
serve  peace  with  France  ;  that  for  that  reason  they 
wished  to  remove  them  to  the  west  side  of  the  Missis 
sippi  ;  that  we  would  be  perfectly  satisfied  with  New 
Orleans  and  the  Floridas,  and  had  no  disposition  to 
extend  across  the  river  ;  that  of  course  we  would  not 
give  any  great  sum  for  the  purchase.  ...  He  then 
pressed  me  to  name  the  sum."  After  a  little  more 
fencing,  Marbois  dropped  at  once  from  one  hundred 
millions  to  sixty,  with  estimated  claims  to  the  amount 
of  twenty  millions  more.  "  I  told  him  that  it  was 
vain  to  ask  anything  that  was  so  greatly  beyond  our 
means  ;  that  true  policy  would  dictate  to  the  First 
Consul  not  to  press  such  a  demand  ;  that  he  must 
know  it  would  render  the  present  government  un- 


32  HISTORY   OF   THE  UNITED   STATES.        CH.  2. 

popular."  The  conversation  closed  by  Livingston's 
departure  at  midnight  with  a  final  protest :  "  I  told 
him  that  I  would  consult  Mr.  Monroe,  but  that  neither 
he  nor  I  could  accede  to  his  ideas  on  the  subject." 
Then  he  went  home ;  and  sitting  down  to  his  desk 
wrote  a  long  despatch  to  Madison,  to  record  that 
without  Monroe's  help  he  had  won  Louisiana.  The 
letter  closed  with  some  reflections  :  — 

"As  to  the  quantum,  I  have  yet  made  up  no  opinion. 
The  field  open  to  us  is  infinitely  larger  than  our  instruc 
tions  contemplated,  the  revenue  increasing,  and  the  land 
more  than  adequate  to  sink  the  capital,  should  we  even 
go  the  sum  proposed  by  Marbois,  — nay,  I  persuade  my 
self  that  the  whole  sum  may  be  raised  by  the  sale  of  the 
territory  west  of  the  Mississippi,  with  the  right  of  sover 
eignty,  to  some  Power  in  Europe  whose  vicinity  we  should 
not  fear.  I  speak  now  without  reflection  and  without 
having  seen  Mr.  Monroe,  as  it  was  midnight  when  I  left 
the  Treasury  Office,  and  it  is  now  near  three  o'clock.  It 
is  so  very  important  that  you  should  be  apprised  that 
a  negotiation  is  actually  opened,  even  before  Mr.  Mon 
roe  has  been  presented,  in  order  to  calm  the  tumult 
which  the  news  of  war  will  renew,  that  I  have  lost  no 
time  in  communicating  it.  We  shall  do  all  we  can  to 
cheapen  the  purchase ;  but  my  present  sentiment  is  that 
we  shall  buy." 

A  week  was  next  passed  in  haggling  over  the  price.1 
Livingston  did  his  utmost  to  beat  Marbois  down,  but 
without  success.  Meanwhile  he  ran  some  risk  of 

1  Livingston  to  Madison,  April  17,  1803  ;  State  Papers,  ii. 
554. 


1803.  THE  LOUISIANA  TREATY.  33 

losing  everything ;  for  when  Bonaparte  offered  a  fa 
vor  suitors  did  well  to  waste  no  time  in  acceptance. 
A  slight  weight  might  have  turned  the  scale;  a  divul- 
gence  of  the  secret,  a  protest  from  Spain,  a  moment 
of  irritation  at  Jefferson's  coquetry  with  England  or 
at  the  vaporings  of  the  American  press,  a  sudden  per 
ception  of  the  disgust  which  every  true  Frenchman 
was  sure  sooner  or  later  to  feel  at  this  squandering 
of  French  territory  and  enterprise, —  any  remonstrance 
that  should  stir  the  First  Consul's  pride  or  startle  his 
fear  of  posterity,  might  have  cut  short  the  thread  of 
negotiation.  Livingston  did  not  know  the  secrets  of 
the  Tuileries,  or  he  would  not  have  passed  time  in 
cheapening  the  price  of  his  purchase.  The  voice  of 
opposition  was  silenced  in  the  French  people,  but 
was  still  so  high  in  Bonaparte's  family  as  to  make  the 
Louisiana  scheme  an  occasion  for  scenes  so  violent  as 
to  sound  like  the  prelude  to  a  tragedy. 

One  evening  when  Talma  was  to  appear  in  a  new 
rdle,  Lucien  Bonaparte,  coming  home  to  dress  for  the 
theatre,  found  his  brother  Joseph  waiting  for  him.1 
"  Here  you  are  at  last !  "  cried  Joseph  ;  "  I  was  afraid 
you  might  not  come.  This  is  no  time  for  theatre- 
going  ;  I  have  news  for  you  that  will  give  you  no 
fancy  for  amusement.  The  General  wants  to  sell 
Louisiana." 

Lucien,  proud  of  having  made  the  treaty  which 
secured  the  retrocession,  was  for  a  moment  thunder 
struck  ;  then  recovering  confidence,  he  said,  "  Come, 

1  Lucien  Bonaparte  et  ses  Memoires,  Th.  Jung,  ii.  121-192. 

TOL.  II.  —  8 


34          HISTORY  OF  THE   UNITED  STATES.        CH.  2 

now !  if  he  were  capable  of  wishing  it,  the  Chambers 
would  never  consent." 

"  So  he  means  to  do  without  their  consent,"  replied 
Joseph.  "  This  is  what  he  answered  me,  when  I  said 
to  him,  like  you,  that  the  Chambers  would  not  con 
sent.  What  is  more,  he  added  that  this  sale  would 
supply  him  the  first  funds  for  the  war.  Do  you  know 
that  I  am  beginning  to  think  he  is  much  too  fond 
of  war?" 

History  is  not  often  able  to  penetrate  the  private 
lives  of  famous  men,  and  catch  their  words  as  they 
were  uttered.  Although  Lucien  Bonaparte's  veracity 
was  not  greatly  superior  to  that  of  his  brother  Napo 
leon,  his  story  agreed  with  the  known  facts.  If  his 
imagination  here  and  there  filled  in  the  gaps  of  mem 
ory, —  if  he  was  embittered  and  angry  when  he  wrote, 
and  hated  his  brother  Napoleon  with  Corsican  pas 
sion,  these  circumstances  did  not  discredit  his  story, 
for  he  would  certainly  have  told  the  truth  against  his 
brother  under  no  other  conditions.  The  story  was  not 
libellous,  but  Napoleonic  ;  it  told  nothing  new  of  the 
First  Consul's  character,  but  it  was  honorable  to 
Joseph,  who  proposed  to  Lucien  that  they  should  go 
together  and  prevent  their  brother  from  committing 
a  fault  which  would  rouse  the  indignation  of  France, 
and  endanger  his  own  safety  as  well  as  theirs. 

The  next  morning  Lucien  went  to  the  Tuileries  ; 
by  his  brother's  order  he  was  admitted,  and  found 
Napoleon  in  his  bath,  the  water  of  which  was  opaque 
with  mixture  of  eau  de  Cologne.  They  talked  for 


1803. 


THE  LOUISIANA  TREATY.  35 


some  time  on  indifferent  matters.  Lucien  was  timid, 
and  dared  not  speak  until  Joseph  came.  Then  Napo 
leon  announced  his  decision  to  sell  Louisiana,  and 
invited  Lucien  to  say  what  he  thought  of  it. 

"  I  natter  myself,"  replied  Lucien,  "  that  the  Cham 
bers  will  not  give  their  consent." 

"  You  natter  yourself !  "  repeated  Napoleon  in  a 
tone  of  surprise ;  then  murmuring  in  a  lower  voice, 
"  that  is  precious,  in  truth ! "  (Jest  pr£cieux,  en 
vtritt!} 

"  And  I  too  flatter  myself,  as  I  have  already  told 
the  First  Consul,"  cried  Joseph. 

"  And  what  did  I  answer  ? "  said  Napoleon  warmly, 
glaring  from  his  bath  at  the  two  men. 

"  That  you  would  do  without  the  Chambers." 

"  Precisely  !  That  is  what  I  have  taken  the  great 
liberty  to  tell  Mr.  Joseph,  and  what  I  now  repeat  to 
the  Citizen  Lucien,  —  begging  him  at  the  same  time 
to  give  me  his  opinion  about  it,  without  taking  into 
consideration  his  paternal  tenderness  for  his  diplo 
matic  conquest."  Then,  not  satisfied  with  irony,  he 
continued  in  a  tone  of  exasperating  contempt :  "  And 
now,  gentlemen,  think  of  it  what  you  will ;  but  both 
of  you  go  into  mourning  about  this  affair,  —  you, 
Lucien,  for  the  sale  itself ;  you,  Joseph,  because  I 
shall  do  without  the  consent  of  any  one  whomsoever. 
Do  you  understand  ? " 

At  this  Joseph  came  close  to  the  bath,  and  rejoined 
in  a  vehement  tone :  "  And  you  will  do  well,  my  dear 
brother,  not  to  expose  your  project  to  parliamentary 


36  HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.        CH.  2. 

discussion;  for  I  declare  to  you  that  if  necessary  I 
will  put  myself  first  at  the  head  of  the  opposition 
which  will  not  fail  to  be  made  against  you." 

The  First  Consul  burst  into  a  peal  of  forced  laugh 
ter,  while  Joseph,  crimson  with  anger  and.  almost 
stammering  his  words,  went  on :  "  Laugh,  laugh, 
laugh,  then !  I  will  act  up  to  my  promise ;  and 
though  I  am  not  fond  of  mounting  the  tribune,  this 
time  you  will  see  me  there !  " 

Napoleon,  half  rising  from  the  bath,  rejoined  in  a 
serious  tone :  "  You  will  have  no  need  to  lead  the 
opposition,  for  I  repeat  that  there  will  be  no  debate, 
for  the  reason  that  the  project  which  has  not  the  for 
tune  to  meet  your  approval,  conceived  by  me,  nego 
tiated  by  me,  shall  be  ratified  and  executed  by  me 
alone,  do  you  comprehend  ?  —  by  me,  who  laugh  at 
your  opposition ! " 

Hereupon  Joseph  wholly  lost  his  self-control,  and 
with  flashing  eyes  shouted  :  "  Good !  I  tell  you,  Gen 
eral,  that  you,  I,  and  all  of  us,  if  you  do  what  you 
threaten,  may  prepare  ourselves  soon  to  go  and  join 
the  poor  innocent  devils  whom  you  so  legally,  hu 
manely,  and  especially  with  such  justice,  have  trans 
ported  to  Sinnamary." 

At  this  terrible  rejoinder  Napoleon  half  started 
up,  crying  out :  "  You  are  insolent !  I  ought  — " 
then  threw  himself  violently  back  in  the  bath  with 
a  force  which  sent  a  mass  of  perfumed  water  into 
Joseph's  flushed  face,  drenching  him  and  Lucien,  who 
had  the  wit  to  quote,  in  a  theatrical  tone,  the  words 


1803.  THE  LOUISIANA  TREATY.  37 

which  Virgil  put  into  the  mouth  of  Neptune  reproving 
the  waves, — 

"  Quos  ego  .  .  ." 

Between  the  water  and  the  wit  the  three  Bona- 
partes  recovered  their  tempers,  while  the  valet  who 
was  present,  overcome  by  fear,  fainted  and  fell  on 
the  floor.  Joseph  went  home  to  change  his  clothes, 
while  Lucien  remained  to  pass  through  another  scene 
almost  equally  amusing.  A  long  conversation  fol 
lowed  after  the  First  Consul's  toilet  was  finished. 
Napoleon  spoke  of  St.  Domingo.  "  Do  you  want  me 
to  tell  you  the  truth?"  said  he.  "I  am  to-day  more 
sorry  than  I  like  to  confess  for  the  expedition  to  St. 
Domingo.  Our  national  glory  will  never  come  from 
our  marine."  He  justified  what  he  called,  in  jest  at 
Lucien,  his  "  Louisianicide,"  by  the  same  reasons  he 
gave  to  Marbois  and  Talleyrand,  but  especially  by 
the  necessity  of  providing  funds  for  the  war  not  yet 
declared.  Lucien  combated  his  arguments  as  Joseph 
had  done,  until  at  last  he  reached  the  same  point. 
"  If,  like  Joseph,  I  thought  that  this  alienation  of 
Louisiana  without  the  assent  of  the  Chambers  might 
be  fatal  to  me,  —  to  me  alone,  —  I  would  consent  to 
run  all  risks  in  order  to  prove  the  devotion  you 
doubt ;  but  it  is  really  too  unconstitutional  and  — " 

"  Ah,  indeed ! "  burst  out  Napoleon  with  another 
prolonged,  forced  laugh  of  derisive  anger.  "  You  lay 
it  on  handsomely  !  Unconstitutional  is  droll  from 
you.  Come  now,  let  me  alone!  How  have  I  hurt 
your  Constitution?  Answer!" 


38  HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.        CH.  2. 

Lucien  replied  that  the  intent  to  alienate  any  por 
tion  whatever  of  territory  belonging  to  the  Republic 
without  the  consent  of  the  Chambers  was  an  uncon 
stitutional  project.  "  In  a  word,  the  Constitution  —  " 

"  Go  about  your  business ! "  broke  in  the  guar 
dian  of  the  Constitution  and  of  the  national  terri 
tory.  Then  he  quickly  and  vehemently  went  on : 
"  Constitution  !  unconstitutional !  republic  !  national 
sovereignty  !  —  big  words  !  great  phrases  !  Do  you 
think  yourself  still  in  the  club  of  St.  Maximin  ?  We 
are  no  longer  there,  mind  that !  Ah,  it  becomes  you 
well,  Sir  Knight  of  the  Constitution,  to  talk  so  to  me  ! 
You  had  not  the  same  respect  for  the  Chambers  on 
the  18th  Brumaire !  " 

Nothing  exasperated  Lucien  more  than  any  allu 
sion  to  the  part  he  took  in  the  coup  d'gtat  of  the 
18th  Brumaire,  when  he  betrayed  the  Chamber  over 
which  he  presided.  He  commanded  himself  for  the 
moment ;  but  when  Napoleon  went  on  to  say  with 
still  more  contempt,  "  I  laugh  at  you  and  your  na 
tional  representation,"  Lucien  answered  coldly,  "  I  do 
not  laugh  at  you,  Citizen  Consul,  but  I  know  well 
what  I  think  about  it." 

"  Parbleu  !  "  said  Napoleon,  "  I  am  curious  to  know 
what  you  think  of  me :  say  it,  quick  !  " 

"I  think,  Citizen  Consul,  that  having  given  your 
oath  to  the  Constitution  of  the  18th  Brumaire  into 
my  own  hands  as  President  of  the  Council  of  Five 
Hundred,  seeing  you  despise  it  thus,  if  I  were  not 
your  brother  I  would  be  your  enemy." 


1803. 


THE   LOUISIANA   TREATY.  39 


"  My  enemy  !  ah,  I  would  advise  you  !  My  enemy  ! 
That  is  a  trifle  strong ! "  cried  Napoleon,  advancing 
as  though  to  strike  his  younger  brother.  "  You  my 
enemy !  I  would  break  you,  look,  like  this  box ! " 
And  so  saying  he  flung  his  snuff-box  violently  on 
the  floor. 

In  these  angry  scenes  both  parties  knew  that  Napo 
leon's  bravado  was  not  altogether  honest.  For  once, 
Lucien  was  in  earnest ;  and  had  his  brother  left  a  few 
other  men  in  France  as  determined  as  he  and  his 
friend  Bernadotte,  the  First  Consul  would  have  de 
fied  public  opinion  less  boldly.  Joseph,  too,  although 
less  obstinate  than  his  brothers,  was  not  easily  man 
aged.  According  to  Lucien  there  were  further  scenes 
between  them,  at  one  of  which  Joseph  burst  into 
such  violence  that  the  First  Consul  took  refuge  in 
Josephine's  room.  These  stories  contained  nothing 
incredible.  The  ^1e  of  Louisiana,  wpp  the  turning- 
point  in  Napoleon's  career^  no  true  Frenchman  for 
gave  i_fv  A  second  betrayal  of  France,  it  announced 
to  his  fellow  conspirators  that  henceforward  he  alone 
was  to  profit  by  the  treason  of  the  18th  Brumaire. 

Livingston  and  Monroe  knew  nothing  of  all  this ; 
they  even  depended  upon  Joseph  to  help  their  nego 
tiation.  Monroe  fell  ill  and  could  not  act.  Over  the 
negotiation  of  the  treaty  has  always  hung  a  cloud  of 
mystery  such  as  belonged  to  no  other  measure  of  equal 
importance  in  American  history.  No  official  report 
showed  that  the  commissioners  ever  met  in  formal 
conference ;  no  protocol  of  their  proceedings,  no  ac- 


40  HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.        CH.  t. 

count  of  their  discussions,  no  date  when  their  agree 
ment  was  made,  was  left  on  record.  Both  the  treaty 
itself  and  the  avowals  of  Livingston  gave  evidence 
that  at  the  end  all  parties  acted  in  haste.  If  it 
were  not  for  a  private  memorandum  by  Monroe, — 
not  sent  to  the  Government,  but  preserved  among  his 
private  papers,  —  the  course  of  negotiation  could  not 
be  followed. 

A  fortnight  passed  after  Monroe's  arrival  without 
advancing  matters  a  step.  This  period  of  inaction 
seems  to  have  been  broken  by  the  First  Consul. 
April  23  he  drew  up  a  "Projet  of  a  Secret  Con 
vention,"  1  which  he  gave  to  Marbois  and  which  set 
forth  that  to  prevent  misunderstandings  about  the 
matters  of  discussion  mentioned  in  Articles  II.  and 
V.  of  the  Morfontaine  treaty,  and  also  to  strengthen 
friendly  relations,  the  French  republic  was  to  cede  its 
rights  over  Louisiana  ;  and  "  in  consequence  of  the 
said  cession,  Louisiana,  its  territory,  and  its  proper 
dependencies  shall  become  part  of  the  American 
Union,  and  shall  form  successively  one  or  more  States 
on  the  terms  of  the  Federal  Constitution ; "  in  return 
the  United  States  were  to  favor  French  commerce 
in  Louisiana,  and  give  it  all  the  rights  of  American 
commerce,  with  perpetual  entrepots  at  six  points  on 
the  Mississippi,  and  a  corresponding  perpetual  right 
of  navigation ;  further,  they  were  to  assume  all  debts 
due  to  American  citizens  under  the  treaty  of  Mor 
fontaine  ;  and,  finally,  were  to  pay  a  hundred  million 
1  Correspondance,  viii.  289. 


1803.  THE  LOUISIANA  TREATY.  41 

francs  to  France.  With  this  projet  Marbois  went  by 
appointment,  at  two  o'clock,  April  27,  to  Monroe's 
lodgings,  where  the  three  gentlemen  had  an  informal 
meeting,  of  which  no  other  record  is  known  to  exist 
than  Monroe's  memoranda.1  Monroe  himself  was  too 
unwell  to  sit  at  the  table,  and  reclined  on  a  sofa 
throughout  the  discussion.  Marbois  produced  Bona 
parte's  projet,  and  after  admitting  that  it  was  hard 
and  unreasonable,  presented  a  substitute  of  his  own 
which  he  thought  the  First  Consul  would  accept. 

Livingston  tried  to  give  precedence  to  the  claims  ; 
he  wanted  to  dispose  of  them  first,  in  case  the  cession 
should  fail ;  but  after  pressing  the  point  as  far  as  he 
could,  he  was  overruled  by  Monroe,  and  Livingston 
took  Marbois's  project  for  consideration.  The  two 
American  commissioners  passed  a  day  in  working 
over  it.  Livingston  drafted  a  claims  convention,  and 
it  was  drawn,  as  he  thought,  "  with  particular  atten 
tion."  2  Monroe  thought  differently.  "  My  colleague 
took  Mr.  Marbois's  project  with  him,  and  brought  me 
one,  very  loosely  drawn,  founded  on  it." 3  Monroe 
made  a  draft  of  his  own  which  was  certainly  not 
creditable  to  his  legal  or  diplomatic  skill,  and  which 
began  by  adopting  an  oversight  contained  in  Bona 
parte's  draft,  according  to  which  the  cancelled  Article 

1  Monroe's    Memoranda,    Monroe    MSS.,    State    Department 
Archives. 

2  Livingston  to  Madison,  May  3,  1804 ;  MSS.  State  Depart 
ment  Archives. 

*  Monroe's  Memoranda,  Monroe  MSS.,  State  Department 
Archives. 


42  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        Cn.2. 

II.  of  the  treaty  of  Morfontaine  was  made  a  foundation 
of  the  new  convention.1  "  We  called  on  Mr.  Marbois 
the  29th,  and  gave  him  our  project,  which  was  read 
to  him  and  discussed.  We  proposed  to  offer  fifty 
millions  to  France,  and  twenty  millions  on  account 
of  her  debt  to  the  citizens  of  the  United  States, 
making  seventy  in  the  whole."  Marbois  replied  that 
he  would  proceed  only  on  the  condition  that  eighty 
millions  were  accepted  as  the  price.  Then  at  last 
the  American  commissioners  gave  way ;  and  with  this 
change  Marbois  took  their  projet  for  reference  to  the 
First  Consul  the  next  morning. 

The  30th  of  April  was  taken  by  Marbois  for  con 
sultation  with  the  First  Consul.  May  1  Monroe  was 
presented  at  the  Tuileries,  and  dined  there  with 
Livingston ;  but  Bonaparte  said  nothing  of  their 
business,  except  that  it  should  be  settled.  The  same 
evening  the  two  envoys  had  a  final  discussion  with 
Marbois.  "  May  2,  we  actually  signed  the  treaty  and 
convention  for  the  sixty  million  francs  to  France,  in 
the  French  language  ;  but  our  copies  in  English  not 
being  made  out,  we  could  not  sign  in  our  language. 
They  were  however  prepared,  and  signed  in  two  or 
three  days  afterward.  The  convention  respecting 
American  claims  took  more  time,  and  was  not  signed 
till  about  the  8th  or  9th."  All  these  documents  were 
antedated  to  the  30th  April.2 

1  Draft   of  Convention  in   Monroe's  writing,  Monroe  MSS., 
State  Department  Archives. 
*  State  Papers,  ii.  507-509. 


1808.  THE  LOUISIANA  TREATY.  43 

The  first  object  of  remark  in  this  treaty  was  the 
absence  of  any  attempt  to  define  the  property  thus 
bought  and  sold.  "  Louisiana  with  the  same  extent 
that  is  now  in  the  hands  of  Spain,  and  that  it  had 
when  France  possessed  it,  and  such  as  it  should  be 
after  the  treaties  subsequently  entered  into  between 
Spain  and  other  States,"  —  these  words,  taken  from 
Berthier's  original  treaty  of  retrocession,  were  con 
venient  for  France  and  Spain,  whose  governments 
might  be  supposed  to  know  their  own  boundaries ; 
but  all  that  the  United  States  government  knew 
upon  the  subject  was  that  Louisiana,  as  France 
possessed  it,  had  included  a  part  of  Florida  and  the 
whole  Ohio  Valley  as  far  as  the  Alleghany  Mountains 
and  Lake  Erie.  The  American  commissioners  at 
first  insisted  upon  defining  the  boundaries,  and  Mar- 
bois  went  to  the  First  Consul  with  their  request.  He 
refused.1  "  If  an  obscurity  did  not  already  exist,  it 
would  perhaps  be  good  policy  to  put  one  there."  He 
intentionally  concealed  the  boundary  he  had  himself 
defined,  a  knowledge  of  which  would  have  prevented 
a  long  and  mortifying  dispute.  Livingston  went  to 
Talleyrand  for  the  orders  given  by  Spain  to  the  Mar 
quis  of  Somoruelo,  by  France  to  Victor  and  Laussat. 
"  What  are  the  eastern  bounds  of  Louisiana  ? "  asked 
Livingston.  "  I  do  not  know,"  replied  Talleyrand  ; 
"  you  must  take  it  as  we  received  it."  "  But  what 
did  you  mean  to  take  ? "  urged  Livingston.  "  I  do 
not  know,"  repeated  Talleyrand.  "  Then  you  mean 

1  Marbois,  Louisiana,  pp.  283,  286. 


44          HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.        CH.  2. 

that  we  shall  construe  it  our  own  way ? "  "I  can 
give  you  no  direction.  You  have  made  a  noble  bar 
gain  for  yourselves,  and  I  suppose  you  will  make  the 
most  of  it,"  was  the  final  reply  of  Talleyrand.  Had 
Livingston  known  that  Victor's  instructions,  which 
began  by  fixing  the  boundaries  in  question,  were  still 
in  Talleyrand's  desk,  the  answer  would  have  been 
the  same. 

One  point  alone  was  fixed,  —  the  Floridas  were 
not  included  in  the  sale ;  this  was  conceded  on  both 
sides.  In  his  first  conversation  with  Marbois,  Living 
ston  made  a  condition  that  France  should  aid  him  in 
procuring  these  territories  from  Spain.1  "  I  asked 
him,  in  case  of  purchase,  whether  they  would  stipulate 
that  France  would  never  possess  the  Floridas,  and 
that  she  would  aid  us  to  procure  them,  and  relinquish 
all  right  that  she  might  have  to  them.  He  told  me 
that  she  would  go  thus  far."  Several  days  later,  Mar 
bois  repeated  this  assurance  to  Monroe,  saying  that 
the  First  Consul  authorized  him,  besides  offering 
Louisiana,  "  to  engage  his  support  of  our  claim  to  the 
Floridas  with  Spain."  2  Yet  when  the  American  com 
missioners  tried  to  insert  this  pledge  into  the  treaty, 
they  failed.  Bonaparte  would  give  nothing  but  a 
verbal  promise  to  use  his  good  offices  with  Spain. 

Besides  the  failure  to  dispose  of  these  two  points, 
which  were  in  reality  but  one,  the  treaty  contained  a 

1  Livingston  to  Madison,  April  13,  1803;  State  Papers,  ii.  552. 

2  Monroe   to    Madison,   April    19,    1803;    State    Department 
Archives. 


1803.  THE  LOUISIANA  TREATY.  45 

positive  provision,  Article  III.,  taken  from  Bonaparte's 
projet,  with  slight  alteration,  that  "  the  inhabitants 
of  the  ceded  territory  shall  be  incorporated  in  the 
Union  of  the  United  States,  and  admitted  as  soon  as 
possible,  according  to  the  principles  of  the  Federal 
Constitution,  to  the  enjoyment  of  all  the  rights,  ad 
vantages,  and  immunities  of  citizens  of  the  United 
States."  On  republican  principles  of  the  Virginian 
school,  only  the  States  themselves  could  by  a  new 
grant  of  power  authorize  such  an  incorporation.  Ar 
ticle  III.  violated  Madison's  instructions,  which  for 
bade  the  promise.1  "  To  incorporate  the  inhabitants 
of  the  hereby-ceded  territory  with  the  citizens  of  the 
United  States,"  said  these  instructions,  "  being  a  pro 
vision  which  cannot  now  be  made,  it  is  to  be  expected, 
from  the  character  and  policy  of  the  United  States, 
that  such  incorporation  will  take  place  without  un 
necessary  delay."  The  provision,  which  Madison 
said  could  not  be  made,  was  nevertheless  made  by 
Livingston  and  Monroe. 

Embarrassing  as  these  omissions  or  provisions  were, 
they  proved  not  so  much  that  the  treaty  was  carelessly 
drawn,  as  that  the  American  negotiators  were  ready 
to  stipulate  whatever  was  needed  for  their  purpose. 
Other  portions  of  the  treaty  were  not  to  be  defended 
on  that  excuse.  The  price  stipulated  for  Louisiana  was 
sixty  million  francs,  in  the  form  of  United  States  six- 
per-cent  bonds,  representing  a  capital  of  $11,250,000. 

1  Madison  to  Livingston  and  Monroe,  March  2,  1803;  State 
Papers,  ii.  540. 


46  HISTORY  OF   THE  UNITED  STATES.       CH.  2. 

Besides  this  sum  of  eleven  and  a  quarter  million 
dollars,  the  United  States  government  was  to  assume 
and  pay  the  debts  due  by  France  to  American  citi 
zens,  estimated  at  twenty  million  francs,  or,  at  the 
same  rate  of  exchange,  $3,750,000,  —  making  fifteen 
million  dollars  in  all  as  the  price  to  be  paid.  Living 
ston  himself  drew  the  claims  convention  with  what  he 
supposed  to  be  particular  attention  ;  but  it  was  modi 
fied  by  Monroe,  and  still  further  altered  by  Marbois. 
"  The  moment  was  critical ;  the  question  of  peace  or 
war  was  in  the  balance ;  and  it  was  important  to 
come  to  a  conclusion  before  either  scale  preponder 
ated.  I  considered  the  convention  as  a  trifle  com 
pared  with  the  other  great  object,"  avowed  Living 
ston  ;  "  and  as  it  had  already  delayed  us  many  days, 
I  was  ready  to  take  it  under  any  form." l  The 
claims  convention  was  not  signed  till  nearly  a  week 
after  the  signature  of  the  treaty  of  cession.  The  form 
in  which  Livingston  took  it  showed  that  neither  he 
nor  Monroe  could  have  given  careful  attention  to  the 
subject;  for  not  only  did  the  preamble  declare  that 
the  parties  were  acting  in  compliance  with  Article  II. 
of  the  treaty  of  Morfontaine,  —  an  Article  which  had 
been  formally  struck  out  by  the  Senate,  cancelled  by 
Bonaparte,  and  the  omission  ratified  by  the  Senate 
and  President  since  Livingston's  residence  at  Paris ; 
not  only  did  the  claims  specified  fail  to  embrace  all 
the  cases  provided  for  by  the  treaty  of  1800,  which 

1  Livingston  to  Madison,  May  3,  1804;  View  of  the  Claims, 
etc.,  by  a  Citizen  of  Baltimore,  p.  75. 


1803.  THE   LOUISIANA   TREATY.  47 

this  convention  was  framed  to  execute  ;  not  only  were 
the  specifications  arbitrary,  and  even  self-contra 
dictory, —  but  the  estimate  of  twenty  million  francs 
was  far  below  the  amount  of  the  claims  admitted 
in  principle  ;  no  rule  of  apportionment  was  provided, 
and,  worst  of  all,  the  right  of  final  decision  in  every 
case  was  reserved  to  the  French  government.  The 
meaning  of  this  last  provision  might  be  guessed  from 
the  notorious  corruption  of  Talleyrand  and  his  band 
of  confidential  or  secret  agents. 

Doubtless  Livingston  was  right  in  securing  his  main 
object  at  any  cost ;  but  could  he  have  given  more 
time  to  his  claims  convention,  he  would  perhaps  have 
saved  his  own  reputation  and  that  of  his  successor 
from  much  stain,  although  he  might  have  gained  no 
more  than  he  did  for  his  Government.  In  the  two 
conventions  of  1800  and  1803  the  United  States 
obtained  two  objects  of  the  utmost  value, — by  the 
first,  a  release  from  treaty  obligations  which,  if  carried 
out,  required  war  with  England  ;  by  the  second,  the 
whole  west  bank  of  the  Mississippi  River  and  the 
island  of  New  Orleans,  with  all  the  incidental  ad 
vantages  attached.  In  return  for  these  gains  the 
United  States  government  promised  not  to  press  the 
claims  of  its  citizens  against  the  French  government 
beyond  the  amount  of  three  million  seven  hundred 
and  fifty  thousand  dollars,  which  was  one  fourth 
part  of  the  price  paid  for  Louisiana.  The  legitimate 
claims  of  American  citizens  against  France  amounted 
to  many  million  dollars ;  in  the  result,  certain  favored 


48  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  2. 

claimants  received  three  million  seven  hundred  and 
fifty  thousand  dollars  less  their  expenses,  which  re 
duced  the  sum  about  one  half. 

The  impression  of  diplomatic  oversight  was  deep 
ened  by  the  scandals  which  grew  out  of  the  distribu 
tion  of  the  three  million  seven  hundred  and  fifty 
thousand  dollars  which  the  favored  claimants  were 
to  receive.  Livingston's  diplomatic  career  was  poi 
soned  by  quarrels  over  this  money.1  That  the  French 
government  acted  with  little  concealment  of  venality 
was  no  matter  of  surprise  ;  but  that  Livingston  should 
be  officially  charged  by  his  own  associates  with  favor 
itism  and  corruption,  — "  imbecility  of  mind  and  a 
childish  vanity,  mixed  with  a  considerable  portion  of 
duplicity,"  —  injured  the  credit  of  his  Government ; 
and  the  matter  was  not  bettered  when  he  threw  back 
similar  charges  on  the  Board  of  Commissioners,  or 
when  at  last  General  Armstrong,  coming  to  succeed 
him,  was  discredited  by  similar  suspicions.  Consid 
ering  how  small  was  the  amount  of  money  distributed, 
the  scandal  and  corruption  surpassed  any  other  expe 
rience  of  the  national  government. 

Livingston's  troubles  did  not  end  there.  He  could 
afford  to  suffer  some  deduction  from  his  triumph  ;  for 
he  had  achieved  the  greatest  diplomatic  success  re 
corded  in  American  history.  Neither  Franklin,  Jay, 
Gallatin,  nor  any  other  American  diplomatist  was  so 
fortunate  as  Livingston  for  the  immensity  of  his  re 
sults  compared  with  the  paucity  of  his  means.  Other 

1  View  of  the  Claims,  etc.,  by  a  Citizen  of  Baltimore.     1829. 


1803.  THE  LOUISIANA  TREATY.  49 

treaties  of  immense  consequence  have  been  signed  by 
American  representatives,  —  the  treaty  of  alliance 
with  France  ;  the  treaty  of  peace  with  England  which 
recognized  independence  ;  the  treaty  of  Ghent ;  the 
treaty  which  ceded  Florida ;  the  Ashburton  treaty  ; 
the  treaty  of  Guadalupe  Hidalgo,  —  but  in  none  of 
these  did  the  United  States  government  get  so  much 
for  so  little.  The  annexation  of  Louisiana  was  an 
event  so  portentous  as  to  defy  measurement ;  it  gave 
a  new  face  to  politics,  and  ranked  in  historical  im 
portance  next  to  the  Declaration  of  Independence 
and  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution,  —  events  of 
which  it  was  the  logical  outcome  ;  but  as  a  matter 
of  diplomacy  it  was  unparallelled,  because  it  cost 
almost  nothing. 

The  scandalous  failure  of  the  claims  convention 
was  a  trifling  drawback  to  the  enjoyment  of  this 
unique  success  ;  but  the  success  was  further  embit 
tered  by  the  conviction  that  America  would  give  the 
honor  to  Monroe.  Virginia  was  all-powerful.  Liv 
ingston  was  unpopular,  distrusted,  not  liked  even  by 
Madison ;  while  Monroe,  for  political  reasons,  had 
been  made  a  prominent  figure.  Public  attention  had 
been  artificially  drawn  upon  his  mission  ;  and  in  con 
sequence,  Monroe's  name  grew  great,  so  as  almost 
to  overshadow  that  of  Madison,  while  Livingston 
heard  few  voices  proclaiming  his  services  to  the 
country.  In  a  few  weeks  Livingston  began  to  see 
his  laurels  wither,  and  was  forced  to  claim  the  credit 
that  he  thought  his  due.  Monroe  treated  him  less 

VOL.  II.  —  4 


50          HISTORY  OF  THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  2. 

generously  than  he  might  have  done,  considering  that 
Monroe  gained  the  political  profit  of  the  success.1 
Acknowledging  that  his  own  share  was  next  to  noth 
ing  in  the  negotiation,  he  still  encouraged  the  idea 
that  Livingston's  influence  had  been  equally  null. 
This  view  was  doubtless  correct,  but  if  universally 
applied  in  history,  would  deprive  many  great  men  of 
their  laurels.  Monroe's  criticism  helped  only  to  di 
minish  the  political  chances  of  a  possible  rival  who 
had  no  Virginia  behind  him  to  press  his  preferment 
and  cover  his  mistakes. 

1  Livingston  to  Madison,  Nov.  15,  1803 ;  State  Papers,  ii.  573. 
Diary  of  John  Quincy  Adams,  v.  433.  Memoir  of  James  Mon 
roe,  1828. 


CHAPTER  III. 

WHEN  Marbois  took  the  treaty  to  the  First  Consul, 
Bonaparte  listened  to  its  provisions  with  lively  inter 
est  ;  and  on  hearing  that  twenty  millions  were  to  be 
employed  in  paying  claims,  —  a  use  of  money  which 
he  much  disliked,  —  he  broke  out :  "  Who  authorized 
you  to  dispose  of  the  money  of  the  State  ?  I  want 
to  have  these  twenty  millions  paid  into  the  Treasury. 
The  claimants'  rights  cannot  come  before  our  own."  l 
His  own  projet  had  required  the  Americans  to  as 
sume  these  claims,  —  which  was,  in  fact,  the  better 
plan.  Marbois's  alteration  turned  the  claims  into  a 
French  job.  Perhaps  Bonaparte  was  not  averse  to 
this ;  for  when  Marbois  reminded  him  that  he  had 
himself  fixed  the  price  at  fifty  millions,  whereas  the 
treaty  gave  him  sixty,  and  settled  the  claims  besides, 
— "  It  is  true,"  he  said ;  "  the  negotiation  leaves  me 
nothing  to  wish.  Sixty  millions  for  an  occupation 
that  will  not  perhaps  last  a  day !  I  want  France  to 
have  the  good  of  this  unexpected  capital,  and  to 
employ  it  in  works  of  use  to  her  marine."  On  the 
spot  he  dictated  a  decree  for  the  construction  of 
five  canals.  This  excellent  use  of  the  money  seemed 
1  Marbois's  Louisiana,  pp.  311,  312. 


52  HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  3. 

inconsistent  with  Lucien's  remark  that  it  was  wanted 
for  war,  —  but  the  canals  were  never  built  or  begun  ; 
and  the  sixty  millions  were  spent,  to  the  last  cen 
time,  in  preparations  for  an  impracticable  descent  on 
England. 

Yet  money  was  not  the  inducement  which  caused 
Bonaparte  to  sell  Louisiana  to  the  United  States. 
The  Prince  of  Peace  would  at  any  time  have  given 
more  money,  and  would  perhaps  have  been  willing, 
as  he  certainly  was  able,  to  pay  it  from  his  private 
means  rather  than  allow  the  United  States  to  own 
Louisiana.  In  other  respects,  the  sale  needed  explan 
ation,  since  it  contradicted  the  First  Consul's  political 
theories  and  prejudices.  He  had  but  two  rooted 
hatreds.  The  deeper  and  fiercer  of  these  was  directed 
against  the  republic,  —  the  organized  democracy,  and 
what  he  called  ideology,  which  Americans  knew  in 
practice  as  Jeffersonian  theories ;  the  second  and 
steadier  was  his  hatred  of  England  as  the  chief  barrier 
to  his  military  omnipotence.  The  cession  of  Louisiana 
to  the  United  States  contradicted  both  these  passions, 
making  the  ideologists  supreme  in  the  New  World, 
and  necessarily  tending  in  the  end  to  strengthen 
England  in  the  Old.  Bonaparte  had  been  taught  by 
Talleyrand  that  America  and  England,  whatever 
might  be  their  mutual  jealousies,  hatreds,  or  wars, 
were  socially  and  economically  one  and  indivisible. 
Barely  ten  years  after  the  Revolutionary  War  had 
closed,  and  at  a  time  when  the  wounds  it  made  were 
still  raw,  Talleyrand  remarked :  "  In  every  part  of 


1803.  CLAIM  TO  WEST  FLORIDA.  53 

America  through  which  I  have  travelled,  I  have  not 
found  a  single  Englishman  who  did  not  feel  himself 
to  be  an  American  ;  not  a  single  Frenchman  who  did 
not  find  himself  a  stranger."  Bonaparte  knew  that 
England  held  the  monopoly  of  American  trade,  and 
that  America  held  the  monopoly  of  democratic  prin 
ciples  ;  yet  he  did  an  act  which  was  certain  to  extend 
British  trade  and  fortify  democratic  principles. 

This  contradiction  was  due  to  no  change  in  Bona 
parte's  opinions  ;  these  remained  what  they  were.  At 
the  moment  when  talking  to  Marbois  about  "  those  re 
publicans  whose  friendship  I  seek,"  he  was  calculating 
on  the  chance  that  his  gift  would  one  day  prove  their 
ruin.  "  Perhaps  it  will  also  be  objected  to  me,"  he 
said,1  "  that  the  Americans  may  in  two  or  three  cen 
turies  be  found  too  powerful  for  Europe ;  but  my  fore 
sight  does  not  embrace  such  remote  fears.  Besides, 
we  may  hereafter  expect  rivalries  among  the  mem 
bers  of  the  Union.  The  confederations  that  are  called 
perpetual  last  only  till  one  of  the  contracting  parties 
finds  it  to  its  interest  to  break  them.  ...  It  is  to  pre 
vent  the  danger  to  which  the  colossal  power  of  Eng 
land  exposes  us  that  I  would  provide  a  remedy." 
The  colossal  power  of  England  depended  on  her 
navy,  her  colonies,  and  her  manufactures.  Bonaparte 
proposed  to  overthrow  it  by  shattering  beyond  repair 
the  colonial  system  of  France  and  Spain  ;  and  even 
this  step  was  reasonable  compared  with  what  followed. 
He  expected  to  check  the  power  of  England  by  giving 
1  Marbois's  Louisiana,  p.  276. 


54          HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  a. 

Louisiana  to  the  United  States,  —  a  measure  which 
opened  a  new  world  to  English  commerce  and  manu 
factures,  and  riveted  England's  grasp  on  the  whole 
American  continent,  inviting  her  to  do  what  she 
afterward  did,  —  join  hands  with  the  United  States 
in  revolutionizing  Mexico  and  South  America  in  her 
own  interests.  As  though  to  render  these  results 
certain,  after  extending  this  invitation  to  English 
commerce  and  American  democracy,  Bonaparte  next 
invited  a  war  with  England,  which  was  certain  to 
drive  from  the  ocean  every  ship  belonging  to  France 
or  Spain,  —  a  war  which  left  even  the  United  States 
at  England's  mercy. 

Every  detail  that  could  explain  Bonaparte's  motives 
becomes  interesting  in  a  matter  so  important  to 
American  history.  Certain  points  were  clear.  Talley 
rand's  colonial  and  peace  policy  failed.  Resting  on 
the  maintenance  of  order  in  Europe  and  the  exten 
sion  of  French  power  in  rivalry  with  the  United  States 
and  England  in  America,  it  was  a  statesmanlike  and 
honorable  scheme,  which  claimed  for  the  Latin  races 
what  Louis  XIV.  tried  to  gain  for  them ;  but  it  had 
the  disadvantage  of  rousing  hostility  in  the  United 
States,  and  of  throwing  them  into  the  arms  of  Eng 
land.  For  this  result  Talleyrand  was  prepared.  He 
knew  that  he  could  keep  peace  with  England,  and 
that  the  United  States  alone  could  not  prevent  him 
from  carrying  out  his  policy.  Indeed,  Madison  in 
his  conversation  with  Pichon  invited  such  action, 
and  Jefferson  had  no  means  of  resisting  it ;  but  from 


1803.  CLAIM   TO   WEST   FLORIDA.  55 

the  moment  when  St.  Domingo  prevented  the  success 
of  the  scheme,  and  Bonaparte  gained  an  excuse  for 
following  his  own  military  instincts,  the  hostility  of 
the  United  States  became  troublesome.  President 
Jefferson  had  chiefly  reckoned  on  this  possibility  as 
his  hope  of  getting  Louisiana ;  and  slight  as  the 
chance  seemed,  he  was  right. 

This  was,  in  effect,  the  explanation  which  Talley 
rand  officially  wrote  to  his  colleague  Decres,  commu 
nicating  a  copy  of  the  treaty,  and  requesting  him  to 
take  the  necessary  measures  for  executing  it.1 

"  The  wish  to  spare  the  North  American  continent  the 
war  with  which  it  was  threatened,  to  dispose  of  different 
points  in  dispute  between  France  and  the  United  States 
of  America,  and  to  remove  all  the  new  causes  of  misun 
derstanding  which  competition  and  neighborhood  might 
have  produced  between  them  ;  the  position  of  the  French 
colonies  ;  their  want  of  men,  cultivation,  and  assistance  ; 
in  fine,  the  empire  of  circumstances,  foresight  of  the  fu 
ture,  and  the  intention  to  compensate  by  an  advantageous 
arrangement  for  the  inevitable  loss  of  a  country  which 
war  was  going  to  put  at  the  mercy  of  another  nation,  — 
all  these  motives  have  determined  the  Government  to  pass 
to  the  United  States  the  rights  it  had  acquired  from  Spain 
over  the  sovereignty  and  property  of  Louisiana." 

Talleyrand's  words  were  always  happily  chosen, 
whether  to  reveal  or  to  conceal  his  thoughts.  This 
display  of  reasons  for  an  act  which  he  probably 
preferred  to  condemn,  might  explain  some  of  the 

1  Talleyrand  to  Decres,  4  Prairial,  All  xi.  (May  24,  1803); 
Archives  des  Aff.  £tr.,  MSS. 


56          HISTORY  OF   THE  UNITED  STATES.        CH.  3, 

First  Consul's  motives  in  ceding  Louisiana  to  the 
United  States ;  but  it  only  confused  another  more  per 
plexing  question.  Louisiana  did  not  belong  to  France, 
but  to  Spain.  The  retrocession  had  never  been  com 
pleted  ;  the  territory  was  still  possessed,  garrisoned, 
and  administered  by  Don  Carlos  IV.;  until  actual  de 
livery  was  made,  Spain  might  yet  require  that  the  con 
ditions  of  retrocession  should  be  rigorously  performed. 
Her  right  in  the  present  instance  was  complete,  be 
cause  she  held  as  one  of  the  conditions  precedent  to 
the  retrocession  a  solemn  pledge  from  the  First  Con 
sul  never  to  alienate  Louisiana.  The  sale  of  Louisiana 
to  the  United  States  was  trebly  invalid  :  if  it  were 
French  property,  Bonaparte  could  not  constitutionally 
alienate  it  without  the  consent  of  the  Chambers  ;  if 
it  were  Spanish  property,  he  could  not  alienate  it  at 
all ;  if  Spain  had  a  right  of  reclamation,  his  sale  was 
worthless.  In  spite  of  all  these  objections  the  aliena 
tion  took  place  ;  and  the  motives  which  led  the  First 
Consul  to  conciliate  America  by  violating  the  Consti 
tution  of  France  were  perhaps  as  simple  as  he  rep 
resented  them  to  be  ;  but  no  one  explained  what 
motives  led  Bonaparte  to  break  his  word  of  honor 
and  betray  the  monarchy  of  Spain. 

Bonaparte's  evident  inclination  toward  a  new  war 
with  England  greatly  distressed  King  Charles  IV. 
Treaty  stipulations  bound  Spain  either  to  take  part 
with  France  in  the  war,  or  to  pay  a  heavy  annual 
subsidy  ;  and  Spain  was  so  weak  that  either  alterna 
tive  seemed  fatal.  The  Prince  of  Peace  would  have 


1803. 


CLAIM  TO  WEST  FLORIDA.  57 


liked  to  join  England  or  Austria  in  a  coalition  against 
Bonaparte ;  but  he  knew  that  to  this  last  desperate 
measure  King  Charles  would  never  assent  until 
Bonaparte's  hand  was  actually  on  his  crown ;  for  no 
one  could  reasonably  doubt  that  within  a  year  after 
Spain  should  declare  an  unsuccessful  war  on  France, 
the  whole  picturesque  Spanish  court  —  not  only  Don 
Carlos  IV.  himself  and  Queen  Luisa,  but  also  the 
Prince  of  Peace,  Don  Pedro  Cevallos,  the  Infant  Don 
Ferdinand,  and  the  train  of  courtiers  who  thronged 
La  Granja  and  the  Escorial  —  would  be  wandering 
in  exile  or  wearing  out  their  lives  in  captivity.  To 
increase  the  complication,  the  young  King  of  Etruria 
died  May  27,  1803,  leaving  an  infant  seated  upon 
the  frail  throne  which  was  sure  soon  to  disappear 
at  the  bidding  of  some  military  order  countersigned 
by  Berthier. 

In  the  midst  of  such  anxieties,  Godoy  heard  a  pub 
lic  rumor  that  Bonaparte  had  sold  Louisiana  to  the 
United  States  ;  and  he  felt  it  as  the  death-knell  of 
the  Spanish  empire.  Between  the  energy  of  the 
American  democracy  and  the  violence  of  Napoleon 
whom  no  oath  bound,  Spain  could  hope  for  no 
escape.  From  New  Orleans  to  Vera  Cruz  was  but  a 
step  ;  from  Bayonne  to  Cadiz  a  winter  campaign  of 
some  five  or  six  hundred  miles.  Yet  Godoy  would 
probably  have  risked  everything,  and  would  have 
thrown  Spain  into  England's  hands,  had  he  been 
able  to  control  the  King  and  Queen,  over  whom  Bona 
parte  exercised  the  influence  of  a  master.  On  learn- 


58  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  3. 

ing  the  sale  of  Louisiana,  the  Spanish  government 
used  language  almost  equivalent  to  a  rupture  with 
France.  The  Spanish  minister  at  Paris  was  ordered 
to  remonstrate  in  the  strongest  terms  against  the  step 
which  the  First  Consul  had  taken  behind  the  back  of 
the  King  his  ally.1 

"  This  alienation,"  wrote  the  Chevalier  d'Azara  to 
Talleyrand,  "  not  only  deranges  from  top  to  bottom  the 
whole  colonial  system  of  Spain,  and  even  of  Europe,  but 
is  directly  opposed  to  the  compacts  and  formal  stipula 
tions  agreed  upon  between  France  and  Spain,  and  to  the 
terms  of  the  cession  in  the  treaty  of  Tuscany ;  and  the 
King  my  master  brought  himself  to  give  up  the  colony 
only  on  condition  that  it  should  at  no  time,  under  no 
pretext,  and  in  no  manner,  be  alienated  or  ceded  to  any 
other  Power." 

Then,  after  reciting  the  words  of  Gouvion  St.-Cyr's 
pledge,  the  note  continued  :  — 

"  It  is  impossible  to  conceive  more  frankness  or  loyalty 
than  the  King  has  put  into  his  conduct  toward  France 
throughout  this  affair.  His  Majesty  had  therefore  the 
right  to  expect  as  much  on  the  part  of  his  ally,  but  un 
happily  finds  himself  deceived  in  his  hopes  by  the  sale 
of  the  said  colony.  Yet  trusting  always  in  the  straight 
forwardness  and  justice  of  the  First  Consul,  he  has  or 
dered  me  to  make  this  representation,  and  to  protest 
against  the  alienation,  hoping  that  it  will  be  revoked,  as 
manifestly  contrary  to  the  treaties  and  to  the  most  solemn 
anterior  promises." 

1  D'Azara  to  Talleyrand,  June  6,  1803;  Archives  des  Aflf.  Etr., 
MSS. 


1803.  CLAIM  TO  WEST  FLORIDA.  59 

Not  stopping  there,  the  note  also  insisted  that 
Tuscany  should  be  evacuated  by  the  French  troops, 
who  were  not  needed,  and  had  become  an  intolerable 
burden,  so  that  the  country  was  reduced  to  the  utmost 
misery.  Next,  King  Charles  demanded  that  Parma 
and  Piacenza  should  be  surrendered  to  the  King  of 
Etruria,  to  whom  they  belonged  as  the  heir  of  the  late 
Duke  of  Parma.  Finally,  the  note  closed  with  a  com 
plaint  even  more  grave  in  substance  than  any  of  the 
rest :  — 

"  The  King  my  master  could  have  wished  also  a  little 
more  friendly  frankness  in  communicating  the  negotia 
tions  with  England,  and  especially  in  regard  to  the  dis 
positions  of  the  Northern  courts,  guarantors  of  the  treaty 
of  Amiens  ;  but  as  this  affair  belongs  to  negotiations  of 
another  kind,  the  undersigned  abstains  for  the  moment 
from  entering  into  them,  reserving  the  right  to  do  so  on 
a  better  occasion." 

Beurnonville,  the  French  minister  at  Madrid,  tried 
to  soothe  or  silence  the  complaints  of  Cevallos  ;  but 
found  himself  only  silenced  in  return.  The  views  of 
the  Spanish  secretary  were  energetic,  precise,  and  not 
to  be  met  by  argument.1  "  I  have  not  been  able  to 
bring  M.  Cevallos  to  any  moderate,  conciliatory,  or 
even  calm  expression,"  wrote  Beurnonville  to  Talley 
rand  ;  "  he  has  persistently  shown  himself  inaccessi 
ble  to  all  persuasion."  The  Prince  of  Peace  was  no 
more  manageable  than  Cevallos :  "  While  substituting 

1  Beurnonville  to  Talleyrand,  24  Prairial,  An  xi.  (June  13, 
1803);  Archives  des  Aff.  ktr.,  MSS. 


60  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  3. 

a  soft  and  pliant  tone  for  the  sharpest  expressions, 
and  presenting  under  the  appearance  of  regret  what 
had  been  advanced  to  me  with  the  bitterness  of  re 
proach,  the  difference  between  the  Prince's  conduct 
and  that  of  M.  Cevallos  is  one  only  in  words."  Both 
of  them  said,  what  was  quite  true,  that  the  United 
States  would  not  have  objected  to  the  continued  pos 
session  of  Louisiana  by  Spain,  and  that  France  had 
greatly  exaggerated  the  dispute  about  the  entrepdt. 

"  The  whole  matter  reduces  itself  to  a  blunder  (gau- 
cherie)  of  the  Intendant,"  said  Cevallos  ;  "  it  has  been 
finally  explained  to  Mr.  Jefferson,  and  friendship  is  re 
stored.  On  both  sides  there  has  been  irritation,  but  not 
a  shadow  of  aggression  ;  and  from  the  moment  of  coming 
to  an  understanding,  both  parties  see  that  they  are  at 
bottom  of  one  mind,  and  mutually  very  well  disposed 
toward  each  other.  Moreover,  it  is  quite  gratuitous  to 
assume  that  Louisiana  is  so  easy  to  take  in  the  event  of 
a  war,  either  by  the  Americans  or  by  the  English.  The 
first  have  only  militia,  —  very  considerable,  it  is  true,  but 
few  troops  of  the  line ;  while  Louisiana,  at  least  for  the 
moment,  has  ten  thousand  militia-men,  and  a  body  of 
three  thousand  five  hundred  regular  troops.  As  for  the 
English,  they  cannot  seriously  have  views  on  a  province 
which  is  impregnable  to  them ;  and  all  things  consid 
ered,  it  would  be  no  great  calamity  if  they  should  take 
it.  The  United  States,  having  a  much  firmer  hold  on  the 
American  continent,  should  they  take  a  new  enlargement, 
would  end  by  becoming  formidable,  and  would  one  day 
disturb  the  Spanish  possessions.  As  for  the  debts  due 
to  Americans,  Spain  has  still  more  claim  to  an  arrange 
ment  of  that  kind ;  and  in  any  case  the  King,  as  Bona- 


1803. 


CLAIM  TO  WEST  FLORIDA.  61 


parte  must  know,  would  have  gladly  discharged  all  the 
debts  contracted  by  France,  and  perhaps  even  a  large 
instalment  of  the  American  claim,  in  order  to  recover  an 
old  domain  of  the  crown.  Finally,  the  intention  which 
led  the  King  to  give  his  consent  to  the  exchange  of  Lou 
isiana  was  completely  deceived.  This  intention  had  been 
to  interpose  a  strong  dyke  between  the  Spanish  colonies 
and  the  American  possessions ;  now,  on  the  contrary, 
the  doors  of  Mexico  are  to  stay  open  to  them." 

To  these  allegations,  which  Beurnonville  called 
"insincere,  weak,  and  ill-timed,"  Cevallos  added  a 
piece  of  evidence  which,  strangely  enough,  was  alto 
gether  new  to  the  French  minister,  and  reduced  him 
to  confusion  :  it  was  Gouvion  St.-Cyr's  letter,  pledging 
the  First  Consul  never  to  alienate  Louisiana. 

When  Beurnonville's  despatch  narrating  these  in 
terviews  reached  Paris,  it  stung  Bonaparte  to  the 
quick,  and  called  from  him  one  of  the  angry  avowals 
with  which  he  sometimes  revealed  a  part  of  the 
motives  that  influenced  his  strange  mind.  Talleyrand 
wrote  back  to  Beurnonville,  June  22,  a  letter  which 
bore  the  mark  of  the  First  Consul's  hand. 

"  In  one  of  my  last  letters,"  he  began,1  "  I  made 
known  to  you  the  motives  which  determined  the  Govern 
ment  to  give  up  Louisiana  to  the  United  States.  You 
will  not  conceal  from  the  Court  of  Madrid  that  one  of  the 
causes  which  had  most  influence  on  this  determination 
was  discontent  at  learning  that  Spain,  after  having  prom 
ised  to  sustain  the  measures  taken  by  the  Intendant  of 

1  Talleyrand  to  Beurnonville,  3  Messidor,  An  xi.  (June  22, 
1803);  Archives  des  Aff.  Etr.,  MSS. 


62  HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  3. 

New  Orleans,  had  nevertheless  formally  revoked  them. 
These  measures  would  have  tended  to  free  the  capital  of 
Louisiana  from  subjection  to  a  right  of  deposit  which  was 
becoming  a  source  of  bickerings  between  the  Louisianians 
and  Americans.  We  should  have  afterward  assigned  to 
the  United  States,  in  conformity  to  their  treaty  with  Spain, 
another  place  of  deposit,  less  troublesome  to  the  colony 
and  less  injurious  to  its  commerce  ;  but  Spain  put  to  flight 
all  these  hopes  by  confirming  the  privileges  of  the  Ameri 
cans  at  New  Orleans,  —  thus  granting  them  definitively 
local  advantages  which  had  been  at  first  only  temporary. 
The  French  government,  which  had  reason  to  count  on 
the  contrary  assurance  given  in  this  regard  by  that  of 
Spain,  had  a  right  to  feel  surprise  at  this  determination  ; 
and  seeing  no  way  of  reconciling  it  with  the  commercial 
advantages  of  the  colony  and  with  a  long  peace  between 
the  colony  and  its  neighbors,  took  the  only  course  which 
actual  circumstances  and  wise  prevision  could  suggest." 

These  assertions  contained  no  more  truth  than 
those  which  Cevallos  had  answered.  Spain  had  not 
promised  to  sustain  the  Intendant,  nor  had  she  re 
voked  the  Intendanf  s  measures  after,  but  before,  the 
imagined  promise  ;  she  had  not  confirmed  the  Ameri 
can  privileges  at  New  Orleans,  but  had  expressly  re 
served  them  for  future  treatment.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  restoration  of  the  deposit  was  not  only 
reconcilable  with  peace  between  Louisiana  and  the 
United  States,  but  the  whole  world  knew  that  the  risk 
of  war  rose  from  the  threat  of  disturbing  the  right 
of  deposit.  The  idea  that  the  colony  had  become 
less  valuable  on  this  account  was  new.  France  had 


1803.  CLAIM   TO   WEST   FLORIDA.  63 

begged  for  the  colony  with  its  American  privileges, 
and  meaning  to  risk  the  chances  of  American  hostil 
ity  ;  but  if  these  privileges  were  the  cause  of  selling 
the  colony  to  the  Americans,  and  if,  as  Talleyrand 
implied,  France  could  and  would  have  held  Louisi 
ana  if  the  right  of  deposit  at  New  Orleans  had  been 
abolished  and  the  Americans  restricted  to  some  other 
spot  on  the  river-bank,  fear  of  England  was  not,  as 
had  been  previously  alleged,  the  cause  of  the  sale. 
Finally,  if  the  act  of  Spain  made  the  colony  worth 
less,  why  was  Spain  deprived  of  the  chance  to  buy 
it  back  ? 

The  answer  was  evident.  The  reason  why  Bona 
parte  did  not  keep  his  word  to  Don  Carlos  IY.  was 
that  he  looked  on  Spain  as  his  own  property,  and 
on  himself  as  representing  her  sovereignty.  The 
reasons  for  which  he  refused  to  Spain  the  chance 
to  redeem  the  colony,  were  probably  far  more  compli 
cated.  The  only  obvious  explanation,  assuming  that 
he  still  remembered  his  pledge,  was  a  wish  to  punish 
Spain. 

After  all  these  questions  were  asked,  one  problem 
still  remained.  Bonaparte  had  reasons  for  not  return 
ing  the  colony  to  Spain  ;  he  had  reasons,  too,  for 
giving  it  to  the  United  States,  —  but  why  did  he 
alienate  the  territory  from  France  ?  Fear  of  England 
was  not  the  true  cause.  He  had  not  to  learn  how 
to  reconquer  Louisiana  on  the  Danube  and  the  Po. 
At  one  time  or  another  Great  Britain  had  captured 
nearly  all  the  French  colonies  in  the  New  World, 


64          HISTORY  OF   THE  UNITED  STATES.        CH.  3. 

and  had  been  forced  not  only  to  disgorge  conquests, 
but  to  abandon  possessions ;  until  of  the  three  great 
European  Powers  in  America,  England  was  weakest. 
Any  attempt  to  regain  old  ascendency  by  conquering 
Louisiana  would  have  thrown  the  United  States  into 
the  hands  of  France ;  and  had  Bonaparte  anticipated 
such  an  act,  he  should  have  helped  it.  That  Great 
Britain  should  waste  strength  in  conquering  Louisiana 
in  order  to  give  it  to  the  United  States,  was  an  idea 
not  to  be  gravely  argued.  Jefferson  might,  indeed, 
be  driven  into  an  English  alliance  in  order  to  take 
Louisiana  by  force  from  France  or  Spain  ;  but  this 
danger  was  slight  in  itself,  and  might  have  been 
removed  by  the  simple  measure  of  selling  only  the 
island  of  New  Orleans,  and  by  retaining  the  west 
bank,  which  Jefferson  was  ready  to  guarantee.  This 
was  the  American  plan  ;  and  the  President  offered 
for  New  Orleans  alone  about  half  the  price  he  paid 
for  all  Louisiana.1  Still,  Bonaparte  forced  the  west 
bank  on  Livingston.  Every  diplomatic  object  would 
have  been  gained  by  accepting  Jefferson's  projet  of  a 
treaty,  and  signing  it  without  the  change  of  a  word. 
Spain  would  have  been  still  in  some  degree  pro 
tected  ;  England  would  have  been  tempted  to  commit 
the  mistake  of  conquering  the  retained  territory,  and 
thereby  the  United  States  would  have  been  held  in 
check  ;  the  United  States  would  have  gained  all  the 
stimulus  their  ambition  could  require  for  many  years 

1  Madison  to  Livingston  and  Monroe,  March  2,  1803;  State 
Papers,  ii.  543. 


1803. 


CLAIM  TO  WEST  FLORIDA.  65 


to  come ;  and  what  was  more  important  to  Bonaparte, 
France  could  not  justly  say  that  he  had  illegally  and 
ignobly  sold  national  territory  except  for  a  sufficient 
and  national  object. 

The  real  reasons  which  induced  Bonaparte  to  alie- 
nate  the  territory  from  France  remained  hidden  in 
the  mysterious  processes  of  his  mind.  Perhaps  he 
could  not  himself  have  given  the  true  explanation  of 
his  act.  Anger  with  Spain  and  Godoy  had  a  share 
in  it,  as  he  avowed  through  Talleyrand's  letter  of 
June  22 ;  disgust  for  the  sacrifices  he  had  made,  and 
impatience  to  begin  his  new  campaigns  on  the  Rhine, 
—  possibly  a  wish  to  show  Talleyrand  that  his  policy 
could  never  be  revived,  and  that  he  had  no  choice 
but  to  follow  into  Germany,  —  had  still  more  to  do 
with  the  act.  Yet  it  is  also  reasonable  to  believe 
that  the  depths  of  his  nature  concealed  a  wish  to  hide 
forever  the  monument  of  a  defeat.  As  he  would  have 
liked  to  blot  Corsica,  Egypt,  and  St.  Domingo  from 
the  map,  and  wipe  from  human  memory  the  record  of 
his  failures,  he  may  have  taken  pleasure  in  flinging 
Louisiana  far  off,  and  burying  it  forever  from  the 
sight  of  France  in  the  bosom  of  the  only  government 
which  could  absorb  and  conceal  it. 

For  reasons  of  his  own,  which  belonged  rather  to 
military  and  European  than  to  American  history, 
Bonaparte  preferred  to  deal  with  Germany  before 
crossing  the  Pyrenees ;  and  he  knew  that  meanwhile 
Spain  could  not  escape.  Godoy  on  his  side  could 
neither  drag  King  Charles  into  a  war  with  France, 


66          HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.        CH.  3. 

nor  could  he  provide  the  means  of  carrying  on  such 
a  war  with  success.  Where  strong  nations  like 
Austria,  Russia,  and  Prussia  were  forced  to  crouch 
before  Bonaparte,  and  even  England  would  have 
been  glad  to  accept  tolerable  terms,  Spain  could  not 
challenge  attack.  The  violent  anger  that  followed 
the  sale  of  Louisiana  and  the  rupture  of  the  peace 
of  Amiens  soon  subsided.  Bonaparte,  aware  that  he 
had  outraged  the  rights  of  Spain,  became  moderate. 
Anxious  to  prevent  her  from  committing  any  act  of 
desperation,  he  did  not  require  her  to  take  part  in 
the  war,  but  even  allowed  her  stipulated  subsidies  to 
run  in  arrears  ;  and  although  he  might  not  perhaps 
regret  his  sale  of  Louisiana  to  the  United  States,  he 
felt  that  he  had  gone  too  far  in  shaking  the  colonial 
system.  At  the  moment  when  Cevallos  made  his 
bitterest  complaints,  Bonaparte  was  least  disposed  to 
resent  them  by  war.  Both  parties  knew  that  so  far 
as  Louisiana  was  concerned,  the  act  was  done  and 
could  not  be  undone ;  that  France  was  bound  to  carry 
out  her  pledge,  or  the  United  States  would  take  pos 
session  of  Louisiana  without  her  aid.  Bonaparte  was 
willing  to  go  far  in  the  way  of  conciliation,  if  Spain 
would  consent  to  withdraw  her  protest. 

Of  this  the  American  negotiators  knew  little. 
Through  such  complications,  of  which  Bonaparte 
alone  understood  the  secret,  the  Americans  moved 
more  or  less  blindly,  not  knowing  enemies  from 
friends.  The  only  public  man  who  seemed  ever  to 
understand  Napoleon's  methods  was  Pozzo  di  Borgo, 


1803.  CLAIM  TO  WEST  FLORIDA.  67 

whose  ways  of  thought  belonged  to  the  island  society 
in  which  both  had  grown  to  manhood ;  and  Monroe 
was  not  skilled  in  the  diplomacy  of  Pozzo,  or  even  of 
Godoy.  Throughout  life,  Monroe  was  greatly  under 
the  influence  of  other  men.  He  came  to  Paris  almost 
a  stranger  to  its  new  society,  for  his  only  relations 
of  friendship  had  been  with  the  republicans,  most  of 
whom  Bonaparte  had  sent  to  Cayenne.  He  found 
Livingston  master  of  the  situation,  and  wisely  inter 
fered  in  no  way  with  what  Livingston  did.  The 
treaty  was  no  sooner  signed  than  he  showed  his 
readiness  to  follow  Livingston  further,  without  regard 
to  embarrassments  which  might  result. 

When  Livingston  set  his  name  to  the  treaty  of 
cession,  May  2,  1803,  he  was  aware  of  the  immense 
importance  of  the  act.  He  rose  and  shook  hands 
with  Monroe  and  Marbois.  "  We  have  lived  long," 
said  he ;  "  but  this  is  the  noblest  work  of  our  lives." 
This  was  said  by  the  man  who  in  the  Continental 
Congress  had  been  a  member  of  the  committee  ap 
pointed  to  draft  the  Declaration  of  Independence ; 
and  it  was  said  to  Monroe,  who  had  been  assured 
only  three  months  before,  by  President  Jefferson 
of  the  grandeur  of  his  destinies  in  words  he  could 
hardly  have  forgotten : 1  "  Some  men  are  born  for 
the  public.  Nature,  by  fitting  them  for  the  service 
of  the  human  race  on  a  broad  scale,  has  stamped 
them  with  the  evidences  of  her  destination  and  their 
duty."  Monroe  was  born  for  the  public,  and  knew 
1  Jefferson  to  Monroe,  Jan.  13,  1803;  Works,  iv.  455. 


68  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  3. 

what  destiny  lay  before  him ;  while  in  Livingston's 
mind  New  York  had  thenceforward  a  candidate  for 
the  Presidency  whose  claims  were  better  than  Mon 
roe's.  In  the  cup  of  triumph  of  which  these  two 
men  then  drank  deep,  was  yet  one  drop  of  acid. 
They  had  been  sent  to  buy  the  Floridas  and  New 
Orleans.  They  had  bought  New  Orleans ;  but  instead 
of  Florida,  so  much  wanted  by  the  Southern  people, 
they  had  paid  ten  or  twelve  million  dollars  for  the 
west  bank  of  the  Mississippi.  The  negotiators  were 
annoyed  to  think  that  having  been  sent  to  buy  the 
east  bank  of  the  Mississippi,  they  had  bought  the 
west  bank  instead  ;  that  the  Floridas  were  not  a  part 
of  their  purchase.  Livingston  especially  felt  the 
disappointment,  and  looked  about  him  for  some  way 
to  retrieve  it. 

Hardly  was  the  treaty  signed,  when  Livingston 
found  what  he  sought.  He  discovered  that  France 
had  actually  bought  West  Florida  without  knowing 
it,  and  had  sold  it  to  the  United  States  without  being 
paid  for  it.  This  theory,  which  seemed  at  first  sight 
preposterous,  became  a  fixed  idea  in  Livingston's 
mind.  He  knew  that  West  Florida  had  not  been 
included  by  Spain  in  the  retrocession,  but  that  on 
the  contrary  Charles  IV.  had  repeatedly,  obstinately, 
and  almost  publicly  rejected  Bonaparte's  tempting 
bids  for  that  province.  Livingston's  own  argument 
for  the  cession  of  Louisiana  had  chiefly  rested  on 
this  knowledge,  and  on  the  theory  that  without  Mo 
bile  New  Orleans  was  worthless.  He  recounted  this 


1803. 


CLAIM  TO   WEST  FLORIDA.  69 


to    Madison    in   the    same    letter    which    announced 
Talleyrand's  offer  to  sell : J  — 

"  I  have  used  every  exertion  with  the  Spanish  Ambas 
sador  and  Lord  Whitworth  to  prevent  the  transfer  of  the 
Floridas,  .  .  .  and  unless  they  [the  French]  get  Florida, 
I  have  convinced  them  that  Louisiana  is  worth  little." 

In  the  preceding  year  one  of  the  French  ministers 
had  applied  to  Livingston  "  to  know  what  we  under 
stand  in  America  by  Louisiana;"  and  Livingston's 
answer  was  on  record  in  the  State  Department  at 
Washington : 2  "  Since  the  possession  of  the  Floridas 
by  Britain  and  the  treaty  of  1762,  I  think  there  can 
be  no  doubt  as  to  the  precise  meaning  of  the  terms." 
He  had  himself  drafted  an  article  which  he  tried  to 
insert  in  Marbois's  projet,  pledging  the  First  Consul 
to  interpose  his  good  offices  with  the  King  of  Spain  to 
obtain  the  country  east  of  the  Mississippi.  As  late 
as  May  12,  Livingston  wrote  to  Madison  : 3  "I  am 
satisfied  that  ...  if  they  [the  French]  could  have 
concluded  with  Spain,  we  should  also  have  had  West 
Florida."  In  his  next  letter,  only  a  week  afterward, 
he  insisted  that  West  Florida  was  his  : 4  — 

"Now,  sir,  the  sum  of  this  business  is  to  recommend 
to  you  in  the  strongest  terms,  after  having  obtained  the 
possession  that  the  French  commissary  will  give  you,  to 

1  Livingston  to    Madison,  April    11,   1803;  State    Papers,  ii. 
552. 

2  Ibid.,  July  30,  1802;  State  Papers,  ii.  519. 
*  Ibid.,  May  12,  1803;  State  Papers,  ii.  557. 
4  Ibid.,  May  20,  1803;  State  Papers,  ii.  561. 


70          HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.        CH.  3. 

insist  upon  this  as  a  part  of  your  right,  and  to  take  pos 
session  at  all  events  to  the  River  Perdido.  I  pledge  my 
self  that  your  right  is  good." 

The  reasoning  on  which  he  rested  this  change  of 
opinion  was  in  substance  the  following :  France  had, 
in  early  days,  owned  nearly  all  the  North  American 
continent,  and  her  province  of  Louisiana  had  then 
included  Ohio  and  the  watercourses  between  the  Lakes 
and  the  Gulf,  as  well  as  West  Florida,  or  a  part  of 
it.  This  possession  lasted  until  the  treaty  of  peace, 
Nov.  3,  1762,  when  France  ceded  to  England  not 
only  Canada,  but  also  Florida  and  all  other  posses 
sions  east  of  the  Mississippi,  except  the  Island  of  New 
Orleans.  Then  West  Florida  by  treaty  first  received 
its  modern  boundary  at  the  Iberville.  On  the  same 
day  France  further  ceded  to  Spain  the  Island  of  New 
Orleans  and  all  Louisiana  west  of  the  Mississippi. 
Not  a  foot  of  the  vast  French  possessions  on  the  con 
tinent  of  North  America  remained  in  the  hands  of 
the  King  of  France  ;  they  were  divided  between  Eng 
land  and  Spain. 

The  retrocession  of  1800  was  made  on  the  under 
standing  that  it  referred  to  this  cession  of  1762.  The 
province  of  Louisiana  which  had  been  ceded  was 
retro-ceded,  with  its  treaty -boundary  at  the  Iberville. 
Livingston  knew  that  the  understanding  between 
France  and  Spain  was  complete ;  yet  on  examination 
he  found  that  it  had  not  been  expressed  in  words  so 
clearly  but  that  these  words  could  be  made  to  bear 
a  different  meaning.  Louisiana  was  retroceded,  he 


1803.  CLAIM   TO   WEST   FLORIDA.  71 

perceived,  "  with  the  same  extent  that  it  now  has 
in  the  hands  of  Spain,  and  that  it  had  when  France 
possessed  it,  and  such  as  it  should  be  according  to  the 
treaties  subsequently  entered  into  between  Spain  and 
other  States."  When  France  possessed  Louisiana  it 
included  Ohio  and  West  Florida:  no  one  could  deny 
that  West  Florida  was  in  the  hands  of  Spain ;  there 
fore  Bonaparte,  in  the  absence  of  negative  proof, 
might  have  claimed  West  Florida,  if  he  had  been 
acute  enough  to  know  his  own  rights,  or  willing  to 
offend  Spain,  —  and  as  all  Bonaparte's  rights  were 
vested  in  the  United  States,  President  Jefferson  was 
at  liberty  to  avail  himself  of  them. 

The  ingenuity  of  Livingston's  idea  was  not  to  be 
disputed  ;  and  as  a  ground  for  a  war  of  conquest  it 
was  as  good  as  some  of  the  claims  which  Bonaparte 
made  the  world  respect.  As  a  diplomatic  weapon, 
backed  as  Napoleon  would  have  backed  it  by  a  hun 
dred  thousand  soldiers,  it  was  as  effective  an  instru 
ment  as  though  it  had  every  attribute  of  morality 
and  good  faith ;  and  all  it  wanted,  as  against  Spain, 
was  the  approval  of  Bonaparte.  Livingston  hoped 
that  after  the  proof  of  friendship  which  Bonaparte 
had  already  given  in  selling  Louisiana  to  the  United 
States,  he  might  without  insuperable  difficulty  be 
induced  to  grant  this  favor.  Both  Marbois  and  Tal 
leyrand,  under  the  First  Consul's  express  orders,  led 
him  on.  Marbois  did  not  deny  that  Mobile  might  lie 
in  Louisiana,  and  Talleyrand  positively  denied  knowl 
edge  that  Laussat's  instructions  contained  a  definition 


72          HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.        CH.  3. 

of  boundaries.  Bonaparte  stood  behind  both  these 
agents,  telling  them  that  if  an  obscurity  did  not  exist 
about  the  boundary  they  should  make  one.  Talley 
rand  went  so  far  as  to  encourage  the  pretensions 
which  Livingston  hinted :  "  You  have  made  a  noble 
bargain  for  yourselves,"  said  he,  "  and  I  suppose  you 
will  make  the  most  of  it."  This  was  said  at  the  time 
when  Bonaparte  was  still  intent  on  punishing  Spain. 

Livingston  found  no  difficulty  in  convincing  Monroe 
that  they  had  bought  Florida  as  well  as  Louisiana.1 

"  We  consider  ourselves  so  strongly  founded  in  this 
conclusion,  that  we  are  of  opinion  the  United  States 
should  act  on  it  in  all  the  measures  relative  to  Louisiana 
in  the  same  manner  as  if  West  Florida  was  comprised 
within  the  Island  of  New  Orleans,  or  lay  to  the  west  of 
the  River  Iberville." 

Livingston  expected  that  "  a  little  force," 2  as  he 
expressed  himself,  might  be  necessary. 

"  After  the  explanations  that  have  been  given  here, 
you  need  apprehend  nothing  from  a  decisive  measure ; 
your  minister  here  and  at  Madrid  can  support  your  claim, 
and  the  time  is  peculiarly  favorable  to  enable  you  to  do  it 
without  the  smallest  risk  at  home.  .  .  .  The  moment  is 
so  favorable  for  taking  possession  of  that  country  that  I 
hope  it  has  not  been  neglected,  even  though  a  little  force 
should  be  necessary  to  effect  it.  Your  minister  must 
find  the  means  to  justify  it." 

1  Livingston  and  Monroe  to  Madison,  June  7,  1803;  State 
Papers,  ii.  563-565. 

8  Livingston  to  Madison,  May  20,  1803;  Nov.  15,  1803;  State 
Papers,  ii.  561,  573. 


1803.  CLAIM  TO  WEST  FLORIDA.  73 

A  little  violence  added  to  a  little  diplomacy  would 
answer  the  purpose.  To  use  the  words  which  "  Aris- 
tides "  Van  Ness  was  soon  to  utter  with  striking 
effect,  the  United  States  ministers  to  France  "  prac 
tised  with  unlimited  success  upon  the  Livingston 
maxim,  — 

'  Hem  facias,  rem 
Si  possis  recte;  si  non,  quocunque  modo,  REM.'" 


CHAPTER  IV. 

IN  the  excitement  of  this  rapid  and  half-understood 
foreign  drama,  domestic  affairs  seemed  tame  to  the 
American  people,  who  were  busied  only  with  the 
routine  of  daily  life.  They  had  set  their  democratic 
house  in  order.  So  short  and  easy  was  the  task, 
that  the  work  of  a  single  year  finished  it.  When  the 
President  was  about  to  meet  Congress  for  the  second 
time,  he  had  no  new  measures  to  offer.1  "  The  path 
we  have  to  pursue  is  so  quiet  that  we  have  nothing 
scarcely  to  propose  to  our  legislature."  The  session 
was  too  short  for  severe  labor.  A  quorum  was  not 
made  until  the  middle  of  December,  1802 ;  the  Seventh 
Congress  expired  March  4,  1803.  Of  these  ten  weeks, 
a  large  part  was  consumed  in  discussions  of  Morales's 
proclamation  and  Bonaparte's  scheme  of  colonizing 
Louisiana. 

On  one  plea  the  ruling  party  relied  as  an  excuse 
for  inactivity  and  as  a  defence  against  attack.  Their 
enemies  had  said  and  believed  that  the  democrats 
possessed  neither  virtue  nor  ability  enough  to  carry  on 
the  government ;  but  after  eighteen  months  of  trial, 
as  the  year  1803  began,  the  most  severe  Federalist 

1  Jefferson  to  Thomas  Cooper,  Nov.  29, 1802 ;  Works,  iv.  452. 


1803.  CONSTITUTIONAL   DIFFICULTIES.  75 

could  not  with  truth  assert  that  the  country  had  yet 
suffered  in  material  welfare  from  the  change.  Al 
though  the  peace  in  Europe,  after  October,  1801, 
checked  the  shipping  interests  of  America,  and  al 
though  France  and  Spain,  returning  to  the  strictness 
of  their  colonial  system,  drove  the  American  flag  from 
their  harbors  in  the  Antilles,  yet  Gallatin  at  the  close 
of  the  first  year  of  peace  was  able  to  tell  Congress 1 
that  the  customs  revenue,  which  he  had  estimated 
twelve  months  before  at  89,500,000,  had  brought  into, 
the  Treasury  $12,280,000,  or  much  more  than  had 
ever  before  been  realized  in  a  single  year  from  all 
sources  of  revenue  united.  That  the  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury  should  miscalculate  by  one  third  the  pro 
duct  of  his  own  taxes  was  strange  ;  but  Gallatin  liked 
to  measure  the  future,  not  by  a  probable  mean,  but 
by  its  lowest  possible  extreme,  and  his  chief  aim 
was  to  check  extravagance  in  appropriations  for  ob 
jects  which  he  thought  bad.  His  caution  increased 
the  popular  effect  of  his  success.  Opposition  became 
ridiculous  when  it  persisted  in  grumbling  at  a  system 
which,  beginning  with  a  hazardous  reduction  of  taxes, 
brought  in  a  single  year  an  immense  increase  in 
revenue.  The  details  of  Gallatin's  finance  fretted  the 
Federalists  without  helping  them. 

The  Federalists  were  equally  unlucky  in  finding 
other  domestic  grievances.  The  removals  from  office 
did  not  shock  the  majority.  The  Judiciary  was  not 

1  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  Dec.  16,  1802. 
Aunali  of  Congress,  1802-1803,  1276, 


76  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  4. 

again  molested.  The  overwhelming  superiority  of  the 
democrats  was  increased  by  the  admission  of  Ohio, 
Nov.  29,  1802.  No  man  of  sense  could  deny  that 
the  people  were  better  satisfied  with  their  new  Ad 
ministration  than  they  ever  had  been  with  the  old. 
Loudly  as  New  England  grumbled,  the  Federalists 
even  there  steadily  declined  in  relative  strength ; 
while  elsewhere  an  organized  body  of  opposition  to 
the  national  government  hardly  existed.  From  New 
York  to  Savannah,  no  one  complained  of  being  forced 
to  work  for  national  objects  ;  South  Carolina  as  well 
as  Virginia  was  pleased  with  the  power  she  helped 
to  sway. 

Here  and  there  might  be  found  districts  in  which 
Federalism  tried  to  hold  its  own  ;  but  the  Federalism 
of  Delaware  and  Maryland  was  not  dangerous,  and 
even  in  Delaware  the  Federalist  champion  Bayard 
was  beaten  by  Caesar  A.  Rodney  in  his  contest  for  the 
House,  and  was  driven  to  take  refuge  in  the  Senate. 
Pennsylvania,  New  York,  Virginia,  and  North  Caro 
lina  were  nearly  unanimous  ;  and  beyond  the  moun 
tains  democracy  had  its  own  way  without  the  trouble 
of  a  discussion.  Federalism  was  already  an  old-fash 
ioned  thing ;  a  subject  of  ridicule  to  people  who  had 
no  faith  in  forms ;  a  half-way  house  between  the 
European  past  and  the  American  future.  The  mass 
of  Americans  had  become  democratic  in  thought  as 
well  as  act ;  not  even  another  political  revolution 
could  undo  what  had  been  done.  As  a  democrat, 
Jefferson's  social  success  was  sweeping  and  final ; 


1803.  CONSTITUTIONAL   DIFFICULTIES.  77 

but  he  was  more  than  a  democrat,  —  and  in  his  other 
character,  as  a  Virginia  republican  of  the  States-rights 
school,  he  was  not  equally  successful. 

In  the  short  session  of  1802-1803  many  signs 
proved  that  the  revolution  of  1800  had  spent  its 
force,  and  that  a  reaction  was  at  hand.  Congress 
showed  no  eagerness  to  adopt  the  President's  new 
economies,  and  dismissed,  with  silence  almost  con 
temptuous,  his  scheme  for  building  at  Washington  a 
large  dry-dock  in  which  the  navy  should  be  stored  for 
safety  and  saving.  The  mint  was  continued  by  law 
for  another  five  years,  and  twenty  thousand  dollars 
were  quietly  appropriated  for  its  support.  Instead  of 
reducing  the  navy,  Congress  decided  to  build  four 
sixteen-gun  brigs  and  fifteen  gunboats,  and  appropri 
ated  ninety-six  thousand  dollars  for  the  brigs  alone. 
The  appropriation  of  two  millions  as  a  first  instal 
ment  toward  paying  for  New  Orleans  and  Florida  was 
another  and  a  longer  stride  in  the  old  Federalist  path 
of  confidence  in  the  Executive  and  liberality  for  na 
tional  objects.  The  expenditure  for  1802,  excluding 
interest  on  debt,  was  $3,737,000.  Never  afterward 
in  United  States  history  did  the  annual  expenditure 
fall  below  four  millions.  The  navy,  in  1802,  cost 
$915,000  ;  never  afterward  did  it  cost  less  than  a 
million. 

The  reaction  toward  Federalist  practices  was  more 
marked  in  the  attitude  of  the  Executive  than  in  that 
of  Congress.  If  Jefferson's  favorite  phrase  was  true, 
—  that  the  Federalist  differed  from  the  Republican 


78          HISTORY  OF  THE   UNITED  STATES.        CH.  4. 

only  in  the  shade  more  or  less  of  power  to  be  given 
the  Executive, — it  was  hard  to  see  how  any  President 
could  be  more  Federalist  than  Jefferson  himself.  A 
resolution  to  commit  the  nation  without  its  knowledge 
to  an  indissoluble  British  alliance,  was  more  than 
Washington  would  have  dared  take ;  yet  this  step  was 
taken  by  the  President,  and  was  sustained  by  Madison, 
Gallatin,  and  Robert  Smith  as  fairly  within  the  limits 
of  the  Constitution.  In  regard  to  another  stretch  of 
the  treaty-making  power,  they  felt  with  reason  the. 
gravest  doubts.  When  the  President  and  Cabinet 
decided  early  in  January,  1803,  to  send  Monroe  with 
two  million  dollars  to  buy  New  Orleans  and  Florida, 
a  question  was  instantly  raised  as  to  the  form  in 
which  such  a  purchase  could  be  constitutionally  made. 
Attorney-General  Lincoln  wished  to  frame  the  treaty 
or  convention  in  such  language  as  to  make  France 
appear  not  as  adding  new  territory  to  the  United 
States,  but  as  extending  already  existing  territory 
by  an  alteration  of  its  boundary.  He  urged  this 
idea  upon  the  President  in  a  letter  written  the  day 
of  Monroe's  nomination  to  the  Senate.1 

"  If  the  opinion  is  correct,"  said  he,  "  that  the  general 
government  when  formed  was  predicated  on  the  then  ex 
isting  United  States,  and  such  as  could  grow  out  of  them, 
and  out  of  them  only  ;  and  that  its  authority  is  constitu 
tionally  limited  to  the  people  composing  the  several  politi 
cal  State  societies  in  that  Union,  and  such  as  might  be 
formed  out  of  them,  —  would  not  a  direct  independent 

1  Lincoln  to  Jefferson,  Jan.  10,  1803;  Jefferson  MSS. 


1803.  CONSTITUTIONAL   DIFFICULTIES.  79 

purchase  be  extending  the  executive  power  farther,  and 
be  more  alarming,  and  improvable  by  the  opposition  and 
the  Eastern  States,  than  the  proposed  indirect  mode?" 

Jefferson  sent  this  letter  to  Gallatin,  who  treated  it 
without  favor.1 

"  If  the  acquisition  of  territory  is  not  warranted  by  the 
Constitution,"  said  he,  "  it  is  not  more  legal  to  acquire 
for  one  State  than  for  the  United  States.  .  .  .  What 
could,  on  his  construction,  prevent  the  President  and 
Senate,  by  treaty,  annexing  Cuba  to  Massachusetts,  or 
Bengal  to  Rhode  Island,  if  ever  the  acquirement  of  colo 
nies  should  become  a  favorite  object  with  governments, 
and  colonies  should  be  acquired?  But  does  any  consti 
tutional  objection  really  exist?  .  .  .  To  me  it  would  ap 
pear,  (1)  that  the  United  States,  as  a  nation,  have  an 
inherent  right  to  acquire  territory ;  (2)  that  whenever 
that  acquisition  is  by  treaty,  the  same  constituted  authori 
ties  in  whom  the  treaty-making  power  is  vested  have  a 
constitutional  right  to  sanction  the  acquisition." 

Gallatin  not  only  advanced  Federal  doctrine,  but 
used  also  what  the  Virginians  always  denounced  as 
Federalist  play  on  words.  "  The  United  States  as  a 
nation"  had  an  inherent  right  to  do  whatever  the 
States  in  union  cared  to  do ;  but  the  Republican 
party,  with  Jefferson,  Madison,  and  Gallatin  at  their 
head,  had  again  and  again  maintained  that  the  United 
States  government  had  the  inherent  right  to  do  no  act 
whatever,  but  was  the  creature  of  the  States  in  union  ; 
and  its  acts,  if  not  resulting  from  an  expressly  granted 

1  Gallatin  to  Jefferson,  Jan.  13,  1803;  Gallatin's  Works,  i.  112. 


80          HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.        CH.  4. 

power,  were  no  acts  at  all,  but  void,  and  not  to  be 
obeyed  or  regarded  by  the  States.  No  foreigner,  not 
even  Gallatin,  could  master  the  theory  of  Virginia 
and  New  England,  or  distinguish  between  the  nation 
of  States  in  union  which  granted  certain  powers,  and 
the  creature  at  Washington  to  which  these  powers 
were  granted,  and  which  might  be  strengthened,  weak 
ened,  or  abolished  without  necessarily  affecting  the 
nation.  Whether  the  inability  to  grasp  this  distinc 
tion  was  a  result  of  clearer  insight  or  of  coarser 
intelligence,  the  fact  was  the  same ;  and  on  this  point, 
in  spite  of  his  speech  on  the  Alien  and  Sedition 
Acts,  Gallatin  belonged  to  the  school  of  Hamilton, 
while  both  were  of  one  mind  with  Dallas.  The  chief 
avowed  object  of  Jefferson's  election  had  been  to 
overthrow  the  reign  of  this  school.  No  Virginian 
could  be  expected  within  two  short  years  to  adopt  the 
opinions  of  opponents  who  had  been  so  often  branded 
as  "  monocrats,"  because  of  acting  on  these  opinions. 
Although  the  Attorney-General's  advice  was  not  fol 
lowed,  the  negotiation  for  New  Orleans  was  begun  on 
the  understanding  that  the  purchase,  if  made,  would 
be  an  inchoate  act  which  would  need  express  sanction 
from  the  States  in  the  shape  of  an  amendment  to  the 
Constitution. 

There  the  matter  rested.  At  the  moment  of  Mon 
roe's  appointment,  the  President,  according  to  his 
letters,  had  little  hope  of  quick  success  in  the  pur 
chase  of  territory.  His  plan  was  to  "  palliate  and 
endure,"  unless  France  should  force  a  war  upon  him ; 


1803.  CONSTITUTIONAL  DIFFICULTIES.  81 

the  constitutional  question  could  wait,  and  it  was 
accordingly  laid  aside.  Yet  the  chief  ambition  of 
Southern  statesmen  in  foreign  affairs  was  to  obtain 
the  Floridas  and  New  Orleans  ;  and  in  effecting  this 
object  they  could  hardly  escape  establishing  a  serious 
precedent.  Already  Jefferson  had  ordered  his  minis 
ters  at  Paris  to  buy  this  territory,  although  he  thought 
the  Constitution  gave  him  no  power  to  do  so  ;  he  was 
willing  to  increase  the  national  debt  for  this  purpose, 
even  though  a  national  debt  Avas  a  "  mortal  canker ; " 
and  he  ordered  his  minister,  in  case  Bonaparte  should 
close  the  Mississippi,  to  make  a  permanent  alliance 
with  England,  or  in  his  own  words  to  "  marry  our 
selves  to  the  British  fleet  and  nation,"  as  the  price 
of  New  Orleans  and  Florida.  Jefferson  foresaw  and 
accepted  the  consequences  of  the  necessity  ;  he  re 
peatedly  referred  to  thenr  and  deprecated  them  in 
his  letters  ;  but  the  territory  was  a  vital  object,  and 
success  there  would,  as  he  pointed  out,  secure  forever 
the  triumph  of  his  party  even  in  New  England. 

"  I  believe  we  may  consider  the  mass  of  the  States 
south  and  west  of  Connecticut  and  Massachusetts 
as  now  a  consolidated  body  of  Republicanism,"  — 
he  wrote  to  Governor  McKean  in  the  midst  of  the 
Mississippi  excitement.1  "  In  Connecticut,  Massa 
chusetts,  and  New  Hampshire  there  is  still  a  Federal 
ascendency  ;  but  it  is  near  its  last.  If  we  can  settle 
happily  the  difficulties  of  the  Mississippi,  I  think  we 
may  promise  ourselves  smooth  seas  during  our  time." 

1  Jefferson  to  Governor  McKean,  Feb.  19, 1803;  Jefferson  MSS. 

VOL.  II.  —  6 


82  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  4. 

What  he  rightly  feared  more  than  any  other  political 
disaster  was  the  risk  of  falling  back  to  the  feelings 
of  1798  and  1799,  "when  a  final  dissolution  of  all 
bonds,  civil  and  social,  appeared  imminent."  l  With 
zeal  which  never  flagged,  Jefferson  kept  up  his  strug 
gle  with  the  New  England  oligarchy,  whose  last  move 
alarmed  him.  So  sensitive  was  the  President,  that 
he  joined  personally  in  the  fray  that  distracted  New 
England ;  and  while  waiting  for  news  from  Monroe, 
he  wrote  a  defence  of  his  own  use  of  patronage,  show 
ing,  under  the  assumed  character  of  a  Massachusetts 
man,  that  a  proportionate  division  of  offices  between 
the  two  parties  would,  since  the  Federalists  had  so 
much  declined  in  numbers,  leave  to  them  even  a 
smaller  share  of  Federal  offices  than  they  still  pos 
sessed.  This  paper  he  sent  to  Attorney-General  Lin 
coln,2  to  be  published 'in  the  Boston  "Chronicle;" 
and  there,  although  never  recognized,  it  appeared. 

Had  the  Federalists  suspected  the  authorship,  they 
would  have  fallen  without  mercy  upon  its  arguments 
and  its  inserted  compliment  to  "  the  tried  ability  and 
patriotism  of  the  present  Executive ; "  but  the  essay 
was  no  sooner  published  than  it  was  forgotten.  The 
"  Chronicle  "  of  June  27,  1803,  contained  Jefferson's 
argument  founded  on  the  rapid  disappearance  of  the 
Federalist  party ;  the  next  issue  of  the  "  Chronicle," 
June  30,  contained  a  single  headline,  which  sounded 
the  death-knell  of  Federalism  altogether:  "Louisiana 

1  Jefferson  to  Colonel  Hawkins,  Feb.  18, 1803  ;  Works,  iv.  565. 
3  Jefferson's  Writings  (Ford),  viii.  234. 


1803.  CONSTITUTIONAL  DIFFICULTIES.  83 

ceded  to  the  United  States ! "  The  great  news  had 
arrived ;  and  the  Federalist  orators  of  July  4,  1803, 
set  about  their  annual  task  of  foreboding  the  ruin  of 
society  amid  the  cheers  and  congratulations  of  the  hap 
piest  society  the  world  then  knew. 

The  President's  first  thought  was  of  the  Constitu 
tion.  Without  delay  he  drew  up  an  amendment, 
which  he  sent  at  once  to  his  Cabinet.1  "  The  prov 
ince  of  Louisiana  is  incorporated  with  the  United 
States  and  made  part  thereof,"  began  this  curious 
paper  ;  "  the  rights  of  occupancy  in  the  soil  and  of 
self-government  are  confirmed  to  the  Indian  inhabi 
tants  as  they  now  exist."  Then,  after  creating  a 
special  Constitution  for  the  territory  north  of  the 
32d  parallel,  reserving  it  for  the  Indians  until  a  new 
amendment  to  the  Constitution  should  give  authority 
for  white  ownership,  the  draft  provided  for  erecting 
the  portion  south  of  latitude  32°  into  a  territorial 
government,  and  vesting  the  inhabitants  with  the 
rights  of  other  territorial  citizens. 

Gallatin  took  no  notice  of  this  paper,  except  to 
acknowledge  receiving  it.2  Robert  Smith  wrote  at 
some  length,  July  9,  dissuading  Jefferson  from  graft 
ing  so  strange  a  shoot  upon  the  Constitution.3 

"  Your  great  object  is  to  prevent  emigrations,"  said 
he,  u  excepting  to  a  certain  portion  of  the  ceded  terri 
tory.  This  could  be  effectually  accomplished  by  a  con- 

1  Jefferson's  Writings  (Ford),  viii.  241. 

a  Gallatin  to  Jefferson,  July  9,  1803 ;  Works,  i.  127. 

*  Jefferson's  Writings  (Ford),  viii.  241. 


84  HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  4. 

stitutional  prohibition  that  Congress  should  not  erect  or 
establish  in  that  portion  of  the  ceded  territory  situated 
north  of  latitude  32°  any  new  state  or  territorial  gov 
ernment,  and  that  they  should  not  grant  to  any  people 
excepting  Indians  any  right  or  title  whatever  to  any  part 
of  the  said  portion  of  the  said  territory." 

Of  any  jealousy  between  North  and  South  which 
could  be  sharpened  by  such  a  restriction  of  north 
ern  and  extension  of  southern  territory,  Jefferson 
was  unaware.  He  proposed  his  amendment  in  good 
faith  as  a  means  of  holding  the  Union  together  by 
stopping  its  too  rapid  extension  into  the  wilderness. 

Coldly  as  his  ideas  were  received  in  the  Cabinet, 
Jefferson  did  not  abandon  them.  Another  month 
passed,  and  a  call  was  issued  for  a  special  meeting  of 
Congress  October  17  to  provide  the  necessary  legis 
lation  for  carrying  the  treaty  into  effect.  As  the 
summer  wore  away,  Jefferson  imparted  his  opinions 
to  persons  outside  the  Cabinet.  He  wrote,  August  12, 
to  Breckinridge  of  Kentucky  a  long  and  genial  letter. 
Congress,  he  supposed,1  after  ratifying  the  treaty  and 
paying  for  the  country,  "  must  then  appeal  to  the 
nation  for  an  additional  article  to  the  Constitution 
approving  and  confirming  an  act  which  the  nation  had 
not  previously  authorized.  The  Constitution  has  made 
no  provision  for  our  holding  foreign  territory,  still 
less  for  incorporating  foreign  nations  into  our  Union. 
The  Executive,  in  seizing  the  fugitive  occurrence 
which  so  much  advances  the  good  of  their  country, 

1  Jefferson  to  Breckinridge,  Aug.  12,  1803 ;  Works,  iv.  498. 


1803.  CONSTITUTIONAL  DIFFICULTIES.  85 

have  done  an  act  beyond  the  Constitution.  The 
Legislature,  in  casting  behind  them  metaphysical  sub 
tleties  and  risking  themselves  like  faithful  servants, 
must  ratify  and  pay  for  it,  and  throw  themselves  on 
their  country  for  doing  for  them  unauthorized  what 
we  know  they  Avould  have  done  for  themselves  had 
they  been  in  a  situation  to  do  it." 

Breckinridge — whose  Kentucky  Resolutions,  hardly 
five  years  before,  declared  that  unconstitutional  as 
sumptions  of  power  were  the  surrender  of  the  form  of 
government  the  people  had  chosen,  and  the  replacing 
it  by  a  government  which  derived  its  powers  from 
its  own  will  —  might  be  annoyed  at  finding  his  prin 
ciples  abandoned  by  the  man  who  had  led  him  to 
father  them ;  and  surely  no  leader  who  had  sent  to 
his  follower  in  one  year  the  draft  of  the  Kentucky 
Resolutions  could  have  expected  to  send  in  another 
the  draft  of  the  Louisiana  treaty.  "  I  suppose  they 
must  then  appeal  to  the  nation  "  were  the  President's 
words ;  and  he  underscored  this  ominous  phrase. 
"  We  shall  not  be  disavowed  by  the  nation,  and  their 
act  of  indemnity  will  confirm  and  not  weaken  the 
Constitution  by  more  strongly  marking  out  its  lines." 
The  Constitution,  in  dealing  with  the  matter  of  amend 
ments,  made  no  reference  to  the  nation ;  the  word 
itself  was  unknown  to  the  Constitution,  which  invari 
ably  spoke  of  the  Union  wherever  such  an  expression 
was  needed ;  and  on  the  Virginia  theory  Congress  had 
no  right  to  appeal  to  the  nation  at  all,  except  as  a 
nation  of  States,  for  an  amendment.  The  language 


86  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  4. 

used  by  Jefferson  was  the  language  of  centralization, 
and  would  have  been  rejected  by  him  and  his  party 
in  1798  or  in  1820. 

On  the  day  of  writing  to  Breckinridge  the  President 
wrote  in  a  like  sense  to  Paine  ;  but  in  the  course  of  a 
week  despatches  arriyed  from  Paris  which  alarmed 
him.  Livingston  had  reason  to  fear  a  sudden  change 
of  mind  in  the  First  Consul,  and  was  willing  to 
hasten  the  movements  of  President  and  Congress. 
Jefferson  took  the  alarm,  and  wrote  instantly  to  warn 
Breckinridge  and  Paine  that  no  whisper  of  constitu 
tional  difficulties  must  be  heard : 1  — 

"  I  wrote  you  on  the  12th  instant  on  the  subject  of 
Louisiana  and  the  constitutional  provision  which  might  be 
necessary  for  it.  A  letter  received  yesterday  shows  that 
nothing  must  be  said  on  that  subject  which  may  give  a 
pretext  for  retracting,  but  that  we  should  do  sub  silentio 
what  shall  be  found  necessary.  Be  so  good,  therefore,  as 
to  consider  that  part  of  my  letter  as  confidential." 

He  gave  the  same  warning  to  his  Cabinet : 2  "I 
infer  that  the  less  we  say  about  constitutional  diffi 
culties  the  better;  and  that  what  is  necessary  for 
surmounting  them  must  be  done  sub  silentio" 

He  then  drew  up  a  new  amendment,  which  he  sent 
to  the  members  of  his  Cabinet.3  The  July  draft  was 

1  Jefferson's  Writings  (Ford),  viii.  245. 

2  Jefferson  to  Madison,  Aug.   18,   1803 ;    to  R.   Smith,  Aug. 
23  ;  Jefferson  MSS. 

8  Jefferson  to  Madison,  Aug.  25;  to  Lincoln,  Aug.  30,  1803; 
Works,  iv.  501-505  ;  to  Gallatin,  Aug.  23,  1803 ;  Gallatin's 
Works,  i.  144. 


1803.  CONSTITUTIONAL  DIFFICULTIES.  87 

long,  elaborate,  and  almost  a  new  Constitution  in 
itself ;  the  August  draft  was  comparatively  brief. 
"  Louisiana  as  ceded  by  France  to  the  United  States 
is  made  a  part  of  the  United  States.  Its  white 
inhabitants  shall  be  citizens,  and  stand,  as  to  their 
rights  and  obligations,  on  the  same  footing  with  other 
citizens  of  the  United  States  in  analogous  situations." 
The  whole  country  north  of  the  Arkansas  River  was 
reserved  for  Indians  until  another  amendment  should 
be  made ;  and  as  an  afterthought  Florida  was  to  be 
admitted  as  a  part  of  the  United  States  "  whenever  it 
may  be  rightfully  obtained." 

These  persistent  attempts  to  preserve  his  own  con 
sistency  and  that  of  his  party  were  coldly  received. 
Jefferson  found  himself  alone.  Wilson  Gary  Nicholas, 
a  prominent  supporter  of  the  Virginia  Resolutions  in 
1798  and  a  senator  of  the  United  States  in  1803,  had 
a  long  conversation  with  the  President,  and  in  the 
early  days  of  September  wrote  him  a  letter  which 
might  have  come  from  Theodore  Sedgwick  or  Roger 
Griswold  in  the  days  of  Jay's  treaty,  when  Federalist 
notions  of  prerogative  ran  highest. 

"  Upon  an  examination  of  the  Constitution,"  wrote 
Nicholas,1  "  I  find  the  power  as  broad  as  it  could  well  be 
made  (Sect.  3,  Art.  IV.),  except  that  uew  States  cannot 
be  formed  out  of  the  old  ones  without  the  consent  of  the 
State  to  be  dismembered  ;  and  the  exception  is  a  proof  to 
my  mind  that  it  was  not  intended  to  confine  the  Congress 
in  the  admission  of  new  States  to  what  was  then  the  ter- 

1  W.  C.  Nicholas  to  Jefferson,  Sept.  3,  1803 ;  Jefferson  MSS. 


88  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  4. 

ritory  of  the  United  States.  Nor  do  I  see  anything  in 
the  Constitution  that  limits  the  treaty-making  power, 
except  the  general  limitations  of  the  other  powers  given 
to  the  government,  and  the  evident  objects  for  which  the 
government  was  instituted." 

Had  Nicholas  reasoned  thus  in  1798  he  would  have 
been  a  Federalist,  as  he  seemed  conscious,  for  he 
went  on  to  say :  "  I  am  aware  that  this  is  to  us  deli 
cate  ground,  and  perhaps  my  opinions  may  clash  with 
the  opinions  given  by  our  friends  during  the  discus 
sion  of  the  British  treaty."  Nevertheless  he  argued 
that  if  this  treaty  was  unconstitutional,  all  other 
treaties  were  open  to  the  same  objection,  and  the 
United  States  government  in  such  a  case  could  make 
no  treaty  at  all.  Finally,  he  begged  the  President  to 
avoid  giving  an  opinion  on  the  subject :  "  I  should 
think  it  very  probable  if  the  treaty  should  be  de 
clared  by  you  to  exceed  the  constitutional  authority 
of  the  treaty-making  power,  it  would  be  rejected  by 
the  Senate,  and  if  that  should  not  happen,  that  great 
use  would  be  made  with  the  people  of  a  wilful  breach 
of  the  Constitution." 

Such  reasoning  in  the  mouths  of  Virginia  Repub 
licans,  who  had  asked  and  gained  office  by  pledging 
themselves  to  their  people  against  the  use  of  implied 
powers,  marked  a  new  epoch.  From  them  the  most 
dangerous  of  all  arguments,  the  reductio  ad  absur- 
dum,  was  ominous.  What  right  had  they  to  ask 
whether  any  constitutional  grant  was  less  complete 
than  the  people  might  have  wished  or  intended  ?  If 


1803.  CONSTITUTIONAL  DIFFICULTIES.  89 

the  Constitution  were  incomplete  or  absurd,  not  the 
government,  but  the  people  of  the  States  who  had 
made  it  were  the  only  proper  authority  to  correct  it. 
Otherwise,  as  Nicholas  had  so  often  pointed  out,  their 
creature  would  become  their  tyrant,  as  had  been  the 
law  of  politics  from  the  beginning. 

Jefferson  was  distressed  to  find  himself  thus  de 
serted  by  his  closest  friends  on  an  issue  which  he 
felt  to  be  vital.  The  principle  of  strict  construction 
was  the  breath  of  his  political  life.  The  Pope  could 
as  safely  trifle  with  the  doctrine  of  apostolic  succes 
sion  as  Jefferson  with  the  limits  of  Executive  power. 
If  he  and  his  friends  were  to  interpret  the  treaty- 
making  power  as  they  liked,  the  time  was  sure  to 
come  when  their  successors  would  put  so  broad  an 
interpretation  on  other  powers  of  the  government  as 
to  lead  from  step  to  step,  until  at  last  Virginia  might 
cower  in  blood  and  flames  before  the  shadowy  terror 
called  the  war-power.  With  what  face  could  Jeffer 
son  then  appear  before  the  tribunal  of  history,  and 
what  position  could  he  expect  to  receive  ? 

All  this  he  felt  in  his  kindly  way ;  and  with  this 
weight  on  his  mind  he  wrote  his  reply  to  Nicholas.1 
Beginning  with  the  warning  that  Bonaparte  could 
not  be  trusted,  and  that  Congress  must  act  with  as 
little  debate  as  possible,  particularly  as  respected  the 
constitutional  difficulty,  he  went  on  :  — 

"  I  am  aware  of  the  force  of  the  observations  you 
make  on  the  power  given  by  the  Constitution  to  Congress 

1  Jefferson  to  W.  C.  Nicholas,  Sept.  7,  1803 ;  Works,  iv.  505. 


90          HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.        CH.  4. 

to  admit  new  States  into  the  Union  without  restraining 
the  subject  to  the  territory  then  constituting  the  United 
States.  But  when  I  consider  that  the  limits  of  the 
United  States  are  precisely  fixed  by  the  treaty  of  1783, 
that  the  Constitution  expressly  declares  itself  to  be  made 
for  the  United  States,  .  .  . ,  I  do  not  believe  it  was 
meant  that  [Congress]  might  receive  England,  Ireland, 
Holland,  etc.,  into  it,  —  which  would  be  the  case  on  your 
construction.  ...  I  had  rather  ask  an  enlargement  of 
power  from  the  nation,  where  it  is  found  necessary,  than 
to  assume  it  by  a  construction  which  would  make  our 
powers  boundless.  Our  peculiar  security  is  in  the  pos 
session  of  a  written  Constitution.  Let  us  not  make  it  a 
blank  paper  by  construction.  I  say  the  same  as  to  the 
opinion  of  those  who  consider  the  grant  of  the  treaty- 
making  power  as  boundless.  If  it  is,  then  we  have  no 
Constitution." 

From  the  Virginia  standpoint  nothing  could  be  bet 
ter  said.  Jefferson  in  this  letter  made  two  points 
clear :  the  first  was  that  the  admission  of  Louisiana 
into  the  Union  without  express  authority  from  the 
States  made  blank  paper  of  the  Constitution ;  the 
second  was  that  if  the  treaty-making  power  was  equal 
to  this  act,  it  superseded  the  Constitution.  He  enter 
tained  no  doubts  on  either  point,  and  time  sustained 
his  view ;  for  whether  he  was  right  or  wrong  in  law, 
the  Louisiana  treaty  gave  a  fatal  "wound  to  "  strict 
construction,"  and  the  Jeffersonian  theories  never 
again  received  general  support.  In  thus  giving  them 
up,  Jefferson  did  not  lead  the  way,  but  he  allowed 
his  friends  to  drag  him  in  the  path  they  chose.  The 


1803.  CONSTITUTIONAL  DIFFICULTIES.  91 

leadership  he  sought  was  one  of  sympathy  and  love, 
not  of  command ;  and  there  was  never  a  time  when 
he  thought  that  resistance  to  the  will  of  his  party 
would  serve  the  great  ends  he  had  in  view.  The 
evils  which  he  foresaw  were  remote  :  in  the  hands  of 
true  Republicans  the  Constitution,  even  though  vio 
lated,  was  on  the  whole  safe ;  the  precedent,  though 
alarming,  was  exceptional.  So  it  happened  that  after 
declaring  in  one  sentence  the  Constitution  at  an  end 
if  Nicholas  had  his  way,  Jefferson  in  the  next  breath 
offered  his  acquiescence  in  advance  :  — 

"  I  confess  I  think  it  important  in  the  present  case  to 
set  an  example  against  broad  construction  by  appealing 
for  new  power  to  the  people.  If,  however,  our  friends 
shall  think  differently,  certainly  I  shall  acquiesce  with 
satisfaction,  confiding  that  the  good  sense  of  our  country 
will  correct  the  evil  of  construction  when  it  shall  produce 
ill  effects." 

With  these  words  Jefferson  closed  his  mouth  on 
this  subject  forever.  Although  his  future  silence  led 
many  of  his  friends  to  think  that  he  ended  by  alter-, 
ing  his  opinion,  and  by  admitting  that  his  purchase  of 
Louisiana  was  constitutional,  no  evidence  showed  the 
change ;  but  rather  one  is  led  to  believe  that  when  in 
later  life  he  saw  what  he  called  the  evils  of  construc 
tion  grow  until  he  cried  against  them  with  violence 
almost  as  shrill  as  in  1798,  he  felt  most  strongly 
the  fatal  error  which  his  friends  had  forced  him 
to  commit,  and  which  he  could  neither  repudiate 
nor  defend.  He  had  declared  that  he  would  acqui- 


92          HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.        CH.  4. 

esce  with  satisfaction  in  making  blank  paper  of  the 
Constitution. 

A  few  weeks  later,  Oct.  17,  1803,  Congress  met. 
The  President's  Message  had  little  to  say  of  domestic 
affairs.  The  Kaskaskia  Indians  had  sold  their  terri 
tory  to  the  United  States,  the  revenue  had  again  ex 
ceeded  the  estimate,  more  than  three  millions  of  debt 
had  been  paid  within  the  year.  Much  was  said  about 
war  in  Europe  and  the  rights  and  duties  of  neutrals, 
about  gunboats  which  were  no  longer  needed,  and 
about  the  unsettled  boundary  in  Maine  and  at  the 
Lake  of  the  Woods,  but  not  a  word  about  the  con 
stitutional  difficulties  raised  by  the  Louisiana  treaty. 
"  With  the  wisdom  of  Congress  it  will  rest,"  said 
Jefferson,  "  to  take  those  ulterior  measures  which 
may  be  necessary  for  the  immediate  occupation  and 
temporary  government  of  the  country,  for  its  incor 
poration  into  our  Union,  for  rendering  the  change  of 
government  a  blessing  to  our  newly  adopted  brethren, 
for  securing  to  them  the  rights  of  conscience  and  of 
property,  for  confirming  to  the  Indian  inhabitants 
their  occupancy  and  self-government."  These  were 
the  points  of  his  proposed  amendment ;  but  he  gave 
no  sign  of  his  opinion  that  Congress  was  incompetent 
to  deal  with  them,  and  that  the  Senate  was  equally 
incompetent  to  make  the  treaty  valid. 

There  were  good  reasons  for  silence.  Not  only 
were  Livingston's  letters  alarming,  but  the  Marquis 
of-  Casa  Yrujo,  the  friend  and  benefactor  of  the 
Administration,  sent  to  Madison  one  protest  after 


1803.  CONSTITUTIONAL  DIFFICULTIES.  93 

another  against  the  sale  of  Louisiana.1  He  quoted 
St.-Cyr's  letter  of  July,  1802,  which  bound  France 
not  to  alienate  the  province,  and  he  declared  that 
France  had  never  carried  out  the  conditions  of  con 
tract  in  regard  to  Tuscany,  and  therefore  could  not 
rightfully  treat  Louisiana  as  her  own.  A  probable 
war  with  Spain  stared  Jefferson  in  the  face,  even  if 
Bonaparte  should  raise  no  new  difficulties.  The  re 
sponsibility  for  a  mistake  was  great,  and  no  one  could 
blame  Jefferson  if  he  threw  his  burden  on  Congress. 

1  Yrujo  to  Madison,  Sept.  4,  Sept.  27,  Oct.  12,  1803 ;  State 
Papers,  ii.  569,  570. 


CHAPTER  V. 

IF  President  Jefferson  and  Secretary  Madison,  who 
wrote  the  Resolutions  of  1798,  acquiesced,  in  1803,  in 
a  course  of  conduct  which  as  Jefferson  believed 
made  blank  paper  of  the  Constitution,  and  wnich, 
whether  it  did  so  or  not,  certainly  made  waste  paper 
of  the  Virginia  and  Kentucky  Resolutions,  no  one 
could  expect  that  their  followers  would  be  more  con 
sistent  or  more  rigid  than  themselves.  Fortunately, 
all  the  more  prominent  Republicans  of  1798  had  been 
placed  in  office  by  the  people  as  a  result  of  popular 
approval,  and  were  ready  to  explain  their  own  views. 
In  the  Senate  sat  John  Breckinridge  of  Kentucky, 
supposed  to  be  the  author  of  the  Kentucky  Resolu 
tions,  and  known  as  their  champion  in  the  Kentucky 
legislature.  From  Virginia  came  John  Taylor  of 
Caroline,  the  reputed  father  of  the  Virginia  Resolu 
tions,  and  the  soundest  of  strict  constructionists. 
Twenty  years  later,  his  "  Construction  Construed " 
and  "  New  Views  of  the  Constitution  "  became  the 
text-books  of  the  States-rights  school.  His  colleague 
was  Wilson  Gary  Nicholas,  who  had  also  taken  a  prom 
inent  part  in  supporting  the  Virginia  Resolutions, 


1803.  THE  LOUISIANA  DEBATE.  95 

and  whose  devotion  to  the  principles  of  strict  con 
struction  was  beyond  doubt.  One  of  the  South  Caro 
lina  senators  was  Pierce  Butler ;  one  of  those  from 
North  Carolina  was  David  Stone  ;  Georgia  was  repre 
sented  by  Abraham  Baldwin  and  James  Jackson, — 
stanch  States-rights  Republicans  all.  In  the  House  a 
small  coterie  of  States-rights  Republicans  controlled 
legislation.  Speaker  Macon  was  at  their  head  ;  John 
Randolph,  chairman  of  the  Ways  and  Means  Com 
mittee,  was  their  mouthpiece.  Joseph  H.  Nicholson 
of  Maryland,  and  Caesar  A.  Rodney  of  Delaware, 
supported  Randolph  on  the  committee ;  while  two 
of  President  Jefferson's  sons-in-law,  Thomas  Mann 
Randolph  and  John  W.  Eppes,  sat  in  the  Virginia 
delegation.  Both  in  Senate  and  House  the  Southern 
Republicans  of  the  Virginia  school  held  supremacy  ; 
their  power  was  so  absolute  as  to  admit  no  contest ; 
they  were  at  the  flood  of  that  tide  which  had  set  in 
three  years  before.  In  the  Senate  they  controlled 
twenty -five  votes  against  nine;  in  the  House,  one 
hundred  and  two  against  thirty-nine.  Virginia  ruled 
the  United  States,  and  the  Republicans  of  1798 
ruled  Virginia.  The  ideal  moment  of  Republican 
principles  had  arrived. 

This  moment  was  big  with  the  fate  of  theories. 
Other  debates  of  more  practical  importance  may 
have  frequently  occurred, — for  in  truth  whatever  the 
decision  of  Congress  might  have  been,  it  would  in 
no  case  have  affected  the  result  that  Louisiana  was 
to  enter  the  Union ;  and  this  inevitable  result  over- 


96  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  5. 

shadowed  all  theory,  —  but  no  debate  ever  took  place 
in  the  Capitol  which  better  deserved  recollection. 

Of  extraordinary  ability  Congress  contained  but 
little,  and  owing  to  the  meagre  character  of  the  re 
ports,  appeared  to  contain  even  less  than  it  actually 
possessed  ;  but  if  no  one  rose  to  excellence  either 
of  logic  or  rhetoric,  the  speakers  still  dealt  with  the 
whole  subject,  and  rounded  the  precedent  with  all 
the  argument  and  illustration  that  a  future  nation 
could  need.  Both  actions  and  words  spoke  with 
decision  and  distinctness  till  that  time  unknown  in 
American  politics. 

The  debate  began  first  in  the  House,  where  Gaylord 
Griswold  of  New  York,  Oct.  24,  1803,  moved  for  such 
papers  as  the  Government  might  possess  tending  to 
show  the  value  of  the  title  to  Louisiana  as  against 
Spain.  Under  the  lead  of  John  Randolph  the  House 
refused  the  call.  That  this  decision  clashed  with  the 
traditions  of  the  Republican  party  was  proved  by  the 
vote.  With  a  majority  of  three  to  one,  Randolph 
succeeded  in  defeating  Griswold  only  by  fifty-nine  to 
fifty-seven ;  while  Nicholson,  Rodney,  Varnum  of 
Massachusetts,  and  many  other  stanch  Republicans 
voted  with  the  Federalists. 

The  next  day  the  House  took  up  the  motion  for 
carrying  the  treaty  into  effect.  Griswold  began 
again,  and  without  knowing  it  repeated  Jefferson's 
reasoning.  The  framers  of  the  Constitution,  he  said, 
"  carried  their  ideas  to  the  time  when  there  might  be 
an  extended  population  ;  but  they  did  not  carry  them 


1803.  THE  LOUISIANA  DEBATE.  97 

forward  to  the  time  when  an  addition  might  be  made 
to  the  Union  of  a  territory  equal  to  the  whole  United 
States,  which  additional  territory  might  overbalance 
the  existing  territory,  and  thereby  the  rights  of  the 
present  citizens  of  the  United  States  be  swallowed  up 
and  lost."  The  power  to  admit  new  States  referred 
only  to  the  territory  existing  when  the  Constitution 
was  framed  ;  but  this  right,  whatever  it  might  be, 
was  vested  in  Congress,  not  in  the  Executive.  In 
promising  to  admit  Louisiana  as  a  State  into  the 
Union,  the  treaty  assumed  for  the  President  power 
which  in  any  case  could  not  have  been  his.  Finally, 
the  treaty  gave  to  French  and  Spanish  ships  special 
privileges  for  twelve  years  in  the  port  of  New  Orleans  ; 
while  the  Constitution  forbade  any  preference  to  be 
given,  by  any  regulation  of  commerce  or  revenue,  to 
the  ports  of  one  State  over  those  of  another. 

John  Randolph  next  rose.  Just  thirty  years  old, 
with  a  sarcasm  of  tone  and  manner  that  overbore  re 
monstrance,  and  with  an  authority  in  the  House  that 
no  one  contested,  Randolph  spoke  the  voice  of  Vir 
ginia  with  autocratic  distinctness.  His  past  history 
was  chiefly  marked  by  the  ardor  with  which,  from 
1798  to  1800,  he  had  supported  the  principles  of  his 
party  and  encouraged  resistance  to  the  national 
government.  He  had  gone  beyond  Jefferson  and 
Madison  in  willingness  to  back  their  theories  by 
force,  and  to  fix  by  a  display  of  Virginia  power  the 
limit  beyond  which  neither  Executive,  Congress,  nor 
Judiciary  should  pass.  Even  then  he  probably  cared 

VOL.  II.  —  7 


98  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  5. 

little  for  what  he  called  the  "  parchment  barriers " 
of  the  Constitution :  in  his  mind  force  was  the  real 
balance,  —  force  of  State  against  force  of  Union  ;  and 
any  measure  which  threatened  to  increase  the  power 
of  the  national  government  beyond  that  of  the  State, 
was  sure  of  his  enmity.  A  feather  might  turn  the 
balance,  so  nice  was  the  adjustment ;  and  Randolph 
again  and  again  cried  with  violence  against  feathers. 

In  the  Louisiana  debate,  Randolph  spoke  in  a  dif 
ferent  tone.  The  Constitution,  he  said,  could  not 
restrict  the  country  to  particular  limits,  because  at 
the  time  of  its  adoption  the  boundary  was  unset 
tled  on  the  northeastern,  northwestern,  and  southern 
frontiers.  The  power  to  settle  disputes  as  to  limits 
was  indispensable ;  it  existed  in  the  Constitution,  had 
been  repeatedly  exercised,  and  involved  the  power  of 
extending  boundaries. 

This  argument  was  startling  in  the  mouth  of  one 
who  had  helped  to  arm  the  State  of  Virginia  against 
a  moderate  exercise  of  implied  powers.  Randolph 
asserted  that  the  right  to  annex  Louisiana,  Texas, 
Mexico,  South  America,  if  need  be,  was  involved  in 
the  right  to  run  a  doubtful  boundary  line  between 
the  Georgia  territory  and  Florida.  If  this  power 
existed  in  the  government,  it  necessarily  devolved 
on  the  Executive  as  the  organ  for  dealing  with  for 
eign  States.  Thus  Griswold's  first  objection  was 
answered. 

Griswold  objected  in  the  second  place  that  the 
treaty  made  New  Orleans  a  favored  port.  "  I  regard 


1803.  THE  LOUISIANA  DEBATE.  99 

this  stipulation,"  replied  Randolph,  "  as  a  part  of  the 
price  of  the  territory.  It  was  a  condition  which  the 
party  ceding  had  a  right  to  require,  and  to  which 
we  had  a  right  to  assent.  The  right  to  acquire  in 
volves  the  right  to  give  the  equivalent  demanded." 
Randolph  did  not  further  illustrate  this  sweeping 
principle  of  implied  power. 

After  the  subject  had  been  treated  by  speakers  of 
less  weight,  Roger  Griswold  of  Connecticut  took  the 
floor.  So  long  as  his  party  had  been  in  office,  the 
vigor  of  the  Constitution  had  found  no  warmer  friend 
than  he ;  but  believing  New  England  to  have  fallen  at 
the  mercy  of  Virginia,  he  was  earnest  to  save  her 
from  the  complete  extinction  which  he  thought  near 
at  hand.  Griswold  could  not  deny  that  the  Constitu 
tion  gave  the  power  to  acquire  territory  :  his  Feder 
alist  principles  were  too  fresh  to  dispute  such  an 
inherent  right ;  and  Gouverneur  Morris,  as  extreme  a 
Federalist  as  himself,  whose  words  had  been  used  in 
the  Constitution,  averred  that  he  knew  in  1788  as 
well  as  he  knew  in  1803,  that  all  North  America 
must  at  length  be  annexed,  and  that  it  would  have 
been  Utopian  to  restrain  the  movement.1  This  was 
old  Federalist  doctrine,  resting  on  "  inherent  rights," 
on  nationality  and  broad  construction,  —  the  Feder 
alism  of  President  Washington,  which  the  Republican 
party  from  the  beginning  denounced  as  monarchical. 
Griswold  would  not  turn  his  back  on  it ;  he  still  took 

1  Morris  to  H.  W.  Livingston,  Nov.  25,  1803.  Writings  of 
Gouverneur  Morris,  iii.  185. 


100        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.       CH.  5. 

a  liberal  view  of  the  power,  and  even  stretched  it 
beyond  reasonable  shape  to  accord  with  Morris's  idea. 
"  A  new  territory  and  new  subjects,"  said  he,  "  may 
undoubtedly  be  obtained  by  conquest  and  by  pur 
chase  ;  but  neither  the  conquest  nor  the  purchase 
can  incorporate  them  into  the  Union.  They  must 
remain  in  the  condition  of  colonies,  and  be  governed 
accordingly."  This  claim  gave  the  central  govern 
ment  despotic  power  over  its  new  purchase ;  but  it 
declared  that  a  treaty  which  pledged  the  nation  to 
admit  the  people  of  Louisiana  into  the  Union  must  be 
invalid,  because  it  assumed  that  "  the  President  and 
Senate  may  admit  at  will  any  foreign  nation  into  this 
copartnership  without  the  consent  of  the  States,"  — 
a  power  directly  repugnant  to  the  principles  of  the 
compact.  In  substance,  Griswold  maintained  that 
either  under  the  war  power  or  under  the  treaty- 
making  power  the  government  could  acquire  terri 
tory,  and  as  a  matter  of  course  could  hold  and  govern 
that  territory  as  it  pleased,  —  despotically  if  neces 
sary,  or  for  selfish  objects ;  but  that  the  President 
and  Senate  could  not  admit  a  foreign  people  into 
the  Union,  as  a  State.  Yet  to  this,  the  treaty  bound 
them. 

To  meet  this  attack  the  Republicans  put  forward 
their  two  best  men,  —  Joseph  H.  Nicholson  of  Mary 
land,  and  Caesar  A.  Rodney  of  Delaware.  The  task 
was  difficult,  and  Nicholson  showed  his  embarrass 
ment  at  the  outset.  "  Whether  the  United  States," 
said  he,  "  as  a  sovereign  and  independent  empire, 


1803.  THE  LOUISIANA  DEBATE.  101 

has  a  right  to  acquire  territory  is  one  thing;  but 
whether  they  can  admit  that  territory  into  the 
Union  upon  an  equal  footing  with  the  other  States 
is  a  question  of  a  very  different  nature."  He  re 
fused  to  discuss  this  latter  issue  ;  in  his  opinion  it 
was  not  before  the  House. 

This  flinching  was  neither  candid  nor  courageous  ; 
but  it  was  within  the  fair  limits  of  a  lawyer's  if  not 
of  a  statesman's  practice,  and  Nicholson  at  least  saved 
his  consistency.  On  the  simpler  question,  whether 
"  a  sovereign  nation,"  as  he  next  said,  "  had  a  right 
to  acquire  new  territory,"  he  spoke  with  as  much 
emphasis  as  Roger  Griswold  and  Gouverneur  Morris, 
and  he  took  the  same  ground.  The  separate  States 
had  surrendered  their  sovereignty  by  adopting  the 
Constitution  ;  "  the  right  to  declare  war  was  given  to 
Congress ;  the  right  to  make  treaties,  to  the  Presi 
dent  and  Senate.  Conquest  and  purchase  alone  are 
the  means  by  which  nations  acquire  territory."  Gris 
wold  was  right,  then,  in  the  ground  he  had  taken ; 
but  Nicholson,  not  satisfied  with  gaining  his  point 
through  the  treaty-making  power,  which  was  at  least 
express,  added :  "  The  right  must  exist  somewhere  : 
it  is  essential  to  independent  sovereignty."  As  it 
was  prohibited  to  the  States,  the  power  was  neces 
sarily  vested  in  the  United  States. 

This  general  implication,  that  powers  inherent  in 
sovereignty  which  had  not  been  expressly  reserved 
to  the  States  were  vested  in  the  national  govern 
ment,  was  not  more  radical  centralization  than 


102         HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  5. 

Nicholson's  next  point.  The  treaty  gave  to  the  port 
of  New  Orleans  a  decided  preference  over  all  other 
ports  of  the  United  States,  although  the  Constitution 
said  that  no  preference  should  be  given  to  the  ports 
of  one  State  over  those  of  another.  To  this  objec 
tion  Nicholson  replied  that  Louisiana  was  not  a  State. 
"  It  is  a  territory  purchased  by  the  United  States  in 
their  confederate  capacity,  and  may  be  disposed  of 
by  them  at  pleasure.  It  is  in  the  nature  of  a  col 
ony  whose  commerce  may  be  regulated  without  any 
reference  to  the  Constitution."  The  new  territory, 
therefore,  was  in  the  nature  of  a  European  colony  ; 
the  United  States  government  might  regulate  its 
commerce  without  regard  to  the  Constitution,  give 
its  population  whatever  advantages  Congress  might 
see  fit,  and  use  it  to  break  down  New  England  —  or 
slavery. 

With  the  fecund  avowal  that  Louisiana  must  be 
governed  by  Congress  at  pleasure  without  reference 
to  the  Constitution,  Nicholson  sat  down  ;  and  Caesar 
Rodney  took  the  floor,  —  an  able  and  ingenious 
lawyer,  who  came  to  the  House  with  the  prestige 
of  defeating  the  Federalist  champion  Bayard.  If 
Randolph  and  Nicholson,  like  the  mouse  in  the  fable 
nibbling  at  the  cords  which  bound  the  lion  of  Power, 
had  left  one  strand  still  unsevered,  the  lion  stood 
wholly  free  before  Rodney  ended.  He  began  by  appeal 
ing  to  the  "general  welfare"  clause, —  a  device  which 
the  Republican  party  and  all  States-rights  advocates 
once  regarded  as  little  short  of  treason.  "  I  cannot 


1803. 


THE  LOUISIANA   DEBATE.  103 


perceive,"  said  he,  "  why  within  the  fair  meaning 
of  this  general  provision  is  not  included  the  power  of 
increasing  our  territory,  if  necessary  for  the  general 
welfare  or  common  defence."  This  argument  in  such 
a  mouth  might  well  have  sent  a  chill  to  the  marrow 
of  every  Republican  of  1798 ;  but  this  was  not  the 
whole.  He  next  invoked  the  "  necessary  and  proper  " 
clause,  even  at  that  early  time  familiar  to  every  strict 
constructionist  as  one  of  the  most  dangerous  instru 
ments  of  centralization.  "Have  we  not  also  vested 
in  us  every  power  necessary  for  carrying  such  a 
treaty  into  effect,  in  the  words  of  the  Constitution 
which  give  Congress  the  authority  to  '  make  all  laws 
which  shall  be  necessary  and  proper  for  carrying 
into  execution  the  foregoing  powers,  and  all  other 
powers  vested  by  this  Constitution  in  the  government 
of  the  United  States  or  in  any  department  or  officer 
thereof?" 

One  more  point  was  affirmed  by  Rodney.  Gaylord 
Griswold  had  maintained  that  the  territory  mentioned 
in  the  Constitution  was  the  territory  existing  in  1789. 
Rodney  denied  it.  Congress,  he  said,  had  express 
power  to  "  make  all  needful  rules  and  regulations " 
respecting  any  and  all  territory  ;  it  had  no  need  to 
infer  this  power  from  other  grants.  As  for  the 
special  privilege  of  trade  accorded  to  New  Orleans,  it 
violated  in  no  way  the  Constitution  ;  it  was  indirectly 
a  benefit  to  all  the  States,  and  a  preference  to  none. 

The  Northern  democrats  also  supported  these 
views ;  but  the  opinions  of  Northern  democrats  on 


104        HISTORY  OF  THE   UNITED  STATES.        CH.  5. 

constitutional  questions  carried  little  weight.  Neither 
among  them  nor  among  Southern  Republicans  did 
any  member  question  what  Randolph,  Nicholson,  and 
Rodney  had  said.  Macon  sat  silent  in  his  chair, 
while  John  Randolph  closed  the  debate.  As  though 
he  could  not  satisfy  himself  with  leaving  a  doubt  as 
to  the  right  of  Government  to  assume  what  powers 
it  wanted,  Randolph  took  this  moment  to  meet  Roger 
Griswold's  assertion  that  the  United  States  govern 
ment  could  not  lawfully  incorporate  Great  Britain  or 
France  into  the  Union.  Randolph  affirmed  that,  so 
far  as  the  Constitution  was  concerned,  this  might  be 
done.  "  We  cannot  because  we  cannot." 

"The  reply  was  disingenuous,  but  decisive.  The 
question  was  not  whether  the  States  in  union  could 
lawfully  admit  England  or  France  into  the  Union,  for 
no  one  denied  that  the  States  could  do  what  they 
pleased.  Griswold  only  affirmed  that  the  people  of 
the  States  had  never  delegated  to  John  Randolph 
or  Thomas  Jefferson,  or  to  a  majority  of  the  United 
States  Senate,  the  right  to  make  a  political  revolution 
by  annexing  a  foreign  State.  Jefferson  agreed  with 
Griswold  that  they  had  not ;  if  they  had,  "  then  we 
have  no  Constitution  "  was  his  comment.  Yet  not  a 
voice  was  raised  in  the  Administration  party  against 
Randolph's  views.  After  one  day's  debate,  ninety 
v  Republicans  supported  Randolph  with  their  votes, 
and  twenty-five  Federalists  alone  protested.  Of 
these  twenty-five,  not  less  than  seventeen  were  from 
New  England. 


1803. 


THE  LOUISIANA  DEBATE.  105 


A  week  afterward,  Nov.  2,  1803,  the  Senate  took 
up  the  subject.  After  several  speeches  had  been 
made  without  touching  deeply  the  constitutional  diffi 
culty,  Senator  Pickering  of  Massachusetts  took  the 
floor,  and  in  a  few  words  stated  the  extreme  New 
England  doctrine.  Like  Griswold  and  Gouverneur 
Morris,  he  affirmed  the  right  of  conquest  or  of  pur 
chase,  and  the  right  to  govern  the  territory  so  ac 
quired  as  a  dependent  province ;  but  neither  the 
President  nor  Congress  could  incorporate  this  terri 
tory  in  the  Union,  nor  could  the  incorporation  law 
fully  be  effected  even  by  an  ordinary  amendment  to 
the  Constitution.  "  I  believe  the  assent  of  each  indi 
vidual  State  to  be  necessary  for  the  admission  of  a 
foreign  country  as  an  associate  in  the  Union,  in  like 
manner  as  in  a  commercial  house  the  consent  of  each 
member  would  be  necessary  to  admit  a  new  partner 
into  the  company."  With  his  usual  skill  in  saying 
what  was  calculated  to  annoy,  —  a  skill  in  which  he 
had  no  superior,  —  he  struck  one  truth  which  no  other 
eyes  would  see.  "  I  believe  that  this  whole  trans 
action  has  been  purposely  wrapped  in  obscurity  by 
the  French  government.  The  boundary  of  Louisiana, 
for  instance,  on  the  side  of  Florida  is  in  the  treaty 
really  unintelligible ;  and  yet  nothing  was  more  easy 
to  define." 

Pickering  was  followed  by  Dayton  of  New  Jersey, 
and  he  by  the  celebrated  John  Taylor  of  Caroline, 
the  senator  from  Virginia,  whose  Resolutions  of  1798, 
with  echoes  which  were  to  ring  louder  and  louder  for 


106        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.        CH.  5. 

sixty  years  to  come,  had  declared  "  deep  regret  that  a 
spirit  has  in  sundry  instances  been  manifested  by  the 
federal  government  to  enlarge  its  powers  by  forced 
constructions  of  the  constitutional  charter  which  de 
fines  them  ;  and  that  indications  have  appeared  of 
a  design  to  expound  certain  general  phrases  ...  so 
as  to  consolidate  the  States  by  degrees  into  one 
sovereignty."  In  purchasing  Louisiana,  the  United 
States  government  had  done  an  act  identical  with 
the  despotic  acts  of  consolidated  European  govern 
ments,  —  it  had  bought  a  foreign  people  without  their 
consent  and  without  consulting  the  States,  and  had 
pledged  itself  to  incorporate  this  people  in  the  Union. 
Colonel  Taylor's  argument,  so  far  as  it  went,  sup 
ported  the  act ;  and  although  it  evaded,  or  tried  to 
evade,  the  most  difficult  points  of  objection,  it  went  as 
far  as  the  farthest  in  the  path  of  forced  construction. 
On  the  right  to  acquire  territory,  Taylor  took  the 
ground  taken  by  Joseph  Nicholson  in  the  House,  — 
he  inferred  it  from  the  war  and  treaty  powers :  "  If 
the  means  of  acquiring  and  the  right  of  holding  are 
equivalent  to  the  right  of  acquiring  territory,  then 
this  right  merged  from  the  separate  States  to  the 
United  States,  as  indispensably  annexed  to  the  treaty- 
making  power  and  the  power  of  making  war  "  This 
part  of  the  Federalist  scheme  he  adopted  without 
a  murmur ;  but  when  he  came  to  the  next  inevi 
table  step,  he  showed  the  want  of  courage  often  felt 
by  honest  men  trying  to  be  untrue  to  themselves. 
This  territory  which  the  Washington  government 


1803.  THE  LOUISIANA  DEBATE.  107 

could  acquire  by  conquest  or  treaty, — what  was  its 
status  ?  Could  the  Washington  government  "  dis 
pose  of"  it,  as  the  government  was  expressly  per 
mitted  to  dispose  of  the  territory  it  already  held  under 
the  Constitution ;  or  must  Louisiana  be  governed 
extra-constitutionally  by  "  inherent  powers,"  as  Gris- 
wold  maintained ;  or  ought  Congress  to  ask  for  new 
and  express  authority  from  the  States  ?  Taylor  took 
the  first  position.  The  treaty-making  power,  he  said, 
was  not  defined ;  it  was  competent  to  acquire  terri 
tory.  This  territory  by  the  acquisition  became  a 
part  of  the  Union,  a  portion  of  the  territories  of 
the  United  States,  and  might  be  "  disposed  of  "  by 
Congress  without  an  amendment  to  the  Constitution. 
Although  Taylor  differed  with  Jefferson  on  this  point, 
no  objection  could  be  made  to  the  justice  of  his 
opinion  except  that  it  left  the  true  dispute  to  be 
settled  by  mere  implication.  The  power  of  the  gov 
ernment  over  the  territory  had  no  limits,  so  far  as 
Colonel  Taylor  defined  it ;  yet  it  either  could  or 
could  not  admit  the  new  territory  as  a  State.  If  it 
could,  the  government  could  alter  the  original  com 
pact  by  admitting  a  foreign  country  as  a  State  ;  if  it 
could  not,  either  the  treaty  was  void,  or  government 
must  apply  to  the  people  of  the  States  for  new 
powers. 

Uriah  Tracy  of  Connecticut  replied  to  Taylor  in 
a  speechjfi^iich  was  probably  the  best  on  his  side  of 
the  question.  His  opposition  to  the  purchase  was 
grounded  on  a  party  reason :  "  The  relative  strength 


108         HISTORY  OF  THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  5. 

which  this  admission  gives  to  a  Southern  and  West 
ern  interest  is  contradictory  to  the  principles  of  our 
original  Union."  The  President  and  Senate  had  no 
power  to  make  States,  and  the  treaty  was  void. 

"I  have  no  doubt  but  we  can  obtain  territory  either 
by  conquest  or  compact,  and  hold  it,  even  all  Louisiana 
and  a  thousand  times  more  if  you  please,  without  violat 
ing  the  Constitution.  We  can  hold  territory ;  but  to 
admit  the  inhabitants  into  the  Union,  to  make  citizens  of 
them,  and  States,  by  treaty,  we  cannot  constitutionally 
do ;  and  no  subsequent  act  of  legislation,  or  even  ordi 
nary  amendment  to  our  Constitution,  can  legalize  such 
measures.  If  done  at  all,  they  must  be  done  by  universal 
consent  of  all  the  States  or  partners  to  our  political 
association  ;  and  this  universal  consent  I  am  positive  can 
never  be  obtained  to  such  a  pernicious  measure  as  the 
admission  of  Louisiana,  —  of  a  world,  and  such  a  world, 
into  our  Union.  This  would  be  absorbing  the  Northern 
States,  and  rendering  them  as  insignificant  in  the  Union 
as  they  ought  to  be,  if  by  their  own  consent  the  measure 
should  be  adopted." 

Tracy's  speech  was  answered  by  Breckinridge  of 
Kentucky,  who  had  induced  the  Kentucky  legisla 
ture,  only  five  years  before,  to  declare  itself  deter 
mined  "  tamely  to  submit  to  undelegated,  and  conse 
quently  unlimited,  powers  in  no  man  or  body  of  men 
on  earth ; "  and  to  assert  further  that  submission  to 
the  exercise  of  such  powers  "  would  be  to  surrender 
the  form  of  government  we  have  chosen,  and  to  live 
under  one  deriving  its  powers  from  its  own  will,  and 
not  from  our  authority."  When  he  came  to  deal  with 


1803.  THE  LOUISIANA  DEBATE.  109 

the  same  question  in  a  new  form,  he  glided  with  ex 
treme  delicacy  over  the  thin  ice  of  the  Constitution. 
His  answer  to  Tracy  was  an  admission.  He  pointed 
out  that  the  Federalist  argument  carried  centraliza 
tion  further  than  it  was  carried  by  this  treaty.  "  By 
his  construction,"  said  Breckinridge,  "  territories  and 
citizens  are  considered  and  held  as  the  property  of 
the  government  of  the  United  States,  and  may  con 
sequently  be  used  as  dangerous  engines  in  the  hands 
of  the  government  against  the  States  and  people." 
This  was  true.  The  Federalists  maintained  that  such 
territory  could  be  held  only  as  property,  not  as  part 
of  the  Union ;  and  the  consequences  of  this  doctrine, 
if  granted,  were  immense.  Breckinridge  argued  that 
the  admission  by  treaty  of  a  foreign  State  was  less 
dangerous,  and  therefore  more  constitutional,  than 
such  ownership  of  foreign  territory.  The  conclusion 
was  not  perfectly  logical,  and  was  the  less  so  because 
he  denied  the  power  in  neither  case.  "  Could  we 
not,"  he  went  on,  quoting  from  Tracy's  speech,  "  in 
corporate  in  the  Union  some  foreign  nation  containing 
ten  millions  of  inhabitants,  —  Africa,  for  instance,  — 
and  thereby  destroy  our  government  ?  Certainly  the 
thing  would  be  possible  if  Congress  would  do  it  and 
the  people  consent  to  it.  ...  The  true  construction 
must  depend  on  the  manifest  import  of  the  instrument 
and  the  good  sense  of  the  community."  What  then 
had  become  of  the  old  Republican  principle  that  acts 
of  undelegated  authority  were  no  acts  at  all  ?  Or 
had  the  States  really  delegated  to  the  President  and 


110        HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  5. 

two  thirds  of  the  Senate  the  right  to  "  destroy  our 
government "  ?  If  Breckinridge  had  expressed  these 
ideas  in  his  Kentucky  Resolutions,  American  history 
would  have  contained  less  dispute  as  to  the  meaning 
of  States-rights  and  the  powers  of  the  central  govern 
ment  ;  but  Breckinridge  himself  would  have  then  led 
the  Federalist,  not  the  Republican  party. 

Breckinridge's  speech  was  followed  by  one  from 
Pickering's  colleague,  the  young  senator  from  Massa 
chusetts,  son  of  John  Adams,  the  Federalist  Presi 
dent  whom  Jefferson  had  succeeded.  The  Federalist 
majority  in  Massachusetts  was  divided ;  one  portion 
followed  the  lead  of  the  Essex  Junto,  the  other  and 
larger  part  yielded  unwillingly  to  the  supremacy  of 
Alexander  Hamilton  and  George  Cabot.  When  in 
the  spring  of  1803  both  seats  of  Massachusetts  in 
the  United  States  Senate  became  by  chance  vacant 
at  once,  the  Essex  Junto  wished  to  choose  Timothy 
Pickering  for  the  long  term.  The  moderate  Federal 
ists  set  Pickering  aside,  elected  John  Quincy  Adams, 
then  thirty-six  years  old,  for  the  long  term,  and  al 
lowed  Pickering  to  enter  the  Senate  only  as  junior 
senator  to  a  man  more  than  twenty  years  younger 
than  himself,  whose  father  had  but  three  years  before 
dismissed  Pickering  abruptly  and  without  explanation 
from  his  Cabinet.  Neither  of  the  senators  owned  a 
temper  or  character  likely  to  allay  strife.  The  feud 
between  them  was  bitter  and  life-long.  From  the 
moment  of  their  appearance  in  the  Senate  they  took 
opposite  sides. 


1803.  THE   LOUISIANA   DEBATE.  Ill 

Pickering  held  with  Tracy,  Griswold,  and  all  the 
extreme  Federalists  that  the  treaty  was  void,  and 
that  the  admission  of  Louisiana  as  a  State  without 
the  separate  consent  of  each  State  in  the  Union  was 
a  rupture  of  the  compact,  which  broke  the  tie  and  left 
each  State  free  to  act  independently  of  the  rest.  His 
colleague  was  as  decided  in  favor  of  the  Louisiana 
purchase  as  Pickering  and  Tracy  were  opposed  to  it ; 
but  he  too  agreed  that  the  treaty  was  outside  of  the 
Constitution,  and  he  urged  the  Senate  to  take  this 
view.  He  believed  that  even  Connecticut  would  ap 
prove  of  admitting  Louisiana  if  the  Southern  majority 
had  the  courage  to  try  the  experiment.  "  I  firmly 
believe,  if  an  amendment  to  the  Constitution,  amply 
sufficient  for  the  accomplishment  of  everything  for 
which  we  have  contracted,  shall  be  proposed,  as  I 
think  it  ought,  it  will  be  adopted  by  the  legislature 
of  every  State  in  the  Union."  This  was  in  effect  the 
view  which  Jefferson  had  pressed  upon  his  Cabinet 
and  friends. 

Then  came  Wilson  Gary  Nicholas.  Five  years  be 
fore,  in  the  Virginia  legislature,  Nicholas  had  spoken 
and  voted  for  the  Resolutions  moved  by  his  colleague, 
John  Taylor  of  Caroline.  He  then  said  that  if  the 
principle  were  once  established  that  Congress  had  a 
right  to  use  powers  not  expressly  delegated,  "  the 
tenure  by  which  we  hold  our  liberty  would  be  en 
tirely  subverted :  instead  of  rights  independent  of 
human  control,  we  must_be__content_to  hold  by  the 
courtesy  and  forbearance  of  those  whom  we  have 


112        HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  5. 

heretofore  considered  as  the  servants  of  the  peo 
ple."  Instead  of  using  the  same  language  in  1803, 
he  accepted  his  colleague's  views  as  to  the  extent 
of  the  treaty-making  power,  and  added  reasoning  of 
his  own.  If  the  spirit  of  New  England  Calvinism 
contained  an  element  of  self-deceit,  Virginia  meta 
physics  occasionally  ran  into  slippery  evasion,  as  the 
argument  of  Nicholas  showed.  He  evaded  a  straight 
forward  opinion  on  every  point  at  issue.  The  treaty- 
making  power  was  undefined,  he  thought,  but  not 
unlimited ;  the  general  limitations  of  the  Consti 
tution  applied  to  it,  not  the  special  limitations  of 
power ;  and  of  course  the  treaty  must  be  judged  by 
its  conformity  with  the  general  meaning  of  the  com 
pact.  He  then  explained  away  the  apparent  difficul 
ties  in  the  case.  "  If  the  third  article  of  the  treaty," 
said  he,  "  is  an  engagement  to  incorporate  the  terri 
tory  of  Louisiana  into  the  Union  of  the  United  States 
and  to  make  it  a  State,  it  cannot  be  considered  as  an 
unconstitutional  exercise  of  the  treaty -making  power, 
for  it  will  not  be  asserted  by  any  rational  man  that 
the  territory  is  incorporated  as  a  State  by  the  treaty 
itself."  This  incorporation  was  stipulated  to  be  done 
"  according  to  the  principles  of  the  Constitution,"  and 
the  States  might  do  it  or  not,  at  their  discretion :  if  it 
could  not  be  done  constitutionally,  it  might  be  done 
by  amendment. 

Nothing  could  be  more  interesting  than  to  see 
the  discomfort  with  which  the  champions  of  States- 
rights  tossed  themselves  from  one  horn  to  the  other 


1803.  THE   LOUISIANA   DEBATE.  113 

of  the  Federalist  dilemma.  The  Federalists  cared 
little  on  which  horn  their  opponents  might  choose 
to  impale  themselves,  for  both  were  equally  fatal. 
Either  Louisiana  must  be  admitted  as  a  State,  or 
must  be  held  as  territory.  In  the  first  case  the 
old  Union  was  at  an  end  ;  in  the  second  case  the 
national  government  was  an  empire,  with  "  inherent 
sovereignty  "  derived  from  the  war  and  treaty-making 
powers, —  in  either  case  the  Virginia  theories  were 
exploded.  The  Virginians  felt  the  embarassment, 
and  some  of  them,  like  Nicholas,  tried  to  hide  it  in  a 
murmur  of  words  and  phrases ;  but  the  Republicans 
of  Kentucky  and  Tennessee  were  impatient  of  such 
restraint,  and  slight  as  it  was,  thrust  it  away.  The 
debate  was  closed  by  Senator  Cocke  of  Tennessee, 
who  defied  opposition.  "  I  assert,"  said  he,  "  that  the 
treaty-making  powers^in  this  country  are  competent 
to  the  full  and  free  exercise  of  their  best  judgment  in 
making  treaties  without  limitation  of  power." 

On  this  issue  the  vote  was  taken  without  fur 
ther  discussion,  and  by  twenty-six  to  five  the  Sen 
ate  passed  the  bill.  Pickering  of  Massachusetts, 
Tracy  and .  Hillhouse  of  Connecticut,  and  the  two 
senators  Wells  and  White  from  Delaware,  were  alone 
in  opposition. 

The  result  of  these  debates  in  the  Senate  and 
House  decided  only  one  point.  Every  speaker,  with 
out  distinction  of  party,  agreed  that  the  United  States 
government  had  the  power  to  acquire  new  territory 
either  by  conquest  or  by  treaty ;  the  only  difference 
voi..  ii.  —  8 


114         HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  5. 

of  opinion  regarded  the  disposition  of  this  territory 
after  it  was  acquired.  Did  Louisiana  belong  to  the 
central  government  at  Washington,  or  to  the  States  ? 
The  Federalists  maintained  that  the  central  govern 
ment,  representing  the  States  in  union,  might,  if  it 
pleased,  as  a  consequence  of  its  inherent  sovereignty, 
hold  the  rest  of  America  in  its  possession  and  govern 
it  as  England  governed  Jamaica  or  as  Spain  was 
governing  Louisiana,  but  without  the  consent  of  the 
States  could  not  admit  such  new  territory  into  the 
Union.  The  Republicans  seemed  rather  inclined  to 
think  that  new  territory  acquired  by  war  or  conquest 
would  become  at  once  a  part  of  the  general  territory 
mentioned  in  the  Constitution,  and  as  such  might  be 
admitted  by  Congress  as  a  State,  or  otherwise  dis 
posed  of  as  the  general  welfare  might  require,  but 
that  in  either  case  neither  the  people  nor  the  States 
had  anything  to  do  with  the  matter.  At  bottom, 
both  doctrines  were  equally  fatal  to  the  old  status  of 
the  Union.  In  one  case  the  States,  formed  or  to  be 
formed,  east  of  the  Mississippi  had  established  a  gov 
ernment  which  could  hold  the  rest  of  the  world  in 
despotic  control,  and  which  bought  a  foreign  people 
as  it  might  buy  cattle,  to  rule  over  them  as  their 
owner ;  in  the  other  case,  the  government  was  equally 
powerful,  and  might  besides  admit  the  purchased  or 
conquered  territory  into  the  Union  as  States.  The 
Federalist  theory  was  one  of  empire,  the  Republican 
was  one  of  assimilation ;  but  both  agreed  that  the 
moment  had  come  when  the  old  Union  must  change 


1803.  THE  LOUISIANA  DEBATE.  115 

its  character.  Whether  the  government  at  Wash 
ington  could  possess  Louisiana  as  a  colony  or  admit 
it  as  a  State,  was  a  difference  of  no  great  matter 
if  the  cession  were  to  hold  good ;  the  essential  point 
was  that  for  the  first  time  in  the  national  history  all 
parties  agreed  in  admitting  that  the  government  could 
govern. 


CHAPTER   VI. 

HARDLY  was  it  decided  that  the  government  had 
an  inherent  right  to  acquire  territory  and  annex  for 
eign  States,  when  the  next  question  forced  itself  on 
Congress  for  settlement,  —  "What  were  the  powers 
of  Congress  over  the  new  territory  ? 

Three  paths  were  open.  The  safest  was  to  adopt 
an  amendment  of  the  Constitution  admitting  Loui 
siana  into  the  Union  and  extending  over  it  the  ex 
press  powers  of  Congress  as  they  had  applied  to  the 
old  territory  of  the  United  States.  The  second 
course  was  to  assume  that  the  new  territory  became, 
by  the  fact  of  acquisition,  assimilated  to  the  old,  and 
might  be  "  disposed  of  "  in  the  same  way.  The  third 
was  to  hold  it  apart  as  a  peculiar  estate,  and  govern 
it,  subject  to  treaty  stipulations,  by  an  undefined 
power  implied  in  the  right  to  acquire,  —  on  the  prin 
ciple  that  government  certainly  had  the  right  to 
govern  what  it  had  the  right  to  buy. 

The  first  plan,  which  was  in  effect  Jefferson's  orig 
inal  idea,  preserved  the  theory  of  the  Constitution  as 
far  as  was  possible  ;  but  the  Republicans  feared  the 
consequences  with  France  and  Spain  of  throwing  a 
doubt  on  the  legality  of  the  treaty.  Another  reason 


1803. 


LOUISIANA  LEGISLATION.  117 


for  their  activity  lay  in  the  peculiarities  of  their 
character  as  a  party.  The  Northern  democrats, 
never  strict  constructions  ts,  knew  and  cared  little 
for  the  dogmas  of  their  Southern  allies.  The  South 
ern  Republicans,  especially  those  of  the  Virginia 
school,  were  honest  in  their  jealousy  of  the  central 
government ;  but  as  a  class  they  were  impatient  of 
control  and  unused  to  self-restraint :  they  liked  to  do 
their  will,  and  counted  so  surely  on  their  own  strength 
and  honesty  of  purpose  that  they  could  not  feel  the 
need  of  a  curb  upon  their  power.  None  of  them 
moved.  The  only  man  in  Congress  who  showed  a 
sincere  wish  to  save  what  could  be  preserved  of  the 
old  constitutional  theory  was  Senator  Adams  of 
Massachusetts,  who  called  upon  Madison  October  28, 
before  the  debate,  to  ask  whether  the  Executive  in 
tended,  through  any  member  of  either  House,  to  pro 
pose  an  amendment  of  the  Constitution  to  carry  the 
treaty  into  effect.1  Madison  talked  to  him  openly, 
and  expressed  ideas  which  as  far  as  they  went  were 
the  same  with  those  of  Jefferson.  For  his  own  part, 
said  Madison,  had  he  been  on  the  floor  of  Congress 
he  should  have  seen  no  difficulty  in  acknowledging 
that  the  Constitution  had  not  provided  for  such  a 
case  as  this  ;  that  it  must  be  estimated  by  the  mag 
nitude  of  the  object ;  and  that  those  who  had  agreed 
to  it  must  rely  upon  the  candor  of  their  country  for 
justification.  Probably,  when  the  immediate  pressure 

1  Documents  relating  to  New  England   Federalism,  pp.  156, 
157;  Diary  of  J.  Q.  Adams,  i.  267. 


118       HISTORY  OF  THE   UNITED  STATES.        CH.  6. 

of  special  legislation  was  past,  the  matter  would  be 
attended  to ;  and  if  he  should  have  any  agency  in 
concerting  the  measure,  he  would  request  its  mover 
to  consult  Senator  Adams.  There  for  a  month  the 
matter  rested,  while  Congress  adopted  its  special 
legislation. 

At  length,  November  25,  Senator  Adams,  becoming 
impatient,  called  again  on  the  Secretary  of  State,  with 
the  draft  of  an  amendment  which  he  meant  to  pro 
pose.  Madison  thought  it  too  comprehensive,  and 
suggested  a  simple  declaration  to  meet  the  special 
case :  "  Louisiana  is  hereby  admitted  into  this  Union." 
On  the  same  day  Adams  accordingly  moved  for  a 
committee,  but  could  not  obtain  a  seconder.  The 
Senate  unanimously  refused  even  the  usual  civility 
of  a  reference.  No  more  was  ever  heard  of  amend 
ing  the  Constitution. 

With  almost  unanimous  consent  Louisiana  was 
taken  into  the  Union  by  the  treaty-making  power, 
without  an  amendment.  This  point  being  fixed,  Con 
gress  had  also  to  determine  whether  the  new  territory 
should  be  governed  by  authority  drawn  from  the 
power  of  acquisition,  or  whether  it  should  be  merged 
in  the  old  territory  which  Congress  had  express  right 
to  "  dispose  of  "  and  regulate  at  will. 

By  an  act  of  sovereignty  as  despotic  as  the  corres 
ponding  acts  of  France  and  Spain,  Jefferson  and  his 
party  had  annexed  to  the  Union  a  foreign  people  and 
a  vast  territory,  which  profoundly  altered  the  rela 
tions  of  the  States  and  the  character  of  their  nation- 


1803.  LOUISIANA  LEGISLATION.  119 

ality.  By  similar  acts  they  governed  both.  Jeffer 
son,  in  his  special  Message  of  October  23,  requested 
Congress  to  make  "  such  temporary  provisions  .  .  . 
as  the  case  may  require."  A  select  committee,  Ran 
dolph  being  chairman,  immediately  reported  a  Bill, 
emanating  from  the  Executive. 

"  It  was  a  startling  Bill,"  was  the  criticism1  of  a  man 
who  shared  in  much  legislation,  "  continuing  the  existing 
Spanish  government ;  putting  the  President  in  the  place 
of  the  King  of  Spain ;  putting  all  the  territorial  officers 
in  the  place  of  the  King's  officers,  and  placing  the  ap 
pointment  of  all  these  officers  in  the  President  alone 
without  reference  to  the  Senate.  Nothing  could  be  more 
incompatible  with  our  Constitution  than  such  a  govern 
ment,  —  a  mere  emanation  of  Spanish  despotism,  in 
which  all  powers,  civil  and  military,  legislative,  execu 
tive,  and  judicial,  were  in  the  Intendant  General,  repre 
senting  the  King ;  and  where  the  people,  far  from 
possessing  political  rights,  were  punishable  arbitrarily 
for  presuming  to  meddle  with  political  subjects." 

The  Federalists  immediately  objected  that  the 
powers  conferred  on  the  President  by  this  bill  were 
unconstitutional.  The  Republicans  replied,  in  effect, 
that  the  Constitution  was  made  for  States,  not  for 
territories.  Rodney  explained  the  whole  intent  of  his 
party  in  advocating  the  bill :  "It  shows  that  Congress 
have  a  power  in  the  territories  which  they  cannot 
exercise  in  the  States,  and  that  the  limitations  of 
power  found  in  the  Constitution  are  applicable  to 

1  Examination  of  the  Decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  in  the 
case  of  Dred  Scott.  By  Thomas  H.  Benton,  p.  55. 


120        HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED  STATES.        CH.  6. 

States  and  not  to  territories."  l  John  Randolph  de 
fended  the  assumption  of  power  on  the  ground  of 
necessity,  and  maintained  that  the  government  of  the 
United  States,  with  respect  to  this  territory,  pos 
sessed  the  powers  of  European  sovereignty :  "  Gen 
tlemen  will  see  the  necessity  of  the  United  States 
taking  possession  of  this  country  in  the  capacity  of 
sovereigns,  in  the  same  extent  as  that  of  the  existing 
government  of  the  province."  The  Bill  passed  Con 
gress  by  a  party  vote,  and  was  approved  by  Jefferson, 
October  31, 2  without  delay. 

The  Act  of  October  31  was  a  temporary  measure 
rather  for  taking  possession  of  the  territory  than  for 
governing  it.  Four  weeks  later,  Senator  Breckinridge 
moved  for  a  committee  to  prepare  a  territorial  form 
of  government  for  Louisiana.  Two  senators  of  the 
States-rights  school, — Jackson  and  Baldwin  of  Geor 
gia, —  besides  Breckinridge  and  J.  Q.  Adams,  were 
appointed  on  this  committee  ;  and  they  reported,  De 
cember  30,  a  Bill  that  settled  the  principle  on  which 
the  new  territory  should  be  governed. 

Breckinridge's  Bill  divided  the  purchased  country 
at  the  33d  parallel,  the  line  which  afterward  divided 
the  State  of  Arkansas  from  the  State  of  Louisiana. 
The  country  north  of  that  line  was  named  the  District 
of  Louisiana,  and,  after  some  dispute,  was  subjected 
to  the  territorial  government  of  the  Indiana  Territory, 

1  Annals  of  Congress,  1803-1804,  p.  514. 

2  Act  of  October  31,  1803.     Annals  of  Congress,  1803-1804. 
App.  p.  1245. 


1803.  LOUISIANA   LEGISLATION.  121 

consisting  of  a  governor,  secretary,  and  judges  with 
out  a  legislature,  all  controlled  by  the  Ordinance  of 
1787.  This  arrangement  implied  that  Congress  con 
sidered  the  new  territory  as  assimilated  to  the  old, 
and  "  disposed  of  "  it  by  the  same  constitutional 
power. 

The  northern  district  contained  few  white  inhabi 
tants,  and  its  administrative  arrangements  chiefly 
concerned  Indians ;  but  the  southern  district,  which 
received  the  name  "  Territory  of  Orleans,"  included 
an  old  and  established  society,  numbering  fifty  thou 
sand  persons.  The  territory  of  Ohio  numbered  only 
forty-five  thousand  persons  by  the  census  of  1800, 
while  the  States  of  Delaware  and  Rhode  Island  con 
tained  less  than  seventy  thousand.  The  treaty  guar 
anteed  that  "  the  inhabitants  of  the  ceded  territory 
shall  be  incorporated  in  the  Union  of  the  United 
States,  and  admitted  as  soon  as  possible,  according 
to  the  principles  of  the  Federal  Constitution,  to  the 
enjoyment  of  all  the  rights,  advantages,  and  immuni 
ties  of  citizens  of  the  United  States ;  and  in  the 
mean  time  they  shall  be  maintained  and  protected 
in  the  free  enjoyment  of  their  liberty,  property,  and 
the  religion  which  they  profess." 

Breckinridge's  Bill,  which  was  probably  drawn  by 
Madison  in  co-operation  with  the  President,  created  a 
territorial  government  in  which  the  people  of  Loui 
siana  were  to  have  no  share.  The  governor  and 
secretary  were  to  be  appointed  by  the  President  for 
three  years  ;  the  legislative  council  consisted  of  thir- 


122        HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  6. 

teen  members  to  be  appointed  by  the  President  with 
out  consulting  the  Senate,  and  was  to  be  convened 
and  prorogued  by  the  governor  as  he  might  think 
proper.  The  judicial  officers,  also  appointed  by  the 
President,  were  to  hold  office  for  four  years,  instead 
of  the  usual  term  of  good  behavior.  The  right  to  a 
jury  trial  was  restricted  to  cases  where  the  matter  in 
controversy  exceeded  twenty  dollars,  and  to  capital 
cases  in  criminal  prosecutions.  The  slave-trade  was 
restricted  by  threefold  prohibitions  :  1.  No  slave 
could  be  imported  from  abroad ;  2.  No  slave  could  be 
brought  into  the  territory  from  the  Union  who  had 
been  imported  from  abroad  since  May  1,  1798 ;  3.  No 
slave  could  be  introduced  into  the  territory,  "  directly 
or  indirectly,"  except  by  an  American  citizen  "  re 
moving  into  said  territory  for  actual  settlement,  and 
being,  at  the  time  of  such  removal,  bona  fide  owner 
of  such  slave,"  —  the  penalty  being  three  hundred 
dollars  fine  and  the  slave's  freedom. 

This  Bill  seemed  to  set  the  new  Territory  apart,  as 
a  peculiar  estate,  to  be  governed  by  a  power  implied 
in  the  right  to  acquire  it.  The  debate  which  followed 
its  introduction  into  the  Senate  was  not  reported,  but 
the  Journal  mentioned  that  Senator  Adams,  Jan.  10, 
1804,  moved  three  Resolutions,  to  the  effect  that  no 
constitutional  power  existed  to  tax  the  people  of 
Louisiana  without  their  consent,  and  carried  but 
three  voices  with  him  in  support  of  the  principle.1 
Other  attempts  were  made  to  arrest  the  exercise  ol 
1  Diary  of  J.  Q.  Adams  (Jan.  10,  1804),  i.  287. 


1803. 


LOUISIANA  LEGISLATION.  123 


arbitrary  power  without  better  success,  and  the  Bill 
passed  the  Senate,  Feb.  18,  1804,  after  six  weeks  con 
sideration,  by  a  vote  of  twenty  to  five. 

Few  gaps  in  the  parliamentary  history  of  the 
Union  left  so  serious  a  want  as  was  caused  by  the 
failure  to  report  the  Senate  debate  on  this  Bill ;  but 
the  report  of  the  House  debate  partly  supplied  the  loss, 
for  the  Bill  became  there  a  target  for  attack  from 
every  quarter.  Michael  Leib,  one  of  the  extreme 
Pennsylvania  democrats,  began  by  objecting  to  the 
power  given  to  the  governor  over  the  Louisiana  legis 
lature  as  "  royal."  His  colleague,  Andrew  Gregg, 
objected  altogether  to  the  appointment  of  the  coun 
cil  by  the  President.  Varnum  of  Massachusetts 
denounced  the  whole  system,  and  demanded  an  elec 
tive  legislature.  Matthew  Lyon,  who  represented 
Kentucky,  compared  Jefferson  to  Bonaparte.  "  Do 
we  not  owe  something  on  this  score  to  principle  ? " 
he  asked.  Speaker  Macon  took  the  same  ground. 
George  W.  Campbell  of  Tennessee  was  more  pre 
cise.  "  It  really  establishes  a  complete  despotism," 
he  said  ;  "  it  does  not  evince  a  single  trait  of  liberty  ; 
it  does  not  confer  one  single  right  to  which  they  are 
entitled  under  the  treaty ;  it  does  not  extend  to  them 
the  benefits  of  the  Federal  Constitution,  or  declare 
when,  hereafter,  they  shall  receive  them."  On  the 
other  hand  Dr.  Eustis,  of  Boston,  took  the  ground 
that  a  despotism  was  necessary  :  "  I  am  one  of  those 
who  believe  that  the  principles  of  civil  liberty  cannot 
suddenly  be  engrafted  on  a  people  accustomed  to  a 


124        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED   STATES.        CH.  6. 

regimen  of  a  directly  opposite  hue."  In  contradiction 
to  the  language  of  the  treaty  and  the  principles  of  his 
party,  he  Tent  on  to  say  that  the  people  of  Louisiana 
had  no  rights :  "  I  consider  them  as  standing  in 
nearly  the  same  relation  to  us  as  if  they  were  a  con 
quered  country."  Other  speakers  supported  him. 
The  Louisianians,  it  was  said,  had  shed  tears  when 
they  saw  the  American  flag  hoisted  in  place  of  the 
French ;  they  were  not  prepared  for  self-government. 
When  the  treaty  was  under  discussion,  the  speakers 
assumed  that  the  people  of  Louisiana  were  so  eager 
for  annexation  as  to  make  an  appeal  to  them  useless ; 
when  they  were  annexed,  they  were  so  degraded  as 
not  to  be  worth  consulting. 

The  House  refused  to  tolerate  such  violation  of 
principle,  and  by  the  majority  of  seventy-four  to 
twenty-three  struck  out  the  section  which  vested 
legislative  powers  in  the  President's  nominees.  John 
Randolph  did  not  vote ;  but  his  friend  Nicholson  and 
the  President's  son-in-law,  Thomas  Mann  Randolph, 
were  in  the  minority.  By  fifty -eight  to  forty-two  the 
House  then  adopted  an  amendment  which  vested 
legislative  powers,  after  the  first  year,  in  an  elective 
council ;  by  forty-four  to  thirty-seven  the  restriction 
on  jury  trials  was  rejected ;  the  Act  was  then  limited 
to  two  years  ;  and  so  altered  it  passed  the  House 
March  17, 1804,  several  Republicans  recording  their 
votes  against  it  to  the  end. 

When  the  Bill,  thus  amended,  came  back  to  the 
Senate,  that  body,  March  20,  summarily  disagreed 


1803.  LOUISIANA  LEGISLATION.  125 

with  all  the  changes  made  by  the  House  except  the 
limitation  of  time,  which  the  Senate  further  reduced 
to  one  year.  This  change  reconciled  the  House,  not 
very  cheerfully,  to  recede,  and  March  23  the  Bill,  as 
it  passed  the  Senate,  became  law  by  a  vote  of  fifty- 
one  to  forty-five.  With  the  passage  of  this  Act  and 
its  twin  statute  for  collecting  duties  in  the  ceded 
territory,  the  precedent  was  complete.  Louisiana 
received  a  government  in  which  its  people,  who  had 
been  solemnly  promised  all  the  rights  of  American 
citizens,  were  set  apart,  not  as  citizens,  but  as  subjects 
lower  in  the  political  scale  than  the  meanest  tribes 
of  Indians,  whose  right  to  self-government  was  never 
questioned. 

By  these  measures  the  Executive  and  the  Legisla 
ture  recorded  their  decision  in  regard  to  the  powers 
of  government  over  national  territory.  The  Judiciary 
was  not  then  consulted  ;  but  twenty-five  years  after 
ward,  in  the  year  1828,  Chief-Justice  Marshall  was 
in  his  turn  required  to  give  an  opinion,  and  he  added 
the  final  authority  of  the  Supreme  Court  to  the  prece 
dent.  With  characteristic  wisdom  he  claimed  for  the 
government  both  the  constitutional  and  the  extra- 
constitutional  powers  in  question.  The  case  con 
cerned  the  rights  of  inhabitants  of  Florida,  who  he 
said  — 

"Do  not  participate  in  political  power;  they  do  not 
share  in  the  government  till  Florida  shall  become  a  State. 
In  the  mean  time  Florida  continues  to  be  a  territory  of  the 
United  States,  governed  by  virtue  of  that  clause  in  the 


126         HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  6. 

Constitution  which  empowers  Congress  '  to  make  all 
needful  rules  and  regulations  respecting  the  territory  or 
other  property  belonging  to  the  United  States.'  Perhaps 
the  power  of  governing  a  territory  belonging  to  the 
United  States  which  has  not,  by  becoming  a  State,  ac 
quired  the  means  of  self-government,  may  result  neces 
sarily  from  the  fact  that  it  is  not  within  the  jurisdiction 
of  any  particular  State,  and  is  within  the  power  and  juris 
diction  of  the  United  States.  The  right  to  govern  may 
be  the  inevitable  consequence  of  the  right  to  acquire  ter 
ritory.  Whichever  may  be  the  source  whence  the  power 
is  derived,  the  possession  of  it  is  unquestioned."  l 

The  effect  of  such  a  precedent  on  constitutional 
principles  was  certain  to  be  great.  A  government 
competent  to  interpret  its  own  powers  so  liberally 
in  one  instance,  could  hardly  resist  any  strong  temp 
tation  to  do  so  in  others.  The  doctrines  of  "  strict 
construction "  could  not  be  considered  as  the  doc 
trines  of  the  government  after  they  had  been  aban 
doned  in  this  leading  case  by  a  government  controlled 
by  strict  constructionists.  The  time  came  at  last 
when  the  opponents  of  centralization  were  obliged  to 
review  their  acts  and  to  discover  the  source  of  their 
mistakes.  In  1856  the  Supreme  Court  was  again 
required  to  pronounce  an  opinion,  and  found  itself 
confronted  by  the  legislation  of  1803-1804  and  the 
decision  of  Chief-Justice  Marshall  in  1828.  Chief- 
Justice  Taney  and  his  associates,  in  the  case  of  Dred 
Scott,  then  reviewed  the  acts  of  Jefferson  and  his 

1  American  Insurance  Company  and  Others  v.  Canter  (Jan 
uary  Term,  1828),  1  Peters's  Eeports,  511-546. 


1803.  LOUISIANA  LEGISLATION.  127 

friends  in  1803-1804,  and  pronounced  upon  them 
the  final  judgment  of  the  States-rights  school. 

Chief-Justice  Taney  affirmed  the  right  of  the  gov 
ernment  to  buy  Louisiana  and  to  govern  it,  but  not 
to  govern  it  as  a  part  of  the  old  territory  over  which 
the  Constitution  gave  Congress  unlimited  power.  Lou 
isiana  was  governed,  according  to  Marshall's  dictum, 
by  a  power  which  was  "  the  inevitable  consequence  of 
the  right  to  acquire  territory," —  a  power  limited  by 
the  general  purposes  of  the  Constitution,  and  there 
fore  not  extending  to  a  colonial  system  like  that  of 
Europe.  Territory  might  thus  be  acquired  ;  but  it 
was  acquired  in  order  to  become  a  State,  and  not  to 
be  held  as  a  colony  and  governed  by  Congress  with 
absolute  authority  ;  citizens  who  migrated  to  it  "  can 
not  be  ruled  as  mere  colonists  dependent  upon  the 
will  of  the  general  government,  and  to  be  governed 
by  any  laws  it  may  think  proper  to  impose."  The 
chief-justice  dwelt  on  this  point  at  much  length ;  the 
federal  government,  he  said,  "  cannot,  when  it  enters 
a  territory  of  the  United  States,  put  off  its  char 
acter  and  assume  discretionary  or  despotic  powers 
which  the  Constitution  has  denied  it." 

Even  this  emphatic  opinion,  which  implied  that 
all  the  Louisiana  legislation  was  unconstitutional,  did 
not  satisfy  Justice  Campbell,  a  Georgian,  who  repre 
sented  the  ultimate  convictions  of  the  strict  construc- 
tionists.  Campbell  reviewed  the  national  history  in 
search  of  evidence  "  that  a  consolidated  power  had 
been  inaugurated,  whose  subject  comprehended  an 


128        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.        CH.  6. 

empire,  and  which  had  no  restriction  but  the  discre 
tion  of  Congress."  He  held  that  the  Constitution  had 
been  plainly  and  repeatedly  violated ;  "  and  in  refer 
ence  to  the  precedent  of  1804,  the  wisest  statesmen 
protested  against  it,  and  the  President  more  than 
doubted  its  policy  and  the  power  of  the  government." 
The  Court,  he  said,  could  not  undertake  to  conquer 
their  scruples  as  the  President  and  Congress  had 
done.  "  They  acknowledge  that  our  peculiar  security 
is  in  the  possession  of  a  written  Constitution,  and 
they  cannot  make  it  blank  paper  by  construction." 

This  sneer  at  President  Jefferson  was  almost  the 
last  official  expression  of  strict-constructionist  princi 
ples.  Of  its  propriety  the  Court  itself  was  the  best 
judge,  but  its  historical  interest  could  not  be  denied. 

If  Justice  Campbell  and  Chief-Justice  Taney  were 
right,  according  to  the  tenets  of  their  school  the 
legislation  of  1803-1804  was  plainly  unconstitutional. 
In  that  case,  by  stronger  reasoning  the  treaty  itself 
was  unconstitutional  and  void  from  the  beginning ; 
for  not  only  did  Jefferson's  doubts  to  which  Campbell 
alluded  refer  to  the  treaty  and  not  to  the  legislation, 
but  the  treaty  was  at  least  equally  responsible  with 
the  laws  for  making,  in  1803,  a  situation  which  re 
quired  what  Campbell  denounced,  —  "  the  supreme 
and  irresistible  power  which  is  now  claimed  for  Con 
gress  over  boundless  territories,  the  use  of  which  can 
not  fail  to  react  upon  the  political  system  of  the 
States  to  its  subversion." 

With  the  law  the   story  need  not  concern  itself, 


1803. 


LOUISIANA  LEGISLATION.  129 


but  the  view  of  American  history  thus  suggested  was 
peculiarly  interesting.  If  the  chief-justice  and  his  as 
sociate  expressed  correctly  the  opinions  of  the  strict- 
constructionist  school,  the  government  had  at  some 
time  been  converted  from  a  government  of  delegated 
powers  into  a  sovereignty.  Such  was  the  belief  of 
Campbell's  political  friends.  Four  years  after  the 
Dred  Scott  decision  was  declared,  the  State  of  South 
Carolina,  in  Convention,  issued  an  "  Address  to  the 
People  of  the  Slave-holding  States,"  justifying  its  act 
of  secession  from  the  Union. 

"  The  one  great  evil,"  it  declared,  "  from  which  all 
other  evils  have  flowed,  is  the  overthrow  of  the  Consti 
tution  of  the  United  States.  The  government  of  the 
United  States  is  no  longer  the  government  of  confed 
erated  republics,  but  of  a  consolidated  democracy.  It 
is  no  longer  a  free  government,  but  a  despotism." 

If  the  strict  constructionists  held  this  opinion,  they 
necessarily  believed  that  at  some  moment  in  the  past 
the  government  must  have  changed  its  character. 
The  only  event  which  had  occurred  in  American  his 
tory  so  large  in  its  proportions,  so  permanent  in  its 
influence,  and  so  cumulative  in  its  effects  as  to  repre 
sent  such  a  revolution  was  the  Louisiana  purchase ; 
and  if  the  Louisiana  purchase  was  to  be  considered 
as  having  done  what  the  Federalists  expected  it  to 
do,  —  if  it  had  made  a  new  constitution  and  a  govern 
ment  of  sovereign  powers, —  the  strict  construction 
ists  were  not  only  consenting  parties  to  the  change, 
they  were  its  authors. 


130        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.        CH.  «. 

From  every  point  of  view,  whether  Justice  Camp 
bell  and  the  secession  convention  of  South  Carolina 
were  right  or  wrong  in  their  historical  judgment,  the 
Louisiana  purchase  possessed  an  importance  not  to 
be  ignored.  Even  in  1804  the  political  consequences 
of  the  act  were  already  too  striking  to  be  overlooked. 
Within  three  years  of  his  inauguration  Jefferson 
bought  a  foreign  colony  without  its  consent  and 
against  its  will,  annexed  it  to  the  United  States  by 
an  act  which  he  said  made  blank  paper  of  the  Consti 
tution  ;  and  then  he  who  had  found  his  predecessors 
too  monarchical,  and  the  Constitution  too  liberal  in 
powers,  —  he  who  had  nearly  dissolved  the  bonds  of 
society  rather  than  allow  his  predecessor  to  order 
a  dangerous  alien  out  of  the  country  in  a  time  of 
threatened  war,  —  made  himself  monarch  of  the  new 
territory,  and  wielded  over  it,  against  its  protests, 
the  powers  of  its  old  kings.  Such  an  experience 
was  final ;  no  century  of  slow  and  half -understood 
experience  could  be  needed  to  prove  that  the  hopes 
of  humanity  lay  thenceforward,  not  in  attempting  to 
restrain  the  government  from  doing  whatever  the 
majority  should  think  necessary,  but  in  raising  the 
people  themselves  till  they  should  think  nothing 
necessary  but  what  was  good. 

Jefferson  took  a  different  view.  He  regarded,  or 
wished  to  regard,  the  Louisiana  treaty  and  legislation 
as  exceptional  and  as  forming  no  precedent.  While 
he  signed  the  laws  for  governing  the  territory,  he 
warmly  objected  to  the  establishment  of  a  branch 


1803.  LOUISIANA  LEGISLATION.  131 

bank  of  the  United  States  at  New  Orleans.  "This 
institution  is  one  of  the  most  deadly  hostility  ex 
isting  against  the  principles  and  form  of  our  Con 
stitution,"  he  wrote  to  Gallatin;1  "  ought  we  to  give 
further  growth  to  an  institution  so  powerful,  so  hos 
tile  ? "  Gallatin  was  clear  that  the  business  of  the 
Treasury  required  such  aid,  and  Jefferson  again  ac 
quiesced.  Gallatin  was  also  allowed  and  encour 
aged  to  enforce  the  restrictions  on  the  importation 
of  slaves  into  Louisiana.2  "  It  seems  that  the  whole 
Cabinet,"  wrote  the  French  charg$  to  his  govern 
ment,  "  put  the  utmost  weight  on  this  prohibition. 
Mr.  Jefferson  is  earnestly  bent  on  maintaining  it, 
and  his  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  takes  the  severest 
measures  to  insure  its  execution." 

As  though  the  annexation  of  Louisiana  alone  made 
not  enough  change  in  the  old  established  balances 
of  the  Constitution,  Congress  took  up  another  matter 
which  touched  the  mainspring  of  the  compact.  A 
new  Presidential  election  was  at  hand.  The  narrow 
escape  of  1800  warned  the  party  in  power  not  again 
to  risk  society  by  following  the  complicated  arrange 
ments  of  1788.  In  the  convention  which  framed  the 
Constitution  no  single  difficulty  was  more  serious 
than  that  of  compromising  the  question  of  power 
between  the  large  and  small  States.  Delaware,  New 
Jersey,  Rhode  Island,  Maryland,  and  Connecticut 

1  Jefferson  to  Gallatin,  Dec.  13,  1803;  Works,  iv.  518. 

2  Pichon  to  Talleyrand,  16  Fructidor,  An  xii.  (Sept.  3,  1804)  ; 
Archives  des  Aff.  Etr.,  MSS. 


132         HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        Cn.6. 

were  well  aware  that  the  large  States  would  take 
the  lion's  share  of  power  and  patronage ;  they  knew 
that  except  by  accident  no  citizen  of  theirs  could 
ever  reach  the  Presidency  ;  and  as  accident  alone 
could  give  the  small  States  a  chance,  accident  was  to 
them  a  thing  of  value.  Whatever  tended  to  make 
their  votes  decisive  was  an  additional  inducement 
with  them  to  accept  the  Constitution.  The  Vice- 
presidency,  as  originally  created,  more  than  doubled 
their  chance  of  getting  the  Presidency,  and  was  in 
vented  chiefly  for  this  purpose ;  but  this  was  not  all. 
As  the  number  of  electoral  votes  alone  decided  be 
tween  President  and  Vice-president,  a  tie-vote  was 
likely  often  to  occur ;  and  such  a  tie  was  decided  by 
the  House  of  Representatives,  where  another  bribe 
was  intentionally  offered  to  the  small  States  by  giv 
ing  the  election  to  the  State  delegations  voting  as 
units,  so  that  the  vote  of  Delaware  weighed  as  heav 
ily  as  the  vote  of  Pennsylvania. 

The  alarm  caused  by  Burr's  rivalry  with  Jefferson 
in  February,  1801,  satisfied  the  Republican  party  that 
such  a  door  to  intrigue  ought  not  to  be  left  open. 
Oct.  17,  1803,  before  the  Louisiana  treaty  was  taken 
up,  an  amendment  to  the  Constitution  was  moved  by 
friends  of  the  Administration  in  the  House.  This, 
which  took  shape  at  length  as  the  Twelfth  Amend 
ment,  obliged  the  members  of  the  electoral  college  to 
distinguish  in  their  ballots  the  persons  voted  for  as 
President  and  Vice-president. 

Slight  as  this  change  might  appear,  it  tended  to- 


1803.  LOUISIANA  LEGISLATION.  133 

ward  centralizing  powers  hitherto  jealously  guarded. 
It  swept  away  one  of  the  checks  on  which  the 
framers  had  counted  to  resist  majority  rule  by  the 
great  States.  Lessening  the  influence  of  the  small 
States,  and  exaggerating  the  office  of  President  by 
lowering  the  dignity  of  Vice-president,  it  made  the 
processes  of  election  and  government  smoother  and 
more  efficient,  —  a  gain  to  politicians,  but  the  result 
most  feared  by  the  States-rights  school.  The  change 
was  suph  as  Pennsylvania  or  New  York  might  natu 
rally  want ;  but  it  ran  counter  to  the  theories  of 
Virginia  Republicans,  whose  jealousy  of  Executive 
influence  had  been  extreme. 

Roger  Griswold  said  with  prophetic  emphasis : l  — 

' '  The  man  voted  for  as  Vice-president  will  be  selected 
without  any  decisive  view  to  his  qualifications  to  adminis 
ter  the  government.  The  office  will  generally  be  carried 
into  the  market  to  be  exchanged  for  the  votes  of  some 
large  States  for  President ;  and  the  only  criterion  which 
will  be  regarded  as  a  qualification  for  the  office  of  Vice- 
president  will  be  the  temporary  influence  of  the  candidate 
over  the  electors  of  his  State.  .  .  .  The  momentary 
views  of  party  may  perhaps  be  promoted  by  such  ar 
rangements,  but  the  permanent  interests  of  the  country 
are  sacrificed." 

Griswold  held  that  true  reform  required  abolition 
of  the  office ;  and  in  this  opinion  his  old  enemy  John 
Randolph  warmly  agreed.  In  the  Senate,  had  the 
question  risen  as  a  new  one,  perhaps  a  majority  might 

1  Dec.  8,  1803;  Annals  of  Congress,  1803-1804,  p.  751. 


134        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED   STATES.        CH.  6. 

have  favored  abolition,  for  the  results  of  retaining  the 
office  were  foreseen ;  but  the  discussion  was  hampered 
by  the  supposed  popular  will  and  by  express  votes 
of  State  legislatures,  and  Congress  felt  itself  obliged 
to  follow  a  prescribed  course.  The  amendment  was 
adopted  by  the  usual  party  vote ;  and  the  Federalists 
thenceforward  were  able  to  charge  Jefferson  and  his 
party  with  responsibility  not  only  for  stripping  the 
small  States  of  an  advantage  which  had  made  part 
of  their  bargain,  but  also  for  putting  in  the  office  of 
President,  in  case  of  vacancies,  men  whom  no  State 
and  no  elector  intended  for  the  post. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

THE  extraordinary  success  which  marked  Jefferson's 
foreign  relations  in  the  year  1803  was  almost  equally 
conspicuous  in  domestic  affairs.  The  Treasury  was 
as  fortunate  as  the  Department  of  State.  Gallatin 
silenced  opposition.  Although  the  customs  produced 
two  millions  less  than  in  1802,  yet  when  the  Sec 
retary  in  October,  1803,  announced  his  financial 
arrangements,  which  included  the  purchase-money  of 
fifteen  million  dollars  for  Louisiana,  he  was  able  to 
provide  for  all  his  needs  without  imposing  a  new  tax. 
The  treaty  required  the  issue  of  six-per-cent  bonds  for 
eleven  million  two  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  dollars, 
redeemable  after  fifteen  years.  These  were  issued  ; 
and  to  meet  the  interest  and  sinking  fund  Gallatin 
added  from  his  surplus  an  annual  appropriation  of 
seven  hundred  thousand  dollars  to  his  general  fund  ; 
so  that  the  discharge  of  the  whole  debt  would  take 
place  within  the  year  1818,  instead  of  eighteen  months 
earlier,  as  had  been  intended.  New  Orleans  was  ex 
pected  to  provide  two  hundred  thousand  dollars  a  year 
toward  the  interest.  Of  the  remaining  four  millions, 
the  Treasury  already  held  half,  and  Gallatin  hoped 


136        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED   STATES.        Cn.7. 

to  provide  the  whole  from  future  surplus,  which  he 
actually  did. 

This  was  ideal  success.  On  a  sudden  call,  to  pay 
out  four  million  dollars  in  hard  money,  and  add  seven 
hundred  thousand  dollars  to  annual  expenditure,  with 
out  imposing  a  tax,  and  with  a  total  revenue  of  eleven 
millions,  was  a  feat  that  warranted  congratulations. 
Yet  Gallatin's  success  was  not  obtained  without  an 
effort.  As  usual,  he  drew  a  part  of  his  estimated 
surplus  from  the  navy.  He  appealed  to  Jefferson 
to  reduce  the  navy  estimates  from  nine  hundred  thou 
sand  to  six  hundred  thousand  dollars.1 

"I  find  that  the  establishment  now  consists  of  the 
4  Constitution,'  the  '  Philadelphia,'  each  44,  and  five  small 
vessels,  all  of  which  are  now  out,  and  intended  to  stay 
the  whole  year,  as  the  crew  is  enlisted  for  two  years. 
In  my  opinion  one  half  of  the  force,  —  namely,  one 
frigate  and  two  or  three  small  vessels,  —  were  amply 
sufficient." 

Jefferson  urged  the  reduction,2  and  Secretary  Smith 
consented.  The  navy  estimates  were  reduced  to  six 
hundred  and  fifty  thousand  dollars,  and  on  the 
strength  of  this  economy  Gallatin  made  his  calcula 
tion.  As  he  probably  foresaw,  the  attempt  failed. 
Whether  in  any  case  Smith  could  have  effected  so 
great  a  retrenchment  was  doubtful ;  but  an  event 
occurred  which  made  retrenchment  impossible. 

1  Remarks  on  the  Message,  Gallatin's  Writings,  i.  156;  Gallatin 
to  Jefferson,  Oct.  6,  1803;  ibid.,  i.  162. 

2  Jefferson  to  R.  Smith,  Oct.  10,  1803;  Jefferson  MSS. 


1803.  IMPEACHMENTS.  137 

The  war  with  Tripoli  dragged  tediously  along,  and 
seemed  no  nearer  its  end  at  the  close  of  1803  than 
eighteen  months  before.  Commodore  Morris,  whom 
the  President  sent  to  command  the  Mediterranean 
squadron,  cruised  from  port  to  port  between  May, 
1802,  and  August,  1803,  convoying  merchant  vessels 
from  Gibraltar  to  Leghorn  and  Malta,  or  lay  in 
harbor  and  repaired  his  ships,  but  neither  blockaded 
nor  molested  Tripoli ;  until  at  length,  June  21, 1803, 
the  President  called  him  home  and  dismissed  him 
from  the  service.  His  successor  was  Commodore 
Preble,  who  Sept.  12,  1803,  reached  Gibraltar  with 
the  relief-squadron  which  Secretary  Gallatin  thought 
unnecessarily  strong.  He  had  the  "  Constitution,"  of 
44  guns,  and  the  "  Philadelphia,"  of  38 ;  the  four 
new  brigs  just  built,  —  the  "  Argus  "  and  the  "  Syren," 
of  16  guns,  the  «  Nautilus  "  and  the  "  Vixen,"  of  14 
guns  ;  and  the  "  Enterprise,"  of  12.  With  this  force 
Preble  set  energetically  to  work. 

Tripoli  was  a  feeble  Power,  and  without  much  effort 
could  be  watched  and  blockaded ;  but  if  the  other 
governments  on  the  coast  should  make  common  cause 
against  the  United  States,  the  task  of  dealing  with 
them  was  not  so  easy.  Morocco  was  especially  dan 
gerous,  because  its  ports  lay  on  the  ocean,  and  could 
not  be  closed  even  by  guarding  the  Straits.  When 
Preble  arrived,  he  found  Morocco  taking  part  with 
Tripoli.  Captain  Bainbridge,  who  reached  Gibraltar 
in  the  "  Philadelphia  "  August  24,  some  three  weeks 
before  Preble  arrived,  caught  in  the  neighborhood  a 


138        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.       CH.  7. 

Moorish  cruiser  of  22  guns  with  an  American  brig  in 
its  clutches.  Another  American  brig  had  just  been 
seized  at  Mogador.  Determined  to  stop  this  peril  at 
the  outset,  Preble  united  to  his  own  squadron  the 
ships  which  he  had  come  to  relieve,  and  with  this 
combined  force,  —  the  "  Constitution,"  44 ;  the  "  New 
York,"  36  ;  the  "  John  Adams,"  28  ;  and  the  "  Nauti 
lus,"  14,  —  sending  the  "  Philadelphia  "  to  blockade 
Tripoli,  he  crossed  to  Tangiers  October  6,  and  brought 
the  Emperor  of  Morocco  to  reason.  On  both  sides 
prizes  and  prisoners  were  restored,  and  the  old  treaty 
was  renewed.  This  affair  consumed  time  ;  and  when 
at  length  Preble  got  the  "  Constitution  "  under  way 
for  the  Tripolitan  coast,  he  spoke  a  British  frigate 
off  the  Island  of  Sardinia,  which  reported  that  the 
"  Philadelphia  "  had  been  captured  October  21,  more 
than  three  weeks  before. 

The  loss  greatly  embarassed  Preble.  The  "  Phila 
delphia  "  was,  next  to  the  "  Constitution,"  his  strong 
est  ship.  Indeed  he  had  nothing  else  but  his  own 
frigate  and  small  brigs  of  two  and  three  hundred 
tons  ;  but  the  accident  was  such  as  could  not  fail 
sometimes  to  happen,  especially  to  active  command 
ers.  Bainbridge,  cruising  off  Tripoli,  had  chased  a 
Tripolitan  cruiser  into  shoal  water,  and  was  hauling 
off,  when  the  frigate  struck  on  a  reef  at  the  mouth 
of  the  harbor.  Every  effort  was  made  without  suc 
cess  to  float  her ;  but  at  last  she  was  surrounded  by 
Tripolitan  gunboats,  and  Bainbridge  struck  his  flag. 
The  Tripolitans,  after  a  few  days'  work,  floated  the 


1803.  IMPEACHMENTS.  139 

frigate,  and  brought  her  under  the  guns  of  the  castle. 
The  officers  became  prisoners  of  war,  and  the  crew, 
in  number  three  hundred  or  more,  were  put  to  hard 
labor. 

The  affair  was  in  no  way  discreditable  to  the 
squadron.  Morris  had  been  recalled  in  disgrace  for 
over-caution,  and  Bainbridge  was  required  to  be  ac 
tive.  The  Tripolitans  gained  nothing  except  the  pris 
oners  ;  for  at  Bainbridge's  suggestion  Preble,  some 
time  afterward,  ordered  Stephen  Decatur,  a  young 
lieutenant  in  command  of  the  "  Enterprise,"  to  take  a 
captured  Tripolitan  craft  re-named  the  "  Intrepid," 
and  with  a  crew  of  seventy-five  men  to  sail  from  Syra 
cuse,  enter  the  harbor  of  Tripoli  by  night,  board  the 
"  Philadelphia,"  and  burn  her  under  the  castle  guns. 
The  order  was  literally  obeyed.  Decatur  ran  into  the 
harbor  at  ten  o'clock  in  the  night  of  Feb.  16,  1804, 
boarded  the  frigate  within  half  gun-shot  of  the  Pacha's 
castle,  drove  the  Tripolitan  crew  overboard,  set  the 
ship  on  fire,  remained  alongside  until  the  flames  were 
beyond  control,  and  then  withdrew  without  losing  a 
man,  while  the  Tripolitan  gunboats  and  batteries 
fired  on  him  as  rapidly  as  want  of  discipline  and 
training  would  allow.  Gallant  and  successful  as  the 
affair  was,  it  proved  only  what  was  already  well 
known,  that  the  Tripolitans  were  no  match  for  men 
like  Decatur  and  his  companions  ;  and  it  left  Preble, 
after  losing  in  the  "  Philadelphia  "  nearly  one  third 
of  his  force,  still  strong  enough  to  do  the  work  that 
needed  to  be  done. 


140         HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  7. 

The  frigate  had  been  built  by  the  citizens  of  Phila 
delphia,  and  given  to  the  government  in  1799.  So 
far  as  the  ship  was  concerned,  the  loss  was  not  much 
regretted,  for  the  Republicans  when  in  opposition  had 
strenuously  opposed  the  building  of  frigates,  and  still 
considered  them  a  danger  rather  than  a  defence.  Al 
though  the  "  Philadelphia "  was  the  newest  ship  in 
the  service,  a  companion  to  the  "  Constellation,"  the 
"  Congress,"  and  the  "  Chesapeake,"  she  was  never 
replaced  ;  two  18-gun  brigs,  the  "  Hornet "  and  the 
"  Wasp,"  were  constructed  instead  of  one  38-gun  frig 
ate  ;  and  these  were  the  last  sea-going  vessels  built 
under  Jefferson's  administration.  The  true  annoy 
ance  was  not  that  a  frigate  had  been  lost,  but  that 
the  captivity  and  enslavement  of  the  crew  obliged 
Government  to  rescue  them  and  to  close  the  war,  by 
a  kind  of  expenditure  which  the  Republican  party 
disliked. 

Bainbridge's  report  of  his  capture,  which  had  hap 
pened  at  the  end  of  October,  1803,  was  sent  to  Con 
gress  March  20, 1804,  in  the  last  week  of  the  session. 
The  President  sent  with  it  a  brief  Message  recom 
mending  Congress  to  increase  the  force  and  enlarge 
expenses  in  the  Mediterranean.  As  Gallatin  never 
willingly  allowed  his  own  plans  for  the  public  ser 
vice  to  be  deranged,  Congress  adopted  a  new  means 
for  meeting  the  new  expense.  Although  the  Treasury 
held  a  balance  of  $1,700,000,  Gallatin  would  not 
trench  upon  this  fund,  but  told  Randolph,  who  was 
Chairman  of  the  Ways  and  Means  Committee,  that 


1803.  IMPEACHMENTS.  141 

the  specie  in  the  Treasury  could  not  be  safely  reduced 
below  that  amount.1  He  informed  Joseph  Nicholson 
that  $150,000  was  the  utmost  sum  he  could  spare. 
The  sum  wanted  was  1750,000  per  annum.  A  Bill 
was  introduced  which  imposed  an  additional  duty  of 
2^  per  cent  on  all  imports  that  paid  duty  ad  valorem. 
These  imports  had  been  divided,  for  purposes  of 
revenue,  into  three  classes,  taxed  respectively  12|, 
15,  and  20  per  cent ;  the  increase  raised  them  to 
15,  17|,  and  22J  per  cent.  The  average  ad  valorem 
duty  was  before  about  13| ;  the  additional  tax 
raised  it  above  16  per  cent ;  and  the  Republicans 
preferred  this  method  of  raising  money  as  in  every 
way  better  than  the  system  of  internal  taxation. 
After  imposing  the  additional  duty  of  2J  per  cent, — 
a  duty  intended  to  produce  about  $750,000,  —  the  Bill 
made  of  it  a  separate  Treasury  account,  to  be  called 
the  "  Mediterranean  Fund,"  which  was  to  last  only 
as  long  as  the  Mediterranean  war  should  last,  when 
the  2 1  per  cent  duty  was  to  cease  three  months 
after  a  general  peace. 

The  Mediterranean  Fund  was  meant  as  a  protest 
against  loose  expenditure, —  a  dike  against  the  im 
pending  flood  of  extravagance.  The  Mediterranean 
war  was  the  first  failure  of  President  Jefferson's 
theory  of  foreign  relations,  and  the  Mediterranean 
Fund  was  the  measure  of  the  error  in  financial  form. 
No  reproach  henceforward  roused  more  ill  temper 

1  Speech  of  John  Kandolph,  March  22,  1804;  Annals  of  Con 
gress,  1803-1804,  p.  1221. 


142        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED   STATES.        CH.  7. 

among  Republicans  than  the  common  charge  that 
their  elaborate  financial  precautions  and  formalities 
were  a  deception,  and  that  the  Mediterranean  Fund 
was  meant  to  conceal  a  change  of  principle  and  a 
return  to  Federalist  practices.  Even  in  the  first 
words  of  the  debate,  Roger  Griswold  told  them  that 
their  plausible  special  fund  was  "  perfectly  deceptive," 
and  amounted  to  nothing.  John  Randolph  retaliated 
by  declaring  that  the  Republican  government  con 
sisted  of  men  who  never  drew  a  cent  from  the  people 
except  when  necessity  compelled  it ;  and  Griswold 
could  not  assert,  though  he  might  even  then  foresee, 
that  for  ten  years  to  come,  Randolph  would  denounce 
the  extravagance  and  waste  of  the  men  whom  he  thus 
described. 

./^The  annexation  of  Louisiana,  the  constitutional 
amendment  in  regard  to  the  Vice-presidency,  the 
change  of  financial  practices  foreshadowed  by  the 
Mediterranean  Fund,  were  signs  of  reaction  toward 
nationality  and  energy  in  government.  /  Yet  the  old 
prejudices  of  the  Republican  party  had  not  yet  wholly 
lost  their  force. /  Especially  the  extreme  wing,  con 
sisting  of  men  like  John  Randolph  and  "W.  B.  Giles, 
thought  that  a  substantial  reform  should  be  attempted. 
Increase  of  power  encouraged  them  to  act.  The 
party,  stimulated  by  its  splendid  success  and  irre 
sistible  popularity,  at  length,  after  long  hesitation, 
prepared  for  a  trial  of  strength  with  the  last  remnant 
of  Federalism,  —  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States. 


1803.  IMPEACHMENTS.  143 

A  year  of  truce  between  Congress  and  the  Supreme 
Court  had  followed  the  repeal  of  the  Judiciary  Act. 
To  prevent  Chief-Justice  Marshall  and  his  associates 
from  interfering  with  the  new  arrangements,  Congress 
in  abolishing  the  circuit  courts  in  1801  took  the 
strong  measure  of  suspending  for  more  than  a  year 
the  sessions  of  the  Supreme  Court  itself.  Between 
December,  1801,  and  February,  1803,  the  court  was 
not  allowed  to  sit.  Early  in  February,  1803,  a  few 
days  before  the  Supreme  Court  was  to  meet,  after 
fourteen  months  of  separation,  President  Jefferson 
sent  an  ominous  Message  to  the  House  of  Represen 
tatives. 

"  The  enclosed  letter  and  affidavits,"  he  said,1  "  exhib 
iting  matter  of  complaint  against  John  Pickering,  district 
judge  of  New  Hampshire,  which  is  not  within  executive 
cognizance,  I  transmit  them  to  the  House  of  Representa 
tives,  to  whom  the  Constitution  has  confided  a  power 
of  instituting  proceedings  of  redress  if  they  shall  be  of 
opinion  that  the  case  calls  for  them." 

The  enclosed  papers  tended  to  show  that  Judge 
Pickering,  owing  to  habits  of  intoxication  or  other 
causes,  had  become  a  scandal  to  the  bench,  and  was 
unfit  to  perform  his  duties.  At  first  sight  the  House 
of  Representatives  might  not  understand  what  it  had 
to  do  with  such  a  matter  ;  but  the  President's  lan 
guage  admitted  no  doubt  of  his  meaning.  The  Consti 
tution  said  that  the  House  of  Representatives  "  shall 

1  Message  of  Feb.  3,  1803;  Annals  of  Congress,  1802-1803, 
p.  460. 


144         HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  7. 

have  the  sole  power  of  impeachment ; "  and  "  all  civil 
officers  of  the  United  States  shall  be  removed  from 
office  on  impeachment  for,  and  conviction  of,  trea 
son,  bribery,  or  other  high  crimes  and  misdemean 
ors."  Jefferson's  Message  officially  announced  to  the 
House  the  President's  opinion  that  Judge  Pickering's 
conduct  was  a  misdemeanor  within  the  reach  of 
impeachment. 

The  House  referred  the  Message  to  a  committee 
of  five,  controlled  by  Joseph  Nicholson  and  John  Ran 
dolph.  A  fortnight  later,  Nicholson  reported  a  reso 
lution  ordering  the  impeachment;  and  before  the 
session  closed,  the  House,  by  a  vote  of  forty-five  to 
eight,  adopted  his  report,  and  sent  Nicholson  and 
Randolph  to  the  bar  of  the  Senate  to  impeach  Judge 
Pickering  of  high  crimes  and  misdemeanors.  March 
3, 1803,  the  last  day  of  the  session,  the  two  members 
delivered  their  message. 

Precisely  as  the  House,  by  the  President's  invita 
tion,  was  about  to  impeach  Judge  Pickering,  the 
Supreme  Court,  through  the  Chief-Justice's  mouth, 
delivered  an  opinion  which  could  be  regarded  in  no 
other  light  than  as  a  defiance.  Chief-Justice  Mar 
shall's  own  appointment  had  been  one  of  those  made 
by  the  last  President  between  Dec.  12,  1800,  and 
March  4,  1801,  which  Jefferson  called  an  "  outrage 
on  decency," l  and  which,  except  as  concerned  life 
offices,  he  held  to  be  "  nullities."  His  doctrine  that 
all  appointments  made  by  a  retiring  President  were 

1  Jefferson  to  General  Knox,  March  27,  1801  ;  Works,  iy.  386. 


1803.  IMPEACHMENTS.  145 

nullities,  unless  made  with  the  consent  of  the  Presi 
dent  elect,  rested  on  the  argument  that  the  retiring 
President  was  no  longer  selecting  his  own  but  his 
successor's  agents.  Perhaps  it  involved  also  the 
favorite  idea  that  the  election  of  1800  was  something 
more  than  a  change  of  Presidents,  —  that  it  was  a 
real  revolution  in  the  principle  of  government.  Any 
theory  was  sufficient  for  the  Executive,  but  execu 
tive  theories  did  not  necessarily  bind  the  Judiciary. 
Among  the  nominations  which,  like  the  appointment 
of  Marshall,  were  obnoxious  to  Jefferson,  was  that  ol 
William  Marbury  as  justice  of  the  peace  for  five  years 
for  the  District  of  Columbia.  The  nomination  was 
sent  to  the  Senate  March  2,  1801,  and  was  approved 
the  next  day,  a  few  hours  before  Jefferson  took  his 
oath  of  office.  The  commission,  regularly  made  out, 
signed  by  the  President,  countersigned  by  John  Mar 
shall  the  acting  Secretary  of  State,  and  duly  sealed, 
was  left  with  other  documents  on  the  table  in  the 
State  Department,  where  it  came  into  the  possession 
of  Attorney-General  Lincoln,  acting  as  President 
Jefferson's  Secretary  of  State.  Jefferson,  having 
decided  that  late  appointments  were  nullities,  retained 
Marbury's  commission.  Marbury,  at  the  December 
term  of  1801,  moved  the  Supreme  Court  for  a  Rule 
to  Secretary  Madison  to  show  cause  why  a  mandamus 
should  not  issue  commanding  him  to  deliver  the  doc 
ument.  The  Rule  was  duly  served,  and  the  case 
argued  in  December,  1801 ;  but  the  Judiciary  Act 
having  suspended  for  fourteen  months  the  sessions 

VOL.  II.  —  10 


146        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.        CH.  7. 

of  the  Supreme  Court,  the  Chief-Justice  did  not  de 
liver  his  opinion  until  Feb.  24, 1803.1 

The  strongest  admirers  of  Marshall  admitted  that 
his  manner  of  dealing  with  this  case  was  unusual. 
Where  a  judgment  was  to  turn  on  a  question  of  juris 
diction,  the  Court  commonly  considered  that  point 
as  first  and  final.  In  the  case  of  Marbury  the  Court 
had  no  original  jurisdiction,  and  so  decided ;  but  in 
stead  of  beginning  at  that  point  and  dismissing  the 
motion,  the  Court  began  by  discussing  the  merits 
of  the  case,  and  ruled  that  when  a  commission  had 
been  duly  signed  and  sealed  the  act  was  complete, 
and  delivery  was  not  necessary  to  its  validity.  Mar- 
bury's  appointment  was  complete  ;  and  as  the  law 
gave  him  the  right  to  hold  for  five  years,  independent 
of  the  Executive,  his  appointment  was  not  revocable : 
"  To  withhold  his  commission,  therefore,  is  an  act 
deemed  by  the  Court  not  warranted  by  law,  but  vio- 
lative  of  a  legal  vested  right." 

This  part  of  the  decision  bore  the  stamp  of  Mar 
shall's  character.  The  first  duty  of  law,  as  he  under 
stood  it,  was  to  maintain  the  sanctity  of  pledged  word. 
In  his  youth  society  had  suffered  severely  from  want 
of  will  to  enforce  a  contract.  The  national  govern 
ment,  and  especially  the  judiciary,  had  been  created 
to  supply  this  want  by  compelling  men  to  perform 
their  contracts.  The  essence  of  the  opinion  in  Mar- 
bury's  case  was  that  the  Executive  should  be  held  to 
the  performance  of  a  contract,  all  the  more  because 
1  Cranch's  Reports,  i.  153. 


1803.  IMPEACHMENTS.  147 

of  his  personal  repugnance.  Marshall  ruled  that 
Marbury  had  to  his  commission  a  vested  legal  right 
of  which  the  Executive  could  not  deprive  him  ;  and 
although  the  Court  could  not  intermeddle  with  the 
prerogatives  of  the  Executive,  it  might  and  would 
command  a  head  of  department  to  perform  a  duty  not 
depending  on  Executive  discretion,  but  on  particular 
Acts  of  Congress  and  the  general  principles  of  law. 
The  mandamus  might  issue,  but  not  from  the  Supreme 
Court,  which  had  appellate  jurisdiction  only.  In  other 
words,  if  Marbury  chose  to  apply  for  the  mandamus 
to  Judge  Cranch  and  the  District  Court,  he  might 
expect  the  success  of  his  application. 

The  decision  in  Marbury's  case  naturally  exasper 
ated  Jefferson  ;  but  the  chief-justice  knew  the  point 
beyond  which  he  could  not  go  in  asserting  the  juris 
diction  of  his  court,  and  was  content  to  leave  the 
matter  as  it  stood.  Marbury  never  applied  for  the 
mandamus  in  the  court  below.  The  opinion  in  the 
case  of  Marbury  and  Madison  was  allowed  to  sleep, 
and  its  language  was  too  guarded  to  furnish  excuse 
for  impeachment ;  but  while  the  President  was  still 
sore  under  the  discourtesy  of  Marshall's  law,  another 
member  of  the  Supreme  Bench  attacked  him  in  a 
different  way.  If  one  judge  in  the  United  States 
should  have  known  the  peril  in  which  the  judiciary 
stood,  it  was  Justice  Samuel  Chase  of  Maryland,  who 
had  done  more  than  all  the  other  judges  to  exas 
perate  the  democratic  majority.  His  overbearing 
manners  had  twice  driven  from  his  court  the  most 


148         HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  7. 

eminent  counsel  of  the  circuit ;  he  had  left  the  bench 
without  a  quorum  in  order  that  he  might  make  politi 
cal  speeches  for  his  party ;  and  his  contempt  for  the 
popular  will  was  loudly  expressed.  In  the  cases  of 
Fries  and  Callender,  in  1800,  he  had  strained  the  law 
in  order  to  convict  for  the  government ;  and  inasmuch 
as  his  energy  was  excess  of  zeal,  for  conviction  was 
certain,  he  had  exposed  himself  to  the  charge  of 
over-officiousness  in  order  to  obtain  the  chief-justice's 
chair,  which  was  given  to  Marshall.  That  he  was 
not  impeached  after  the  change  of  administration 
proved  the  caution  of  the  Republican  party;  but  by 
this  neglect  Congress  seemed  to  have  condoned  his 
old  offences,  or  at  least  had  tacitly  consented  to  let 
their  punishment  depend  on  the  judge's  future  good 
behavior. 

Unluckily  Chase's  temper  knew  no  laws  of  caution. 
He  belonged  to  the  old  class  of  conservatives  who 
thought  that  judges,  clergymen,  and  all  others  in  au 
thority  should  guide  and  warn  the  people.  May  2, 
1803,  barely  two  months  after  Marshall's  defiance  of 
the  President  in  Marbury's  case  and  the  impeachment 
of  Pickering,  Justice  Chase  addressed  the  grand  jury 
at  Baltimore  on  the  democratic  tendencies  of  their 
local  and  national  government.1 

"Where  law  is  uncertain,  partial,  or  arbitrary,"  he 

said;  "where  justice  is  not  impartially  administered  to 

all ;  where  property  is  insecure,  and  the  person  is  liable 

to  insult  and  violence  without  redress  by  law,  —  the  peo- 

1  Annals  of  Congress,  1804-1805,  pp.  673-676. 


1803.  IMPEACHMENTS.  149 

pie  are  not  free,  whatever  may  be  their  form  of  gov 
ernment.  To  this  situation  I  greatly  fear  we  are  fast 
approaching.  .  .  .  The  late  alteration  of  the  Federal 
judiciary  by  the  abolition  of  the  office  of  the  sixteen  cir 
cuit  judges,  and  the  recent  change  in  our  State  Consti 
tution  by  the  establishing  of  universal  suffrage,  and  the 
further  alteration  that  is  contemplated  in  our  State  judi 
ciary  (if  adopted)  will  in  my  judgment  take  away  all 
security  for  property  and  personal  liberty.  The  inde 
pendence  of  the  national  judiciary  is  already  shaken  to 
its  foundation,  and  the  virtue  of  the  people  alone  can  re 
store  it.  ...  Our  republican  Constitution  will  sink  into 
a  mobocracy,  —  the  worst  of  all  possible  governments. 
.  .  .  The  modern  doctrines  by  our  late  reformers,  that 
all  men  in  a  state  of  society  are  entitled  to  enjoy  equal 
liberty  and  equal  rights,  have  brought  this  mighty  mis 
chief  upon  us ;  and  I  fear  that  it  will  rapidly  progress 
until  peace  and  order,  freedom  and  property,  shall  be 
destroyed." 

At  the  moment  of  Justice  Chase's  outburst  to  the 
Baltimore  grand  jury,  the  President  was  at  Washing 
ton  deeply  interested  in  the  Louisiana  business,  and 
unaware  that  on  the  day  when  Chase  delivered  his 
tirade  Livingston  and  Monroe  in  Paris  were  signing 
their  names  to  a  treaty  which  put  the  Administration 
beyond  danger  from  such  attacks.  When  he  saw  in 
the  newspapers  a  report  of  what  had  been  said  from 
the  bench  at  Baltimore,  he  wrote  to  Joseph  Nichol 
son,  in  whose  hands  already  lay  the  management  of 
Pickering's  impeachment : l  — 

1  Jefferson  to  Nicholson,  May  13,  1803;  Works,  iv.  486. 


150         HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  7. 

"  You  must  have  heard  of  the  extraordinary  charge  of 
Chase  to  the  grand  jury  at  Baltimore.  Ought  this  sedi 
tious  and  official  attack  on  the  principles  of  our  Constitu 
tion  and  on  the  proceedings  of  a  State  to  go  unpunished ; 
and  to  whom  so  pointedly  as  yourself  will  the  public  look 
for  the  necessary  measures?  I  ask  these  questions  for 
your  consideration ;  for  myself,  it  is  better  that  I  should 
not  interfere." 

"  Non-intervention,"  according  to  Talleyrand,  "  is  a 
word  used  in  politics  and  metaphysics,  which  means 
very  nearly  the  same  thing  as  intervention."  The 
event  proved  that  non-intervention  was  wise  policy ; 
but  Jefferson  was  somewhat  apt  to  say  that  it  was 
better  he  should  not  interfere  in  the  same  breath  with 
which  he  interfered.  The  warning  that  he  could  not 
officially  interfere  seemed  to  imply  that  the  quarrel 
was  personal ;  for  in  the  case  of  Pickering  he  had 
interfered  with  decision.  If  this  was  his  view,  the 
success  of  any  attack  upon  Chase  would  be  a  gain 
to  him,  and  he  was  so  ordering  as  to  make  failure 
a  loss  only  to  those  who  undertook  it.  Nicholson, 
hot-headed  though  he  was,  did  not  enter  readily  into 
this  hazardous  venture.  He  reflected  upon  it  all 
summer,  and  consulted  the  friends  on  whose  support 
he  depended.  Macon  wrote  to  him  a  letter  of  unu 
sual  length,1  suggesting  grave  doubts  whether  a  judge 
ought  to  be  impeached  for  expressing  to  a  grand  jury 
political  opinions  which  every  man  was  at  liberty  to 
hold  and  express  elsewhere,  and  closed  by  announc- 
1  Macon  to  Nicholson,  Aug.  6,  1803;  Nicholson  MSS. 


1803.  IMPEACHMENTS.  151 

ing  the  conviction  that  if  any  attempt  were  made  to 
impeach,  Nicholson  ought  not  to  be  the  leader.  In 
this  opinion  Macon  was  evidently  right,  for  Chase's 
friends  could  not  fail  to  suggest  that  Nicholson  was 
to  be  rewarded  by  an  appointment  to  Chase's  vacant 
seat  on  the  Supreme  Bench  ;  but  the  House  of  Repre 
sentatives  contained  no  other  leader  whose  authority, 
abilities,  and  experience  warranted  him  in  taking  so 
prominent  a  part,  unless  it  were  John  Randolph. 

A  worse  champion  than  Randolph  for  a  difficult 
cause  could  not  be  imagined.  Between  him  and  Jef 
ferson  little  sympathy  existed.  Randolph  had  quar 
relled  with  the  branch  of  his  family  to  which  Jefferson 
was  closely  allied  ;  and  his  private  feelings  stood  in 
the  way  of  personal  attachment.  His  intimates  in 
Congress  were  not  chiefly  Virginians,  but  men  like 
Macon  of  North  Carolina,  Joseph  Bryan  of  Georgia, 
and  Nicholson  of  Maryland,  —  independent  followers 
of  Virginia  doctrine,  who  owned  no  personal  allegiance 
to  Jefferson.  That  the  President  should  have  been 
willing  to  let  such  a  man  take  entire  responsibility 
for  an  impeachment  was  natural ;  but  had  Jefferson 
directed  the  step,  he  would  never  have  selected  Ran 
dolph  to  manage  a  prosecution  on  which  the  fate  of 
his  principles  closely  depended.  Randolph  was  no 
lawyer  ;  but  this  defect  was  a  trifling  objection  com 
pared  with  his  greater  unfitness  in  other  respects. 
Ill-balanced,  impatient  of  obstacles,  incapable  of  sus 
tained  labor  or  of  methodical  arrangement,  illogical 
to  excess,  and  egotistic  to  the  verge  of  madness,  he 


152        HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  7. 

was  sparkling  and  formidable  in  debate  or  on  the 
hustings,  where  he  could  follow  the  wayward  impulse 
of  his  fancy  running  in  the  accustomed  channels  of 
his  thought;  but  the  qualities  which  helped  him  in 
debate  were  fatal  to  him  at  the  bar. 

Such  was  the  origin  of  a  measure  which  did  more 
to  define  the  character  of  the  government  than  any 
other  single  event  in  Jefferson's  first  administration, 
except  the  purchase  of  Louisiana.  Randolph  threw 
himself  into  the  new  undertaking ;  for  he  sincerely 
believed  in  the  justice  of  his  cause,  and  was  alive  to 
the  danger  of  leaving  the  Supreme  Court  in  the  hands 
of  Marshall  and  men  of  his  stamp  who  were  deter 
mined  to  consolidate  the  government.  Yet  the  chance 
of  obtaining  a  conviction,  on  a  charge  no  stronger  than 
that  of  the  Baltimore  address,  was  so  slight  as  to 
incline  Randolph  against  risking  it ;  and  he  decided 
to  insure  success  by  putting  the  cases  of  Fries  and 
Callender  in  the  foreground. 

This  was  not  easily  done.  Pickering's  impeach 
ment  had  been  brought  before  the  House  by  a  Mes 
sage  from  the  President;  but  in  Chase's  case  the 
President  preferred  not  to  take  part.  Randolph  was 
forced  to  escape  the  difficulty  by  an  awkward  ma 
noeuvre.  During  the  autumn  and  early  winter  of 
1803  Congress  was  busy  with  Louisiana  legislation, 
and  had  no  leisure  for  other  matters  ;  but  soon  after 
the  new  year  Randolph  rose  and  said1  that  in  the 
course  of  the  last  session  Mr.  Smilie  of  Pennsylvania 
1  Jan.  5,  1804;  Annals  of  Congress,  1803-1804,  p.  805. 


1803.  IMPEACHMENTS.  153 

had  made  some  statements  in  regard  to  Justice 
Chase's  conduct  which  seemed  to  call  for  notice,  but 
that  want  of  time  had  precluded  action.  Finding 
his  attention  thus  drawn  to  the  matter,  Randolph 
gravely  continued,  he  had  felt  it  his  duty  to  inves 
tigate  Smilie's  charges  ;  and  having  convinced  him 
self  that  ground  for  impeachment  existed,  he  asked 
the  House  to  appoint  a  committee  of  inquiry.  Such 
an  introduction  of  a  great  constitutional  struggle  was 
not  imposing  ;  but  party  discipline  was  at  its  highest 
point,  and  after  some  vigorous  Federalist  resistance 
Randolph  carried  his  motion  by  a  vote  of  eighty-one 
to  forty.  Three  Northern  democrats  voted  with  the 
Federalists  ;  and  although  the  defection  seemed  not 
serious  so  far  as  concerned  the  scientific  Dr.  Samuel 
L.  Mitchill,  whose  political  principles  were  liberal 
enough  at  all  times,  some  importance  even  then  at 
tached  to  the  vote  of  John  Smith  of  New  York,  who 
was  about  to  enter  the  Senate  and  to  act  as  one  of 
Chase's  judges. 

Meanwhile  Judge  Pickering's  trial  began.  The 
Senate,  "  sitting  as  a  Court  of  Impeachments,"  lis 
tened  while  Nicholson,  Randolph,  Rodney,  and  six  or 
seven  other  Republican  members  "  exhibited  the  grand 
inquest  of  the  nation."  The  character  of  a  court  was 
taken  in  all  the  forms  of  summons.  The  Secretary  of 
the  Senate  signed,  and  the  Sergeant-at-Arms  served, 
the  summons  to  Judge  Pickering,  while  the  witnesses 
were  regularly  subpoenaed  by  the  Secretary,  "  to  ap 
pear  before  the  Senate  of  the  United  States  in  their 


154        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.        CH.  T. 

capacity  of  a  Court  of  Impeachments,"  and  the  sub- 
prenas  were  served  by  the  marshals  of  the  district 
courts. 

Judge  Pickering  was  ordered  to  appear  on  the  2d 
of  March,  1804 ;  but  when  the  day  arrived,  and  the 
Senate  was  assembled,  with  the  managers  in  attend 
ance,  John  Pickering's  name  was  three  times  called 
without  an  answer.  Vice-President  Burr,  then  sub 
mitted  to  the  Senate  a  petition  from  Jacob  Pickering, 
son  of  the  impeached  judge,  praying  the  court  to  post 
pone  the  trial  that  he  might  have  time  to  collect  evi 
dence  with  the  view  of  showing  that  when  the  alleged 
crimes  were  committed,  and  two  years  before  as  well 
as  ever  since,  the  judge  was  wholly  deranged,  incapa 
ble  of  transacting  any  kind  of  business  which  required 
the  exercise  of  reason,  and  therefore  incapable  of  cor 
ruption  of  judgment,  no  subject  of  impeachment,  and 
amenable  to  no  tribunal  for  his  actions.  "With  this 
petition  a  letter  from  Robert  G.  Harper  was  laid  be 
fore  the  court,  requesting  to  be  allowed  to  appear  on 
the  part  of  the  petitioner  in  support  of  the  petition. 
Harper,  having  been  invited  to  a  seat  within  the  bar, 
asked  whether  he  might  be  heard,  not  as  counsel  for 
Judge  Pickering,  who  being  insane  could  give  no 
authority  for  the  purpose,  but  as  agent  for  the  peti 
tioner,  to  ask  a  postponement. 

The  question  threw  all  parties  into  agitation.  The 
managers  instantly  protested  that  Harper  in  such  a 
character  could  not  be  heard.  The  senators  retired 
for  consultation,  and  debated  all  day  without  coming 


1803.  IMPEACHMENTS.  155 

to  a  decision.  The  impeaching  party  dreaded  the 
alternative  to  which  the  proof  of  insanity  must  force 
them,  —  of  saying  either  that  an  insane  man  was  re 
sponsible,  or  that  a  man  mentally  irresponsible  might 
still  be  guilty  of  "high  crimes  and  misdemeanors" 
for  purposes  of  impeachment.  Senator  Jackson  of 
Georgia,  who  had  always  the  merit  of  speaking  with 
candor,  avowed  the  fear  that  presently  Judge  Chase's 
friends  would  come  and  pretend  that  he  too  was  mad ; l 
but  he  could  not,  even  with  Breckinridge's  help, 
carry  his  point.  The  Northern  democrats  flinched. 
Six  of  them  and  three  Southern  senators  voted  with 
the  Federalists,  and  admitted  Harper  in  his  volunteer 
character. 

Harper  put  in  his  testimony,  which  was  decisive 
in  regard  to  the  insanity  ;  but  when  he  rose  to  do 
so,  the  managers  retired,  saying  that  they  considered 
themselves  under  no  obligation  to  discuss  a  prelimi 
nary  question  raised  by  an  unauthorized  third  party. 
The  Senate  went  on  with  its  session.  The  managers 
were  obliged  to  maintain  that  insanity  was  no  bar 
to  impeachment,  and  the  Northern  democrats  were 
forced  to  accept  the  doctrine.2 

This  view  of  impeachment,  so  far  as  concerned 
the  judiciary,  had  strong  arguments  in  its  favor. 
Although  the  Constitution  made  judges'  tenure  of 

1  Diary  of  J.  Q.  Adams,  i.  299. 

2  Ibid.,  i.  301-302.     Pickering  to  George  Cabot,  Jan.  29,  1804; 
Pickering  to   Theodore   Lyman,  Feb.  11,  1804;   New  England 
Federalism,  pp.  340,  344. 


156         HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  7. 

office  dependent  on  their  good  behavior,  it  provided 
no  other  means  than  that  of  impeachment  for  their 
removal.  Even  in  England  and  in  Massachusetts, 
judges  could  be  removed  by  the  joint  action  of  Legis 
lature  and  Executive  ;  but  this  was  not  the  case 
under  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States.  If  in 
sanity  or  any  other  misfortune  was  to  bar  impeach 
ment,  the  absurdity  followed  that  unless  a  judge 
committed  some  indictable  offence  the  people  were 
powerless  to  protect  themselves.  Even  Federalists 
might  reasonably  assume  that  the  people  had  never 
placed  themselves  in  such  a  situation,  but  that  in 
making  their  judges  subject  to  impeachment  for 
misdemeanors  they  had  meant  to  extend  the  scope 
of  impeachment,  and  to  include  within  it  all  cases 
of  misbehavior  which  might  require  a  removal  from 
office  for  the  good  of  the  public  service. 

This  ground  was  fairly  taken  by  the  impeachers, 
though  not  formally  expressed.  When  Harper  had 
put  in  his  evidence  and  retired,  the  Senate  sent  again 
for  the  managers,  who  occupied  one  day  in  supplying 
evidence,  and  then  left  their  case  without  argument 
in  the  hands  of  the  court.  The  Senate  found  itself 
face  to  face  with  an  issue  beyond  measure  delicate, 
which  had  never  been  discussed,  but  from  which  es 
cape  was  impossible.  Acquittal  of  Pickering  would 
probably  be  fatal  to  the  impeachment  of  Chase,  and 
would  also  proclaim  that  the  people  could  not  pro 
tect  themselves  from  misbehavior  in  their  judicial 
servants.  On  the  other  hand,  conviction  would  vio- 


1803.  IMPEACHMENTS.  157 

late  the  deep  principle  of  law  and  justice  that  an 
insane  man  was  not  responsible  for  his  acts,  and  not 
amenable  to  any  earthly  tribunal.  Virginians  like 
Randolph  and  Wilson  Gary  Nicholas,  or  John  Breck- 
inridge,  were  ready  to  make  a  precedent  which  should 
fix  the  rule  that  impeachment  need  not  imply  crimi 
nality,  and  might  be  the  equivalent  to  removal  by 
address.  The  Northern  democrats  were  not  unwilling 
to  accept  this  view ;  but  their  consciences  revolted 
against  saying  "  guilty "  where  no  guilt  was  implied 
or  proved. 

To  escape  this  objection  a  compromise  was  proposed 
and  adopted.  The  Federalists  would  have  forced  sen 
ators  to  say  in  their  final  vote  that  Judge  Pickering 
was  "  guilty"  or  "not  guilty"  of  high  crimes  and  mis 
demeanors.  Senator  Anderson  of  Tennessee  eluded 
this  challenge  by  moving  for  a  yea-and-nay  vote  on  the 
question  whether  Pickering  was  guilty  "  as  charged." 
The  nine  Federalists  alone  opposed  his  motion,  which 
was  at  length  adopted  by  a  majority  of  two  to  one. 
By  a  vote  of  nineteen  to  seven  Judge  Pickering  was 
declared  "  guilty  as  charged "  in  the  articles  of  im 
peachment  ;  and  by  a  vote  of  twenty  to  six  the  Senate 
resolved  that  he  ought  to  be  removed  from  office. 

Two  of  the  Federalist  senators  refused  to  vote,  on 
the  ground  that  the  proceedings  were  irregular ;  Sen 
ator  Bradley  of  Vermont,  Senator  Armstrong  of  New 
York,  and  Senator  Stone  of  North  Carolina  tacitly 
protested  by  absenting  themselves.  In  a  Senate  of 
thirty-four  members  only  twenty-six  voted,  and  only 


158         HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.       CH.  7. 

nineteen  voted  for  conviction.  So  confused,  contra 
dictory,  and  irregular  were  these  proceedings  that 
Pickering's  trial  was  never  considered  a  sound  prece 
dent.  That  an  insane  man  could  be  guilty  of  crime, 
and  could  be  punished  on  ex  parte  evidence,  without 
a  hearing,  with  not  even  an  attorney  to  act  in  his 
behalf,  seemed  such  a  perversion  of  justice,  that  the 
precedent  fell  dead  on  the  spot.  Perhaps,  from  the 
constitutional  point  of  view,  a  more  fatal  objection 
was  that  in  doing  what  the  world  was  sure  to  con 
sider  an  arbitrary  and  illegal  act,  the  Virginians  failed 
to  put  on  record  the  reasons  which  led  them  to  think 
it  sound  in  principle.  In  the  Louisiana  purchase  they 
had  acted  in  a  way  equally  arbitrary,  but  they  had 
given  their  reasons  for  thinking  themselves  in  the 
right.  In  Pickering's  case  not  a  word  was  publicly 
spoken  on  either  side  ;  a  plainly  extra-constitutional 
act  was  done  without  recording  the  doctrine  on  which 
it  rested. 

The  Republicans  showed  no  hesitation.  John 
Randolph's  orders  were  obeyed  without  open  protest. 
Senator  Bradley  of  Vermont  talked  strongly  in  pri 
vate  against  them ;  Senator  Armstrong  of  New  York 
would  not  support  them ;  barely  half  the  Senate  voted 
in  their  favor  ;  but  Randolph  forced  his  party  forward 
without  stopping  to  see  how  well  his  steps  were 
taken,  or  how  far  he  was  likely  to  go.  As  though 
to  intimidate  the  Senate,  March  6,  the  day  after  the 
managers  were  defeated  on  the  vote  to  hear  Harper, 
Randolph  reported  to  the  House  a  resolution  ordering 


1803.  IMPEACHMENTS.  159 

the  impeachment  of  Justice  Chase.  March  12,  the 
day  when  the  Senate  voted  Pickering  guilty,  the 
House  took  up  Randolph's  report,  and  the  majority, 
without  debate,  voted  by  seventy-three  to  thirty-two 
that  Chase  should  be  impeached.  Not  a  Republican 
ventured  to  record  a  vote  in  the  negative.  The  next 
morning  Randolph  again  appeared  at  the  bar  of  the 
Senate,  and  announced  that  the  House  of  Repre 
sentatives  would  in  due  time  exhibit  articles  of 
impeachment  against  Samuel  Chase. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

As  the  year  1804  began,  with  Louisiana  annexed, 
the  Electoral  Amendment  secured,  and  the  impeach 
ments  in  prospect,  the  Federalists  in  Congress  wrought 
themselves  into  a  dangerous  state  of  excitement.  All 
agreed  that  the  crisis  was  at  hand ;  democracy  had 
nearly  reached  its  limit ;  and,  as  Justice  Chase  said 
from  the  bench,  peace  and  order,  freedom  and  prop 
erty,  would  soon  be  destroyed.  They  discussed  in 
private  what  should  be  done ;  and  among  the  New 
Englanders  almost  all  the  men  of  weight  were  found 
to  favor  the  policy  of  at  least  saving  New  England. 
Of  the  six  Federalist  senators  from  the  Eastern 
States, —  Plumer  and  Olcott  of  New  Hampshire,  Pick 
ering  and  Adams  of  Massachusetts,  Tracy  and  Hill- 
house  of  Connecticut,  —  all  but  Olcott  and  Adams 
thought  a  dissolution  of  the  Union  inevitable.1  Among 
the  Federalist  members  of  the  House,  Roger  Griswold 
of  Connecticut  was  the  most  active ;  he  too  was  con 
vinced  that  New  England  must  protect  herself. 
Samuel  Hunt  of  New  Hampshire,  and  Calvin  Goddard 
of  Connecticut  held  the  same  opinion.  Indeed,  Pick- 

1  New  England  Federalism,  pp.  106,  146,  342,  352;  Plumer'a 
Life  of  Plumer,  pp.  284-311. 


1804  CONSPIRACY.  161 

ering  declared  that  he  did  not  know  "  one  reflecting 
Nov-Anglian "  who  held  any  other. 

In  the  month  of  January,  1804,  despair  turned  into 
conspiracy.  Pickering,  Tracy,  Griswold,  Plumer,  and 
perhaps  others  of  the  New  England  delegation,  agreed 
to  organize  a  movement  in  their  States  for  a  disso 
lution  of  the  Union.  They  wrote  to  their  most  influ 
ential  constituents,  and  sketched  a  plan  of  action. 
In  a  letter  to  George  Cabot,  Pickering  recounted  the 
impending  dangers 1 :  — 

"By  the  Philadelphia  papers  I  see  that  the  Supreme 
Court  judges  of  Pennsylvania  are  to  be  hurled  from  their 
seats,  on  the  pretence  that  in  punishing  one  Thomas 
Passmore  for  a  contempt  they  acted  illegally  and  tyran 
nically.  I  presume  that  Shippen,  Yates,  and  Smith  are 
to  be  removed  by  the  Governor,  on  the  representation 
of  the  Legislature.  And  when  such  grounds  are  taken 
in  the  National  and  State  legislatures  to  destroy  the 
rights  of  the  judges,  whose  rights  can  be  safe?  Why 
destroy  them,  unless  as  the  prelude  to  the  destruction  of 
every  influential  Federalist  and  of  every  man  of  consid 
erable  property  who  is  not  of  the  reigning  sect?  New 
judges,  of  characters  and  tempers  suited  to  the  object, 
will  be  the  selected  ministers  of  vengeance." 

A  separation,  Pickering  inferred,  had  become  neces 
sary  ;  but  when  and  how  was  it  to  be  effected  ? 

"If  Federalism  is  crumbling  away  in  New  England, 
there  is  no  time  to  be  lost,  lest  it  should  be  overwhelmed 
and  become  unable  to  attempt  its  own  relief;  its  last 

1  Pickering  to  George  Cabot,  Jan.  29,  1804;  Lodge's  Cabot, 
p.  337. 

TOL.  II.  — 11 


162        HISTORY  OF  THE   UNITED  STATES.        CH.  8. 

refuge  is  New  England,  and  immediate  exertion  perhaps 
its  only  hope.  It  must  begin  in  Massachusetts.  The 
proposition  would  be  welcomed  in  Connecticut;  and 
could  we  doubt  of  New  Hampshire?  But  New  York 
must  be  associated ;  and  how  is  her  concurrence  to  be 
obtained?  She  must  be  made  the  centre  of  the  confed 
eracy.  Vermont  and  New  Jersey  would  follow  of  course, 
and  Rhode  Island  of  necessity.  Who  can  be  consulted, 
and  who  will  take  the  lead  ?  The  legislatures  of  Massa 
chusetts  and  Connecticut  meet  in  May,  and  of  New 
Hampshire  in  the  same  month,  or  June.  The  subject 
has  engaged  the  contemplation  of  many.  The  Connec 
ticut  gentlemen  have  seriously  meditated  upon  it.  ... 
Tracy  has  written  to  several  of  his  most  distinguished 
friends  in  Connecticut,  and  may  soon  receive  their  an 
swers.  R.  Griswold,  examining  the  finances,  has  found 
that  the  States  above  mentioned,  to  be  embraced  by  the 
Northern  confederacy,  now  pay  as  much  or  more  of 
the  public  revenues  as  would  discharge  their  share  of  the 
public  debts  due  those  States  and  abroad,  leaving  out 
the  millions  given  for  Louisiana." 

Roger  Griswold  wrote  a  few  weeks  afterward  to 
Oliver  Wolcott  in  similar  terms  : 1  - 

"  The  project  which  we  had  formed  was  to  induce,  if 
possible,  the  legislatures  of  the  three  New  England 
States  who  remain  Federal  to  commence  measures  which 
should  call  for  a  reunion  of  the  Northern  States.  The 
extent  of  those  measures,  and  the  rapidity  with  which 
they  shall  be  followed  up,  must  be  governed  by  circum- 

1  Roger  Griswold  to  Oliver  Wolcott,  March  11,  1804;  Hamil 
ton's  History  of  the  Republic,  vii.  781;  New  England  Federal 
ism,  p.  354. 


1804.  CONSPIRACY.  163 

stances.  The  magnitude  and  jealousy  of  Massachusetts 
would  render  it  necessary  that  the  operation  should  be 
commenced  there.  If  any  hope  can  be  created  that  New 
York  will  ultimately  support  the  plan,  it  may  perhaps  be 
supported." 

The  first  action,  said  he,  must  come  from  the  Legis 
lature  of  Massachusetts,  which  was  not  yet  elected, 
but  would  meet  early  in  June.  Connecticut  and  New 
Hampshire  were  to  follow ;  and  to  Pickering's  san 
guine  mind  the  Northern  Confederacy  seemed  already 
established.  "  The  people  of  the  East,"  he  said, 
"  cannot  reconcile  their  habits,  views,  and  interests 
with  those  of  the  South  and  West.  The  latter  are 
beginning  to  rule  with  a  rod  of  iron." 

Pickering  knew  that  the  Federalist  majority  in 
Massachusetts  was  none  too  great.  The  election  in 
May,  four  months  later,  showed  a  Federalist  vote  of 
30,000  against  a  Republican  minority  of  24,000,  while 
in  the  Legislature  Harrison  Gray  Otis  was  chosen 
Speaker  by  129  votes  to  103.  Pickering  knew  also 
that  his  colleague,  Senator  Adams,  was  watching  his 
movements  with  increasing  ill-will,  which  Pickering 
lost  no  chance  to  exasperate.  Nothing,  could  be  more 
certain  than  that  at  the  first  suggestion  of  disunion 
Senator  Adams  and  the  moderate  Federalists  would 
attack  the  Essex  Junto  with  the  bitterness  of  long- 
suppressed  hatred  ;  and  if  they  could  not  command 
fourteen  votes  in  the  Legislature  and  three  thousand 
in  the  State,  a  great  change  must  have  occurred  since 
the  year  before,  when  they  elected  Adams  to  the 


164        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.        CH.  8. 

Senate  for  the  long  term  over  Pickering's  head.  Pick 
ering  concealed  his  doings  from  his  colleague ;  but 
Tracy  was  not  so  cautious.  Adams  learned  the  secret 
from  Tracy ;  and  the  two  senators  from  Massachusetts 
drew  farther  and  farther  apart,  in  spite  of  the  im 
peachments,  which  tended  to  force  them  together. 

The  Essex  Junto,  which  sent  Pickering  to  Wash 
ington,  and  to  which  he  appealed  for  support,  read 
his  letter  with  evident  astonishment.  George  Cabot, 
Chief-Justice  Parsons,  Fisher  Ames,  and  Stephen 
Higginson,  who  were  the  leaders  consulted,1  agreed 
that  the  scheme  was  impracticable ;  and  Cabot,  as 
gently  as  possible,  put  their  common  decision  into 
words. 

"All  the  evils  you  describe,"  he  said,2  "and  many 
more,  are  to  be  apprehended ;  but  I  greatly  fear  that  a 
separation  would  be  no  remedy,  because  the  source  of 
them  is  in  the  political  theories  of  our  country  and  in 
ourselves.  A  separation  at  some  period  not  very  remote 
may  probably  take  place, —  the  first  impression  of  it  is 
even  now  favorably  received  by  many ;  but  I  cannot 
natter  myself  with  the  expectation  of  essential  good  to 
proceed  from  it  while  we  retain  maxims  and  principles 
which  all  experience,  and  I  may  add  reason  too,  pro 
nounce  to  be  impracticable  and  absurd.  Even  in  New 
England,  where  there  is  among  the  body  of  the  people 
more  wisdom  and  virtue  than  in  any  other  part  of  the 
United  States,  we  are  full  of  errors  which  no  reasoning 

1  Cabot  to  Pickering,  March  7,  1804;  New  England  Feder 
alism,  p.  353. 

3  Cabot  to  Pickering,  Feb.  14,  1804;  Lodge's  Cabot,  p.  341. 


1804.  CONSPIRACY.  165 

could  eradicate  if  there  were  a  Lycurgus  in  every  village. 
We  are  democratic  altogether ;  and  I  hold  democracy  in 
its  natural  operation  to  be  the  government  of  the  worst. 

"  There  is  no  energy  in  the  Federal  party,  and  there 
could  be  none  manifested  without  great  hazard  of  losing 
the  State  government.  Some  of  our  best  men  in  high 
stations  are  kept  in  office  because  they  forbear  to  exert 
any  influence,  and  not  because  they  possess  right  princi 
ples.  They  are  permitted  to  have  power  if  they  will  not 
use  it.  ...  I  incline  to  the  opinion  that  the  essential 
alterations  which  may  in  future  be  made  to  amend  our 
form  of  government  will  be  the  consequences  only  of 
great  suffering  or  the  immediate  effects  of  violence.  If 
we  should  be  made  to  feel  a  very  great  calamity  from  the 
abuse  of  power  by  the  National  Administration,  we 
might  do  almost  anything ;  but  it  would  be  idle  to  talk 
to  the  deaf,  to  warn  the  people  of  distant  evils.  By  this 
time  you  will  suppose  I  am  willing  to  do  nothing  but 
submit  to  fate.  I  would  not  be  so  understood.  I  am 
convinced  we  cannot  do  what  is  wished ;  but  we  can  do 
much,  if  we  work  with  Nature  (or  the  course  of  things), 
and  not  against  her.  A  separation  is  now  impracticable, 
because  we  do  not  feel  the  necessity  or  utility  of  it.  The 
same  separation  then  will  be  unavoidable  when  our  loyalty 
to  the  Union  is  generally  perceived  to  be  the  instrument 
of  debasement  and  impoverishment.  If  it  is  prematurely 
attempted,  those  few  only  will  promote  it  who  discern 
what  is  hidden  from  the  multitude." 

Cabot's  letter,  more  clearly  than  any  writing  of 
Alexander  Hamilton  himself,  expressed  the  philosophy 
and  marked  the  tactics  of  their  school.  Neither 
Cabot  nor  Hamilton  was  a  lively  -writer,  and  the  duat 


166         HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  8. 

which  has  gathered  deep  on  their  doctrines  dulls 
whatever  brilliancy  they  once  possessed ;  but  this 
letter  showed  why  Cabot  was  considered  the  wisest 
head  in  his  party,  to  whose  rebuke  even  Ham 
ilton  was  forced  to  bow.  For  patient  and  willing 
students  who  have  groped  in  search  of  the  idea 
which,  used  by  Hamilton  and  Jefferson,  caused  bit 
terer  feeling  and  roused  deeper  terrors  than  civil  war 
itself,  Cabot's  long  and  perhaps  pedantic  letter  on 
the  policy  of  disunion  was  full  of  meaning.  "  "We 
shall  go  the  way  of  all  governments  wholly  popular, 
—  from  bad  to  worse,  —  until  the  evils,  no  longer 
tolerable,  shall  generate  their  own  remedies."  De 
mocracy  must  end  in  a  crisis,  experience  and  reason 
pronounced  it  impracticable  and  absurd,  Nature  would 
in  due  time  vindicate  her  own  laws ;  and  when  the 
inevitable  chaos  should  come,  then  conservative  states 
manship  could  set  society  on  a  sound  footing  by 
limiting  the  suffrage  to  those  citizens  who  might 
hold  in  their  own  right  two  thousand  dollars  value  in 
land.  Meanwhile  disunion  would  be  useless,  and  the 
attempt  to  bring  it  about  would  break  up  the  Fed 
eralist  party.  "  A  war  with  Great  Britain  manifestly 
provoked  by  our  rulers  "  was  the  only  chance  which 
Cabot  foresaw  of  bringing  the  people  of  New  Eng 
land  to  a  dissolution  of  the  Union. 

Pickering  was  not  so  intelligent  as  Cabot,  Parsons, 
and  Ames ;  his  temper  was  harsher  than  theirs ;  he 
was  impatient  of  control,  and  never  forgot  or  wholly 
forgave  those  who  forced  him  to  follow  another  course 


1804.  CONSPIRACY.  167 

than  the  one  he  chose.  Cabot's  letter  showed  a  sense 
of  these  traits  ;  for  though  it  was  in  the  nature  of 
a  command  or  entreaty  to  cease  discussing  disunion, 
if  the  Federalist  party  in  Massachusetts  were  to  be 
saved,  it  was  couched  in  gentle  language,  and  without 
affecting  a  tone  of  advice  suggested  ideas  wThich 
ought  to  guide  Federalists  in  Congress.  Pickering 
was  to  wait  for  the  crisis.  Inaction  was  easy ;  and 
even  though  the  crisis  should  be  delayed  five  or  ten 
years,  —  a  case  hardly  to  be  supposed,  —  no  step  could 
be  taken  without  a  blunder  before  the  public  should 
be  ready  for  it.  With  this  simple  and  sound  prin 
ciple  to  guide  them,  conservatives  could  not  go  wrong. 
Cabot  there  left  the  matter. 

Such  gentleness  toward  a  man  of  Pickering's 
temper  was  a  mistake,  which  helped  to  cost  the  life 
of  one  whom  conservatives  regarded  as  their  future 
leader  in  the  crisis.  Pickering  was  restive  under  the 
sense  that  his  friends  preferred  other  counsellors  ; 
whereas  his  experience  and  high  offices,  to  saj7  noth 
ing  of  his  ability,  entitled  him,  as  he  thought,  to 
greater  weight  in  the  party  than  Hamilton,  Cabot, 
or  Rufus  King.  Backed  by  Tracy,  Griswold,  and 
other  men  of  standing,  Pickering  felt  able  to  cope 
with  opposition.  His  rough  sense  and  democratic 
instincts  warned  him  that  the  fine-drawn  political 
theories  of  George  Cabot  and  Theophilus  Parsons 
might  end  in  impotence.  He  could  see  no  reason 
why  Massachusetts,  once  corrupted,  might  not  wallow 
in  democratic  iniquities  with  as  much  pleasure  as 


168        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.        CH.  8. 

New  York  or  Pennsylvania ;  and  all  that  was  worth 
saving  might  be  lost  before  her  democracy  would 
consent  to  eat  the  husks  of  repentance  and  ask  for 
giveness  from  the  wise  and  good.  Cabot  wanted  to 
wait  a  few  months  or  years  until  democracy  should 
work  out  its  own  fate  ;  and  whenever  the  public  should 
yearn  for  repose,  America  would  find  her  Pitt  and 
Bonaparte  combined  in  the  political  grasp  and  mili 
tary  genius  of  Alexander  Hamilton.  Pickering,  as  a 
practical  politician,  felt  that  if  democracy  were  suf 
fered  to  pull  down  the  hierarchy  of  New  England, 
neither  disunion  nor  foreign  war,  nor  "  a  very  great 
calamity "  of  any  kind,  could  with  certainty  restore 
what  had  once  been  destroyed. 

Cabot's  argument  shook  none  of  Pickering's  con 
victions  ;  but  the  practical  difficulty  on  which  the 
home  Junto  relied  was  fatal  unless  some  way  of  re 
moving  it  could  be  invented.  During  the  month  of 
February,  1804,  when  the  impeachment  panic  was  at 
its  height  in  Congress,  Pickering,  Tracy,  and  Plumer 
received  letter  after  letter  from  New  England,  all 
telling  the  same  story.  The  eminent  Judge  Tapping 
Reeve,  of  Connecticut,  wrote  to  Tracy : l  "  I  have  seen 
many  of  our  friends ;  and  all  that  I  have  seen  and 
most  that  I  have  heard  from  believe  that  we  must 
separate,  and  that  this  is  the  most  favorable  mo 
ment."  He  had  heard  only  one  objection,  —  that 
the  country  was  not  prepared ;  but  this  objection, 

1  Tapping  Reeve  to  Uriah  Tracy,  Feb.  7,  1804;  Lodge's 
Cabot,  p.  442. 


1804.  CONSPIRACY.  169 

which  meant  that  the  disunionists  were  a  minority, 
was  echoed  from  all  New  England.  The  conspirators 
dared  not  openly  discuss  the'  project.  "  There  are  few 
among  my  acquaintance,"  wrote  Pickering's  nephew, 
Theodore  Lyman,1  "  with  whom  I  could  on  that  sub 
ject  freely  converse ;  there  may  be  more  ready  than  I 
am  aware  of."  Plumer  found  a  great  majority  of  the 
New  Hampshire  Federalists  decidedly  opposed.  Roger 
Griswold,  toward  the  end  of  the  session,  summed  up 
the  result  in  his  letter  to  Oliver  Wolcott :  — 

"  We  have  endeavored  during  this  session  to  rouse  our 
friends  in  New  England  to  make  some  bold  exertions  in 
that  quarter.  They  generally  tell  us  that  they  are  sensi 
ble  of  the  danger,  that  the  Northern  States  must  unite ; 
but  they  think  the  time  has  not  yet  arrived.  Prudence 
is  undoubtedly  necessary ;  but  when  it  degenerates  into 
procrastination  it  becomes  fatal.  Whilst  we  are  waiting 
for  the  time  to  arrive  in  New  England,  it  is  certain  the 
democracy  is  making  daily  inroads  upon  us,  and  'our 
means  of  resistance  are  lessening  every  day.  Yet  it 
appears  impossible  to  induce  our  friends  to  make  any 
decisive  exertions.  Under  these  circumstances  I  have 
been  induced  to  look  to  New  York." 

The  representatives  of  the  wise  and  good  looked  at 
politics  with  eyes  which  saw  no  farther  than  those 
of  the  most  profligate  democrat  into  the  morality  of 
the  game.  Pickering  enjoyed  hearing  himself  called 
"  honest  Tim  Pickering,"  as  though  he  were  willing 
to  imply  a  tinge  of  dishonesty  in  others,  even  in  the 

1  Theodore  Lyman  to  Pickering,  Feb.  29,  1804;  Lodge's 
Cabot,  p.  446. 


170        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.        CH.  8. 

Puritan  society  of  Wenham  and  Salem.  Griswold 
was  to  the  end  of  his  life  a  highly  respected  citizen 
of  Connecticut,  and  died  while  governor  of  the  State. 
That  both  these  worthy  men  should  conspire  to  break 
up  the  Union  implied  to  their  minds  no  dishonesty, 
because  they  both  held  that  the  Republican  majority 
had  by  its  illegal  measures  already  destroyed  the 
Constitution  which  they  had  sworn  to  support;  but 
although  such  casuistry  might  excuse  in  their  own 
consciences  the  act  of  conspiracy,  neither  this  rea 
soning  nor  any  other  consistent  with  self-respect  war 
ranted  their  next  step.  Griswold's  remark  that  the 
procrastination  of  New  England  had  led  him  to  look 
to  New  York  was  not  quite  candid ;  his  plan  had 
from  the  first  depended  on  New  York.  Pickering 
had  written  to  Cabot  at  the  outset,  "  She  must  be 
made  the  centre  of  the  confederacy."  New  York 
seemed,  more  than  New  England,  unfit  to  be  made 
the  centre  of  a  Northern  confederacy,  because  there 
the  Federalist  party  was  a  relatively  small  minority. 
If  Massachusetts  and  Connecticut  showed  fatal  apa 
thy,  in  New  York  actual  repulsion  existed  ;  the  ex 
treme  Federalists  had  no  following.  To  bring  New 
York  to  the  Federalism  of  Pickering  and  Gris 
wold,  the  Federalist  party  needed  to  recover  power 
under  a  leader  willing  to  do  its  work.  The  idea 
implied  a  bargain  and  an  intrigue  on  terms  such  as 
in  the  Middle  Ages  the  Devil  was  believed  to  impose 
upon  the  ambitious  and  reckless.  Pickering  and 
Griswold  could  win  their  game  only  by  bartering 


1804.  CONSPIRACY.  171 

their  souls  ;  they  must  invoke  the  Mephistopheles  of 
politics, 


To  this  they  had  made  up  their  minds  from  the 
beginning.  .  Burr's  four  years  of  office  were  drawing 
to  a  close.  The  Virginians  had  paid  him  the  price 
he  asked  for  replacing  them  in  power  ;  and  had  it 
been  Shylock's  pound  of  flesh,  they  could  not  have 
looked  with  greater  care  to  see  that  Burr  should  get 
neither  more  nor  less,  even  in  the  estimation  of  a 
hair,  than  the  exact  price  they  had  covenanted  to 
pay.  In  another  year  the  debt  would  be  discharged, 
and  the  Virginians  would  be  free.  Burr  had  not  a 
chance  of  regaining  a  commanding  place  among  Re 
publicans,  for  he  was  bankrupt  in  private  and  public 
character.  In  New  York  the  Clintons  never  ceased 
their  attacks,  with  the  evident  wish  to  drive  him 
from  the  party.  Cheetham,  after  publishing  in  1802 
two  heavy  pamphlets,  a  "  Narrative  "  and  a  "  View," 
attempted  in  1803  to  crush  him  under  the  weight  of 
a  still  heavier  volume,  containing  "  Nine  Letters  on  the 
Subject  of  Aaron  Burr's  Political  Defection."  Nov. 
16,  1803,  the  "  Albany  Register  "  at  length  followed 
Cheetham's  lead  ;  and  nearly  all  the  other  democratic 
newspapers  followed  the  "  Register,"  abandoning  Burr 
as  a  man  who  no  longer  deserved  confidence. 

Till  near  the  close  of  1803  the  Vice-President  held 
his  peace.  The  first  sign  that  he  meant  energetic 
retaliation  was  given  by  an  anonymous  pamphlet,1 

1  An  Examination  of  the  various  Charges  against  Aaron  Burr, 
by  Aristides.  December,  1803. 


172         HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED  STATES.        CH.  8. 

which  won  the  rare  double  triumph  of  political  and 
literary  success,  in  which  ability  and  ill  temper 
seemed  to  have  equal  shares.  The  unexpected  ap 
pearance  of  "  Aristides  "  startled  New  York.  This 
attack  recalled  the  scandal  which  Alexander  Hamil 
ton  had  created  four  years  before  by  his  pamphlet 
against  his  own  President.  "  Aristides  "  wrote  with 
even  more  bitterness  than  Hamilton,  and  the  ferocity 
of  his  assault  on  the  personal  and  political  characters 
of  the  Republican  leaders  made  the  invectives  of 
Hamilton  and  Cheetham  somewhat  tame ;  but  the 
scandal  in  each  case  was  due  not  so  much  to  per 
sonalities  of  abuse  as  to  breaches  of  confidence. 
"  Aristides  "  furnished  to  the  enemies  of  the  Clintons 
and  Livingstons  an  arsenal  of  poisoned  weapons ;  but 
what  was  more  to  the  purpose,  his  defence  of  Burr 
was  strong.  That  it  came  directly  from  the  Vice- 
President  was  clear ;  but  the  pamphlet  showed  more 
literary  ability  than  Burr  claimed,  and  the  world 
was  at  a  loss  to  discover  who  could  be  held  respon 
sible  for  its  severities.  Cheetham  tried  in  vain  to 
pierce  the  incognito.  Not  till  long  afterward  was 
"  Aristides  "  acknowledged  by  Burr's  most  intimate 
friend,  William  Peter  Van  Ness. 

An  attempt  to  separate  what  was  just  from  what 
was  undeserved  in  Van  Ness's  reproaches  of  the 
Clintons  and  Livingstons  would  be  useless.  The 
Clintons  and  Livingstons,  however  unprincipled  they 
might  be,  could  say  that  they  were  more  respectable 
than  Burr ;  but  though  this  were  true  so  far  as  social 


1804. 


CONSPIRACY.  173 


standing  was  concerned,  they  could  not  easily  show 
that  as  a  politician  the  Vice-President  was  worse  than 
his  neighbors.  The  New  England  Federalists  knew 
well  that  Burr  was  not  to  be  trusted,  but  they  did 
not  think  much  worse  of  him  than  they  thought  of 
De  Witt  Clinton,  or  John  Armstrong,  or  Edward 
Livingston,  at  this  moment  removed  from  office  by 
Jefferson  for  failing  to  account  for  thirty  thousand 
dollars  due  to  the  United  States  Treasury.  As  a 
politician  Burr  had  played  fast  and  loose  with  all 
parties ;  but  so  had  most  of  his  enemies.  Seeing 
that  he  was  about  to  try  another  cast  of  the  dice,  all 
the  political  gamblers  gathered  round  to  help  or  hurt 
his  further  fortunes ;  and  Van  Ness  might  fairly 
have  said  that  in  the  matter  of  principle  or  political 
morality,  none  of  them  could  show  clean  hands. 

Although  Vice-President  until  March,  1805,  Burr 
announced  that  he  meant  to  offer  himself  as  a  candi 
date  for  the  post  of  governor  of  New  York  in  April, 
1804.  At  the  same  time  Governor  Clinton  privately 
gave  warning  of  his  own  retirement.  De  Witt 
Clinton  was  annoyed  at  his  uncle's  conduct,  and 
tried  to  prevent  the  withdrawal  by  again  calling 
Jefferson  to  his  aid  and  alarming  him  with  fear  of 
Burr. 

"  A  certain  gentleman  was  to  leave  this  place  yester 
day  morning,"  wrote  De  "Witt  to  the  President.1  "  He 
has  been  very  active  in  procuring  information  as  to  his 
probable  success  for  governor  at  the  next  election.  This, 

1  De  Witt  Clinton  to  Jefferson,  Nov.  26,  1803  ;  Jefferson  MSS. 


174        HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  8. 

I  believe,  is  his  intention  at  present,  although  it  is  cer 
tain  that  if  the  present  Governor  will  consent  to  be  a 
candidate,  he  will  prevail  by  an  immense  majority.  .  .  . 
Perhaps  a  letter  from  you  may  be  of  singular  service." 

Jefferson  declined  to  interfere,  putting  his  refusal 
on  the  ground  of  Burr's  candidacy. 

"  I  should  think  it  indeed  a  serious  misfortune,"  was 
his  reply,1  "  should  a  change  in  the  administration  of 
your  government  be  hazarded  before  its  present  princi 
ples  be  well  established  through  all  its  parts  ;  yet  on 
reflection  you  will  be  sensible  that  the  delicacy  of  my 
situation,  considering  who  may  be  competitors,  forbids 
my  intermeddling  even  so  far  as  to  write  the  letter  you 
suggest.  I  can  therefore  only  brood  in  silence  over  my 
secret  wishes." 

No  real  confidence  ever  existed  between  Jefferson 
and  the  Clintons.  A  few  days  after  these  letters  were 
written,  "Aristides"  betrayed  the  secret  that  Governor 
Clinton,  in  the  spring  of  1800,  declared  Jefferson  to 
be  "  an  accommodating  trimmer,  who  would  change 
with  times  and  bend  to  circumstances  for  the  purposes 
of  personal  promotion."  This  revelation  by  "Aris 
tides,"  supported  by  the  names  of  persons  who  heard 
the  remark,  forced  Governor  Clinton  into  an  awkward 
denial  of  the  charge,  and  led  to  an  exchange  of  letters 2 
and  to  professions  of  confidence  between  him  and 
Jefferson ;  but  time  showed  that  neither  the  Governor 

1  Jefferson's  Writings  (Ford),  viii.  282. 

2  Jefferson  to  Governor  Clinton,  Dec.  31,  1803 ;  Works,  iv. 
520. 


1804.  CONSPIRACY.  175 

nor  his  nephew  loved  the  Virginians  more  than  they 
were  loved  by  Burr. 

The  threads  of  intrigue  drew  together,  as  they  were 
apt  to  do  before  a  general  election.  The  last  week  in 
January  came.  Three  days  before  Senator  Pickering 
wrote  his  conspiracy  letter  to  George  Cabot,  a  letter 
which  implied  co-operation  with  Burr  in  making  him 
governor  of  New  York,  Burr  asked  for  a  private  inter 
view  with  Jefferson,  and  formally  offered  him  the 
choice  between  friendship  or  enmity.  The  President 
thought  the  conversation  so  curious  that  he  made 
a  note  of  it. 

"  He  began,"  said  Jefferson,1  "  by  recapitulating  sum 
marily  that  he  had  come  to  New  York  a  stranger,  some 
years  ago ;  that  he  found  the  country  in  possession  of 
two  rich  families,  —  the  Livingstons  and  Clintons ;  .  .  . 
that  since,  those  great  families  had  become  hostile  to 
him  and  had  excited  the  calumnies  which  I  had  seen 
published ;  that  in  this  Hamilton  had  joined,  and  had 
even  written  some  of  the  pieces  against  him.  .  .  .  He 
observed,  he  believed  it  would  be  for  the  interest  of  the 
Republican  cause  for  him  to  retire,  —  that  a  disadvanta 
geous  schism  would  otherwise  take  place ;  but  that  were 
he  to  retire,  it  would  be  said  he  shrank  from  the  public 
sentence,  which  he  would  never  do ;  that  his  enemies 
were  using  my  name  to  destroy  him,  and  something 
was  necessary  from  me  to  prevent  and  deprive  them 
of  that  weapon,  —  some  mark  of  favor  from  me  which 
would  declare  to  the  world  that  he  retired  with  my 
confidence." 

1  The  Anas,  Jan.  26,  1804 ;  Works,  ix.  204. 


176        HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  8. 

Jefferson,  with  many  words  but  with  his  usual  cour 
tesy,  intimated  that  he  could  not  appoint  the  Vice- 
President  to  an  Executive  office  ;  and  Burr  then  united 
his  intrigues  with  those  of  Pickering  and  Griswold. 
Thenceforth  his  chance  of  retaining  power  depended 
on  the  New  York  election;  and  his  success  in  this 
election  depended  on  the  Federalists.  Before  George 
Cabot  had  yet  written  his  answer  to  Pickering's  ques 
tions,  Pickering  could  no  longer  resist  the  temptation 
to  act. 

The  effect  of  what  passed  at  Washington  was  in 
stantly  felt  at  Albany.  Toward  the  middle  of  Feb 
ruary,  about  three  weeks  after  Jefferson  had  civilly 
rejected  the  Vice-President's  advances,  Burr's  friends 
in  the  New  York  legislature  announced  that  they 
should  hold  a  caucus  February  18,  and  nominate  him 
as  candidate  for  governor.  The  Federalists  at  once 
called  a  preliminary  caucus  to  decide  whether  they 
should  support  Burr.  Alexander  Hamilton,  who  hap 
pened  to  be  engaged  in  law  business  at  Albany,  Feb. 
16,  1804,  attended  the  Federal  caucus,  and  used  his 
influence  in  favor  of  the  regular  Clinton  candidate 
against  Burr's  pretensions.  The  drift  of  his  argument 
was  given  in  an  abstract  of  reasons  which  he  drew 
up  for  the  occasion.1  Unfortunately  the  strongest  of 
these  reasons  was  evidently  personal;  the  leadership 
of  Hamilton  would  not  tolerate  rivalry  from  Burr. 
Hamilton  pointed  out  that  Burr's  elevation  by  the 
Federalists  of  New  York  would  present  him  as  their 
1  Hamilton's  Works,  vii.  851. 


1804.  CONSPIRACY.  177 

leader  to  the  Federalists  of  New  England,  and  would 
assist  him  to  disorganize  New  England  if  so  disposed ; 
that  there  "  the  ill-opinion  of  Jefferson,  and  jealousy 
of  the  ambition  of  Virginia,  is  no  inconsiderable  prop 
of  good  opinions ;  but  these  causes  are  leading  to  an 
opinion  that  a  dismemberment  of  the  Union  is  expe 
dient.  It  would  probably  suit  Mr.  Burr's  views  to 
promote  this  result,  —  to  be  the  chief  of  the  Northern 
portion ;  and  placed  at  the  head  of  the  State  of  New 
York,  no  man  would  be  more  likely  to  succeed." 

If  the  Union  was  to  be  severed,  Hamilton  was 
the  intended  chief  of  the  Northern  portion ;  but  he 
wanted  no  severance  that  should  leave  the  germs  of 
the  democratic  disease.  His  philosophy  was  that 
of  George  Cabot,  William  Pitt,  and  Talleyrand  ;  he 
waited  for  the  whole  country  to  come  to  its  senses  and 
restore  sound  principles,  that  democracy  might  every 
where  die  out  or  be  stifled.  Burr's  methods  were 
democratic,  and  would  perpetuate  in  a  Northern  con 
federacy  the  vices  of  the  Union ;  they  would  break  up 
the  conservative  strength  without  weakening  democ 
racy.  Within  a  few  days  the  danger  which  Hamilton 
foresaw  came  to  pass.  Burr's  little  band  of  friends 
in  the  Legislature,  Feb.  18, 1804,  set  him  in  nomina 
tion  ;  and  a  large  majority  of  Federalists,  in  defiance 
of  Hamilton's  entreaties,  meant  to  vote  for  him. 

As  the  situation  became  clearer,  Hamilton's  per 
sonal  feeling  became  public.  While  at  Albany, 
February  16,  he  dined  with  John  Tayler,  and  at 
table  talked  of  the  political  prospect.  One  of  the 

VOL.  II. 12 


178         HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED  STATES.        CH.  8. 

company,  Dr.  Charles  D.  Cooper,  an  active  partisan, 
wrote  an  account  of  the  conversation  to  a  certain  Mr. 
Brown  near  Albany :  "  General  Hamilton  and  Judge 
Kent  have  declared,  in  substance,  that  they  looked 
upon  Mr.  Burr  to  be  a  dangerous  man,  and  one  who 
ought  not  to  be  trusted  with  the  reins  of  government." 
The  letter  was  printed,  and  went  the  rounds  of  the 
press.  As  it  roused  some  question  and  dispute, 
Cooper  wrote  again  :  "  I  could  detail  to  you  a  still 
more  despicable  opinion  which  General  Hamilton  has 
expressed  of  Mr.  Burr."  This  letter  also  was  printed1 ; 
the  "  Albany  Register "  of  April  24  contained  th  $ 
correspondence. 

The  news  of  Burr's  nomination  reached  Washington 
at  the  moment  when  Pickering  and  Tracy  received 
answers  to  their  disunion  scheme  ;  and  it  served  to 
keep  them  steady  to  their  plan.  The  Federalists,  who 
professed  to  consider  Hamilton  their  leader,  seldom 
followed  his  advice  ;  but  on  this  occasion  they  set 
him  somewhat  unkindly  aside.  Too  much  in  awe  of 
Hamilton  to  say  directly  to  his  face  that  he  must 
be  content  with  the  place  of  Burr's  lieutenant,  they 
wrote  letters  to  that  effect  which  were  intended  for 
his  eye. 

Of  all  Federalist  leaders,  moderate  and  extreme, 
Rufus  King,  who  had  recently  returned  from  London, 
stood  highest  in  the  confidence  of  his  party.  He  was 
to  be  the  Federalist  candidate  for  Vice-President ;  he 
had  mixed  in  none  of  the  feuds  which  made  Hamilton 
obnoxious  to  many  of  his  former  friends ;  and  while 


1804.  CONSPIRACY.  179 

King's  manners  were  more  conciliatory,  his  opinions 
were  more  moderate,  than  those  of  other  party  leaders. 
To  him  Pickering  wrote,  March  4, 1804,  in  a  tone  of 
entreaty :  — 

"  I  am  disgusted  with  the  men  who  now  rule,  and  with 
their  measures.  At  some  manifestations  of  their  malig 
nancy  I  am  shocked.  The  cowardly  wretch  at  their 
head,  while  like  a  Parisian  revolutionary  monster  prat 
ing  about  humanity,  would  feel  an  infernal  pleasure  in 
the  utter  destruction  of  his  opponents." 

After  avowing  his  hopes  of  disunion,  Pickering 
next  touched  the  New  York  election : 1  — 

"  The  Federalists  here  in  general  anxiously  desire  the 
election  of  Mr.  Burr  to  the  chair  of  New  York,  for  they 
despair  of  a  present  ascendency  of  the  Federalist  party. 
Mr.  Burr  alone,  we  think,  can  break  your  democratic 
phalanx,  and  we  anticipate  much  good  from  his  success. 
Were  New  York  detached,  as  under  his  administration  it 
would  be,  from  the  Virginia  influence,  the  whole  Union 
would  be  benefited.  Jefferson  would  then  be  forced  to 
observe  some  caution  and  forbearance  in  his  measures. 
And  if  a  separation  should  be  deemed  proper,  the  five 
New  England  States,  New  York,  and  New  Jersey  would 
naturally  be  united." 

Rufus  King  was  as  cautious  as  Pickering  was  indis 
creet.  He  acknowledged  this  letter  in  vague  terms 
of  compliment,2  saying  that  Pickering's  views  "  ought 

1  Pickering  to  Rufus  King,  March  4,  1804;  Lodge's  Cabot, 
p.  447. 

3  Rufus  King  to  Pickering,  March  9,  1804;  Lodge's  Cabot, 
p.  460. 


180         HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  8. 

to  fix  the  attention  of  the  real  friends  of  liberty  in 
this  quarter  of  the  Union,  and  the  more  so  as  things 
seem  to  be  fast  advancing  to  a  crisis."  Even  King's 
cool  head  was  possessed  with  the  thought  which 
tormented  Hamilton,  Cabot,  Ames,  Pickering,  Gris- 
wold,  and  Tracy,  —  the  crisis  which  was  always  com 
ing,  and  which,  in  the  midst  of  peace,  plenty,  and 
contentment  such  as  a  tortured  world  had  seldom 
known,  overhung  these  wise  and  virtuous  men  like 
the  gloom  of  death. 

A  week  later  Roger  Griswold  followed  Pickering's 
example  by  writing  to  another  of  Hamilton's  friends, 
Oliver  Wolcott,  who  apparently  sent  the  letter  to 
Hamilton.1  A  Congressional  caucus,  February  25, 
nominated  George  Clinton  as  the  Republican  candi 
date  for  Vice-President  by  sixty-five  votes  against 
forty-one, — Burr's  friends  absenting  themselves.  This 
nomination  showed  some  division  between  the  North 
ern  and  Southern  democrats ;  but  Griswold  rightly 
argued  that  nothing  could  be  done  in  Congress, — 
the  formation  of  a  Northern  interest  must  begin 
at  home,  and  must  find  its  centre  of  union  in  Burr. 
The  arguments  for  this  course  were  set  forth  with 
entire  candor. 

"I  have  wished  to  ascertain,"  wrote  Griswold,  "the 
views  of  Colonel  Burr  in  relation  to  the  general  govern 
ment  ;  but  having  had  no  intimacy  with  him  myself,  and 
finding  no  one  on  the  spot  calculated,  or  indeed  author- 

1  Roger  Griswold  to  Oliver  Wolcott,  March  11,  1804;  Hamil 
ton's  History,  vii.  781;  New  England  Federalism,  p.  354. 


1804.  CONSPIRACY.  181 

ized,  to  require  an  explanation,  I  have  obtained  but  little 
information.  He  speaks  in  the  most  bitter  terms  of  the 
Virginia  faction,  and  of  the  necessity  of  a  union  at  the 
northward  to  resist  it ;  but  what  the  ultimate  objects  are 
which  he  would  propose,  I  do  not  know.  It  is  appar 
ent  that  his  election  is  supported  in  New  York  on  the 
principle  of  resisting  Virginia  and  uniting  the  North ; 
and  it  may  be  presumed  that  the  support  given  to  him  by 
Federal  men  would  tend  to  reconcile  the  feelings  of  those 
democrats  who  are  becoming  dissatisfied  with  their  South 
ern  masters.  But  it  is  worthy  of  great  consideration 
whether  the  advantage  gained  in  this  manner  will  not 
be  more  than  counterbalanced  by  fixing  on  the  Northern 
States  a  man  in  whom  the  most  eminent  of  our  friends 
will  not  repose  confidence.  If  Colonel  Burr  is  elevated 
in  New  York  to  the  office  of  governor  by  the  votes  of 
Federalism,  will  he  not  be  considered,  and  must  he  not 
in  fact  become,  the  head  of  the  Northern  interest?  His 
ambition  will  not  suffer  him  to  be  second,  and  his  office 
will  give  him  a  claim  to  the  first  rank." 

Having  proposed  this  question,  Griswold  argued 
it  as  one  in  which  the  interests  of  New  York  must 
yield  to  the  larger  interests  behind,  and  decided  that 
"  unpleasant  as  the  thing  may  be,"  Burr's  election 
and  consequent  leadership  of  the  Federalist  party 
was  "  the  only  hope  which  at  this  time  presents  itself 
of  rallying  in  defence  of  the  Northern  States.  .  .  . 
What  else  can  we  do  ?  If  we  remain  inactive,  our 
ruin  is  certain.  Our  friends  will  make  no  attempts 
alone.  By  supporting  Mr.  Burr  we  gain  some  sup 
port,  although  it  is  of  a  doubtful  nature,  and  of  which, 


182        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.        CH.  8. 

God  knows,  we  have  cause  enough  to  be  jealous.     In 
short,  I  see  nothing  else  left  for  us." 

Had  this  been  all,  though  it  was  a  rude  blow  to 
Hamilton,  it  might  have  passed  as  a  difference  of  opin 
ion  on  a  point  of  party  policy ;  but  Griswold's  object 
in  writing  these  excuses  was  to  explain  that  he  had 
already  done  more,  and  had  even  entered  into  personal 
relations  with  Colonel  Burr  in  view  of  a  bargain. 
What  this  bargain  was  to  be,  Griswold  explained :  — 

"  I  have  engaged  to  call  on  the  Vice-President  as  I  pass 
through  New  York.  The  manner  in  which  he  gave  me 
the  invitation  appeared  to  indicate  a  wish  to  enter  upon 
some  explanation.  He  said  he  wished  very  much  to  see 
me,  and  to  converse,  but  his  situation  in  this  place  did 
not  admit  of  it,  and  he  begged  me  to  call  on  him  at  New 
York.  This  took  place  yesterday  in  the  library.  Indeed, 
I  do  not  see  how  he  can  avoid  a  full  explanation  with 
Federal  men.  His  prospects  must  depend  on  the  union 
of  the  Federalists  with  his  friends,  and  it  is  certain  that 
his  views  must  extend  much  beyond  the  office  of  governor 
of  New  York.  He  has  the  spirit  of  ambition  and  revenge 
to  gratify,  and  can  do  but  little  with  his  '  little  band ' 
alone." 

Even  George  Cabot  deserted  Hamilton,  and  wrote 
from  Boston  to  Rufus  King  a  long  letter,  in  the  tone 
of  indolent  speculation  which  irritated  restless  fight 
ers  like  Pickering  and  Griswold  : 1  — 

"An  experiment  has  been  suggested  by  some  of  our 
friends,  to  which  I  object  that  it  is  impracticable,  and 

1  George  Cabot  to  Rufua  King,  March  17,  1804;  Lodge's 
Cabot,  p.  345. 


1804. 


CONSPIRACY.  183 


if  practicable  would  be  ineffectual.  The  thing  proposed 
is  obvious  and  natural ;  but  it  would  now  be  thought  too 
bold,  and  would  be  fatal  to  its  advocates  as  public  men  ; 
yet  the  time  may  soon  come  when  it  will  be  demanded 
by  the  people  of  the  North  and  East,  and  then  it  will 
unavoidably  take  place." 

He  explained  his  favorite  thesis,  —  the  last  resource 
of  failing  protestants,  —  that  things  must  be  worse 
before  they  were  better;  but  closed  by  wishing  suc 
cess  to  Burr.  "  I  should  rejoice  to  see  Burr  win  the 
race  in  your  State,  but  I  cannot  approve  of  aid  being 
given  him  by  any  of  the  leading  Federalists." 

Ten  days  later,  March  27,  Congress  adjourned ; 
and  thenceforward  the  intrigue  centred  about  Burr 
and  Hamilton  in  ^ew  York.  No  sooner  did  Gris- 
wold  reach  that  city,  on  his  way  from  Washington  to 
Connecticut,  than  he  kept  his  engagement  with  Burr, 
and  in  a  conversation,  April  4,  Burr  cautiously  said  l 
that  in  his  present  canvass  "  he  must  go  on  democrat 
ically  to  obtain  the  government ;  that  if  he  succeeded, 
he  should  administer  it  in  a  manner  that  would  be 
satisfactory  to  the  Federalists.  In  respect  to  the 
affairs  of  the  nation,  Burr  said  that  the  Northern 
States  must  be  governed  by  Virginia,  or  govern  Vir 
ginia,  and  that  there  was  no  middle  course ;  that 
the  democratic  members  of  Congress  from  the  East 
were  in  this  sentiment,  —  some  of  those  from  New 
York,  some  of  the  leaders  in  Jersey,  and  likewise  in 

1  Hamilton's  History,  vii.  787 ;  King's  Life  of  Rufus  King,  iv. 
356. 


184        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.        Cn.8. 

Pennsylvania."  Further  than  this  he  would  not  go ; 
and  Griswold  contented  himself  with  such  vague 
allurements. 

On  the  other  hand,  Rufus  King's  library  was  the 
scene  of  grave  dissensions.  There  Pickering  went, 
April  8,  to  urge  his  scheme  of  disunion,  and  re 
tired  on  the  appearance  of  his  colleague,  Senator 
Adams,  who  for  the  first  and  last  time  in  his  life 
found  himself  fighting  the  battle  of  Alexander  Ham 
ilton,  whom  he  disliked  as  decidedly  as  Pickering 
professed  to  love  him.  As  the  older  senator  left 
the  house  at  his  colleague's  entrance,  King  said  to 
Adams  : 1  "  Colonel  Pickering  has  been  talking  to  me 
about  a  project  they  have  for  a  separation  of  the 
States  and  a  Northern  Confederacy ;  and  he  has  also 
been  this  day  talking  of  it  with  General  Hamilton. 
Have  you  heard  anything  of  it  at  "Washington  ? " 
Adams  replied  that  he  had  heard  much,  but  not  from 
Colonel  Pickering.  "  I  disapprove  entirely  of  the 
project,"  said  King ;  "  and  so,  I  am  happy  to  tell  you, 
does  General  Hamilton." 

The  struggle  for  control  between  Hamilton  and  the 
conspirators  lasted  to  the  eve  of  the  election,  —  secret, 
stifled,  mysterious  ;  the  intrigue  of  men  afraid  to  avow 
their  aims,  and  seeming  rather  driven  by  their  own 
passions  than  guided  by  the  lofty  and  unselfish  mo 
tives  which  ought  to  inspire  those  whom  George 
Cabot  emphatically  called  the  best!  The  result  was 
a  drawn  battle.  Hamilton  prevented  leading  Federal- 

1  New  England  Federalism,  p.  148. 


1804.  CONSPIRACY.  185 

ists  from  open  committal  of  the  party,  but  he  could 
not  prevent  the  party  itself  from  voting  for  Burr. 
The  election  took  place  April  25, 1804 ;  and  although 
Burr  succeeded  in  carrying  to  the  Federalists  a  few 
hundred  voters  in  the  city  of  New  York,  where  his 
strength  lay,  giving  him  there  a  majority  of  about  one 
hundred  in  a  total  vote  of  less  than  three  thousand, 
he  polled  but  about  twenty-eight  thousand  votes  in 
the  State  against  thirty-five  thousand  for  the  Clinton 
candidate.  The  Federalists  gained  nothing  by  sup 
porting  him ;  but  only  a  small  portion  of  the  party 
refused  him  their  aid. 

The  obstinacy  of  Pickering  and  Griswold  in  press 
ing  Burr  on  the  party  forced  Hamilton  to  strain  his 
strength  in  order  to  prevent  what  he  considered  his 
own  humiliation.  That  all  Hamilton's  doings  were 
known  to  Burr  could  hardly  be  doubted.  When  the 
election  closed,  a  new  era  in  Burr's  life  began.  He 
was  not  a  vindictive  man,  but  this  was  the  second 
time  Hamilton  had  stood  in  his  way  and  vilified  his 
character.  Burr  could  have  no  reason  to  suppose  that 
Hamilton  was  deeply  loved  ;  for  he  knew  that  four 
fifths  of  the  Federal  party  had  adopted  his  own  leader 
ship  when  pitted  against  Hamilton's  in  the  late  elec 
tion,  and  he  knew  too  that  Pickering,  Griswold,  and 
other  leading  Federalists  had  separated  from  Hamil 
ton  in  the  hope  of  making  Burr  himself  the  chief  of 
a  Northern  confederacy.  Burr  never  cared  for  the 
past,  —  the  present  and  future  were  his  only  thought ; 
but  his  future  in  politics  depended  on  his  breaking 


186        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.        CH.  8. 

somewhere  through  the  line  of  his  personal  enemies ; 
and  Hamilton  stood  first  in  his  path,  for  Hamilton 
would  certainly  renew  at  every  critical  moment  the 
tactics  which  had  twice  cost  Burr  his  prize. 

Pickering  and  Griswold  saw  their  hopes  shattered 
by  the  result  of  the  New  York  election.  They  gained 
at  the  utmost  only  an  agreement  to  hold  a  private 
meeting  of  leading  Federalists  at  Boston  in  the  fol 
lowing  autumn ; l  and  as  Hamilton  was  to  be  pres 
ent,  he  probably  intended  to  take  part  only  in  order 
to  stop  once  for  all  the  intrigues  of  these  two  men. 
Such  an  assemblage,  under  the  combined  authority  of 
Cabot,  King,  and  Hamilton,  could  not  have  failed  to 
restore  discipline. 

Nearly  two  months  passed  after  the  New  York 
election,  when,  on  the  morning  of  June  18,  William 
P.  Van  Ness,  not  yet  known  as  "  Aristides,"  appeared 
in  Hamilton's  office.  He  brought  a  note  from  Vice- 
President  Burr,  which  enclosed  newspaper-cuttings 
containing  Dr.  Cooper's  report  of  Hamilton's  "  despi 
cable"  opinion  of  Burr's  character.  The  paragraph, 
Burr  said,  had  but  very  recently  come  to  his  knowl 
edge.  "  You  must  perceive,  sir,  the  necessity  of  a 
prompt  and  unqualified  acknowledgment  or  denial  of 
the  use  of  any  expression  which  would  warrant  the 
assertions  of  Dr.  Cooper."  General  Hamilton  took 
two  days  to  consider  the  subject ;  and  then  replied  in 
what  Burr  thought  an  evasive  manner,  but  closed 
with  two  lines  of  defiance :  "  I  trust  on  more  reflec- 
1  Life  of  Plumer,  p.  299. 


1804.  CONSPIRACY.  187 

tion  you  will  see  the  matter  in  the  same  light  with 
me;  if  not,  I  can  only  regret  the  circumstance,  and 
must  abide  the  consequences."  1 

These  concluding  words  were  the  usual  form  in 
which  men  expressed  themselves  when  they  intended 
to  accept  a  challenge  to  a  duel.  At  first  sight,  no 
sufficient  reason  for  accepting  a  challenge  was  shown 
by  Hamilton's  letter,  which  disavowed  Dr.  Cooper's 
report  so  far  as  Burr  was  warranted  in  claiming  dis 
avowal.  Hamilton  might  without  impropriety  have 
declined  to  give  further  satisfaction.  In  truth,  not 
the  personal  but  the  political  quarrel  drew  him  into 
the  field ;  he  knew  that  Burr  meant  to  challenge, 
not  the  man,  but  the  future  political  chief,  and  that 
an  enemy  so  bent  on  rule  must  be  met  in  the  same 
spirit.  Hamilton  fought  to  maintain  his  own  right 
to  leadership,  so  rudely  disputed  by  Burr,  Pickering, 
and  Griswold.  He  devoted  some  of  his  moments 
before  the  duel  to  the  task  of  explaining,  in  a  formal 
document,  that  he  fought  only  to  save  his  political  in 
fluence.2  "  The  ability  to  be  in  future  useful,  whether 
in  resisting  mischief  or  effecting  good,  in  those  crises 
of  our  public  affairs  which  seem  likely  to  happen, 
would  probably  be  inseparable  from  a  conformity  with 
public  prejudice  in  this  particular." 

Always  the  crisis !  Yet  this  crisis  which  brought 
Hamilton  in  July  to  the  duelling-ground  at  Weehaw- 
ken  was  not  the  same  as  that  which  Pickering  and 

1  Hamilton's  History,  vii.  806. 

*  Hamilton's  History,  vii.  pp.  816-819. 


188        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.        CH.  8. 

Griswold  had  so  lately  tried  to  create.  Pickering's 
disunion  scheme  came  to  a  natural  end  on  Burr's 
defeat  in  April.  The  legislatures  of  the  three  Feder 
alist  States  had  met  and  done  nothing ;  all  chance  of 
immediate  action  was  lost,  and  all  parties,  including 
even  Pickering  and  Griswold,  had  fallen  back  on  their 
faith  in  the  "  crisis  "  ;  but  the  difference  of  opinion 
between  Hamilton  and  the  New  Englanders  was  still 
well  denned.  Hamilton  thought  that  disunion,  from 
a  conservative  standpoint,  was  a  mistake  ;  nearly  all 
the  New  Englanders,  on  the  contrary,  looked  to  ulti 
mate  disunion  as  a  conservative  necessity.  The  last 
letter  which  Hamilton  wrote,  a  few  hours  before  he 
left  his  house  for  the  duelling-ground,  was  a  short 
and  earnest  warning  against  disunion,  addressed  to 
Theodore  Sedgwick,  one  of  the  sternest  Massachusetts 
Federalists  of  Pickerjng's  class.1 

"  Dismemberment  of  our  empire,"  said  Hamilton,  "  will 
be  a  clear  sacrifice  of  great  positive  advantages,  with 
out  any  counterbalancing  good ;  administering  no  relief 
to  our  real  disease,  which  is  democracy,  —  the  poison  of 
which,  by  a  subdivision,  -will  only  be  the  more  concentred 
in  each  part,  and  consequently  the  more  virulent." 

The  New  Englanders  thought  this  argument  un 
sound,  as  it  certainly  was ;  for  a  dissolution  of  the 
American  Union  would  have  struck  a  blow  more 
nearly  fatal  to  democracy  throughout  the  world  than 
any  other  "  crisis "  that  man  could  have  compassed. 
Yet  the  argument  showed  that  had  Hamilton  sur- 
1  Hamilton  to  Sedgwick,  July  10,  1804;  Works,  vi.  567. 


1804.  CONSPIRACY.  189 

vived,  he  would  probably  have  separated  from  his 
New  England  allies,  and  at  last,  like  his  friends  Rufus 
King  and  Oliver  Wolcott,  would  have  accepted  the 
American  world  as  it  was. 

The  tragedy  that  actually  happened  was  a  fitter 
ending  to  this  dark  chapter  than  any  tamer  close 
could  have  been.  Early  on  the  morning  of  July  11, 
in  the  brilliant  sunlight  of  a  hot  summer,  the  two  men 
were  rowed  to  the  duelling-ground  across  the  river, 
under  the  rocky  heights  of  Weehawken,  and  were 
placed  by  their  seconds  face  to  face.  Had  Hamilton 
acted  with  the  energy  of  conviction,  he  would  have 
met  Burr  in  his  own  spirit ;  but  throughout  this 
affair  Hamilton  showed  want  of  will.  He  allowed 
himself  to  be  drawn  into  a  duel,  but  instead  of  kill 
ing  Burr  he  invited  Burr  to  kill  him.  In  the  paper 
Hamilton  left  for  his  justification,  he  declared  the 
intention  to  throw  away  his  first  fire.  He  did  so. 
Burr's  bullet  passed  through  Hamilton's  body.  The 
next  day  he  was  dead. 

As  the  news  spread,  it  carried  a  wave  of  emotion 
over  New  England,  and  roused  everywhere  sensations 
strangely  mixed.  In  New  York  the  Clinton  interest, 
guided  by  Cheetham,  seized  the  moment  to  destroy 
Burr's  influence  forever.  Cheetham  affected  to  think 
the  duel  a  murder,  procured  Burr's  indictment,  and 
drove  him  from  the  State.  Charges  were  invented  to 
support  this  theory,  and  were  even  accepted  as  history. 
In  the  South  and  West,  on  the  other  hand,  the  duel 
was  considered  as  a  simple  "  affair  of  honor,"  in  which 


190         HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  8. 

Burr  appeared  to  better  advantage  than  his  opponent. 
In  New  England  a  wail  of  despair  arose.  Even  the 
clergy,  though  shocked  that  Hamilton  should  have 
offered  the  evil  example  of  duelling,  felt  that  they 
had  lost  their  champion  and  sword  of  defence.  "  In 
those  crises  of  our  public  affairs  which  seemed  likely 
to  happen,"  Hamilton's  genius  in  council  and  in  the 
field  had  been  their  main  reliance  ;  he  was  to  be  their 
Washington,  with  more  than  Washington's  genius, — 
their  Bonaparte,  with  Washington's  virtues.  The 
whole- body  of  Federalists,  who  had  paid  little  regard 
to  Hamilton's  wishes  in  life,  went  into  mourning  for 
his  death,  and  held  funeral  services  such  as  had  been 
granted  to  no  man  of  New  England  birth.  Orators, 
ministers,  and  newspapers  exhausted  themselves  in 
execration  of  Burr.  During  the  whole  summer  and 
autumn,  undisturbed  by  a  breath  of  discord  or  danger, 
except  such  as  their  own  fears  created,  they  bewailed 
their  loss  as  the  most  fatal  blow  yet  given  to  the 
hopes  of  society. 

The  death  of  Hamilton  cleared  for  a  time  the  murky 
atmosphere  of  New  York  and  New  England  politics. 
Pickering  and  Griswold,  Tracy  and  Plumer,  and  their 
associates  retired  into  the  background.  Burr  disap 
peared  from  New  York,  and  left  a  field  for  De  Witt 
Clinton  to  sacrifice  in  his  turn  the  public  good  to 
private  ambition.  The  bloody  feuds  of  Burr's  time 
never  again  recurred.  The  death  of  Hamilton  and 
the  Vice-President's  flight,  with  their  accessories 
of  summer-morning  sunlight  on  rocky  and  wooded 


1804.  CONSPIRACY.  191 

heights,  tranquil  river,  and  distant  city,  and  behind 
all,  their  dark  background  of  moral  gloom,  double 
treason,  and  political  despair,  still  stand  as  the 
most  dramatic  moment  in  the  early  politics  of  the 
Union. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

PRESIDENT  JEFFERSON  was  told  from  day  to  day  of 
the  communications  that  passed  between  Burr  and  the 
Connecticut  Federalists.  Of  all  members  of  the  Gov 
ernment,  the  most  active  politician  was  Gideon  Gran 
ger,  the  Postmaster-General,  whose  "  intimacy  with 
some  of  those  in  the  secret,"  as  Jefferson  afterward 
testified,  gave  him  "  opportunities  of  searching  into 
their  proceedings." 1  Every  day  during  this  period 
Granger  made  a  confidential  report  to  the  President ; 
and  at  the  President's  request  Granger  warned  De 
Witt  Clinton  of  Burr's  intrigues  with  the  Federal 
ists.  What  passed  in  Rufus  King's  library  and  in 
Burr's  private  room  seemed  known  at  once  by 
Granger,  and  was  reported  within  a  few  days  to 
Jefferson,  who  received  the  news  with  his  innate 
optimism,  warranted  by  experience.2 

"  It  will  be  found  in  this,  as  in  all  other  similar  cases, 
that  crooked  schemes  will  end  by  overwhelming  their  au 
thors  and  coadjutors  in  disgrace,  and  that  he  alone  who 
walks  strict  and  upright,  and  who  in  matters  of  ppinion 

1  Jefferson  to  Granger,  March  9,  1814;  Works,  vi.  329. 
3  Jefferson  to  Granger,  April  16,  1804;  Works,  iv.  543. 


1804. 


THE  YAZOO  CLAIMS.  193 


will  be  contented  that  others  should  be  as  free  as  himself, 
and  acquiesce  when  his  opinion  is  fairly  overruled,  will 
attain  his  object  in  the  end." 

If  Jefferson  and  his  Virginia  friends  in  1798,  when 
their  own  opinions  were  overruled,  had  expressed  the 
idea  of  acquiescence  as  strongly,  the  nation  might  per 
haps  have  been  saved  the  necessity  of  proving  later 
the  truth  of  his  words ;  but  Jefferson  could  afford  to 
treat  with  contempt  the  coalition  between  Burr  and 
Pickering,  because,  as  he  wisely  said,  it  had  no  cohe 
sive  force  to  hold  it  together,  no  common  principle 
on  which  to  rest.  When  Burr's  defeat  in  April  and 
Hamilton's  death  in  July  dissolved  the  unnatural 
connection,  Jefferson  let  the  secret  die  ;  he  wanted  no 
scandal.  He  stood  a  little  in  awe  of  the  extreme 
Federalists,  whom  he  called  incurables,  and  was  un 
willing  to  exasperate  them  without  an  object. 

The  Administration  had  every  reason  to  rejoice  that 
Burr's  factious  influence  in  the  State  of  New  York 
was  at  an  end ;  for  other  causes  of  anxiety  gave  the 
President  more  personal  annoyance.  The  strength 
of  the  Republican  party  lay  in  the  alliance  between 
Virginia  and  Pennsylvania.  So  long  as  these  two 
central  States,  with  their  forty  members  of  Congress, 
remained  harmonious,  nothing  could  shake  Jeffer 
son's  power;  but  any  discord  which  threatened  his 
control  of  Pennsylvania  caused  him  anxiety.  Hardly 
had  Burr's  schism  been  checked  in  New  York  by 
a  succession  of  measures  as  energetic  as  De  Witt 
Clinton  could  persuade  Jefferson  to  adopt,  when  a 

VOL.  II. —  18 


194        HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  9. 

schism,  that  threatened   greater   mischief,  broke  out 
in  Pennsylvania. 

In  this  State  no  social  hierarchy  existed  such  as 
governed  New  England,  nor  were  rich  families  with 
political  followings  to  be  found  there,  as  in  New 
York ;  but  instead,  Duane's  "  Aurora  "  shone  without 
break  or  bar  over  one  broad  democratic  level.  Duane 
was  represented  in  Congress  by  Michael  Leib ;  while 
over  the  State  Legislature  his  influence  was  complete. 
In  Jefferson's  Cabinet  Pennsylvania  was  represented 
by  Gallatin,  who  had  little  sympathy  with  the  "  Au 
rora,"  and  began  his  administration  of  the  finances 
by  resisting  Duane's  demand  for  Federal  patronage. 

"The  thirst  for  offices,"  to  use  Gallatin's  own  words,1 
"  too  much  encouraged  by  Governor  McKean's  first 
measures,  created  a  schism  in  Philadelphia  as  early  as 
1802.  Leib,  ambitious,  avaricious,  envious,  and  disap 
pointed,  blew  up  the  flame,  and  watched  the  first  oppor 
tunity  to  make  his  cause  a  general  one.  The  vanity,  the 
nepotism,  and  the  indiscretion  of  Governor  McKean 
afforded  the  opportunity.  Want  of  mutual  forbearance 
among  the  best-intentioned  and  most  respectable  Repub 
licans  has  completed  the  schism.  Duane,  intoxicated  by 
the  persuasion  that  he  alone  had  overthrown  Federalism, 
thought  himself  neither  sufficiently  rewarded  nor  re 
spected  ;  and  possessed  of  an  engine  which  gives  him  an 
irresistible  control  over  public  opinion,  he  easily  gained 
the  victory  for  his  friends." 

In  the  spring  of  1803  the  "  Aurora "  began  to  at 
tack  Gallatin  and  Madison,  under  cover  of  devotion  to 
1  Gallatin  to  Badollet,  Oct.  25, 1805;  Adams's  Gallatin,  p.  331. 


1804. 


THE  YAZOO   CLAIMS.  195 


the  President ;  and  from  this  beginning  Duane  went 
on  to  quarrel  with  Governor  McKean  and  Alexander 
J.  Dallas,  the  district  attorney. 

The  impeachment  of  Judge  Pickering  in  Congress 
followed  and  in  some  degree  imitated  an  impeachment 
by  the  Pennsylvania  Legislature  of  Judge  Addison, 
one  of  the  five  president  judges  of  the  Common  Pleas. 
With  the  help  of  Dallas  and  Governor  McKean,  the 
Legislature  in  January,  1803,  removed  Judge  Addi 
son  ;  then,  inspired  by  Randolph's  attack  on  Justice 
Chase,  they  turned  against  their  Supreme  Court,  —  at 
one  sweep  impeaching  three  of  the  judges,  and  ad 
dressing  the  Governor  for  the  removal  of  H.  H.  Brack- 
enridge,  the  fourth,  because  he  insisted  on  making 
common  cause  with  his  associates.  The  alleged 
ground  of  impeachment  was  the  arbitrary  committal  of 
a  suitor  for  contempt  of  court ;  the  real  motive  seemed 
rather  to  be  a  wish  for  legal  reforms  such  as  society 
was  too  unskilful  to  make  for  itself,  and  lawyers  were 
slow  to  begin.  Throughout  America  the  bar  was  a 
sort  of  aristocracy,  conservative  to  a  degree  that 
annoyed  reformers  of  every  class.  Jefferson  and  his 
party  raised  one  Republican  lawyer  after  another  to 
the  bench,  only  to  find  that  when  their  professions 
of  political  opinion  were  tested  in  legal  form,  the 
Republican  judge  rivalled  Marshall  in  the  Federalist 
and  English  tendencies  of  his  law.  The  bar  chose 
to  consider  the  prejudice  of  society  against  their  caste 
unreasonable  ;  but  the  bar  was  itself  somewhat  un 
reasonable  to  require  that  an  untrained  and  ill-led 


196         HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  9. 

body  of  country  farmers  and  local  politicians  should 
say  precisely  what  legal  reform  they  wanted,  or  know 
exactly  what  was  practicable. 

No  sooner  did  the  Pennsylvania  Legislature  begin 
to  pull  in  pieces  the  judicial  system  of  the  State,  and 
persecute  the  legal  profession,  than  Dallas,  McKean, 
and  all  the  educated  leaders  of  the  Republican  party 
broke  from  the  mass  of  their  followers,  and  attempted 
to  check  their  violence.  Governor  McKean  stopped 
with  his  veto  certain  measures  which  the  Legisla 
ture  had  approved,  and  he  declined  to  remove  Judge 
Brackenridge  when  the  Legislature  asked  him  to  do 
so.  Dallas  became  counsel  for  the  impeached  judges. 
Duane  and  Leib  raged  against  McKean  and  Dallas  ; 
a  large  majority  of  Pennsylvania  Republicans  fol 
lowed  the  "  Aurora ; "  Gallatin  lost  control  over  his 
State,  and  saw  himself  threatened,  like  his  friend 
Dallas,  with  ostracism;  while  the  outside  world, 
roused  by  the  noise  of  this  faction-fight,  asked  what 
it  meant,  and  could  not  understand  the  answer.  The 
Federalists  alone  professed  to  explain  the  mystery 
which  perplexed  people  less  wise  than  themselves ; 
they  had  said  from  the  beginning  that  the  demo 
crats  had  neither  virtue  nor  understanding  to  carry 
on  the  government,  and  must  bring  about  a  crisis 
at  last. 

After  the  excitement  of  Burr's  intrigues  and  Ham 
ilton's  death  subsided,  leaving  the  politics  of  New 
York  in  comparative  repose,  the  autumn  elections  in 
Pennsylvania  began  to  disturb  Jefferson's  temper. 


1804. 


THE  YAZOO   CLAIMS.  197 


"Thank  Heaven!"  wrote  Dallas  to  Gallatin,  in  Octo 
ber,1  "  our  election  is  over  !  The  violence  of  Duane  has 
produced  a  fatal  division.  He  seems  determined  to  de 
stroy  the  Republican  standing  and  usefulness  of  every 
man  who  does  not  bend  to  his  will.  He  has  attacked  me 
as  the  author  of  an  address  which  I  never  saw  till  it  was 
in  the  press.  He  menaces  the  Governor ;  you  have 
already  felt  his  lash ;  and  I  think  there  is  reason  for 
Mr.  Jefferson  himself  to  apprehend  that  the  spirit  of 
Callender  survives." 

A  struggle  took  place  over  the  re-election  of  Leib 
to  Congress,  which  the  "  Aurora "  carried  by  a  few 
hundred  votes.  Republicans  of  Dallas's  kind,  who 
would  not  support  Leib,  were  nicknamed  "  Quids " 
by  Duane,  after  the  tertium  quid,  which  was  worth 
not  even  a  name.  At  least  three  fourths  of  the  Re 
publican  party  followed  the  "  Aurora,"  and  left  the 
"  Quids  "  in  the  solitude  of  deserted  leaders. 

Jefferson's  social  relations  were  wholly  with  Galla 
tin,  McKean,  and  Dallas,  but  his  political  strength 
depended  on  the  popular  vote,  which  followed  Duane 
and  Leib.  At  one  moment  he  wanted  to  reason  with 
Duane,  but  by  Gallatin's  advice  gave  up  this  idea. 
At  length  he  temporized,  became  neutral,  and  left 
Gallatin  and  Dallas  to  their  own  resources. 

"  I  see  with  infinite  pain,"  he  wrote  to  Dr.  Logan,8 
"  the  bloody  schism  which  has  taken  place  among  our 
friends  in  Pennsylvania  and  New  York,  and  will  proba 
bly  take  place  in  other  States.  The  main  body  of  both 

1  Dallas  to  Gallatin,  Oct.  16,  1804;  Adams's  Gallatin,  p.  326. 

2  Jefferson  to  Dr.  Logan,  May  11,  1805  ;  Works,  iv.  575. 


198        HISTORY  OF  THE   UNITED   STATES.        Cn.9. 

sections  mean  well,  but  their  good  intentions  will  pro 
duce  great  public  evil.  The  minority,  whichever  section 
shall  be  the  minority,  will  end  in  coalition  with  the  Fed 
eralists  and  some  compromise  of  principle.  Republican 
ism  will  thus  lose,  and  royalism  gain,  some  portion  of 
that  ground  which  we  thought  we  had  rescued  to  good 
government." 

The  idea  that "  royalism  "  could  in  any  case  gain  sup 
port  among  the  factions  of  Pennsylvania  democrats 
was  one  which  could  have  occurred  only  to  Jefferson, 
who  saw  monarchy,  as  the  New  Englanders  saw  Anti 
christ,  in  every  man  who  opposed  him  in  politics. 
Apart  from  this  trick  of  words,  Jefferson's  theory 
of  his  own  duties  failed  to  satisfy  his  followers. 
Dallas  was  disgusted  at  the  situation  in  which  he 
found  himself  left. 

"It  is  obvious  to  me,"1  he  wrote  to  Gallatin  soon 
after  the  schism  broke  out,  ' '  that  unless  our  Adminis 
tration  take  decisive  measures  to  discountenance  the 
factious  spirit  that  has  appeared ;  unless  some  principle 
of  political  cohesion  can  be  introduced  into  our  public 
councils  as  well  as  at  our  elections  ;  and  unless  men  of 
character  and  talents  can  be  drawn  from  professional 
and  private  pursuits  into  the  legislative  bodies  of  our 
governments,  Federal  and  State,  —  the  empire  of  Repub 
licanism  will  moulder  into  anarchy,  and  the  labor  and 
hope  of  our  lives  will  terminate  in  disappointment  and 
wretchedness.  ...  At  present  we  are  the  slaves  of  men 
whose  passions  are  the  object  of  all  their  actions, — I 

1  A.  J.  Dallas  to  GaUatin,  Jan.  16,  1805 ;  Adams'a  Gallatin, 
p.  327. 


1804.  THE  YAZOO   CLAIMS.  199 

mean  your  Duanes,  Cheethams,  Leibs,  etc.  They  have 
the  press  in  their  power ;  and  though  we  may  have  vir 
tue  to  assert  the  liberty  of  the  press,  it  is  too  plain 
that  we  have  not  spirit  enough  to  resist  the  tyranny  of 
the  printers." 

This  last  sharp  sentence  aimed  at  the  President, 
who  displeased  Dallas  by  showing  too  evident  a  wish 
not  to  offend  Duane.  "The  duty  of  an  upright  Ad 
ministration,"  Jefferson  told  Dr.  Logan,1  "  is  to  pursue 
its  course  steadily,  to  know  nothing  of  these  family 
dissensions,  and  to  cherish  the  good  principles  of 
both  parties."  Had  the  President  followed  this  duty 
in  the  case  of  Burr,  the  triumph  of  De  Witt  Clinton 
and  Cheetham  would  have  been  more  difficult  than  it 
was  ;  but  the  President  feared  Burr  the  less  because 
Burr's  newspaper,  the  "  Morning  Chronicle,"  was  re 
spectable,  while  the  "Aurora"  was  unscrupulous,  and 
to  cherish  Duane's  principles,  whether  good  or  bad, 
was  the  only  way  of  escaping  the  lash  of  his  tongue. 
Jefferson  chose  the  path  of  caution  in  refusing  to 
sustain  Dallas  and  the  "  Quids  "  against  the  party 
and  the  Legislature ;  but  during  the  rest  of  his  term 
he  was  forced  to  endure  Duane's  attachment,  and  to 
feel  that  Madison  and  Gallatin  were  sacrificed  to  his 
own  safety.  Duane  never  hesitated  to  assert  that  he 
was  in  Jefferson's  confidence  and  was  acting  in  his 
interests,2  and  commonly  he  or  some  of  his  friends 

1  Jefferson  to  Dr.  Logan,  May  11,  1805  ;  "Works,  iv.  575. 

2  Dallas  to  Gallatin,  April  4,  1805 ;  April  21,  1811 ;  Adams's 
Gallatin,  pp.  333,  439. 


200        HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        Cn.9. 

could  show  a  recent  letter  in  the  President's  hand 
writing  which  gave  color  to  their  assertion. 

The  Pennsylvania  schism  was  not  serious.  Gover 
nor  McKean  and  Dallas  were  alarmed  when  they  saw 
the  democratic  system  blundering  in  its  rude  way, 
without  taking  sound  advice  or  heeding  trained  law 
yers  ;  but  only  the  Federalists  believed  in  a  crisis. 
Society  went  undisturbed  to  its  daily  duties  in  spite 
of  Duane's  outcries  and  Dallas's  grumbling.  The 
only  result  of  the  Pennsylvania  schism  was  to  check 
the  aggressive  energy  of  the  democratic  movement 
by  alarming  a  few  of  the  older  leaders  and  causing 
them  to  halt.  From  the  day  of  Jefferson's  inaug 
uration  this  tendency  toward  reaction  had  begun, 
and  it  developed  in  party  schisms  which  could  not 
fail  to  hurry  the  process.  The  symptom,  however 
unpleasant  to  old  political  leaders  such  as  Jefferson, 
McKean,  and  Dallas,  who  liked  the  quiet  enjoyment 
of  power,  was  healthy  for  society  at  large ;  but  no 
one  could  fail  to  be  struck  by  the  contrast  which  in 
this  respect  was  offered  by  the  two  great  sections 
of  the  country.  While  the  mobile,  many-sided,  rest 
less  democracy  of  New  England,  New  York,  and 
Pennsylvania  exhibited  its  faults,  and  succeeded,  with 
much  personal  abuse,  in  thrusting  out  the  elements 
foreign  to  its  character  which  retarded  its  move 
ment,  the  society  of  the  Southern  States  was  classi 
cally  calm.  Not  a  breath  disturbed  the  quiet  which 
brooded  over  the  tobacco  and  cotton  fields  between 
the  Potomac  and  Florida.  A  Presidential  election 


1804.  THE  YAZOO  CLAIMS.  201 

was  taking  place,  but  the  South  saw  only  one  candi 
date.  The  State  legislatures  quietly  chose  electors 
to  vote  for  Jefferson  and  Clinton.  From  the  St. 
Mary's  to  the  Potomac  and  the  Ohio,  every  electoral 
voice  was  given  to  Jefferson.  With  some  surprise 
the  public  learned  that  Maryland  gave  two  of  eleven 
votes  to  C.  C.  Pinckney,  who  received  also  the  three 
votes  of  Delaware.  This  little  State  even  went  back 
on  its  path,  repudiated  Caesar  A.  Rodney,  and  re 
turned  to  its  favorite  Bayard,  who  was  sent  by  a 
handsome  majority  to  his  old  seat  in  the  House  of 
Representatives.  Broken  for  an  instant  only  by  this 
slight  check,  the  tide  of  democratic  triumph  swept 
over  the  States  of  Pennsylvania,  New  Jersey,  and 
New  York,  and  burst  upon  Connecticut  as  though 
Jefferson's  hope  of  dragging  even  that  State  from 
its  moorings  were  at  length  to  be  realized.  With 
difficulty  the  Connecticut  hierarchy  held  its  own ;  and 
with  despair  after  the  torrent  passed  by,  it  looked 
about  and  found  itself  alone.  Even  Massachusetts 
cast  29,310  votes  for  Jefferson,  against  25,777  for 
Pinckney. 

Rarely  was  a  Presidential  election  better  calculated 
to  turn  the  head  of  a  President,  and  never  was  a 
President  elected  who  felt  more  keenly  the  pleasure 
of  his  personal  triumph.  At  the  close  of  four  years 
of  administration,  all  Jefferson's  hopes  were  fulfilled. 
He  had  annihilated  opposition.  The  slanders  of  the 
Federalist  press  helped  to  show  that  he  was  the  idol 
of  four  fifths  of  the  nation.  He  received  one  him- 


202        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED   STATES.        CH.  9. 

dred  and  sixty-two  of  one  hundred  and  seventy-six 
electoral  votes,  while  in  1801  he  had  but  seventy- 
three  in  one  hundred  and  thirty-eight ;  and  in  the 
Ninth  Congress,  which  was  to  meet  in  December, 
1805,  barely  seven  out  of  thirty-four  senators,  and 
twenty-five  out  of  one  hundred  and  forty-one  repre 
sentatives,  would  oppose  his  will.  He  described  his 
triumph,  in  language  studiously  modest,  in  a  letter 
to  Yolney  : l  — 

"  The  two  parties  which  prevailed  with  so  much  vio 
lence  when  you  were  here  are  almost  wholly  melted  into 
one.  At  the  late  Presidential  election  I  have  received 
one  hundred  and  sixty-two  votes  against  fourteen  only. 
Connecticut  is  still  Federalist  by  a  small  majority,  and 
Delaware  on  a  poise,  as  she  has  been  since  1775,  and 
will  be  till  Anglomany  with  her  yields  to  Americanism. 
Connecticut  will  be  with  us  in  a  short  time.  Though  the 
people  in  mass  have  joined  us,  their  leaders  had  com 
mitted  themselves  too  far  to  retract.  Pride  keeps  them 
hostile ;  they  brood  over  their  angry  passions,  and  give 
them  vent  in  the  newspapers  which  they  maintain.  They 
still  make  as  much  noise  as  if  they  were  the  whole 
nation." 

Such  success  might  have  turned  the  head  of  any 
philosopher  that  ever  sat  on  a  throne.  Easily  elated, 
unwilling  to  forebode  trouble,  devoid  of  humor,  and 
unable  to  see  himself  in  any  but  the  heroic  light, 
President  Jefferson  basked  in  the  sunshine  of  popu 
larity  and  power  as  though  it  were  no  passing  warmth 
such  as  had  led  scores  of  kings  into  disaster,  but  shone 
1  Jefferson  to  Volney,  Feb.  8,  1805  ;  Works,  iv.  573. 


1804.  THE  YAZOO  CLAIMS.  203 

by  virtue  of  some  democratic  law  which  rested  on 
truth  that  could  never  change.  The  White  House 
was  filled  with  an  atmosphere  of  adulation.  Flattery, 
gross  as  any  that  man  could  ask,  was  poured  into  the 
President's  ear,  but  was  as  nothing  compared  with  the 
more  subtle  flattery  of  the  popular  vote.  No  friend 
stopped  him  to  ask  how  such  a  miraculous  success 
had  been  brought  about.  Four  years  had  not  passed 
since  Jefferson  and  his  party  had  clamored  against 
attempts  to  give  energy  to  government ;  and  no  one 
could  ever  forget  that  they  claimed  and  received  power 
from  the  people  in  order  to  defend  States-rights,  restrict 
Executive  influence,  and  correct  strained  constructions 
of  the  Construction.  Who  upheld  States-rights  in  1804, 
and  complained  of  Executive  influence  and  strained 
constructions  ?  Certainly  not  Jefferson  or  his  friends, 
but  the  monarchical  Federalists,  who  were  fit  inmates 
for  an  asylum.  Whenever  Jefferson  had  occasion  to 
discuss  the  aims  and  opinions  of  the  two  parties,  he 
did  not  allude  to  the  principles  set  forth  in  1798 ;  not 
a  word  was  said  of  "  strict  construction."  The  only 
theories  opposed  to  his  own  which  he  could  see  in 
the  political  horizon  were  those  of  a  few  hundred 
conservatives  of  the  colonial  epoch. 

"  What,  in  fact,"  he  wrote,1  "  is  the  difference  of  prin 
ciple  between  the  two  parties  here  ?  The  one  desires  to 
preserve  an  entire  independence  of  the  executive  and 
legislative  branches  on  each  other  and  the  dependence 
of  both  on  the  same  source,  —  the  free  election  of  the 

1  Jefferson  to  J.  F.  Mercer,  Oct.  9,  1804 ;  Works,  iv.  563. 


204         HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  9. 

people.  The  other  party  wishes  to  lessen  the  depend 
ence  of  the  Executive  and  of  one  branch  of  the  Legis 
lature  on  the  people,  some  by  making  them  hold  for  life, 
some  hereditary,  and  some  even  for  giving  the  Executive 
an  influence  by  patronage  or  corruption  over  the  remain 
ing  popular  branch,  so  as  to  reduce  the  elective  franchise 
to  its  minimum." 

After  nearly  four  years  of  Executive  authority  more 
complete  than  had  ever  before  been  known  in  Ameri 
can  history,  Jefferson  could  see  in  himself  and  in 
his  principles  only  a  negation  of  Executive  influence. 
What  had  become  of  the  old  radical  division  of  par 
ties,  —  the  line  between  men  who  wished  the  national 
government  to  exercise  inherent  powers  of  sovereignty 
and  those  who  held  to  a  strict  observance  of  powers 
expressly  delegated  by  the  people  of  the  States  ? 

Jefferson  said  with  truth  that  the  two  old  parties 
were  almost  wholly  melted  into  one ;  but  in  this  fusion 
his  own  party  had  shown  even  more  willingness  than 
its  opponents  to  mix  its  principles  in  a  useful,  but 
not  noble,  amalgam.  His  own  protests  in  regard  to 
the  Louisiana  purchase  and  the  branch  bank  at  New 
Orleans  were  recorded.  With  such  evidence  on  their 
side,  the  moderate  Federalists  who  in  the  election  of 
1804  gave  to  Jefferson  the  nineteen  electoral  votes 
of  Massachusetts  and  the  seven  of  New  Hampshire, 
could  claim  that  they  had  altered  no  opinion  they 
ever  held ;  that  the  government  had  suffered  no 
change  in  principle  from  what  it  had  been  under 
President  Washington ;  that  not  a  Federalist  measure, 


1804.  THE  YAZOO   CLAIMS.  205 

not  even  the  Alien  and  Sedition  laws,  had  been  ex 
pressly  repudiated  ;  that  the  national  debt  was  larger 
than  it  had  ever  been  before,  the  navy  maintained 
and  energetically  employed,  the  national  bank  pre 
served  and  its  operations  extended ;  that  the  powers 
of  the  national  government  had  been  increased  to  a 
point  that  made  blank  paper  of  the  Constitution  as 
heretofore  interpreted  by  Jefferson,  while  the  national 
territory,  vastly  more  than  doubled  in  extent,  was 
despotically  enlarged  and  still  more  despotically  ruled 
by  the  President  and  Congress,  in  the  teeth  of  every 
political  profession  the  Republican  party  had  ever 
made.  Had  this  been  the  work  of  Federalists,  it 
would  have  been  claimed  as  a  splendid  triumph  of 
Federalist  principles ;  and  the  good  sense  of  New  Eng 
land  was  never  better  shown  than  when  Massachusetts 
and  New  Hampshire  flung  aside  their  prejudices  and 
told  Jefferson  that  they  accepted  his  inaugural  pledge 
to  be  a  Federalist  as  they  were  Republicans. 

Every  Federalist  who  came  over  and  every  State 
that  joined  the  majority  weakened  the  relative  influ 
ence  of  Virginia,  and  helped  to  dilute  the  principles 
of  the  pure  Virginia  school.  The  new  democrats  in 
New  England,  New  York,  and  Ohio  were  Federalists 
in  disguise,  and  cared  nothing  for  fine-spun  constitu 
tional  theories  of  what  government  might  or  might 
not  do,  provided  government  did  what  they  wanted. 
They  feared  no  corruption  in  which  they  were  to 
have  a  part.  They  were  in  secret  jealous  of  Virginia, 
and  as  devoted  as  George  Cabot  and  Stephen  Biggin- 


206         HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  9. 

son  to  the  interests  of  commerce  and  manufactures. 
A  majority  of  the  Northern  democrats  were  men  of 
this  kind.  Their  dislike  of  Federalists  was  a  social 
rather  than  political  feeling,  for  Federalist  manners 
seemed  to  them  a  wilful  impertinence ;  but  the  Var- 
nums  and  Crowninshields  of  Massachusetts  cared  as 
little  as  De  Witt  Clinton  or  Aaron  Burr  for  the 
notions  of  Speaker  Macon  and  John  Randolph.  As 
orators  and  leaders  the  Northern  democrats  made  a 
poor  figure  beside  the  Virginians  ;  but  their  votes 
weighed  more  and  more  heavily  with  every  succeed 
ing  Congress,  and  both  Randolph  and  Macon  were 
becoming  suspicious  that  these  votes  were  too  apt  to 
be  cast  against  the  wishes  of  Virginia. 

The  second  session  of  the  Eighth  Congress  met  on 
the  first  Monday  in  November,  as  provided  by  a  law 
passed  in  view  of  Judge  Chase's  impeachment.  The 
President's  Message,  sent  to  Congress  Nov.  8,  1804, 
was  as  usual  toned  to  cheerful  harmony.  The  in 
come  had  reached  eleven  millions  and  a  half  of  dol 
lars  ;  more  than  three  million  six  hundred  thousand 
dollars  of  the  public  debt  had  been  discharged  within 
the  year,  more  than  twelve  millions  since  1801 ;  and 
the  revenue  was  still  increasing.  Difficulties  had 
risen  with  foreign  nations,  but  no  disturbance  of  the 
peace  was  to  be  expected.  The  Indians  were  quiet. 
Gunboats  were  in  course  of  construction.  No  increase 
of  the  army  was  called  for.  Congress  had  only  ta 
inquire  whether  anything  remained  to  be  done  for  the 
public  good. 


1804.  THE  YAZOO   CLAIMS.  207 

The  Federalists  were  reduced  to  showing  that  Jef 
ferson's  political  success  had  not  chastened  his  style ; 
for  the  Message  contained  a  number  of  sentences  that 
exaggerated  his  peculiar  faults  of  expression :  — 

"  Tt  e  war  which  was  lighted  up  in  Europe  a  little 
before  our  last  meeting  has  not  yet  extended  its  flames 
to  other  nations,  nor  been  marked  by  the  calamities 
which  sometimes  stain  the  footsteps  of  war." 

The  Federalists  reasonably  objected  to  the  figure 
of  a  war  which  not  only  extended  flames  but  also 
made  footsteps  and  marked  them  by  calamities  which 
stained.  Jefferson  went  on  to  say  that  he  had  bought 
from  the  Delaware  Indians  the  country  between  the 
Wabash  and  the  Ohio :  — 

"  This  acquisition  is  important  not  only  for  its  extent 
and  fertility,  but  as  fronting  three  hundred  miles  on  the 
Ohio,  and  near  half  that  on  the  Wabash.  The  produce  of 
the  settled  country  descending  those  rivers  will  no  longer 
pass  in  view  of  the  Indian  frontier  but  in  a  small  portion, 
and  with  the  cession  heretofore  made  by  the  Kaskaskias 
nearly  consolidates  our  possessions  north  of  the  Ohio 
in  a  very  respectable  breadth  from  Lake  Erie  to  the 
Mississippi." 

Produce  passing  in  view  of  a  frontier  in  a  portion 
and  consolidating  possessions  in  a  breadth  did  not 
suit  fastidious  Federalists  ;  nor  were  they  satisfied 
with  the  President's  closing  exhortation,  requesting 
the  Legislature  to  inquire  "  whether  laws  are  provided 
in  all  cases  where  they  are  wanting."  They  enjoyed 
their  jests  at  Jefferson's  literary  style ;  but  with  the 


208        HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED  STATES.        CH.  9. 

public  the  matter  of  the  Message  was  more  weighty 
than  its  manner.  No  kind  of  criticism  had  less 
political  value  than  that  wasted  on  the  style  of  a 
public  document. 

Yet  one  thing  was  certainly  wanting  in  this  Message. 
No  hint  was  given  that  Congress  stood  in  danger  of 
overstepping  the  limits  of  its  powers,  or  would  do  well 
to  return  within  them.  This  silence  was  not  acci 
dental  ;  it  marked  the  tnoment  of  separation  between 
Jefferson  and  the  old  Republicans  of  1798.  Speaker 
Macon,  John  Randolph,  and  Joseph  Nicholson  soon 
showed  that  they  meant  to  take  no  such  view  of 
their  duties. 

Hardly  had  legislation  begun,  when  Randolph,  No 
vember  26,  made  a  report  against  the  remission  of 
duties  on  books  imported  for  the  use  of  schools  and 
colleges.  The  Constitution,  he  said,  was  a  grant  of 
limited  powers  for  general  objects  ;  its  leading  feature 
was  an  abhorrence  of  exclusive  privileges ;  impost 
must  be  uniform  ;  if  Congress  could  exempt  one  class 
of  the  people  from  taxes,  they  might  exempt  other 
classes  ;  and  although  the  practice  had  been  different, 
and  philosophical  apparatus  for  the  use  of  schools  was 
actually  exempt  by  law,  he  believed  that  law  to  be 
unconstitutional.  The  doctrine,  which  if  carried  to 
its  ultimate  conclusions  would  have  left  hardly  a  tax 
on  the  statute-book,  was  accepted  by  the  same  House 
which  had  supported  Randolph  in  defending  the  Loui 
siana  purchase  by  arguments  that,  in  President  Jef 
ferson's  opinion,  left  no  Constitution  at  all.  Two 


1804.  THE  YAZOO  CLAIMS.  209 

days  afterward  Randolph  repeated  the  lesson,  and  his 
friends  Macon  and  Nicholson  came  to  his  support.  A 
Bill  was  before  the  House  authorizing  the  corporation 
.of  Georgetown  to  construct  a  dam  or  causeway  from 
Mason's  Island  to  the  shore  of  the  Potomac,  in  order 
to  scour  the  channel  and  improve  navigation.  Ran 
dolph  affirmed  that  the  Potomac  was  the  joint  property 
of  Maryland  and  Virginia,  over  which  Congress  had 
no  right  to  legislate ;  that  the  Bill  authorized  the  cor 
poration  of  Georgetown  to  lay  a  tax  which  would  be 
unequal  and  oppressive,  because  all  Georgetown  prop 
erty  would  not  be  equally  benefited  by  deepening  the 
harbor ;  and  finally,  "  he  hoped  a  prompt  rejection  of 
the  Bill  would  serve  as  a  general  notice  to  the  inhabi 
tants  of  the  District  to  desist  from  their  daily  and 
frivolous  applications  to  Congress."  Macon,  Nichol 
son,  and  a  number  of  the  Virginians  spoke  earnestly 
in  the  same  sense.  "  So  long  as  I  have  the  honor 
of  a  seat  in  the  House,"  said  Nicholson,  "  I  will  hold 
up  my  hands  against  any  measure  like  the  present, 
which  would  go  to  affect  the  rights  of  any  of  the  States. 
If  Congress  have  a  right  to  interfere  in  the  least  with 
the  free  navigation  of  the  Potomac,  they  have  a  right 
to  stop  it  altogether."  In  reply  to  these  exhortations 
the  House  passed  the  Bill  by  a  vote  of  sixty-six  to 
thirty-eight ;  and  more  than  enough  Republicans  voted 
for  it  to  have  passed  it  without  Federalist  help. 

The  reason  for  this  sudden  decline  of  Randolph's 
influence  was  not  far  to  seek.  He  was  undertaking 
to  act  without  concert  with  the  President.  While  he 

VOL.  II.  —  14 


210        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.        CH.  9. 

and  his  friends  argued  on  the  States-rights  theory  at 
one  end  of  Pennsylvania  Avenue,  Jefferson  at  the 
other  end  said  openly,  to  Federalists  and  Republicans 
alike,  that  such  arguments  were  mere  metaphysical 
subtleties  which  ought  to  have  no  weight.1  The  next 
subject  in  debate  left  no  longer  a  doubt  of  the  cleft 
opening  between  the  old  Republicans  of  1798  and  the 
Republicans  of  the  future,  with  Jefferson  and  Madison 
at  their  head.  That  Randolph  had  determined  to 
fight  for  control  of  the  party  and  for  the  principles 
upon  which  it  had  come  into  office  was  clear  ;  but  the 
reason  for  the  suddenness  and  violence  of  his  emotion 
was  found  in  the  once  famous  story  of  the  Yazoo 
Claims,  which  from  his  youth  acted  on  his  passionate 
temper  with  the  force  of  a  point  of  honor. 

As  already  told,  Congress  seemed  about  to  settle 
these  claims  as  early  as  April,  1802,  when  the  six 
commissioners  made  their  Report.2  John  Randolph 
and  his  friends  were  then  supreme.  Dec.  30,  1803, 
a  few  days  before  the  Federalists  were  startled  by 
Randolph's  demand  for  the  impeachment  of  Judge 
Chase,  the  Northern  democrats  and  the  friends  of 
Madison  were  surprised  by  a  Resolution  offered  by 
Randolph  excluding  claimants  under  the  Georgia 
grants  of  1795  from  any  share  in  the  proposed 
settlement.  A  few  weeks  later,  Feb.  20,  1804,  Ran 
dolph  withdrew  this  Resolution,  in  order  to  introduce 
a  series  of  declaratory  Resolves,  which,  after  reciting 

1  Diary  of  J.  Q.  Adams  (Jan.  11,  1805),  i.  331. 
*  See  vol.  i.  p.  305. 


1804.  THE  YAZOO   CLAIMS.  211 

the  story  of  the  Georgia  grants,  affirmed  the  right  of 
Georgia  to  rescind  them,  and  forbade  the  appropriation 
of  money  to  the  settlement  of  claims  derived  from 
them.  March  7,  1804,  he  made  a  long  and  earnest 
speech  on  the  subject ;  and  after  a  sharp  struggle  in 
a  House  nearly  equally  divided,  he  succeeded  in 
defeating  action  on  the  Bill.  On  the  final  vote  of 
postponement,  March  12,  1804,  he  carried  fifteen 
members  of  the  Virginia  delegation  with  him.  Of 
the  three  Republicans  from  Virginia  who  rejected  his 
lead,  one  was  John  G.  Jackson,  brother-in-law  of  the 
Secretary  of  State. 

From  that  moment  Randolph's  energies  quickened 
in  sympathy  with  old  Republican  principles ;  and 
when  he  returned  to  Congress  in  November,  1804,  he 
and  his  friends  began  at  once  to  take  extreme  ground 
as  champions  of  States-rights.  He  lost  no  chance  of 
enforcing  his  theories,  whether  in  regard  to  exemp 
tions  from  taxes,  or  in  denying  to  government  power 
to  improve  navigation  within  the  District  of  Columbia, 
or  in  reproving  the  people  of  Georgetown  for  pro 
posing  to  lay  a  general  tax  on  their  property  for 
the  betterment  of  their  river  front.  He  found  the 
Administration  opposed  to  him.  "  Mere  metaphysical 
subtleties,"  said  Jefferson.  The  influence  of  Madison 
was  strong  in  favor  of  the  Yazoo  Compromise,  and 
the  Northern  democrats  supported  the  Secretary.  A 
struggle  for  supremacy  was  imminent,  and  its  conse 
quences  were  soon  felt.  The  impeachment  of  Judge 
Chase  was  Randolph's  measure,  and  received  no  sup- 


212        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.       CH.  9. 

port  from  Madison.  The  Yazoo  Compromise  was 
Madison's  measure,  and  its  defeat  was  Randolph's 
passionate  wish. 

The  three  branches  of  government  were  likely  to  be 
at  variance  on  a  point  of  deep  concern.  No  one  who 
knew  Chief -Justice  Marshall  could  doubt  that  he,  and 
the  Supreme  Bench  with  him,  would  hold  that  the 
State  of  Georgia  was  bound  by  its  contract  with  the 
Land  Companies.  The  Administration  had  taken 
the  ground  that  the  State  was  not  bound  in  law,  but 
that  the  United  States  should  nevertheless  make  an 
equitable  compromise  with  the  claimants.  Randolph 
was  bent  on  forcing  Congress  to  assert  that  a  State 
had  the  right  to  repudiate  its  own  acts  where  it  was 
evident  that  these  acts  were  against  common  morality 
or  public  interest ;  and  that  its  decision  in  such  a  case 
should  be  final.  The  conflict  was  embittered  by  the 
peculiarities  of  Randolph's  character.  In  his  eyes, 
when  such  questions  of  honor  were  involved,  every 
man  who  opposed  him  seemed  base.  Unfortunately 
the  New  England  Mississippi  Company  secured  the 
services  of  Gideon  Granger,  the  Postmaster-General, 
as  their  agent ;  and  Randolph's  anger  became  in 
tense  when,  at  the  close  of  the  year  1804,  he  saw 
the  Postmaster-General  on  the  floor  of  the  House 
openly  lobbying  for  the  passage  of  the  Bill. 

At  length,  at  the  end  of  January,  1805,  the  House 
went  into  committee  on  the  Georgia  claims,  and 
Randolph  for  the  first  time  displayed  the  full  vio 
lence  of  his  temper.  Hitherto  as  a  leader  he  had 


1804.  THE  YAZOO   CLAIMS.  213 

been  at  times  arrogant ;  but  from  this  moment  he  be 
gan  the  long  series  of  personal  assaults  which  made  him 
famous,  as  though  he  were  the  bully  of  a  race  course, 
dispensed  from  regarding  ordinary  rules  of  the  ring, 
and  ready  at  any  sudden  impulse  to  spring  at  his  ene 
mies,  gouging,  biting,  tearing,  and  rending  his  victims 
with  the  ferocity  of  a  rough-and-tumble  fight.  The 
spectacle  was  revolting,  but  terrific ;  and  until  these 
tactics  lost  their  force  by  repetition,  few  men  had  the 
nerve  and  quickness  to  resist  them  with  success. 

"  Past  experience  has  shown,"  he  cried,  "  that  this 
is  one  of  those  subjects  which  pollution  has  sanctified." 
He  treated  the  majority  of  the  House  as  corruptionists, 
"  As  if  animated  by  one  spirit,  they  perform  all  their 
evolutions  with  the  most  exact  discipline,  and  march 
in  a  firm  phalanx  directly  up  to  their  object.  Is  it 
that  men  combined  to  effect  some  evil  purpose,  acting 
on  previous  pledge  to  each  other,  are  ever  more  in 
unison  than  those  who,  seeking  only  to  discover  truth, 
obey  the  impulse  of  that  conscience  which  God  has 
placed  in  their  bosoms  ? "  He  fell  upon  Granger  : 
"  Millions  of  acres  are  easily  digested  by  such 
stomachs.  Goaded  by  avarice,  they  buy  only  to  sell, 
and  sell  only  to  buy.  The  retail  trade  of  fraud  and 
imposture  yields  too  small  and  slow  a  profit  to  gratify 
their  cupidity.  They  buy  and  sell  corruption  in  the 
gross."  He  hinted  that  the  Administration  was  to 
blame  :  "  Is  it  come  to  this  ?  Are  heads  of  executive 
departments  to  be  brought  into  this  House,  with  all  the 
influence  and  patronage  attached  to  them,  to  extort 


214        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.       Cn.9. 

from  us  now  what  was  refused  at  the  last  session  of 
Congress  ? "  He  closed  by  asserting  that  this  was 
the  spirit  of  Federalism,  and  that  Republicans  who 
yielded  to  it  were  false  to  their  party  :  "  Of  what  con 
sequence  is  it  that  a  man  smiles  in  your  face,  holds 
out  his  hand,  and  declares  himself  the  advocate  of 
those  political  principles  to  which  you  are  also  at 
tached,  when  you  see  him  acting  with  your  adversaries 
upon  other  principles  which  the  voice  of  the  nation 
has  put  down,  and  which  I  did  hope  were  buried, 
never  to  rise  again  in  this  section  of  the  globe  ? " 
He  maintained  that  the  Federalist  administrations  had 
done  no  act  so  corrupt :  "  If  Congress  shall  deter 
mine  to  sanction  this  fraud  upon  the  public,  I  trust  in 
God  we  shall  hear  no  more  of  the  crimes  and  follies 
of  the  former  Administration.  For  one,  I  promise 
that  my  lips  upon  this  subject  shall  be  closed  in 
eternal  silence.  I  should  disdain  to  prate  about  the 
petty  larcenies  of  our  predecessors  after  having  given 
my  sanction  to  this  atrocious  public  robbery." 

The  tirade  could  have  no  other  result  than  a  per 
sonal  quarrel  and  a  party  schism.  Madison  and  the 
Administration  had  done  nothing  to  deserve  the  at 
tack,  and  of  course  could  not  trust  Randolph  again. 
The  question  whether  the  claimants  had  rights  which 
the  government  would  do  well  to  compromise  was 
for  the  law  to  decide,  and  was  ultimately  settled  by 
Chief-Justice  Marshall  in  their  favor.  The  question 
of  morality,  in  regard  to  sanctioning  fraud,  though  a 
much  wider  issue,  was  not  to  be  settled  ex  parte,  but 


1804.  THE  YAZOO  CLAIMS.  215 

must  abide  by  the  answer  to  the  question  of  law. 
Only  the  States-rights  difficulty  remained ;  and  even 
on  that  delicate  ground,  although  the  right  of  Georgia 
to  repudiate  her  own  pledges  under  the  plea  of  her 
own  corruption  were  conceded,  the  States-rights  the 
ory  could  not  insist  that  this  act  must  bind  other 
States,  or  affect  any  sovereignty  except  that  which  was 
directly  involved.  After  the  property  in  question  had 
been  sold  to  the  United  States  government,  Georgia 
need  not  prevent  the  purchaser  from  doing  what  it 
would  with  its  own.  Randolph  could  not  make  States- 
rights  serve  his  whole  purpose  in  the  argument,  and 
was  obliged  to  rely  on  the  charge  of  sanctioning  cor 
ruption  and  fraud,  —  a  charge  irrelevant  to  the  claim 
of  innocent  third  parties  like  the  New  Englanders, 
unless  he  could  prove  their  complicity,  which  was  not 
in  his  power. 

Randolph's  harangue  struck  at  the  credit  of  Madi 
son  ;  and  the  conduct  of  the  Postmaster-General  in 
acting  as  claim-agent  cast  a  shadow  of  corruption 
over  the  whole  government.  Madison's  friends  were 
obliged  to  take  up  the  challenge  ;  and  his  brother- 
in-law,  John  G.  Jackson  of  Virginia,  replied  to  Ran 
dolph  in  a  speech  which  was  thought  to  bear  evident 
marks  of  Madison's  hand.  Some  of  Jackson's  retorts 
carried  a  sting.  Randolph  had  dwelt  much  on  the 
silence  and  discipline  of  the  majority.  "  When  un 
principled  men,"  said  he,  "  acquire  the  ascendency, 
they  act  in  concert  and  are  silent."  "  Silence  and 
concert,  then,"  retorted  Jackson,  "  are  to  him  proofs 


216         HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  9. 

of  corrupt  motive.  Is  this  always  a  correct  position  ? 
Does  the  gentleman  recollect  that  measures  were 
adopted  a  few  years  past  without  discussion,  by  my 
political  friends  in  conjunction  with  him,  who  were 
silent  and  united?"  Throughout  Jackson's  speech 
ran  a  tone  of  irritating  disregard  for  his  colleague, 
"  whose  influence  in  this  House  is  equal  to  the  rapacity 
of  the  speculator  whose  gigantic  grasp  has  been  de 
scribed  by  him  as  extending  from  the  shores  of  Lake 
Erie  to  the  mouth  of  the  Mobile."  Whether  Madison 
meant  it  or  not,  an  impression  prevailed  in  the  House 
that  in  Jackson's  speech  the  Secretary  of  State  took  up 
Randolph's  challenge  with  a  defiance  equally  strong. 

Randolph  returned  to  his  charges,  attacking  Granger 
bitterly,  but  not  yet  venturing  to  take  the  single  step 
that  remained  to  create  a  Virginia  feud  ;  he  left  Jack 
son  and  Madison  alone.  He  bore  with  something  like 
patience  the  retorts  which  his  violence  drew  upon  him, 
and  his  self-esteem  made  him  proof  to  the  insults  of 
democrats  like  Matthew  Lyon,  who  thanked  his  Creator 
"that  he  gave  me  the  face  of  a  man,  not  that  of  an  ape 
or  a  monkey,  and  that  he  gave  me  the  heart  of  a  man 
also."  After  a  long  and  ill-tempered  debate,  Feb.  2, 
1805,  Randolph  closed  by  an  allusion  to  Madison  and 
Gallatin  which  implied  hesitation.  "  When  I  first  read 
their  Report,  I  was  filled  with  unutterable  astonish 
ment,  finding  men  in  whom  I  had  and  still  have  the 
highest  confidence  recommend  a  measure  which  all  the 
facts  and  all  the  reasons  they  had  collected  opposed 
and  unequivocally  condemned."  Prudence  restrained 


1804.  THE  YAZOO   CLAIMS.  217 

him  from  making  a  final  breach  with  Madison  ;  and 
perhaps  he  was  the  more  cautious  because  he  felt  the 
danger  of  pressing  too  far  his  influence  over  Virginia 
sentiment  which  to  this  point  supported  his  opposition. 
When  the  House  divided,  a  majority  of  sixty-three 
to  fifty-eight  sustained  the  compromise,  and  ordered 
the  committee  of  claims  to  report  a  Bill ;  but  in  the 
minority  Randolph  found  by  his  side  every  Republican 
member  of  the  Virginia  delegation  except  two,  one 
of  whom  was  Jackson.  Even  the  two  sons-in-law  of 
President  Jefferson  voted  against  the  Yazoo  claims. 
So  strong  was  the  current  of  opinion  in  Virginia,  that 
Senator  Giles  went  about  Washington 1  asserting  that 
Jefferson  himself  would  lose  an  election  there  if  he 
were  known  to  favor  the  compromise,  and  that  Jack 
son  would  certainly  be  defeated.  For  the  moment 
Randolph  might  fairly  suppose  that  hi  a  contest  for 
supremacy  with  the  Secretary  of  State,  his  own  hold 
on  Virginia  was  stronger  than  Madison's.  In  spite  of 
the  majority  against  him,  he  succeeded  in  postponing 
action  on  the  Bill. 

Perhaps  his  temper  was  further  restrained  by  an 
other  motive.  The  trial  of  Judge  Chase  was  near  at 
hand.  Within  a  few  days  after  the  close  of  the  Yazoo 
debate,  Randolph  was  to  open  the  case  for  the  man 
agers  before  the  Senate  ;  and  he  had  reason  to  fear 
that  the  Northern  democrats  were  beginning  to  doubt 
the  wisdom  of  this  Virginia  scheme. 

1  Diary  of  J.  Q.  Adams  (Feb.  1,  1805),  i.  343. 


CHAPTER  X. 

THE  schisms  which  characterized  the  last  year  of 
President  Jefferson's  first  term  increased  the  diffi 
culty  of  convicting  Justice  Chase,,  Burr  was  still 
Vice-President,  and  was  sure  not  only  to  preside  at 
the  trial,  but  also,  unless  conciliated,  to  encourage  re 
bellion  against  the  Virginians.  He  had  warm  friends 
even  in  the  Senate ;  and  he  was  observed  to  cultivate 
close  social  relations  with  John  Smith,  the  senator 
from  Ohio,  whose  vote  was  likely  to  be  necessary  for 
conviction.  Although  the  two  senators  from  New 
York  were  no  friends  of  Burr,  one  of  them,  Dr. 
Samuel  L.  Mitchill,  was  known  to  oppose  impeach 
ment  ;  and  not  only  he,  but  also  his  colleague, 
another  John  Smith,  when  members  of  the  House, 
voted  against  Randolph's  motion  for  a  committee 
of  inquiry.  Senator  Bradley  of  Vermont  privately 
talked  with  earnestness  against  the  Pickering  im 
peachment,  and  never  favored  that  of  Chase.  His 
colleague,  Israel  Smith,  shared  his  doubts.  Twenty- 
three  votes  were  required  to  convict,  and  the  Re 
publicans  had  but  twenty-five  senators  against  nine 
Federalists.  A  defection  of  three  Republican  senators 


1805.  TRIAL   OF  JUSTICE   CHASE.  219 

would  be  fatal ;  but  the  votes  of  at  least  five  were 
in  doubt. 

Randolph's  attack  on  the  Yazoo  Republicans  and  on 
the  friends  of  Madison  took  from  them  all  desire  to 
strengthen  his  influence  ;  while,  as  though  to  com 
plicate  confusion,  his  assault  on  his  own  party  was 
cheered  by  Duane  and  the  "  Aurora,"  until  the  Penn 
sylvania  schism  seemed  about  to  join  with  a  Virginia 
schism  for  the  overthrow  of  the  judiciary  in  the  first 
place,  and  of  Madison  and  Gallatin  afterward.  A  col 
lapse  of  the  Republican  party  was  to  be  feared.  In 
the  success  of  impeachment,  the  interests  of  Duane 
and  Randolph  were  closely  connected,  and  Duane 
controlled  Pennsylvania  as  Randolph  ruled  Virginia. 
Everything  tended  to  show  that  Chase's  conviction 
would  add  to  the  power  already  in  the  hands  of  these 
two  men ;  and  hands  less  fitted  to  guide  a  government 
or  less  trusted  by  moderate  Republicans  could  hardly 
be  found  in  either  party. 

Duane's  support  of  Randolph  was  the  warmer  be 
cause  his  own  attack  on  the  judiciary  failed.  The 
Pennsylvania  judges  were  brought  to  trial  in  Janu 
ary,  1805.  The  managers  for  the  Legislature,  know 
ing  no  law  themselves  and  unable  to  persuade  any 
competent  Pennsylvania  lawyer  to  act  as  counsel, 
sent  for  Caesar  A.  Rodney  from  Delaware  to  conduct 
the  case.  So  important  did  Randolph  and  Nicholson 
at  Washington  think  the  success  of  the  Pennsylvania 
impeachment,  that  at  the  end  of  December,  1804,  they 
allowed  Rodney  to  drop  his  work  as  member  of  Con- 


220        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  10. 

gress  and  manager  of  Chase's  trial,  in  order  to  hurry 
to  Lancaster  and  do  battle  with  Dallas,  Jefferson's  dis 
trict  attorney,  who  was  defending  the  judges.  After  a 
long  struggle,  Jan.  28,  1805,  the  Senate  at  Lancaster 
came  to  a  vote,  and  Rodney  was  beaten.  Thirteen 
senators  declared  the  judges  guilty,  —  three  less  than 
the  required  two  thirds. 

This  defeat  of  the  impeachers  occurred  the  day 
before  Randolph  attacked  Granger  and  the  Yazoo 
claims  in  Congress.  During  the  week  that  preceded 
Chase's  trial,  Randolph's  bad  management  or  ill-luck 
seemed  accumulating  disasters  on  his  head.  He  roused 
needless  hatred  against  himself  in  Congress ;  his  alli 
ance  with  Duane  was  unsuccessful ;  he  exhausted  his 
strength  in  fighting  the  Yazoo  Bill,  and  was  in  no 
condition  of  mind  or  body  to  meet  the  counsel  of 
Judge  Chase. 

Neither  the  Administration  nor  his  Virginia  friends 
failed  to  support  Randolph.  They  made  efforts  to 
conciliate  Burr,  whose  opposition  to  the  impeachment 
was  most  feared.  Jefferson  appointed  J.  B.  Prevost 
of  New  York,  Burr's  stepson,  a  judge  of  the  Superior 
Court  at  New  Orleans  ;  James  Brown,  who  married 
Mrs.  Burr's  sister,  was  made  secretary  to  the  Loui 
siana  Territory  and  sent  to  govern  St.  Louis,  solely 
on  Burr's  recommendation  ;  James  Wilkinson,  one  of 
Burr's  most  intimate  friends  and  general-in-chief  of 
the  army,  was  made  governor  of  the  Louisiana  Ter 
ritory,  —  an  appointment  directly  opposed  to  Jeffer 
son's  theories  about  the  union  of  civil  and  military 


1805.  TRIAL  OF  JUSTICE  CHASE.  221 

authority.1  Besides  these  conciliatory  compliments 
the  President  repeatedly  invited  Burr  to  dinner,  and 
treated  him  with  more  attention  than  ever  before ; 2 
both  Madison  and  Gallatin  kept  up  friendly  relations 
with  him ;  while  Senator  Giles  of  Virginia  drew  an 
Address  to  Governor  Bloomfield  of  New  Jersey,  and 
caused  it  to  be  signed  by  all  the  senators  who  could 
be  induced  to  let  their  names  be  used,  requesting  that 
a  nolle  prosequi  should  be  entered  on  the  indictment 
against  Burr  found  by  the  grand  jury  of  Bergen 
county. 

The  Virginians  closed  their  quarrels  for  the  moment 
in  order  to  support  the  impeachment.  William  B. 
Giles,  who  came  to  the  Senate  in  place  of  Wilson 
Gary  Nicholas,  acted  as  Randolph's  representative  in 
shaping  the  Senate's  rules.3  He  canvassed  its  mem 
bers,  and  dealt  with  those  who  doubted,  laboring 
earnestly  and  openly  to  bring  senators  to  the  Virginia 
standpoint,  as  fixed  by  him  in  a  speech  intended  to 
serve  as  guide  in  framing  rules  for  the  proceedings 
about  to  begin.  This  speech,  made  Dec.  20,  1804,* 
maintained  that  the  Constitution  put  no  limit  on  im 
peachment,  but  said  only  that  the  Senate  should  try 
all  impeachments  ;  and  therefore,  while  any  civil  offi 
cer  convicted  of  treason,  bribery,  or  other  high  crimes 
and  misdemeanors  should  be  removed  from  office,  in 

1  Jefferson  to  General  Smith,  May  4,  1806;  Works,  v.  13. 

2  Life  of  Plumer,  p.  330. 

*  Diary  of  J.  Q.  Adams  (Nov.  29,  30,  1804),  i.  318. 

*  Boston  Ceutinel,  Jan.  9,  1805. 


222        HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.       CH.  10. 

all  other  cases  not  enumerated  the  Senate  might  at  its 
discretion  remove,  disqualify,  or  suspend  the  officer. 
Thus  Judge  Pickering  had  been  removed,  said  Giles, 
though  undoubtedly  insane  and  incapable  of  commit 
ting  any  crime  or  of  making  his  defence.  "  So  the 
assumption  of  power  on  the  part  of  the  Supreme 
Court  in  issuing  their  process  to  the  office  of  the 
Secretary  of  State,  directing  the  Executive  how  a  law 
of  the  United  States  should  be  executed,  and  the  right 
which  the  courts  have  assumed  to  themselves  of  re 
viewing  and  passing  upon  the  Acts  of  the  Legislature 
in  other  cases,"  were  matter  of  impeachment.  In 
arguing  this  thesis  Giles  was  obliged  to  take  the 
ground  that  the  Senate  was  not  a  court,  and  ought  to 
discard  all  analogy  with  a  court  of  justice  ; 1  impeach 
ment  need  imply  no  criminality  or  corruption,  and 
removal  was  nothing  more  than  a  notice  to  the  im 
peached  officer  that  he  held  opinions  dangerous  to  the 
State,  and  that  his  office  must  be  put  in  better  hands. 
He  induced  the  Senate  to  strike  out  the  word  "court" 
where  it  occurred  in  the  proposed  rules  ; 2  and  at 
length  went  so  far  as  to  deny  that  the  secretary  of 
the  Senate  could  administer  the  oath  to  witnesses, 
or  that  the  Senate  had  power  to  authorize  the  secre 
tary  to  administer  such  an  oath,  but  must  send  for  a 
magistrate  competent  for  the  purpose.  Unfortunately 
for  him,  the  impeachment  of  Judge  Pickering  was  a 
precedent  directly  opposed  to  this  doctrine.  He  was 

1  Diary  of  J.  Q.  Adams  (Dec.  21,  1804),  i.  322. 
a  Ibid.  (Dec.  24,  1804),  i.  324,  325. 


1805.  TRIAL   OF  JUSTICE   CHASE.  223 

compelled  to  submit  while  the  Senate  unwillingly  took 
the  forms  of  a  court. 

Giles's  view  of  impeachment,  which  was  the  same 
with  that  of  Randolph,  had  the  advantage  of  being 
clear  and  consistent.  The  opposite  extreme,  afterward 
pressed  by  Luther  Martin  and  his  associate  counsel  for 
the  defence,  restricted  impeachment  to  misdemeanors 
indictable  at  law,  —  a  conclusion  not  to  be  resisted  if 
the  words  of  the  Constitution  were  to  be  understood 
in  a  legal  sense.  Such  a  rule  would  have  made  im 
peachment  worthless  for  many  cases  where  it  was 
likely  to  be  most  needed  ;  for  comparatively  few  vio 
lations  of  official  duty,  however  fatal  to  the  State, 
could  be  brought  within  this  definition.  Giles  might 
have  quoted  Madison  in  support  of  the  broader  view ; 
and  if  Madison  did  not  understand  the  Constitution, 
any  other  Virginian  might  be  excused  for  error.  So 
far  back  as  the  year  1789,  when  Congress  began  to 
discuss  the  President's  powers,  Madison  said :  "  I 
contend  that  the  wanton  removal  of  meritorious  offi 
cers  would  subject  him  to  impeachment  and  removal 
from  his  own  high  trust."  Such  a  misdemeanor  was 
certainly  not  indictable,  and  could  not  technically  be 
brought  within  the  words  of  the  Constitution ;  it  was 
impeachable  only  on  Giles's  theory. 

The  Senate  became  confused  between  these  two 
views,  and  never  knew  on  what  theory  it  acted.  Giles 
failed  to  take  from  its  proceedings  the  character  of  a 
court  of  justice  ;  but  though  calling  itself  a  court  of 
justice,  it  would  not  follow  strict  rules  of  law.  The 


224         HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  10. 

result  was  a  nondescript  court,  neither  legal  nor  politi 
cal,  making  law  and  voting  misdemeanors  for  itself 
as  it  went,  and  stumbling  from  one  inconsistency  to 
another. 

The  managers  added  to  the  confusion.  They  put 
forward  no  steady  theory  of  their  own  as  to  the  nature 
of  impeachment ;  possibly  differing  in  opinion,  they 
intentionally  allotted  different  lines  of  argument  to 
each.  In  opening  the  case,  Feb.  20, 1805,  one  of  the 
managers,  George  W.  Campbell  of  Tennessee,  took  the 
ground  that  "  misdemeanor  "  in  the  Constitution  need 
imply  no  criminality.  "  Impeachment,"  said  he,  "  ac 
cording  to  the  meaning  of  the  Constitution,  may  fairly 
be  considered  a  kind  of  inquest  into  the  conduct  of  an 
officer  merely  as  it  regards  his  office.  ...  It  is  more 
in  the  nature  of  a  civil  investigation  than  of  a  criminal 
prosecution."  Such  seemed  to  be  the  theory  of  the 
managers  and  of  the  House  ;  for  although  the  articles 
of  impeachment  reported  by  Randolph  in  March,  1804, 
had  in  each  case  alleged  acts  which  were  inspired  by 
an  evil  intent  to  oppress  the  victim  or  to  excite  odium 
against  the  Government,  and  were  at  least  misdemean 
ors  in  the  sense  of  misbehavior,  Randolph  at  the  last 
moment  slipped  into  the  indictment  two  new  articles, 
one  of  which  alleged  no  evil  intent  at  all,  while  both 
alleged,  at  worst,  errors  in  law  such  as  every  judge  in 
the  United  States  had  committed.  Article  V.  charged 
that  Chase  had  issued  a  capias  against  Callender, 
when  the  law  of  Virginia  required  a  summons  to 
appear  at  the  next  court.  Article  VI.  charged  that 


1805. 


TRIAL  OF  JUSTICE  CHASE.  225 


he  had,  "  with  intent  to  oppress,"  held  Callender  for 
trial  at  once,  contrary  to  the  law  of  Virginia.  Every 
judge  on  the  Supreme  Bench  had  ruled  that  United 
States  courts  were  not  bound  to  follow  the  processes 
of  the  State  courts ;  Chief-Justice  Marshall  himself,  as 
Giles  threatened,  must  be  the  first  victim  if  such  an 
offence  were  a  misdemeanor  in  constitutional  law. 

That  a  judge  was  impeachable  for  a  mistake  in 
declaring  the  law  seemed  therefore  to  be  settled,  so 
far  as  the  House  and  its  managers  could  decide  the 
point.  Judge  Chase's  counsel  assumed  that  this  prin 
ciple,  which  had  been  so  publicly  proclaimed,  was 
seriously  meant;  and  one  after  another  dwelt  on  the 
extravagance  of  the  doctrine  that  a  civil  officer  should 
be  punished  for  mere  error  of  judgment.  In  reply, 
Joseph  H.  Nicholson,  Randolph's  closest  ally,  repu 
diated  the  theory  on  which  he  had  himself  acted  in 
Pickering's  case,  and  which  Giles,  Randolph,  and 
Campbell  pressed ;  he  even  denied  having  heard  such 
ground  taken  as  that  an  impeachment  was  a  mere 
inquest  of  office :  — 

"  For  myself,  I  am  free  to  declare  that  I  heard  no  such 
position  taken.  If  declarations  of  this  kind  have  been 
made,  in  the  name  of  the  managers  I  here  disclaim  them. 
We  do  contend  that  this  is  a  criminal  prosecution  for 
offences  committed  in  the  discharge  of  high  official  duties, 
and  we  now  support  it,  —  not  merely  for  the  purpose  of 
removing  an  individual  from  office,  but  in  order  that  the 
punishment  inflicted  on  him  may  deter  others  from  pur 
suing  the  baneful  example  which  has  been  set  them." 

TOL.  II.  —  16 


226        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  10. 

The  impeachment,  then,  was  a  criminal  prosecution, 
and  the  Senate  was  a  criminal  court;  yet  no  offence 
was  charged  which  the  law  considered  a  misdemeanor, 
while  error  of  judgment,  with  no  imputed  ill-intent, 
was  alleged  as  a  crime. 

Staggering  under  this  load  of  inconsistencies,  uncer 
tain  what  line  of  argument  to  pursue,  and  ignorant 
whether  the  Senate  would  be  ruled  by  existing  law 
or  invent  a  system  of  law  of  its  own,  the  managers, 
Feb.  9,  1805,  appeared  in  the  Senate  chamber  to  open 
their  case  and  produce  their  witnesses.  Upon  the 
popular  imagination  of  the  day  the  impeachment  of 
Warren  Hastings  had  taken  deep  hold.  Barely  ten 
years  had  passed  since  the  House  of  Lords  rendered 
its  judgment  in  that  famous  case ;  and  men's  minds 
were  still  full  of  associations  with  Westminster  Hall. 
The  impeachment  of  Judge  Chase  was  a  cold  and 
colorless  performance  beside  the  melodramatic  splen 
dor  of  Hastings's  trial ;  but  in  the  infinite  possibilities 
of  American  democracy,  the  questions  to  be  decided 
in  the  Senate  chamber  had  a  weight  for  future  ages 
beyond  any  that  were  then  settled  in  the  House  of 
Lords.  Whether  Judge  Chase  should  be  removed 
from  the  bench  was  a  trifling  matter ;  whether  Chief- 
Justice  Marshall  and  the  Supreme  Court  should  hold 
their  power  and  principles  against  this  combination 
of  States-rights  conservatives  and  Pennsylvania  demo 
crats  was  a  subject  for  grave  reflection.  Men  who 
did  not  see  that  the  tide  of  political  innovation  had 
long  since  turned,  and  that  the  French  revolution 


1805. 


TRIAL  OF  JUSTICE  CHASE.  227 


was  no  longer  raging,  were  consumed  with  anxiety 
for  the  fate  of  Chase,  and  not  wholly  without  rea 
son  ;  for  had  Marshall  been  a  man  of  less  calm  and 
certain  judgment,  a  single  mistake  by  him  might 
easily  have  prostrated  the  judiciary  at  the  feet  of 
partisans. 

By  order  of  the  Vice-President  the  Senate  chamber 
was  arranged  in  accordance  with  his  ideas  of  what 
suited  so  grave  an  occasion.  His  own  chair  stood,  like 
that  of  the  chief-justice  in  the  court-room,  against 
the  wall,  and  on  its  right  and  left  crimson  benches 
extended  like  the  seats  of  associate  judges,  to  accom 
modate  the  thirty-four  senators,  who  were  all  present. 
In  front  of  the  Vice-President,  on  the  right,  a  box  was 
assigned  to  the  managers ;  on  the  left,  a  similar  box 
was  occupied  by  Justice  Chase  and  his  counsel.  The 
rest  of  the  floor  was  given  to  members  of  the  House, 
foreign  ministers,  and  other  official  persons.  Behind 
these  a  new  gallery  was  erected  especially  for  ladies, 
and  at  each  end  of  this  temporary  gallery  boxes  were 
reserved  for  the  wives  and  families  of  public  officers. 
The  upper  and  permanent  gallery  was  public.  The 
arrangement  was  a  mimic  reproduction  of  the  famous 
scene  in  Westminster  Hall ;  and  the  little  society  of 
Washington  went  to  the  spectacle  with  the  same 
interest  and  passion  which  had  brought  the  larger 
society  of  London  to  hear  the  orations  of  Sheridan 
and  Burke. 

Before  this  audience  Justice  Chase  at  last  appeared 
with  his  array  of  counsel  at  his  side,  —  Luther  Martin, 


228        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  10. 

Robert  Goodloe  Harper,  Charles  Lee,  Philip  Barton 
Key,  and  Joseph  Hopkinson.  In  such  a  contest  weak 
ness  of  numbers  was  one  element  of  strength ;  for  the 
mere  numbers  of  Congressmen  served  only  to  rouse 
sympathy  for  the  accused.  The  contest  was  unequal 
in  another  sense,  for  the  intellectual  power  of  the 
House  was  quite  unable  on  the  field  of  law  to  cope 
with  the  half-dozen  picked  and  trained  champions  who 
stood  at  the  bar.  Justice  Chase  alone  was  a  better 
lawyer  than  any  in  Congress ;  Luther  Martin  could 
easily  deal  with  the  whole  box  of  managers ;  Harper 
and  Lee  were  not  only  lawyers,  but  politicians ;  and 
young  Hopkinson's  genius  was  beyond  his  years. 

In  the  managers'  box  stood  no  lawyer  of  correspond 
ing  weight.  John  Randolph,  who  looked  upon  the 
impeachment  as  his  personal  act,  was  not  only  ignorant 
of  law,  but  could  not  work  by  legal  methods.  Joseph 
H.  Nicholson  and  Caesar  A.  Rodney  were  more  formid 
able  ;  but  neither  of  them  would  have  outweighed  any 
single  member  of  Chase's  counsel.  The  four  remain 
ing  managers,  all  Southern  men,  added  little  to  the 
strength  of  their  associates.  John  Boyle  of  Kentucky 
lived  to  become  chief-justice  of  that  State,  and  was 
made  district  judge  of  the  United  States  by  a  Presi 
dent  who  was  one  of  the  Federalist  senators  warmly 
opposed  to  the  impeachment.  George  Washington 
Campbell  of  Tennessee  lived  to  be  a  senator,  Secretary 
of  the  Treasury,  and  minister  to  Russia.  Peter  Early 
of  Georgia  became  a  judge  on  the  Supreme  Bench  of 
his  own  State.  Christopher  Clark  of  Virginia  was 


1805. 


TRIAL  OF  JUSTICE  CHASE.  229 


chosen  only  at  the  last  moment  to  take  the  place 
of  Roger  Nelson  of  Maryland,  who  retired.  None  of 
them  rose  much  above  the  average  level  of  Congress ; 
and  Chase's  counsel  grappled  with  them  so  closely,  and 
shut  them  within  a  field  so  narrow,  that  no  genius 
could  have  found  room  to  move.  From  the  moment 
that  the  legal  and  criminal  character  of  impeachment 
was  conceded,  Chase's  counsel  dragged  them  hither 
and  thither  at  will. 

Feb.  9, 1805,  the  case  was  opened  by  John  Randolph. 
Randolph  claimed  to  have  drawn  all  the  articles  of 
impeachment  with  his  own  hand.  If  any  one  under 
stood  their  character,  it  was  he  ;  and  the  respondent's 
counsel  naturally  listened  with  interest  for  Randolph's 
explanation  or  theory  of  impeachment,  and  for  the 
connection  he  should  establish  between  his  theory  and 
his  charges.  These  charges  were  numerous,  but  fell 
under  few  heads.  Of  the  eight  articles  which  Ran 
dolph  presented,  the  first  concerned  the  judge's  conduct 
at  the  trial  of  John  Fries  for  treason  in  Philadelphia 
in  1800 ;  the  five  following  articles  alleged  a  num 
ber  of  offences  committed  during  the  trial  of  James 
Thompson  Callender  for  libel  at  Richmond  in  that 
year ;  Article  VII.  charged  as  a  misdemeanor  the 
judge's  refusal,  in  the  same  year,  to  dismiss  the  grand 
jury  in  Delaware  before  indicting  a  seditious  printer ; 
finally,  Article  VIII.  complained  of  the  judge's  har 
angue  to  the  grand  jury  at  Baltimore  in  May,  1803, 
which  it  characterized  as  "highly  indecent,  extra- 
judicial,  and  tending  to  prostitute  the  high  judicial 


230         HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  10. 

character  with  which  he  was  invested  to  the  low  pur 
pose  of  an  electioneering  partisan." 

Serious  as  some  of  these  charges  certainly  were, — 
for  in  the  case  of  Callender,  even  more  than  in  that 
of  Fries,  Chase's  temper  had  led  him  to  strain,  if  not 
to  violate,  the  law,  —  none  of  the  articles  alleged  an 
offence  known  to  the  statute-books  or  the  common 
law ;  and  Randolph's  first  task  was  to  show  that  they 
could  be  made  the  subject  of  impeachment,  that  they 
were  high  crimes  and  misdemeanors  in  the  sense  of 
the  Constitution,  or  that  in  some  sense  they  were 
impeachable.  Instead  of  arguing  this  point,  he  con 
tented  himself  by  declaring  the  theory  of  the  defence 
to  be  monstrous.  His  speech  touched  the  articles, 
one  by  one,  adding  little  to  their  force,  but  piling 
one  mistake  on  another  in  its  assertions  of  fact  and 
assumptions  of  law. 

Ten  days  passed  in  taking  evidence  before  the  field 
was  cleared  and  the  discussion  began.  Then,  Feb.  20, 
1805,  Early  and  Campbell  led  for  the  managers  in 
arguments  which  followed  more  or  less  closely  in 
Randolph's  steps,  inferring  criminality  in  the  accused 
from  the  manifest  tenor  of  his  acts.  Campbell  ven 
tured  to  add  that  he  was  not  obliged  to  prove  the 
accused  to  have  committed  any  crime  known  to  the 
law,  —  it  was  enough  that  he  had  transgressed  the  line 
of  official  duty  with  corrupt  motives ;  but  this  timid 
incursion  into  the  field  of  the  Constitution  was  sup 
ported  by  no  attempt  at  argument.  "I  lay  it  down 
as  a  settled  rule  of  decision,"  said  he,  "  that  when  a 


1805. 


TRIAL  OF  JUSTICE  CHASE.  231 


man  violates  a  law  or  commits  a  manifest  breach  of 
his  duty,  an  evil  intent  or  corrupt  motive  must  be 
presumed  to  have  actuated  his  conduct." 

Joseph  Hopkinson  opened  for  the  defence.  Friends 
and  enemies  joined  in  applauding  the  vigor  of  this 
young  man's  attack.  The  whole  effort  of  Chase's 
counsel  was  to  drive  the  impeachers  within  the  limits 
of  law,  and  compel  them  to  submit  to  the  restrictions 
of  legal  methods.  Hopkinson  struck  into  the  heart 
of  the  question.  He  maintained  that  under  the  Con 
stitution  no  judge  could  be  lawfully  impeached  or 
removed  from  office  for  any  act  or  offence  for  which 
he  could  not  be  indicted  ;  "  misdemeanor,"  he  argued, 
was  a  technical  term  well  understood  and  defined, 
which  meant  the  violation  of  a  public  law,  and  which, 
when  occurring  in  a  legal  instrument  like  the  Con 
stitution,  must  be  given  its  legal  meaning.  After 
stating  this  proposition  with  irresistible  force,  he  dealt 
with  Article  I.  of  the  impeachment,  which  covered 
the  case  of  Fries,  and  shook  it  to  pieces  with  skill 
very  unlike  the  treatment  of  Early  and  Campbell. 
Barton  Key  next  rose,  and  dealt  with  Articles  II.,  III., 
and  IV.,  covering  part  of  Callender's  case  ;  he  was 
followed  by  Charles  Lee,  who  succeeded  in  breaking 
down  Randolph's  interpolated  Articles  V.  and  VI. 
Then  Luther  Martin  appeared  on  the  scene,  and  the 
audience  felt  that  the  managers  were  helpless  in  his 
hands. 

This  extraordinary  man  —  "  unprincipled  and  impu 
dent  Federalist  bulldog,"  as  Jefferson  called  him  — 


232         HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  10. 

revelled  in  the  pleasure  of  a  fight  with  democrats. 
The  bar  of  Maryland  felt  a  curious  mixture  of  pride 
and  shame  in  owning  that  his  genius  and  vices  were 
equally  remarkable.  Rough  and  coarse  in  manner 
and  expression,  verbose,  often  ungrammatical,  com 
monly  more  or  less  drunk,  passionate,  vituperative, 
gross,  he  still  had  a  mastery  of  legal  principles  and 
a  memory  that  overbalanced  his  faults,  an  audacity 
and  humor  that  conquered  ill-will.  In  the  practice 
of  his  profession  he  had  learned  to  curb  his  passions 
until  his  ample  knowledge  had  time  to  give  the 
utmost  weight  to  his  assaults.  His  argument  at 
Chase's  trial  was  the  climax  of  his  career ;  but  such 
an  argument  cannot  be  condensed  in  a  paragraph. 
Its  length  and  variety  defied  analysis  within  the  limits 
of  a  page,  though  its  force  made  other  efforts  seem 
unsubstantial. 

Martin  covered  the  same  ground  that  his  associates 
had  taken  before  him,  dwelling  earnestly  on  the  con 
tention  that  an  impeachable  offence  must  be  also 
indictable.  Harper  followed,  concluding  the  argu 
ment  for  the  defence,  and  seeming  to  go  beyond  his 
associates  in  narrowing  the  field  of  impeachment ; 
for  he  argued  that  it  was  a  criminal  prosecution, 
which  must  be  founded  on  some  wilful  violation  of 
a  known  law  of  the  land,  —  a  line  of  reasoning 
which  could  end  only  in  requiring  the  violation  of 
an  Act  of  Congress.  This  theory  did  not  necessarily 
clash  with  that  of  Martin.  No  hesitation  or  incon 
sistency  was  shown  on  the  side  of  the  defence ;  every 


1805.  TRIAL  OF  JUSTICE  CHASE.  238 

resource  of  the  profession  was  used  with  energy  and 
skill. 

The  managers  then  put  forward  their  best  pleaders ; 
for  they  had  need  of  all  their  strength.  Nicholson 
began  by  disavowing  the  idea  that  impeachment  was 
a  mere  inquest  of  office  ;  this  impeachment  was,  he 
said,  a  criminal  prosecution  intended  not  merely  to 
remove,  but  to  punish,  the  offender.  On  the  other 
hand,  he  maintained  that  since  judges  held  their  com 
missions  during  good  behavior,  and  could  be  removed 
only  by  impeachment,  the  Constitution  must  have 
intended  that  any  act  of  misbehavior  should  be  con 
sidered  a  misdemeanor.  He  showed  the  absurdities 
which  would  rise  from  construing  the  Constitution  in 
a  legal  sense.  His  argument,  though  vigorous  and 
earnest,  and  offering  the  advantages  of  a  plausible 
compromise  between  two  extreme  and  impracticable 
doctrines,  yet  evidently  strained  the  language  of  the 
Constitution  and  disregarded  law.  As  Nicholson  him 
self  said,  he  discarded  legal  usage :  "  In  my  judgment 
the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  ought  to  be 
expounded  upon  its  own  principles,  and  foreign  aid 
ought  never  to  be  called  in.  Our  Constitution  was 
fashioned  after  none  other  in  the  known  world ;  and  if 
we  understand  the  language  in  which  it  is  written,  we 
require  no  assistance  in  giving  it  a  true  exposition." 
He  wanted  a  construction  "  purely  and  entirely  Ameri 
can."  In  the  mouth  of  a  strict  constructionist  this 
substitution  of  the  will  of  Congress  for  the  settled 
rules  of  law  had  as  strange  a  sound  as  Luther  Martin 


234         HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED  STATES.      CH.  10. 

could  have  wished,  and  offered  another  example  of  the 
instinct,  so  striking  in  the  Louisiana  debate,  which  not 
even  Nicholson,  Randolph,  or  Jefferson  himself  could 
always  resist. 

Rodney,  the  same  day,  followed  Nicholson  ;  and  as 
though  not  satisfied  with  his  colleague's  theory,  did 
what  Nicholson,  in  the  name  of  all  the  managers,  had 
a  few  hours  before  expressly  disclaimed,  —  he  adopted 
and  pressed  Giles's  theory  of  impeachment  with  all  the 
precision  of  language  he  could  command.  Nicholson 
seemed  content  to  assume  impeachment  as  limited 
to  "treason,  bribery,  or  other  high  crimes  and  mis 
demeanors  ; "  but  in  his  view  misbehavior  might  be 
construed  as  a  misdemeanor  in  a  "purely  and  entirely 
American"  sense.  Rodney  was  not  satisfied  with  this 
argument,  and  insisted  that  the  Constitution  imposed 
no  limit  on  impeachment. 

"Is  there  a  word  in  the  whole  sentence,"  he  asked, 
"  which  expresses  an  idea,  or  from  which  any  fair  infer 
ence  can  be  drawn,  that  no  person  shall  be  impeached 
but  for  '  treason,  bribery,  or  other  high  crimes  and  mis 
demeanors  ? '  .  .  .  From  the  most  cursory  and  transient 
view  of  this  passage  I  submit  with  due  deference  that  it 
must  appear  very  manifest  that  there  are  other  cases  than 
those  here  specified  for  which  an  impeachment  will  lie 
and  is  the  proper  remedy." 

The  judges  held  their  offices  during  good  behavior  ; 
the  instant  a  judge  should  behave  ill  his  office  became 
forfeited.  To  ascertain  the  fact  "  officially,  or  rather 
judicially,"  impeachment  was  provided  ;  the  authority 


1805.  TRIAL   OF  JUSTICE   CHASE.  235 

of  the  Senate  was  therefore  coextensive  with  the 
complaint. 

Rodney  stated  this  principle  broadly,  but  did  not  rest 
upon  it ;  on  the  contrary,  he  accepted  the  respondent's 
challenge,  and  undertook  to  show  that  Chase  had  been 
guilty  of  crimes  and  misdemeanors  in  the  technical 
sense  of  the  term.  Probably  he  was  wise  in  choosing 
this  alternative  ;  for  no  one  could  doubt  that  his  con 
stitutional  doctrine  was  one  into  which  Chase's  counsel 
were  sedulously  trying  to  drive  him.  If  Rodney  was 
right,  the  Senate  was  not  a  court  of  justice,  and  should 
discard  judicial  forms.  Giles  had  seen  this  consequence 
of  the  argument,  and  had  acted  upon  it,  until  beaten 
by  its  inevitable  inconsistencies ;  at  least  sixteen  sen 
ators  were  willing  to  accept  the  principle,  and  to  make 
of  impeachment  an  "  official,  or  rather  judicial,"  in 
quest  of  office.  Judge  Chase's  counsel  knew  also  that 
some  half-dozen  Republican  senators  feared  to  allow  a 
partisan  majority  in  the  Senate  to  decide,  after  the  fact, 
that  such  or  such  a  judicial  opinion  had  forfeited  the 
judge's  seat  on  the  bench.  This  practice  could  end 
only  in  making  the  Senate,  like  the  House  of  Lords, 
a  court  of  last  appeal.  Giles  threatened  to  impeach 
Marshall  and  the  whole  Supreme  Court  on  Rodney's 
theory  ;  and  such  a  threat  was  as  alarming  to  Dr. 
Mitchill  of  New  York,  or  Senator  Bradley  of  Vermont, 
as  it  was  to  Pickering  and  Tracy. 

When  Rodney  finished,  the  theory  of  impeachment 
was  more  perplexed  than  ever,  and  but  one  chance 
remained  to  clear  it.  All  the  respondent's  counsel 


236        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  10. 

had  spoken  in  their  turn ;  all  the  managers  had 
expounded  their  theories :  John  Randolph  was  to 
close.  Randolph  was  an  invalid,  overwhelmed  by 
work  and  excitement,  nervous,  irritable,  and  not  to 
be  controlled.  When  he  appeared  in  the  box,  Feb. 
27,  1805,  he  was  unprepared  ;  and  as  he  spoke,  he 
not  only  made  his  usual  long  pauses  for  recollection, 
but  continually  complained  of  having  lost  his  notes, 
of  his  weakness,  want  of  ability,  and  physical  as  well 
as  moral  incompetence.  Such  expressions  in  the 
mouths  of  other  men  might  have  passed  for  rhetoric; 
but  Randolph's  speech  showed  that  he  meant  all  he 
said.  He  too  undertook  to  answer  the  argument 
of  Luther  Martin,  Harper,  and  Hopkinson  on  the 
nature  of  impeachment ;  but  he  answered  without 
understanding  it,  —  calling  it  "  almost  too  absurd  for 
argument,"  "  a  monstrous  pretension,"  "  a  miserable 
quibble,"  but  advancing  no  theory  of  his  own,  and  sup 
porting  neither  Campbell's,  Nicholson's,  nor  Rodney's 
opinion.  After  a  number  of  arguments  which  were 
in  no  sense  answers,  he  said  he  would  no  longer 
worry  the  good  sense  of  the  Court  by  combating 
such  a  claim,  —  a  claim  which  the  best  lawyers  in 
America  affirmed  to  be  sound,  and  the  two  ablest  of 
the  managers  had  exhausted  themselves  in  refuting. 

Randolph's  closing  speech  was  overcharged  with 
vituperation  and  with  misstatements  of  fact  and 
law,  but  was  chiefly  remarkable  on  account  of  the 
strange  and  almost  irrational  behavior  of  the  speaker. 
Randolph's  tall,  thin  figure,  his  penetrating  eyes  and 


1805.  TRIAL  OF  JUSTICE  CHASE.  237 

shrill  voice,  were  familiar  to  the  society  of  Wash 
ington,  and  his  violence  of  manner  in  the  House 
only  a  short  time  before,  in  denouncing  Granger  and 
the  Yazoo  men,  had  prepared  his  audience  for  some 
eccentric  outburst ;  but  no  one  expected  to  see  him, 
"  with  much  distortion  of  face  and  contortion  of  body, 
tears,  groans,  and  sobs,"  break  down  in  the  middle  of 
his  self-appointed  task,  and  congratulate  the  Senate 
that  this  was  "the  last  day  of  my  sufferings  and  of 
yours." J 

The  next  day  the  Senate  debated  the  form  of  its 
final  judgment.2  Bayard  moved  that  the  question 
should  be  put:  "Is  Samuel  Chase  guilty  or  not  guilty 
of  a  high  crime  or  misdemeanor  as  charged  in  the 
article  just  read  ? "  The  point  was  vital ;  for  if  this 
form  should  be  adopted,  the  Senate  returned  to  the 
ground  it  had  deserted  in  the  case  of  Judge  Picker 
ing,  and  every  senator  would  be  obliged  to  assert  that 
Chase's  acts  were  crimes.  At  this  crisis  Giles  aban 
doned  the  extreme  impeachers.  He  made  a  speech 
repeating  his  old  argument,  and  insisting  that  the 
House  might  impeach  and  the  Senate  convict  not 
only  for  other  than  indictable  offences,  but  for  other 
than  high  crimes  and  misdemeanors ;  yet  since  in 
the  present  case  the  charges  were  avowedly  for  high 
crimes  and  misdemeanors,  he  was  willing  to  take  the 
question  as  Bayard  proposed  it,  protesting  meanwhile 
against  its  establishment  as  a  precedent.  Bayard's 

1  Diary  of  J.  Q.  Adams  (Feb.  27,  1805),  i.  359. 
a  Ibid.,  i.  361,  362. 


238        HISTORY  OF  THE   UNITED  STATES.      CH.  10. 

Resolution  was  adopted  March  1,  a  few  moments 
before  the  hour  of  half-past  twelve,  which  had  been 
appointed  for  pronouncing  judgment. 

The  Senate  chamber  was  crowded  with  spectators 
when  Vice-President  Burr  took  the  chair  and  directed 
the  secretary  to  read  the  first  article  of  impeachment. 
Every  member  of  the  Senate  answered  to  his  name. 
Tracy  of  Connecticut,  prostrated  by  recent  illness, 
was  brought  on  a  couch  and  supported  to  his  seat, 
where  his  pale  face  added  to  the  serious  effect  of  the 
scene.  The  first  article,  which  concerned  the  trial 
of  Fries,  was  that  on  which  Randolph  had  founded 
the  impeachment,  and  on  which  the  managers  had 
thrown  perhaps  the  greatest  weight.  As  the  roll 
was  called,  Senator  Bradley  of  Vermont,  first  of  the 
Republican  members,  startled  the  audience  by  saying 
"  Not  Guilty."  Gaillard  of  South  Carolina,  and,  to  the 
astonishment  of  every  one,  Giles,  the  most  ardent  of 
impeachers,  repeated  the  same  verdict.  These  three 
defections  decided  the  result ;  but  they  were  only 
the  beginning.  Jackson  of  Georgia,  another  hot 
impeacher,  came  next ;  then  Dr.  Mitchill,  Samuel 
Smith  of  Maryland,  and  in  quick  succession  all  the 
three  Smiths  of  New  York,  Ohio,  and  Vermont.  A 
majority  of  the  Senate  declared  against  the  article, 
and  the  overthrow  of  the  impeachers  was  beyond 
expectation  complete. 

On  the  second  article  the  acquittal  was  still  more 
emphatic ;  but  on  the  third  the  impeachers  rallied,  — 
Giles,  Jackson,  and  Samuel  Smith  returned  to  their 


1805.  TRIAL  OF  JUSTICE  CHASE.  239 

party,  and  for  the  first  time  a  majority  appeared  for 
conviction.  Yet  even  with  this  support,  the  impeach- 
ers  were  far  from  obtaining  the  required  twenty -three 
votes  ;  the  five  recalcitrant  Northern  democrats  stood 
firm ;  Gaillard  was  not  to  be  moved,  and  Stone  of 
North  Carolina  joined  him :  —  the  impeachers  could 
muster  but  eighteen  votes.  They  did  no  better  on  the 
fourth  article.  On  the  fifth,  —  Randolph's  interpolated 
charge,  which  alleged  no  evil  intent,  —  every  member 
of  the  Senate  voted  "  Not  Guilty  ; "  on  the  sixth, 
which  was  little  more  than  a  repetition  of  the  fifth, 
only  four  senators  could  be  found  to  condemn,  and 
on  the  seventh,  only  ten.  One  chance  of  conviction 
remained,  the  eighth  article,  which  covered  the  judge's 
charge  to  the  grand  jury  at  Baltimore  in  1803. 
There  lay  the  true  cause  of  impeachment ;  yet  this 
charge  had  been  least  pressed  and  least  defended. 
The  impeachers  brought  out  their  whole  strength  in 
its  support ;  Giles,  Jackson,  Samuel  Smith,  and  Stone 
united  in  pronouncing  the  judge  guilty :  but  the  five 
Northern  democrats  and  Gaillard  held  out  to  the 
last,  and  the  managers  saw  themselves  deserted  by 
nearly  one  fourth  of  the  Republican  senators.  Nine 
teen  voices  were  the  utmost  that  could  be  induced  to 
sustain  impeachment. 

The  sensation  was  naturally  intense ;  and  yet  the 
overwhelming  nature  of  the  $Qfeai  would  have  war 
ranted  an  excitement  still  greater.  No  one  under 
stood  better  the  meaning  of  Chase's  acquittal  than 
John  Randolph,  whose  authority  it  overthrew.  His 


240         HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  10. 

anger  showed  itself  in  an  act  which  at  first  alarmed 
and  then  amused  his  enemies.  Hurrying  from  the 
Senate  chamber  to  the  House,  he  offered  a  Resolution 
for  submitting  to  the  States  an  amendment  to  the 
Constitution  :  "  The  judges  of  the  Supreme  and  all 
other  courts  of  the  United  States  shall  be  removed 
by  the  President  on  the  joint  address  of  both  Houses 
of  Congress."  His  friend  Nicholson,  as  though  still 
angrier  than  Randolph,  moved  another  amendment, — 
that  the  legislature  of  any  State  might,  whenever  it 
thought  proper,  recall  a  senator  and  vacate  his  seat. 
These  resolutions  were  by  a  party  vote  referred  to 
the  next  Congress. 

Randolph  threatened  in  vain ;  the  rod  was  no 
longer  in  his  hands.  His  overthrow  before  the 
Senate  was  the  smallest  of  his  failures.  The  North 
ern  democrats  talked  of  him  with  disgust ;  and  Sena 
tor  Cocke  of  Tennessee,  who  had  voted  "  Guilty  "  on 
every  article  of  impeachment  except  the  fifth,  told 
his  Federalist  colleagues  in  the  Senate  that  Ran 
dolph's  vanity,  ambition,  insolence,  and  dishonesty, 
not  only  in  the  impeachment  but  in  other  matters, 
were  such  as  to  make  the  acquittal  no  subject  for 
regret.1  Madison  did  not  attempt  to  hide  his  amuse 
ment  at  Randolph's  defeat.  Jefferson  held  himself 
studiously  aloof.  To  Jefferson  and  men  of  his  class 
Randolph  seems  to  have  alluded,  in  a  letter  written 
a  few  weeks  later,  as  "  whimsicals,"  who  "  advocated 
the  leading  measures  of  their  party  until  they  were 
1  Diary  of  J.  Q.  Adams  (March  1,  1805),  i.  364. 


1805.  TRIAL  OF  JUSTICE  CHASE.  241 

nearly  ripe  for  execution,  when  they  hung  back,  con 
demned  the  step  after  it  was  taken,  and  on  most 
occasions  affected  a  glorious  neutrality." l  Even  Giles 
turned  hostile.  He  not  only  yielded  to  the  enemies  of 
Randolph  in  regard  to  the  form  of  vote  to  be  taken 
on  the  impeachment,  and  fairly  joined  them  in  the 
vote  on  the  first  article,  but  he  also  aided  in  offering 
Randolph  a  rebuke  on  another  point  connected  with 
the  impeachment. 

In  the  middle  of  the  trial,  February  15,  Randolph 
reported  to  the  House,  and  the  House  quickly  passed, 
a  Bill  appropriating  five  thousand  dollars  for  the  pay 
ment  of  the  witnesses  summoned  by  the  managers. 
When  this  Bill  came  before  the  Senate,  Bayard  moved 
to  amend  it  by  extending  its  provisions  to  the  wit 
nesses  summoned  by  Judge  Chase.  The  point  was 
delicate ;  for  if  the  Senate  was  a  court,  and  impeach 
ment  a  criminal  procedure,  this  court  should  follow 
the  rules  that  guided  other  judicial  bodies  ;  and  every 
one  knew  that  no  court  in  America  or  in  Christendom 
obliged  the  State,  as  a  prosecutor,  to  pay  the  wit 
nesses  of  the  accused.  After  the  acquittal,  such  a 
rule  was  either  equivalent  to  telling  the  House  that 
its  charges  against  Chase  were  frivolous  and  should 
never  have  been  presented,  or  it  suggested  that  the 
trial  had  been  an  official  inquiry  into  the  conduct  of 
an  officer,  and  not  a  criminal  procedure  at  law.  The 
Republicans  might  properly  reject  the  first  assump- 

1  Randolph  to  Nicholson,  April  30,  1805  ;  Adams's  Randolph, 
p.  157. 

VOL.  II.  —  16 


242        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  10. 

tion,  the  Federalists  ought  to  resist  the  second ;  yet 
when  Bayard's  amendment  came  to  a  vote,  it  was 
unanimously  adopted.1  The  House  disagreed ;  the 
Senate  insisted,  and  Giles  led  the  Senate,  affirming 
that  he  had  drawn  the  form  of  summons,  and  that 
this  form  made  no  distinction  between  the  witnesses 
for  one  party  and  the  other.  The  argument  was  not 
decisive,  for  the  court  records  showed  at  once  by 
whom  each  witness  was  called  ;  but  Giles's  reason 
ing  satisfied  the  Senate,  and  led  to  his  appointment, 
March  3,  with  Bradley,  an  enemy  of  impeachment,  as 
conferrees  to  meet  Randolph,  Nicholson,  and  Early 
on  the  part  of  the  House.  They  disagreed  ;  and 
Randolph,  with  his  friends,  felt  that  Giles  and  the 
Senate  had  inflicted  on  them  a  grievous  insult.  The 
Report  of  the  conference  committee  was  received  by 
the  House  at  about  seven  o'clock  on  the  evening  of 
March  3,  when  the  Eighth  Congress  was  drawing  its 
last  breath.  Randolph,  who  reported  the  disagree 
ment,  moved  that  the  House  adhere ;  and  having 
thus  destroyed  the  Bill,  he  next  moved  that  the  Clerk 
of  the  House  should  be  directed  to  pay  the  witnesses, 
or  any  other  expense  certified  by  the  managers,  from 
the  contingent  fund.  He  would  have  carried  his 
point,  although  it  violated  every  financial  profession 
of  the  Republican  party,  but  that  the  House  was 
thin,  and  the  Federalists,  by  refusing  to  vote,  pre 
vented  a  quorum.  At  half-past  nine  o'clock  on  Sun 
day  night,  the  3d  of  March,  1805,  the  Eighth  Congress 
1  Diary  of  J.  Q.  Adams  (March  2,  1805),  i.  367. 


1805.  TRIAL  OF  JUSTICE  CHASE.  243 

came  to  an  end  in  a  scene  of  total  confusion  and 
factiousness. 

The  failure  of  Chase's  impeachment  was  a  blow 
to  the  Republican  party  from  which  it  never  wholly 
recovered.  Chief -Justice  Marshall  at  length  was  safe ; 
he  might  henceforward  at  his  leisure  fix  the  princi 
ples  of  Constitutional  law.  Jefferson  resigned  him 
self  for  the  moment  to  Randolph's  overthrow  ;  but 
the  momentary  consolations  passed  away,  and  a  life 
long  disappointment  remained.  Fifteen  years  later 
his  regret  was  strongly  expressed :  — 

"The  Judiciary  of  the  United  States,"  mourned  the 
old  ex-President,1  "is  the  subtle  corps  of  sappers  and 
miners  constantly  working  underground  to  undermine  the 
foundations  of  our  confederated  fabric.  They  are  con 
struing  our  Constitution  from  a  co-ordination  of  a  general 
and  special  government  to  a  general  and  supreme  one 
alone.  .  .  .  Having  found  from  experience  that  impeach 
ment  is  an  impracticable  thing,  a  mere  scarecrow,  they 
consider  themselves  secure  for  life  ;  they  skulk  from  re 
sponsibility  ;  ...  an  opinion  is  huddled  up  in  conclave, 
perhaps  by  a  majority  of  one,  delivered  as  if  unanimous, 
and  with  the  silent  acquiescence  of  lazy  or  timid  asso 
ciates,  by  a  crafty  chief-judge  who  sophisticates  the  law 
to  his  mind  by  the  turn  of  his  own  reasoning." 

The  acquittal  of  Chase  proved  that  impeachment 
was  a  scarecrow ;  but  its  effect  on  impeachment  as 
a  principle  of  law  was  less  evident.  No  point  was 
decided.  The  theory  of  Giles,  Randolph,  and  Rodney 

1  Jefferson  to  Thomas  Ritchie,  Dec.  25, 1820 ;  Works,  vii.  192. 


244        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  10. 

was  still  intact,  for  it  was  not  avowedly  applied  to 
the  case.  The  theory  of  Judge  Chase's  counsel  — 
that  an  impeachable  offence  must  be  also  indictable, 
or  even  a  violation  of  some  known  statute  of  the 
United  States  —  was  overthrown  neither  by  the  argu 
ment  nor  by  the  judgment.  So  far  as  Constitutional 
law  was  concerned,  President  Jefferson  himself  might 
still  be  impeached,  according  to  the  dictum  of  Madi 
son,  for  the  arbitrary  removal  of  a  useful  tide-waiter, 
and  Chief-Justice  Marshall  might  be  driven  from  the 
bench,  as  Giles  wished,  for  declaring  the  Constitution 
to  be  above  the  authority  of  a  statute ;  but  although 
the  acquittal  of  Chase  decided  no  point  of  law  except 
his  innocence  of  high  crimes  or  misdemeanors,  as 
charged  in  the  indictment,  it  proved  impeachment 
to  be  "  an  impracticable  thing "  for  partisan  purpo 
ses,  and  it  decided  the  permanence  of  those  lines  of 
Constitutional  development  which  were  a  reflection 
of  the  common  law.  Henceforward  the  legal  profes 
sion  had  its  own  way  in  expounding  the  principles 
and  expanding  the  powers  of  the  central  government 
through  the  Judiciary. 


CHAPTER  XI. 

THE  Louisiana  treaty,  signed  in  May,  1803,  was 
followed  by  two  years  of  diplomatic  activity.  The 
necessary  secrecy  of  diplomacy  gave  to  every  Presi 
dent  the  power  to  involve  the  country  without  its 
knowledge  in  dangers  which  could  not  be  afterward 
escaped,  and  the  Republican  party  neither  invented 
nor  suggested  means  by  which  this  old  evil  of  irre 
sponsible  politics  could  be  cured ;  but  of  all  Presi 
dents,  none  used  these  arbitrary  powers  with  more 
freedom  and  secrecy  than  Jefferson.  His  ideas  of 
Presidential  authority  in  foreign  affairs  were  little 
short  of  royal.  He  loved  the  sense  of  power  and 
the  freedom  from  oversight  which  diplomacy  gave, 
and  thought  with  reason  that  as  his  knowledge  of 
Europe  was  greater  than  that  of  other  Ameri 
cans,  so  he  should  be  left  to  carry  out  his  policy 
undisturbed. 

Jefferson's  overmastering  passion  was  to  obtain 
West  Florida.  To  this  end  two  paths  seemed  open. 
If  he  chose  to  conciliate,  Yrujo  was  still  ready  to 
aid ;  and  Spain  stood  in  such  danger  between  England 
and  France  that  Godoy  could  not  afford  to  throw  the 
United  States  into  the  hands  of  either.  If  Jefferson 


246         HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  11. 

wished  the  friendship  of  Spain,  he  had  every  reason 
to  feel  sure  that  the  Prince  of  Peace  would  act  in  the 
same  spirit  in  which  he  had  negotiated  the  treaty  of 
1795  and  restored  the  right  of  deposit  in  1802.  In 
this  case  Florida  must  be  let  alone  until  Spain  should 
be  willing  to  cede,  or  the  United  States  be  ready 
for  war. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  President  might  alienate 
Spain  and  grasp  at  Florida.  Livingston  and  Monroe 
warmly  urged  this  policy,  and  were  in  fact  its  authors. 
Livingston's  advice  would  by  itself  have  had  no  great 
weight  with  Jefferson  or  Madison,  but  they  believed 
strongly  in  Monroe ;  and  when  he  made  Livingston's 
idea  his  own,  he  gave  it  weight.  Monroe  had  been 
sent  abroad  to  buy  Florida ;  he  had  bought  Loui 
siana.  From  the  Potomac  to  the  Mississippi,  every 
Southern  man  expected  and  required  that  by  peace 
or  war  Florida  should  be  annexed  to  the  Union ; 
and  the  annexation  of  Louisiana  made  that  of  Florida 
seem  easy.  Neither  Monroe,  Madison,  nor  Jefferson 
could  resist  the  impulse  to  seize  it. 

Livingston's  plan  has  been  described.  He  did  not 
assert  that  Spain  had  intended  to  retrocede  Florida  to 
France,  or  that  France  had  claimed  it  as  included  in 
the  retrocession.  He  knew  the  contrary;  and  tried  in 
vain  to  find  some  one  willing  to  say  that  the  country 
to  the  Perdido  ought  to  be  included  in  the  purchase. 
He  made  much  of  Marbois's  cautious  encouragement 
and  Talleyrand's  transparent  manoeuvres ;  but  he  was 
forced  at  last  to  maintain  that  Spain  had  retroceded 


1803.  QUARREL  WITH  YRUJO.  247 

West  Florida  to  France  without  knowing  it,  that 
France  had  sold  it  to  the  United  States  without 
suspecting  it,  that  the  United  States  had  bought  it 
without  paying  for  it,  and  that  neither  France  nor 
Spain,  although  the  original  contracting  parties,  were 
competent  to  decide  the  meaning  of  their  own  con 
tract.  Believing  that  Bonaparte  was  pledged  to  sup 
port  the  United  States  in  their  effort  to  obtain  West 
Florida,  Livingston  was  anxious  only  to  push  Spain 
to  the  utmost.  Talleyrand  allowed  him  to  indulge  in 
these  dreams.  "  I  have  obtained  from  him,"  wrote 
Livingston  to  Madison,1  "  a  positive  promise  that  this 
government  shall  aid  any  negotiation  that  shall  be 
set  on  foot "  for  the  purchase  of  East  Florida ;  while 
as  for  Florida  west  of  the  Perdido,  "  the  moment  is  so 
favorable  for  taking  possession  of  that  country,  that 
I  hope  it  has  not  been  neglected,  even  though  a  little 
force  should  be  necessary  to  effect  it.  Your  minister 
must  find  the  means  to  justify  it." 

When  the  letters  written  by  Livingston  and  Monroe 
in  May,  1803,  reached  Washington,  they  were  care 
fully  studied  by  the  President,  fully  understood,  and 
a  policy  quickly  settled.  When  Jefferson  wrote  to 
Senator  Breckinridge  his  ideas  on  the  unconstitution 
ally  of  the  purchase,  he  spoke  with  equal  clearness 
on  the  course  he  meant  to  pursue  toward  Spain  in 
order  to  obtain  Florida  : 2  — 

1  Livingston  to  Madison,  Nov.  15,  1803;  State  Papers,  ii.  573, 
574. 
',    2  Jefferson  to  Breckinridge,  Aug.  12,  1803;  Works,  iv.  498. 


248        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  II. 

"We  have  some  claims  to  extend  on  the  sea-coast 
westwardly  to  the  Rio  Norte  or  Bravo,  and,  better,  to  go 
eastward!  y  to  the  Rio  Perdido,  between  Mobile  and  Pen- 
sacola,  the  ancient  boundary  of  Louisiana.  These  claims 
will  be  a  subject  of  negotiation  with  Spain ;  and  if  as 
soon  as  she  is  at  war  we  push  them  strongly  with  one 
hand,  holding  out  a  price  with  the  other,  we  shall  cer 
tainly  obtain  the  Floridas,  and  all  in  good  time." 

This  was  not  Livingston's  plan,  but  something  quite 
distinct  from  it.  Livingston  and  Monroe  wanted  the 
President  to  seize  West  Florida,  and  negotiate  for 
East  Florida.  Jefferson  preferred  to  negotiate  for 
West  Florida  and  to  leave  East  Florida  alone  for  the 
time. 

Madison  had  already  instructed1  the  minister  at 
Madrid  that  the  Floridas  were  not  included  in  the 
treaty,  "  being,  it  appears,  still  held  by  Spain,"  and 
that  the  negotiation  for  their  purchase  would  be  con 
ducted  by  Monroe  at  Madrid.  Instructions  of  the 
same  date  were  instantly  sent  to  Monroe,2  urging  him 
to  pursue  the  negotiation  for  Florida,  although  owing 
to  the  large  drain  made  on  the  Treasury,  and  to  the 
"  manifest  course  of  events,"  the  government  was  not 
disposed  to  make  sacrifices  for  the  sake  of  obtaining 
that  country.  "  Your  inquiries  may  also  be  directed," 
wrote  Madison,  "  to  the  question  whether  any,  and 
how  much,  of  what  passes  for  West  Florida  be  fairly 
included  in  the  territory  ceded  to  us  by  France." 

1  Madison  to  Pinckney,  July  29,  1803;  State  Papers,  ii.  614. 

2  Madison  to  Monroe,  July  29,  1803;  State  Papers,  ii.  626. 


1803.  QUARREL  WITH  YRUJO.  249 

The  idea  that  West  Florida  could  be  claimed  as  a 
part  of  the  Louisiana  purchase  was  a  turning-point  in 
the  second  Administration  of  Jefferson.  Originating 
in  Minister  Livingston's  mind,  it  passed  from  him  to 
Monroe  ;  and  in  a  few  weeks  the  President  declared 
the  claim  substantial.1  As  the  summer  of  1803  closed, 
Jefferson's  plan  became  clear.  He  meant  to  push  this 
claim,  in  connection  with  other  claims,  and  to  wait 
the  moment  when  Spain  should  be  dragged  into  the 
war  between  France  and  England. 

These  other  claims  were  of  various  degrees  of  merit, 
and  involved  France  as  well  as  Spain.  During  the 
quasi  war  between  the  United  States  and  France,  be 
fore  Jefferson  came  into  power,  American  commerce 
in  Spanish  waters  suffered  severely  from  two  causes. 
The  first  consisted  in  captures  made  by  Spanish  cruis 
ers,  and  condemnations  decided  in  Spanish  courts ; 
the  second  was  due  to  captures  made  by  French 
cruisers,  and  condemned  by  French  consuls  in  Spanish 
ports,  or  by  courts  of  appeal  in  France,  without  re 
gard  to  the  rights  or  dignity  of  Spain.  With  much 
trouble,  in  August,  1802,  at  the  time  when  Europe 
and  America  were  waiting  for  the  end  of  Leclerc's 
struggle  with  the  negroes  and  fevers  of  St.  Domingo, 
Pinckney  succeeded  in  persuading  the  Prince  of  Peace 
to  let  the  claims  for  Spanish  depredations  go  before  a 
commission  for  settlement;  but  Godoy  obstinately 
refused  to  recognize  the  claims  for  French  depreda 
tions,  taking  the  ground  that  Spain  was  in  no  way 

1  Jefferson  to  Madison,  Aug.  25,  1803;  Works,  iv.  501. 


250         HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  11. 

responsible  for  them,  had  never  in  any  way  profited  by 
them,  and  had  no  power  at  the  time  they  occurred 
to  prevent  them  ;  that  France,  and  France  alone,  had 
committed  the  offence,  and  should  pay  for  it. 

Pinckney  resisted  this  reasoning  as  energeticaEy  as 
possible ;  but  when  Cevallos  offered  to  sign  a  conven 
tion  covering  the  Spanish  depredations,  and  reserving 
the  Franco-Spanish  claims  for  future  discussion,  Pinck 
ney  properly  decided  to  accept  an  offer  which  secured 
for  his  fellow-citizens  five  or  ten  millions  of  money, 
and  which  left  the  other  claim  still  open.1  The  con 
vention  of  Aug.  11,  1802,  was  sent  to  the  Senate  Jan. 
11,  1803,  in  the  excitement  that  followed  Morales's 
withdrawal  of  the  entrepdt  at  New  Orleans.  The 
Senate  deferred  action  until  the  last  moment  of  the 
session  ;  and  then,  March  3,  1803,  after  Nicholson  and 
Randolph  had  appeared  at  the  bar  to  impeach  Judge 
Pickering,  Pinckney's  claims  convention  was  taken 
up,  and  the  nine  Federalists  were  allowed  to  defeat  it 
by  the  absence  of  Republican  senators.  The  majority 
reconsidered  the  vote  and  postponed  the  whole  subject 
till  the  next  session.  Thus,  owing  to  the  action  of 
Federalist  senators,  when  Jefferson  in  the  following 
summer,  after  buying  Louisiana,  looked  about  for  the 
means  of  buying  Florida,  he  found  these  classes  of 
claims,  aggregating  as  he  supposed  between  five  and 
ten  million  dollars,  ready  to  his  hand.  Monroe  was 
promptly  ordered  to  insist  upon  treating  both  classes 
alike,  and  setting  both  of  them  against  the  proposed 

1  Pinckney  to  Madison,  Aug.  15,  1802;  State  Papers,  ii.  482. 


1803.  QUARREL  WITH  YRUJO.  251 

purchase  of  Florida.     "  On  the  subject  of  these  claims 
you  will  hold  a  strong  language,"  said  Madison.1 

A  third  class  of  claims  could  be  made  useful  for 
the  same  purpose.  Damages  had  been  sustained  by 
individuals  in  the  violation  of  their  right  of  deposit  at 
New  Orleans  in  the  autumn  of  1802. 

"  A  distinction,  however,  is  to  be  made,"  wrote  Madi 
son,  "  between  the  positive  and  specific  damages  sus 
tained  by  individuals  and  the  general  injuries  accruing 
from  that  breach  of  treaty.  The  latter  could  be  provided 
for  by  a  gross  and  vague  estimate  only,  and  need  not 
be  pressed  as  an  indispensable  condition.  The  claim 
however  may  be  represented  as  strictly  just,  and  a  for 
bearance  to  insist  on  it  as  an  item  in  the  valuable  con 
siderations  for  which  the  cession  [of  Florida]  is  made. 
Greater  stress  may  be  laid  on  the  positive  and  specific 
damages  capable  of  being  formally  verified  by  individ 
uals  ;  but  there  is  a  point  beyond  which  it  may  be  pru 
dent  not  to  insist,  even  here,  especially  as  the  incalculable 
advantage  accruing  from  the  acquisition  of  New  Orleans 
will  diffuse  a  joy  throughout  the  western  country  that  will 
drown  the  sense  of  these  little  sacrifices.  Should  no  bar 
gain  be  made  on  the  subject  of  the  Floridas,  our  claims 
of  every  sort  are  to  be  kept  in  force." 

The  President  had  not  then  decided  to  claim  West 
Florida  as  included  in  the  Louisiana  purchase,  and 
he  conceived  of  no  reason  which  should  make  Spain 
cling  the  more  closely  to  Florida  on  account  of  the 
loss  of  New  Orleans. 

The  news  of  the  Louisiana  purchase  reached  Wash- 
1  Madison  to  Moiiroe,  July  29,  1803;  State  Papers,  ii.  626. 


252        HISTORY  OP  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  11. 

ington  early  in  July,  1803;  Madison  wrote  his  in 
structions  to  Monroe  at  the  end  of  the  same  month ; 
Jefferson  announced  his  policy  to  Breckenridge  in 
August.  This  was  the  harvest  season  of  his  life. 
His  theories  were  proved  sound ;  his  system  of  gov 
ernment  stood  in  successful  rivalry  with  that  of 
Bonaparte  and  Pitt;  and  he  felt  no  doubt  that  his 
friendship  was  as  vital  to  England,  France,  and  Spain 
as  all  the  armies  and  navies  of  the  world.  In  the 
midst  of  this  enjoyment,  September  4,  he  was  sud 
denly  told  by  the  Marquis  of  Casa  Yrujo  that  he  had 
bought  stolen  goods,  and  that  Spain  as  the  rightful 
owner  protested  against  the  sale.1 

Notwithstanding  this  strong  measure,  doubtless 
taken  in  obedience  to  orders,  Yrujo  was  still  true 
to  his  old  friendship.  On  hearing  of  the  cession,  he 
did  again  what  he  had  done  eight  months  before,  in 
the  excitement  about  the  entrepot  at  New  Orleans, — 
he  tried  to  smooth  difficulties  and  quiet  alarms. 

"  The  ports  of  Florida,"  he  wrote  to  Don  Pedro  Ceval- 
los,2  "  as  they  would  make  it  easy  for  us  to  annoy  greatly 
the  American  commerce  in  case  of  a  war,  would  in  like 
degree  furnish  the  Americans,  if  the  Americans  should 
possess  them,  the  same  means  of  annoying  ours,  and  of 
carrying  on  an  immense  contraband  trade  from  them, 
especially  from  Pensacola  and  Mobile,  with  our  provinces 
in  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.  This  last  is  the  chief  evil  which 
in  my  opinion  will  result  from  the  acquisition  of  Loui- 

1  Yrujo  to  Madison,  Sept.  4  and  27,  1803  ;   State  Papers,  ii. 
569. 

2  Yrujo  to  Cevallos,  Aug.  3,  1803;  MSS.  Spanish  Archives. 


1803.  QUARREL  WITH  YRUJO.  253 

siana  by  the  Americans,  and  can  only  be  diminished  by 
numerous,  watchful,  and  active  revenue-cutters.  For  the 
rest  I  do  not  look  on  the  alienation  of  Louisiana  as  a 
loss  for  Spain.  That  colony  cost  us  much,  and  produced 
us  very  little." 

In  short,  Louisiana  could  not  be  defended  by  Spain, 
while  as  a  part  of  the  United  States  it  would  certainly 
weaken,  and  probably  dissolve,  the  Union.  As  for 
the  protest,  he  told  l  his  Government,  even  before  he 
received  Madison's  reply,  that  nothing  would  come 
of  it. 

As  late  as  Nov.  5, 1803,  Yrujo  continued  to  write 
in  the  same  tone  to  his  Government. 

"  The  information  I  have  received  from  trustworthy 
persons,"  he  said,2  "  in  regard  to  the  disposition  in  which 
General  Victor  was  coming  here,  and  the  spirit  of  rest 
lessness  and  almost  of  rapine  which  reigned  among  many 
of  the  officials  in  his  army,  leave  me  no  doubt  that  the 
military  colony  of  the  French  in  Louisiana  would  have 
been  in  reality  a  worse  neighbor  than  the  Americans  for 
us.  Things  have  now  taken  such  a  turn,  that  in  my 
humble  opinion  if  we  are  to  lose  Louisiana,  the  choice 
whether  that  colony  shall  fall  into  the  power  of  one  nation 
rather  than  another  is  not  worth  the  expense  and  trouble 
of  a  war,  provided  we  preserve  the  Floridas.  ...  I  am 
convinced  that  this  Government  knows  perfectly  the 
national  interests,  and  to  promote  them  will  follow  in 
this  respect  a  course  of  conduct  which  in  proportion  as 
it  better  suits  our  own,  should  inspire  us  with  greater 
confidence." 

1  Yrujo  to  Cevallos,  Sept,  12,  1803;  MSS.  Spanish  Archives. 

8  Yrujo  to  Cevallos,  Nov.  5,  1803  ;  MSS.  Spanish  Archives. 


254        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED   STATES.      CH.  11. 

Yrujo  acted  the  part  of  a  true  friend  to  both  coun 
tries,  in  trying  by  such  arguments  to  reconcile  his 
Government  to  the  loss  of  Louisiana ;  but  there  were 
limits  to  his  good-will.  He  held  that  Spain  could  not 
afford  to  part  with  Florida.  Yrujo  went  to  the  ex 
treme  of  concession  when  he  reconciled  his  Govern 
ment  to  the  loss  of  New  Orleans,  and  nothing  would 
reconcile  him  to  the  further  loss  of  Mobile  and  Pen- 
sacola.  Only  on  the  theory  that  Spanish  America 
was  already  ruined  by  the  cession  of  Louisiana  could 
Yrujo  argue  in  favor  of  selling  Florida. 

On  receiving  Yrujo's  protests  of  September  4  and 
27,  Jefferson's  first  feeling  was  of  anger.  He  sent  a 
strong  body  of  troops  to  Natchez.  "  The  Government 
of  Spain,"  he  wrote  to  Dupont  de  Nemours,1  "  has 
protested  against  the  right  of  France  to  transfer,  and 
it  is  possible  she  may  refuse  possession,  and  that  may 
bring  on  acts  of  force ;  but  against  such  neighbors  as 
France  there  and  the  United  States  here,  what  she 
can  expect  from  so  gross  a  compound  of  folly  and 
false  faith  is  not  to  be  sought  in  the  book  of  wis 
dom."  The  folly  of  such  conduct  might  be  clear, 
but  the  charge  of  false  faith  against  Spain  for  pro 
testing  against  being  deprived  of  her  rights,  seemed 
unjust,  especially  in  the  mouth  of  Jefferson,  who 
meant  to  claim  West  Florida  under  a  Franco-Spanish 
treaty  which  was  acknowledged  by  all  parties  to  have 
transferred  Louisiana  alone. 

Only  a  week   before  this   letter  was  written,  the 

1  Jefferson  to  Dupont,  Nov.  1,  1803 ;  Works,  iv.  508. 


1803. 


QUARREL    WITH  YRUJO.  255 


scheme  of  seizing  West  Florida  had  been  publicly 
avowed  by  John  Randolph  on  the  floor  of  the  House. 
Randolph's  speech  of  October  24,  in  language  as 
offensive  to  Spain  as  was  possible  in  the  mouth  of  a 
responsible  leader,  asserted,  as  a  fact  admitting  no 
doubt,  that  West  Florida  belonged  to  the  United 
States.1  "  We  have  not  only  obtained  the  command 
of  the  mouth  of  the  Mississippi,  but  of  the  Mobile, 
with  its  widely  extended  branches  ;  and  there  is  not 
now  a  single  stream  of  note  rising  within  the  United 
States  and  falling  into  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  which  is 
not  entirely  our  own,  the  Appalachicola  excepted."  In 
a  second  speech  the  next  day,  he  reiterated  the  state 
ment  even  more  explicitly  and  in  greater  detail.2  The 
Republican  press  echoed  the  claim.  Jefferson  and 
Madison  encouraged  the  manoeuvre  until  they  could 
no  longer  recede,  and  pushed  inquiries  in  every  direc 
tion,3  without  obtaining  evidence  that  West  Florida 
was,  or  ever  had  been,  a  part  of  the  government  of 
Louisiana.  They  even  applied  to  Laussat,4  the  morti 
fied  and  angry  French  commissioner  whom  Bonaparte 
had  sent  to  receive  possession  of  New  Orleans ;  and 
Laussat,  to  the  annoyance  of  Talleyrand  and  Godoy, 
told  the  truth,  —  that  the  Iberville  and  the  Rio  Bravo 
were  the  boundaries  fixed  by  his  instructions,  and 

1  Annals  of  Congress,  1803-1804,  p.  415. 

2  Annals  of  Congress,  1803-1804,  p.  440. 

*  Jefferson  to  William  Dunbar,   March  13,  1804;  Works,  iv. 
537. 

4  Madison  to  Livingston,  Jan.  31,  1804;  State  Papers,  ii.  574. 


256        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  11. 

therefore  that  West  Florida  was  not  a  part  of  the 
purchase,  but  that  Texas  was. 

Notwithstanding  John  Randolph's  official  declara 
tion,  when  the  time  came  for  the  delivery  of  Louisiana 
the  Spanish  governor,  Dec.  20,  1803,  peacefully  sur 
rendered  the  province  to  Laussat ;  Laussat  handed  it 
in  due  form  to  Claiborne ;  and  Claiborne  received  it 
without  asking  for  West  Florida,  or  even  recording  a 
claim  for  it.  That  this  silence  was  accidental  no  one 
pretended.  The  acquiescence  in  Spanish  authority  was 
so  implicit  that  Madison  three  months  afterward,  at 
a  time  when  both  Executive  and  Legislature  were 
acting  on  the  theory  that  West  Florida  was  in  Loui 
siana,  found  himself  obliged  to  explain  the  cause  of 
conduct  and  contradictions  so  extraordinary.  He 
wrote  1  to  Livingston  at  Paris  that  the  President  had 
for  several  reasons  preferred  to  make  no  demand  for 
West  Florida,  — 

"  First,  because  it  was  foreseen  that  the  demand 
would  not  only  be  rejected  by  the  Spanish  authority  at 
New  Orleans,  which  had  in  an  official  publication 
limited  the  cession  westwardly  by  the  Mississippi  and 
the  Island  of  New  Orleans,  but  it  was  apprehended,  as 
has  turned  out,  that  the  French  commissioner  might  not 
be  ready  to  support  the  demand,  and  might  even  be  dis 
posed  to  second  the  Spanish  opposition  to  it ;  secondly, 
because  in  the  latter  of  these  cases  a  serious  check 
would  be  given  to  our  title,  and  in  either  of  them  a  pre 
mature  dilemma  would  result  between  an  overt  submis- 

1  Madison  to  Livingston,  March  31, 1804;  State  Papers,  ii.  575. 


1803.  QUARREL  WITH  YRUJO.  257 

sion  to  the  refusal  and  a  resort  to  force  ;  thirdly,  because 
mere  silence  would  be  no  bar  to  a  plea  at  any  time  that 
a  delivery  of  a  part,  particularly  of  the  seat  of  the  gov 
ernment,  was  a  virtual  delivery  of  the  whole." 

The  President's  silence  at  New  Orleans  was  the 
more  conspicuous  because,  at  the  moment  when  the 
province  of  Louisiana  was  thus  delivered  with  such 
boundaries  as  Spain  chose  to  define,  Congress  was 
legislating  for  Florida  as  an  integral  part  of  the 
Union.  John  Randolph's  official  assertion  that  Mobile 
belonged  to  the  United  States  under  the  treaty  of  ces 
sion,  was  made  in  the  last  part  of  October,  1803,  soon 
after  Congress  met.  About  a  month  later,  November 
30,  he  introduced  a  Bill  nominally  for  giving  effect 
to  the  laws  of  the  United  States  within  the  ceded 
territory.  After  much  debate  and  disagreement  this 
Bill  at  length  passed  both  Houses,  and  Feb.  24,  1804, 
received  the  President's  signature.  The  fourth  sec 
tion  directed  that  the  territories  ceded  to  the  United 
States  by  the  treaty,  "  and  also  all  the  navigable 
waters,  rivers,  creeks,  bays,  and  inlets  lying  within 
the  United  States,  which  empty  into  the  Gulf  of 
Mexico  east  of  the  River  Mississippi,  shall  be  annexed 
to  the  Mississippi  district,  and  shall,  together  with 
the  same,  constitute  one  district,  to  be  called  the 
'  District  of  Mississippi.'  "  This  provision  was  re 
markable,  because,  as  every  one  knew,  no  creeks, 
bays,  or  inlets  lying  within  the  United  States  emptied 
into  the  Gulf.  The  Act  by  its  eleventh  section  au 
thorized  the  President,  "  whenever  he  shall  deem  it 

TOL.  II.— 17 


258        HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.       CH.  11. 

expedient,  to  erect  the  shores,  waters,  and  inlets  of 
the  Bay  and  River  of  Mobile,  and  of  the  other  rivers, 
creeks,  inlets,  and  bays  emptying  into  the  Gulf  of 
Mexico  east  of  the  said  River  Mobile,  and  west  thereof 
to  the  Pascagoula,  inclusive,  into  a  separate  district, 
and  to  establish  such  place  within  the  same  as  he 
shall  deem  expedient,  to  be  the  port  of  entry  and 
delivery  for  such  district."  This  section  gave  the 
President  power  of  peace  and  war,  for  had  he  exer 
cised  it,  the  exercise  must  have  been  an  act  of  war ; 
and  John  Randolph's  previous  declarations  left  no 
doubt  as  to  the  meaning  in  which  he,  who  reported 
the  Bill,  meant  it  to  be  understood. 

By  this  time  Yrujo  was  boiling  with  such  wrath 
as  a  Spaniard  alone  could  imagine  or  express.  His 
good-will  vanished  from  the  moment  he  saw  that  to 
save  Florida  he  must  do  battle  with  President,  Secre 
tary  of  State,  Congress,  and  people.  One  insult  had 
followed  another  with  startling  rapidity.  The  Presi 
dent's  pele-mele,  of  which  the  story  will  be  told  here 
after,  wounded  him  personally.  The  cold  reception 
of  his  protest  against  the  Louisiana  cession ;  the  cap- 
tiousness  of  Madison's  replies  to  his  remonstrances ; 
the  armed  seizure  of  New  Orleans  with  which  he 
was  threatened ;  the  sudden  disregard  of  his  friend 
ship  and  great  services  ;  the  open  eagerness  of  the 
Government  to  incite  Bonaparte  to  plunder  and  dis 
member  Spain ;  the  rejection  of  the  claims  convention 
in  March,  and  its  sudden  approval  by  the  Senate  in 
January,  as  though  to  obtain  all  the  money  Spam 


1803. 


QUARREL  WITH  YRUJO.  259 


was  willing  to  give  before  taking  by  force  territory 
vital  to  her  empire  ;  and  above  all,  the  passage  of 
this  law  annexing  the  Floridas  without  excuse  or 
explanation,  —  all  these  causes  combined  to  change 
Yrujo's  ancient  friendship  into  hatred. 

In  the  midst  of  the  complicated  legislation  about 
Louisiana,  while  the  Mobile  Act  was  under  discussion, 
Jefferson  sent  to  the  Senate,  Dec.  21,  1803,  the  cor 
respondence  about  the  Spanish  claims,  and  among  the 
rest  an  adverse  opinion  which  Yrujo  had  obtained 
from  five  prominent  American  lawyers  on  an  abstract 
case  in  regard  to  the  Franco-Spanish  spoliations. 
Madison  was  particularly  annoyed  by  this  legal  opin 
ion,  and  thought  it  should  bring  these  five  gentlemen 
within  the  penalties  of  the  law  passed  Jan.  30,  1799, 
commonly  known  as  Logan's  Act.  Senator  Bradley 
of  Vermont  moved  for  a  committee,  which  reported 
in  favor  of  directing  the  President  to  institute  pro 
ceedings  against  Jared  Ingersoll,  William  Rawle, 
J.  B.  McKean,  Peter  S.  Duponceau,  and  Edward 
Livingston,  —  five  lawyers  whose  legal,  social,  and 
political  character  made  a  prosecution  as  unwise  in 
politics  as  it  was  doubtful  in  law.  The  Senate  hav 
ing  at  the  moment  too  many  prosecutions  already  on 
its  hands,  let  Senator  Bradley's  Report  lie  unnoticed, 
and  soon  afterward  confirmed  the  claims  convention 
by  a  vote  of  eighteen  to  eight,1  —  barely  two  thirds,  the 
least  factious  of  the  Federalists  joining  the  majority, 
and  by  this  unpartisan  act  causing  in  the  end  more 
1  Journal  of  Executive  Sessions,  Jan.  9,  1804. 


260        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  11. 

embarrassment  to  the  party  in  power  than  the  most 
ingenious  factiousness  could  have  plotted.  Madison, 
in  the  midst  of  his  measures  for  pressing  the  acquisi 
tion  of  Florida,  sent  the  ratified  claims  convention 
to  Madrid.  The  period  fixed  for  ratification  had  long 
since  expired,  and  the  attitude  of  the  United  States 
toward  Florida  had  altered  the  feelings  and  inter 
ests  of  Spain  ;  but  either  Madison  was  unaware  of 
the  change,  or  he  wished  to  embarrass  Godoy.  He 
added  in  his  letter  to  Pinckney,1  "  It  was  judged 
best,  on  the  whole,  no  longer  to  deprive  that  class  of 
our  citizens  who  are  comprehended  in  the  convention 
of  the  benefit  of  its  provisions  ; "  but  although  con 
senting  to  take  what  Spain  was  willing  to  give,  he 
spoke  with  contempt  of  the  Spanish  argument  against 
the  Franco-Spanish  claims,  and  insisted  that  these 
should  be  pressed  without  relaxation.  He  even  com 
plained  that  Yrujo,  in  taking  the  opinion  of  American 
lawyers,  had  failed  in  respect  to  the  United  States 
government  and  his  own.2 

Madison  seemed  unconscious  that  Yrujo  could  have 
any  just  cause  of  complaint,  or  that  his  Government 
could  resent  the  tone  and  temper  of  President  and 
Congress.  The  passage  of  the  Bill  which  made 
Mobile  a  collection  district  and  a  part  of  the  Missis 
sippi  territory  gave  Yrujo  the  chance  to  retaliate. 
About  a  fortnight  after  the  President  had  signed  this 
law,  Yrujo  one  morning  entered  the  State  Department 

1  Madison  to  Pinckney,  Jan.  31,  1804  ;  State  Papers,  ii.  614. 
8  Madison  to  Pinckney,  Feb.  6,  1804;  State  Papers,  ii.  615. 


1804.  QUARREL  WITH  YRUJO.  261 

with  the  printed  Act  in  his  hand,  and  overwhelmed 
Madison  with  reproaches,  which  he  immediately  after 
ward  supported  by  a  note  1  so  severe  as  to  require 
punishment,  and  so  able  as  to  admit  of  none.  He 
had  at  first,  he  said,  regarded  as  "  an  atrocious  libel " 
on  the  United  States  government  the  assertion  that  it 
had  made  a  law  which  usurped  the  rights  of  Spanish 
sovereignty  ;  yet  such  was  the  case.  He  gave  a  short 
and  clear  abstract  of  the  evidence  which  refuted  the 
claim  to  West  Florida,  and  closed  by  requesting  that 
the  law  be  annulled. 

Madison  could  neither  maintain  the  law  nor  annul 
it ;  he  could  not  even  explain  it  away.  Gallatin  told 
the  President  six  months  afterward,2  that  "  the  public 
mind  is  altogether  unprepared  for  a  declaration  that 
the  terms  and  object  of  the  Mobile  Act  had  been 
misunderstood  by  Spain  ;  for  every  writer,  without 
a  single  exception,  who  has  written  on  the  subject 
seems  to  have  understood  the  Act  as  Spain  did  ;  it 
has  been  justified  by  our  friends  on  that  ground." 
Yet  Jefferson  was  not  prepared  to  maintain  and  de 
fend  the  Act  in  its  full  assertions  of  authority,  after 
accepting  Louisiana  without  asking  for  West  Florida. 
Madison  wrote  a  letter  of  complaint  to  Livingston 
at  Paris,8  explaining,  as  already  quoted,  the  rea- 

1  Yrujo  to  Madison,  March  7,  1804  ;  MSS.  State  Department 
Archives. 

2  Gallatin  to  Jefferson,  October,  1804  ;   Gallatin's  Works,  i. 
211. 

8  Madison  to  Livingston,  March  31,  1804  ;  State  Papers,  ii. 
575. 


262        HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  11. 

sons  which  had  induced  the  President  to  make  no 
demand  for  West  Florida  before  ascertaining  the 
views  and  claiming  the  interposition  of  the  French 
government. 

"In  this  state  of  things,"  said  he,  "it  was  deemed 
proper  by  Congress,  in  making  the  regulations  necessary 
for  the  collection  of  revenue  in  the  ceded  territory,  and 
guarding  against  the  new  danger  of  smuggling  into  the 
United  States  through  the  channels  opened  by  it,  to  in 
clude  a  provision  for  the  case  of  West  Florida  by  vesting 
in  the  President  a  power  which  his  discretion  might  ac 
commodate  to  events." 

This  interpretation  of  the  law  was  not  in  harmony 
with  the  law  itself  or  with  Randolph's  speeches  ;  but 
Madison  hastened  to  turn  from  this  delicate  subject  in 
order  to  bring  another  complaint  against  Yrujo. 

"  The  Act  had  been  many  weeks  depending  in  Congress 
with  these  sections,  word  for  word,  in  it ;  ...  it  must  in 
all  probability  have  been  known  to  the  Marquis  d'Yrujo 
in  an  early  stage  of  its  progress  ;  if  it  was  not,  it  marks 
mnch  less  of  that  zealous  vigilance  over  the  concerns  of 
his  sovereign  than  he  now  makes  the  plea  for  his  intem 
perate  conduct.  For  some  days,  even  after  the  Act  was 
published  in  the  Gazette  of  this  city,  he  was  silent.  At 
length,  however,  he  called  at  the  office  of  State,  with  the 
Gazette  in  his  hand,  and  entered  into  a  very  angry 
comment." 

The  Spanish  minister's  subsequent  notes  had  been 
written  with  "  a  rudeness  which  no  government  can 
tolerate ; "  but  his  conduct  was  chiefly  of  importance 


1804.  QUARREL   WITH  YRUJO.  263 

"  as  it  urges  the  expediency  of  cultivating  the  dispo 
sition  of  the  French  government  to  take  our  side  of 
the  question." 

The  President  came  to  Madison's  relief.  By  a  pro 
clamation  issued  a  few  weeks  afterward,  reciting  the 
terms  of  the  Act  of  Congress  in  regard  to  the  Bay 
and  River  of  Mobile,  he  declared  all  these  "  shores, 
waters,  inlets,  creeks,  and  rivers,  lying  within  the 
boundaries  of  the  United  States,""  to  be  a  collection 
district,  with  Fort  Stoddert  for  its  port  of  entry.1 
The  italics  were  a  part  of  the  proclamation,  and  sug 
gested  that  such  could  not  have  been  the  intent  of 
Congress,  because  no  part  of  the  shores  or  waters  of 
Mobile  Bay,  or  of  the  other  bays  east  of  Mobile,  lay 
within  the  boundaries  of  the  United  States.  The 
evasion  was  a  divergence  from  the  words  of  the  Act 
unwarranted  by  anything  in  the  context ;  and  to  give 
it  authority,  Jefferson,  in  spite  of  Gallatin's  remon 
strance,  declared  in  his  next  Annual  Message  that  the 
Mobile  Act  had  been  misunderstood  on  the  part  of 
Sjiain.2 

1  Proclamation  of  May  30,  1804  ;  State  Papers,  ii.  583. 

2  Message  of  Nov.  8,  1804.     Annals  of  Congress,  1804-1805, 
>    11. 


CHAPTER   XII. 

THOUGH  Yrujo's  language  was  strong,  and  his 
anonymous  writings  in  the  press  were  indiscreet,  he 
had,  down  to  the  summer  of  1804,  laid  himself  open 
to  no  just  official  censure  ;  for  whatever  the  Secretary 
of  State  might  think,  no  one  could  seriously  blame 
a  foreign  minister  for  obtaining  the  best  legal  advice 
in  America  on  an  abstract  question  of  international 
law.  The  protests  with  which  Yrujo  contented  him 
self,  vigorous  as  they  were,  could  neither  be  disavowed 
by  his  Government  nor  answered  by  Madison.  Had 
he  stopped  there,  his  triumph  would  have  been  sig 
nal  ;  but  fortunately  for  Madison,  the  Spaniard,  with 
all  the  high  qualities  of  his  nation,  had  also  its  weak 
nesses,  besides  having  the  love  of  intrigue  inherent  in 
diplomacy.  Yrujo  was  in  his  political  training  more 
American  than  Spanish.  At  home  in  Philadelphia, 
son-in-law  to  Governor  McKean,  and  well  acquainted 
with  the  methods  of  party  politics,  he  burned  to  coun 
teract  the  influence  of  the  Administration  press,  and 
had  no  other  means  of  doing  so  than  by  acting  on 
Federalist  editors.  As  no  one  but  himself  knew  even 
a  part  of  the  truth  about  the  Spanish  imbroglio,  he 
was  obliged  to  be  the  channel  for  conveying  his  own 


1804.  PINCKNEY'S  DIPLOMACY.  265 

information  to  the  public ;  and  from  time  to  time 
Madison  read  in  opposition  newspapers  anonymous 
letters  which  bore  plain  marks  of  Yrujo's  peculiar 
style.  He  had  already  published  a  pamphlet  on  the 
Louisiana  cession.  After  his  hot  protest  against 
the  Mobile  Act,  in  March,  1804,  the  Spanish  minister 
left  Washington,  without  taking  leave  of  the  Secre 
tary  of  State.  At  length  his  indiscretions  enabled 
Madison  to  enjoy  the  pleasure  of  seeing  him  keenly 
mortified. 

Among  other  Federalist  newspapers  in  Philadel 
phia  was  one  called  the  "  Political  Register,"  edited 
by  a  man  named  Jackson.  In  September,  1804,  six 
months  after  the  passage-at-arms  over  the  Mobile 
Act,  Yrujo,  then  in  Philadelphia,  asked  for  an  inter 
view  with  Jackson,  and  urged  him  to  oppose  the 
course  which  the  President  had  taken  against  Spain. 
"  If  you  will  consent,"  he  said,  "  to  take  elucidations 
on  the  subject  from  me,  I  will  furnish  them,  and  I 
will  make  you  any  acknowledgment."  He  charged 
the  Administration  with  wishing  for  war,  and  with 
intriguing  for  a  rebellion  among  the  Spaniards  of 
West  Florida. 

That  Yrujo  or  any  other  diplomatic  agent  was 
quite  ready  to  use  money,  if  by  doing  so  he  could 
obtain  objects  necessary  for  his  purposes,  need  not 
be  doubted,  —  although  corruption  of  this  kind  in  the 
affairs  of  the  United  States  has  left  few  traces  even 
on  the  most  secret  diplomatic  records  of  England, 
France,  and  Spain.  In  the  ethical  code  of  diplomacy 


266         HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  12. 

the  offer  of  money  to  an  editor  for  inserting  informa 
tion  was  no  offence,  but  discovery  was  fatal ;  and  for 
this  reason  perhaps  Yrujo  told  the  truth  when  he 
afterward  said  that  the  use  of  money  was  not  in  his 
mind.  Had  he  meant  to  bribe,  he  would  not  have 
exposed  himself  to  detection,  or  put  himself,  without 
need,  in  the  hands  of  a  person  over  whom  he  held 
no  power.  Nevertheless,  his  blunder  deserved  the 
punishment  which  quickly  followed. 

A  few  days  after  his  interview  with  Jackson,  Yrujo 
left  Philadelphia  to  visit  Jefferson  at  Monticello. 
Sept.  20,  1804,  immediately  after  his  departure,  Jack 
son  printed  an  affidavit  narrating  the  attempt  which 
Yrujo  had  made  upon  his  virtue,  and  detailing  every 
expression  of  the  minister  which  could  do  him  most 
injury.  As  though  to  make  Yrujo's  position  still  more 
mortifying,  Jackson  sent  this  affidavit  to  President 
Jefferson  ten  days  or  more  before  publishing  it ;  and 
when  Yrujo,  ignorant  of  the  betrayal,  after  passing 
Madison's  door  at  Montpelier  without  the  courtesy  of 
stopping  to  inquire  for  the  Secretary's  health,1  at  last 
reached  Monticello,  not  only  his  host,  but  every  one 
except  himself,  had  heard  of  the  diplomatic  scandal 
to  which  he  was  a  party. 

Jefferson  received  his  visitor  with  the  usual  hospi 
tality,  and  said  not  a  word  on  the  subject.  Being 
obliged  to  return  to  Washington,  the  President  left 
Yrujo,  two  days  later,  under  the  protection  of  his 

1  Pichon  to  Talleyrand,  18  Brumaire,  An  xiii.  (Nov.  9, 
]£04) ;  Archives  des  Aff.  Etr.,  MSS. 


1804.  PINCKNEY'S  DIPLOMACY.  267 

daughter  Mrs.  Randolph,  and  set  out  to  meet  his 
Cabinet  on  the  last  day  of  the  month  at  the  Federal 
city.  Madison  was  delayed  at  Montpelier,  and  could 
not  attend  the  Cabinet  meeting,  but  wrote  a  few  days 
afterward : 1  — 

"Jackson,  I  find,  has  lost  no  time  in  giving  publicity 
to  the  affair  between  him  and  Yrujo.  What  course  the 
latter  will  take,  remains  to  be  seen.  Should  circum 
stances  of  any  kind  be  thought  to  urge  a  close  of  the 
business  with  him,  or  any  other  arrangement  with  re 
spect  to  it,  why  might  not  one  of  the  other  secretaries, 
or  even  Mr.  Wagner,  be  made  a  channel  of  your  senti 
ments  and  determinations?  .  .  .  Should  the  door  be 
shut  against  further  communication  [through]  Yrujo, 
and  Pinckney's  situation  at  Madrid  not  be  contradicted, 
a  direct  communication  with  Cevallos  appears  to  be  the 
next  resource." 

Already  Madison  flattered  himself  with  the  hope 
that  he  was  to  be  relieved  from  relations  with  the 
Spaniard,  whose  continuance  at  Washington  he  had 
asked  as  a  favor  from  Don  Carlos  IV.  only  three 
years  before. 

Jefferson's  delicacy  and  hospitality  were  worthy 
of  a  great  lord  of  Spain,  and  did  honor  to  his  innate 
kindliness  ;  but  they  put  Yrujo  in  an  attitude  so  mor 
tifying,  that  when  he  returned  to  Washington  and 
learned  what  had  taken  place  in  his  absence,  he  was 
overcome  with  shame  at  finding  himself  charged  with 
calumniating  his  host  at  the  moment  of  claiming 

1  Madison  to  Jefferson,  Oct.  2,  1804  ;  Jefferson  MSS. 


268        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  12. 

his  hospitality.  He  immediately  prepared  a  counter- 
statement  and  took  it  to  the  President,  who  replied 
that  the  matter  was  one  which  should  properly  be 
long  to  Madison.  Yrujo  then  printed  his  letter  in 
the  "  National  Intelligencer,"  where  Madison  first 
saw  it.  For  the  moment  the  matter  went  no  further ; 
but  Madison  was  fixed  in  his  purpose  of  effecting 
Yrujo's  recall,  and  when  in  the  following  spring  he 
instructed  his  minister  at  Madrid  to  ask  this  favor, 
he  alleged  the  affair  of  Jackson  among  the  reasons 
which  justified  his  request. 

Pichon,  who  was  in  charge  of  the  French  lega 
tion,  cordially  disliked  Yrujo,  and  did  nothing  to  help 
him  against  Madison,  although  the  relations  between 
Spain  and  France  were  those  of  close  alliance ;  but 
Madison  next  suffered  a  severe  loss  in  the  removal  of 
Pichon,  and  in  the  arrival,  Nov.  23,  1804,  of  the  first 
minister  sent  by  France  to  the  United  States  since  the 
departure  of  Adet  in  President  Washington's  time. 
The  new  appointment  was  not  a  happy  one.  Pichon 
had  carried  friendliness  so  far  as  on  several  serious 
questions  to  take  sides  with  the  United  States  gov 
ernment  against  his  own,  and  had  fallen  into  disfavor 
with  Napoleon  in  consequence.  The  new  minister 
was  little  likely  to  repeat  this  blunder.  Napoleon 
liked  military  discipline  in  all  things  ;  and  he  sent 
as  his  minister  to  Washington  a  former  general  of 
the  Republic,  Louis  Marie  Turreau,  best  known  for 
the  extreme  severities  he  was  charged  with  having 
inflicted  on  the  Vendeans  in  1794.  Like  most  of 


1804.  ,      PINCKNEY'S  DIPLOMACY.  269 

the  republican  generals,  including  even  Moreau  and 
Bernadotte,  Turreau  accepted  the  coup  d'Stat  of  the 
18th  Brumaire,  and  was  for  private  reasons  anxious 
to  obtain  some  position  far  removed  from  France. 
According  to  his  own  story,  he  had  during  the  Ven 
dean  war  been  so  unfortunate  as  to  be  saved  from 
death,  in  a  moment  of  extreme  danger,  by  a  woman's 
self-sacrifice.  In  token  of  his  gratitude  he  married 
his  preserver ;  but  from  that  time  his  life,  became  a 
long  regret.  His  wife's  temper  was  terrible  ;  his  own 
was  querulous  and  morbidly  depressed.  Although  he 
could  speak  no  English,  had  no  diplomatic  experience 
and  little  taste  for  general  society,  he  sought  the  post 
of  minister  resident  at  Washington  in  order  to  escape 
his  wife.  To  his  extreme  annoyance,  she  followed 
him  to  America  ;  and  Washington  resounded  with 
the  scandal  of  their  quarrels,  which  reached  the  ex 
tremity  of  pitched  battles.  He  wrote  to  his  friends 
in  the  French  Foreign  Office  that  he  was  almost  mad 
with  mortification  and  despair. 

Such  a  minister  was  not  happily  chosen  for  the 
difficult  task  on  hand ;  but  Bonaparte  loaded  him 
with  other  burdens,  of  a  kind  even  more  embar 
rassing  to  a  diplomatist.  At  best,  the  position  of  a 
French  minister  in  America  was  not  agreeable.  The 
mere  difference  in  habits,  manners,  amusements,  and 
the  want  of  a  thousand  luxuries  and  pleasures  such 
as  made  Paris  dear  to  every  Frenchman,  rendered 
Washington  a  place  of  exile.  Perhaps  nothing  but 
fear  of  the  guillotine  could  have  reconciled  even 


270        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  12. 

republican  Frenchmen  to  staying  in  a  country  where, 
in  the  words  of  Talleyrand,  there  was  no  French 
man  who  did  not  feel  himself  a  stranger ;  but  if 
this  were  true  while  France  was  a  republic  fighting 
the  battles  of  American  democracy,  it  became  doubly 
true  after  Bonaparte  had  crushed  French  liberties  and 
made  himself  the  foremost  enemy  of  republican  ideas. 
Turreau  arrived  at  Washington  about  six  months  be 
fore  Bonaparte  took  the  title  of  Emperor;  and  he 
found  that  as  representative  of  Napoleon  I.  he  could 
never  hope  for  a  friend  in  the  United  States,  unless 
it  were  among  a  few  bankrupt  adventurers,  who  to 
retrieve  their  broken  fortunes  would  have  liked  to 
see  an  18th  Brumaire  at  New  Orleans,  which  should 
give  an  imperial  crown  and  the  mines  of  Mexico 
to  Aaron  Burr  and  his  troop  of  embryo  dukes  and 
marshals. 

As  though  to  embarrass  his  representative  to  the 
utmost,  Bonaparte  deprived  him  of  the  only  means  by 
which  he  could  win  even  the  venal  respect  of  a  money- 
making  people.  At  one  stroke  the  First  Consul  had 
annulled  and  sent  to  protest  all  the  drafts  drawn 
under  Rochambeau's  orders  by  the  fiscal  administra 
tor  of  St.  Domingo.1  His  avowed  reason  was  that 
every  bill  of  exchange  or  draft  on  the  public  treasury 
which  did  not  purport  to  rest  on  the  authority  of  a 
letter  from  the  minister  authorizing  the  expenditure, 
should  not  be  paid.  The  true  reason  was  that  he  had 

1  Note  du  Premier  Consul,  2  Flore'al,  An  xi.  (April  22,  1803)} 
Correspondance,  viii.  288. 


1804.  PINCKNEY'S  DIPLOMACY.  271 

determined  to  waste  no  more  money  on  St.  Domingo, 
but  to  sacrifice  his  army  there  under  cover  of  a  war 
with  England,  which  required  all  the  means  then  at 
his  disposal.  Rochambeau's  expenditures  were  be 
coming  wild  ;  but  thus  far  his  drafts  on  the  Treasury 
were  regularly  drawn.  They  had  been  taken  in  good 
faith  throughout  the  West  Indies  and  in  every  com 
mercial  city  on  the  American  seaboard ;  they  rested 
on  the  national  credit  of  France,  and  their  repudiation 
destroyed  French  credit  in  America,  public  and  pri 
vate.  Before  Turreau  sailed  for  his  post,  the  credit  of 
his  Government  was  at  an  end  in  the  United  States. 
Not  only  had  the  drafts  drawn  in  St.  Domingo  been 
refused  payment,  but  Pichon's  had  also  suffered  the 
same  fate ;  and  neither  the  new  minister  nor  his  con 
suls  could  find  a  man  in  Baltimore,  Philadelphia,  or 
New  York  to  advance  money  on  their  official  signa 
tures.  Turreau  complained  bitterly  to  Talleyrand 
of  the  penury  and  mortification  to  which  he  was 
condemned.  In  one  of  his  despatches  1  he  reported 
that  at  a  tavern  in  Baltimore  one  of  the  French 
agents,  not  known  to  be  such,  was  offered  French 
government  paper  at  fifty  per  cent  discount,  and  at 
the  same  time  five  per  cent  premium  for  drafts  on 
the  British  government.  "  In  short,  we  are  brought 
to  such  a  state  of  affairs  that  private  discredit  follows 
the  discredit  of  the  nation,  and  I  experience  it  for  my 
own  individual  drafts." 

1  Turreau  to  Talleyrand,  23  Floral,  An  liii.  (May  13,  180fc) ; 
Archives  des  Aff.  fitr.,  MSS. 


272        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  12. 

Owing  to  these  circumstances,  Turreau  declared 
that  his  position  was  hardly  tolerable ;  but  even  apart 
from  such  matters,  he  found  a  formidable  legacy  of 
diplomatic  difficulties  left  by  Pichon  to  be  settled. 
The  question  of  trade  with  St.  Domingo,  of  boundary 
on  both  sides  of  Louisiana,  the  Spanish  imbroglio,  the 
unpaid  claims  on  France,  and  the  repudiated  drafts 
negotiated  by  Pichon  in  the  United  States,  were  all 
matters  which  Turreau  was  required  to  master  and 
manage  ;  but  none  of  them  gave  him  more  trouble 
than  the  personal  quarrel  between  his  colleague  Yrujo 
and  the  Secretary  of  State. 

Yrujo's  affair  with  Major  Jackson  occurred  in  Sep 
tember,  1804,  and  Turreau,  reaching  Washington  in 
the  following  November,  was  soon  obliged  to  take  part 
in  Yrujo's  feuds.  Not  only  the  tone  of  his  instruc 
tions,  but  the  increasing  certainty  that  Spain  must 
side  with  France  in  the  war  against  England,  obliged 
him  to  make  common  cause  with  the  Spanish  minis 
ter,  who  came  from  Philadelphia  to  Washington  in 
order  to  invoke  his  services.  The  result  was  told 
in  a  despatch  to  Talleyrand :  !  — 

"  Following  your  instructions  and  the  request  of  M. 
d'Yrujo,  I  consented  to  an  interview  with  him  at  Mr. 
Madison's.  ...  I  had  no  trouble  in  perceiving  from  the 
outset  of  the  conversation  that  Mr.  Madison  and  M. 
d'Yrujo  cordially  detested  each  other,  and  in  the  dis 
cussion  that  their  passions  took  the  place  of  reason 
and  law." 

1  Turreau  to  Talleyrand,  6  Pluviose,  An  xii.  (Jan.  27,  1805); 
Archives  des  Aff.  Etr.,  MSS. 


1804.  PINCKNEY'S  DIPLOMACY.  273 

This  discussion  naturally  turned  on  the  question  of 
West  Florida ;  and  unfortunately  for  Madison,  Tur- 
reau's  instructions  on  that  point  were  emphatic  in 
support  of  Spain.  Turreau  was  obliged  to  enter  the 
lists  in  defence  of  Yrujo's  position. 

' '  I  mixed  in  the  discussion  only  in  order  to  represent 
to  Mr.  Madison,  who  is  unwilling  to  stop  at  the  treaty  of 
1762,  that  in  general  the  last  conventions  were  those 
which  ought  to  guide  in  negotiations  ;  otherwise,  if  each 
party  invoked  the  antecedent  ones  in  favor  of  his  system, 
we  should  be  forced  to  go  back  to  the  Deluge  to  find  the 
primitive  title.  '  But,  General ! '  replied  Mr.  Madison, 
'  we  have  a  map  which  probably  carries  to  the  Perdido 
the  eastern  limit  of  Louisiana ! '  —  'I  should  be  curious 
to  see  it,  sir ;  the  more,  because  I  have  one  which  includes 
Tennessee  and  Kentucky  in  Louisiana.  You  will  agree 
that  maps  are  not  titles.'  The  Secretary  of  State  closed 
this  session,  which  lasted  two  long  hours,  by  saying  that 
if  Spain  had  always  conducted  herself  toward  the  United 
States  as  well  as  France  had  done,  the  difficulties  would 
not  have  taken  place.  I  did  not  think  myself  called  upon 
to  appear  very  grateful  for  this  kind  of  cajolery." 

Turreau  did  not  want  keenness  of  insight ;  and  this 
early  experience  gave  him  no  high  respect  either  for 
Madison  or  for  the  American  system  of  government. 
His  despatch  explained  that  the  dispute  was  in  great 
part  due  to  the  fact  that  the  Louisiana  purchase  had 
been  made  a  battle-ground  in  the  Presidential  election 
just  ended  ;  that  the  opposition,  by  depreciating  its 
importance,  had  driven  the  party  in  power  to  exag 
gerate  its  value  ;  and  that  the  Administration,  to 

VOL.  II.  —  18 


274         HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  12. 

assure  itself  of  victory,  had  committed  itself  to  the 
policy  of  obtaining  Florida  by  one  means  or  another, 
till  it  could  no  longer  recede.  Yrujo's  indiscretions 
had  helped  to  make  it  impossible  for  Jefferson  to 
withdraw  with  dignity  from  his  position. 

"For  the  rest,"  continued  Turreau,  "I  have  made 
every  effort  to  reconcile  M.  d'Yrujo  with  the  Secretary 
of  State,  and  if  I  have  not  succeeded,  it  is  the  fault  of 
the  latter.  He  is  dry  (sec),  spiteful  (haineux),  pas 
sionate  ;  and  his  private  resentments,  still  more  than 
political  difference,  will  long  keep  him  apart  from  M. 
d'Yrujo.  Nevertheless,  as  I  am  on  very  good  terms 
with  Mr.  Madison,  whom  I  was  about  to  ask  to  dine  with 
me,  I  sent  my  first  aide-de-camp  to  ask  him  whether 
he  would  be  pleased  to  meet  the  Spanish  minister  at 
dinner ;  and  in  consequence  of  his  very  civil  and  even 
obliging  answer,  I  had  them  together  at  my  table, 
where  I  again  attempted  a  reconciliation.  M.  d'Yrujo 
would  have  agreed  to  it ;  but  the  Secretary  of  State 
cannot  forgive." 

Finally,  Turreau  called  Talleyrand's  attention  to 
the  question  whether  it  was  for  the  interest  of 
France  and  Spain  that  Yrujo  should  be  kept  at 
Washington :  — 

"  Doubtless  the  Government  here  wishes  for  his  recall, 
and  regards  this  step  as  the  duty  of  the  Court  at  Madrid, 
the  more  because  Mr.  Pinckney  has  been  recalled ;  but 
ought  the  Spanish  minister  to  be  changed  because  the 
American  government  wishes  it?  This  point  deserves 
attention.  These  people  here  have  been  well  spoiled  ;  it 
is  tune  to  send  them  back  to  their  proper  place." 


1804.  PINCKNEY'S  DIPLOMACY.  275 

The  quarrel  with  Yrujo  was  the  more  unfortunate 
because  it  happened  at  a  moment  when  Charles 
Pinckney,  the  American  minister  at  Madrid,  showed 
extreme  want  of  discretion.  The  President  had  not 
intended  to  leave  Pinckney  unassisted.  After  the  con 
clusion  of  the  Louisiana  treaty,  in  May,  1803,  Madison 
supposed  that  Monroe,  in  obedience  to  his  instructions, 
would  go  at  once  to  Madrid  and  take  the  negotiation 
from  Pinckney's  hands.1  For  reasons  that  will  here 
after  appear,  Monroe  decided  against  this  step,  and 
went  to  London  instead.  On  learning  the  change  of 
plan,  Madison  warned  Pinckney  2  to  make  no  propo 
sitions  to  the  Spanish  government,  which  was  not  yet 
in  a  humor  to  receive  them  with  favor.  Pinckney, 
restive  under  restraint,  managed  to  keep  up  an  ap 
pearance  of  diplomatic  activity  that  greatly  vexed  the 
Secretary  of  State.  Madison  complained 3  to  the  Presi 
dent  that  his  minister  at  Madrid  teased  the  Spanish 
government  on  the  subject  of  Florida,  which  he  had 
been  ordered  not  to  touch  without  the  presence  or  the 
advice  of  Monroe  ;  forbidden  to  make  but  permitted 
to  accept  offers, he  was  continually  offering  to  accept; 
while  Livingston  at  Paris,  equally  restive  under  the 
imposed  authority  of  Monroe,  could  not  resist  the 
temptation  to  stimulate  Pinckney  and  offer  advice 
both  to  France  and  Spain.  Madison's  complaints 

1  Madison  to  Monroe,  July  29,  1803  ;  State  Papers,  ii.  626. 
Madison  to  Pinckney,  July  29,  1803  ;  State  Papers,  ii.  614. 
a  Madison  to  Pinckney,  Oct.  12,  1803  ;  State  Papers,  ii.  570. 
8  Madison  to  Jefferson,  April  9,  1804  ;  Jefferson  MSS. 


276        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  12. 

were  well  founded  ;  but  when  he  wrote  in  this  sense 
to  Jefferson,  he  had  not  begun  to  appreciate  the  full 
measure  of  diplomatic  activity  which  his  minister  at 
Madrid  was  capable  of  displaying. 

Yrujo  always  managed  to  embarrass  the  American 
government  without  seriously  committing  his  own ; 
but  Pinckney  showed  no  such  forbearance,  and  by 
the  close  of  the  year  1804  drew  Madison  into  a 
mortifying  position.  He  began  his  activity  in  July, 
1803,  immediately  after  hearing  that  Monroe  had 
given  up  the  proposed  visit  to  Madrid,  and  had  gone 
to  London.  Without  waiting  to  learn  how  this  change 
of  plan  and  the  purchase  of  Louisiana  might  affect 
the  President's  views  toward  Spain,  Pinckney,  to  use 
his  own  words,1  "  pushed  the  new  propositions  respect 
ing  our  claims  in  that  positive  and  decided  manner 
which  the  circumstances  of  Europe  and  the  particular 
situation  of  Spain  seemed  to  me  to  warrant."  Cevallos 
contented  himself  with  parrying  this  attack  by  giving 
to  Pinckney  the  written  opinion  obtained  by  Yrujo 
from  the  five  American  lawyers  in  support  of  his 
argument  that  the  United  States,  by  their  treaty  with 
France  of  Sept.  30,  1800,  had  renounced  their  right 
to  demand  indemnity  for  losses  sustained  from  French 
cruisers.2 

Both  parties  next  appealed  to  the  French  ambas 
sador  at  Madrid.  The  Prince  of  Peace,  though 
irritated  by  the  sale  of  Louisiana,  quickly  saw  that  his 

1  Pinckney  to  Madison,  Aug.  2,  1803  ;  State  Papers,  ii.  597. 

2  Cevallos  to  Pinckney,  Aug.  23,  1803;  State  Papers,  ii.  604. 


1804.  PINCKNEY'S  DIPLOMACY.  277 

only  chance  of  retaining  Florida  was  to  conciliate 
Bonaparte ;  and  Pinckney,  who  knew  that  the  French 
ambassador  at  Madrid  had  been  instructed  to  support 
Monroe  in  negotiating  for  Florida,  counted  on  the 
same  aid  in  order  to  maintain  a  threatening  attitude. 
The  result  was  soon  seen.  Pinckney,  disturbed  by  the 
news  of  Yrujo's  protest  against  the  sale  of  Louisiana, 
turned  to  the  French  ambassador  for  advice.1  Beur- 
nonville  accordingly  wrote  to  Talleyrand  for  instruc 
tions  ;  but  Talleyrand  had  already  sent  to  the  Spanish 
embassy  at  Paris  a  note  of  sharp  remonstrance  against 
the  protest.2  Beurnonville,  learning  this,  asked  the 
Prince  of  Peace  for  explanations ;  and  Godoy  hastened 
to  assure  him  that  Bonaparte  might  be  at  ease  on 
this  score,  for  orders  had  been  sent  to  New  Orleans  to 
surrender  the  province  without  opposition,  and  already 
Yrujo  had  been  instructed  to  change  his  tone  at 
Washington.3  Soon  afterward  Cevallos  formally  no 
tified  Pinckney  that  the  King  renounced  his  opposi 
tion  to  the  cession  of  Louisiana.*  In  due  time  Yrujo 
sent  to  the  State  Department  a  formal  note  to  the 
same  effect.5 

At  the  cost  of  recognizing  the  Louisiana  cession, 

1  Beurnonville  to    Talleyrand,  18   Nivose,  An  xii.    (Jan.  9, 
1804)  ;  Archives  des  Aff.  fitr.,  MSS. 

2  Talleyrand  to  D'Hervas,  12  Nivose,  An  xii.  (Jan.  3,  1804)  ; 
Archives  des  Aff.  Etr.,  MSS. 

8  Beurnonville  to   Talleyrand,  21   Nivose,  An  xii.  (Jan.  12, 
1804)  ;  Archives  des  Aff.  £tr.,  MSS. 

4  Cevallos  to  Pinckney,  Feb.  10,  1804 ;  State  Papers,  ii.  583. 
*  Yrujo  to  Madison,  May  15,  1804;  State  Papers,  ii.  583. 


278        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  12. 

Godoy  pacified  Bonaparte,  who  stood  in  need  of 
Spanish  support.  From  that  moment  Pinckney 
begged  in  vain  for  help  from  the  French  ambassador 
at  Madrid,  although  the  need  of  aid  increased  from 
day  to  day.  Just  as  his  first  and  least  important 
point,  the  withdrawal  of  Yrujo's  protest,  was  gained 
at  Madrid,  the  Government  at  Washington  created 
new  difficulties  about  his  path.  At  the  moment  when 
Beurnonville,  Talleyrand,  and  Pinckney  wrung  from 
King  Charles  his  adhesion  to  the  Louisiana  treaty, 
the  Senate  at  Washington,  Jan.  9,  1804,  ratified  the 
Spanish  claims  convention,  which  had  been  negotiated 
by  Pinckney  nearly  eighteen  months  before,  and  had 
been  held  an  entire  year  under  consideration  by  the 
Senate.  The  last  article  of  this  convention  provided, 
as  usual  with  such  instruments,  that  it  should  have 
no  effect  until  ratified  by  both  parties,  and  that  the 
ratifications  should  be  exchanged  as  soon  as  possible. 
So  far  from  performing  its  part  of  the  contract,  the 
Senate  had  at  one  moment  refused  to  ratify  at  all, 
and  after  reconsidering  this  refusal,  had  delayed  rati 
fication  an  entire  year,  until  the  relations  of  the  two 
parties  had  been  wholly  changed.  The  idea  that  the 
King  of  Spain  was  bound  to  ratify  in  his  turn,  im 
plied  excessive  confidence  in  his  good-nature ;  but 
Madison,  in  sending  the  ratified  treaty  to  Pinckney, 
suggested  no  suspicion  that  Charles  IV.  might  have 
changed  his  mind,  and  gave  not  a  hint  to  Pinckney 
of  the  course  to  be  followed  in  such  a  contingency. 
The  Mobile  Act  had  not  yet  become  law,  and  Yrujo 


1804.  PINCKNEY'S   DIPLOMACY.  279 

was  waiting  for  its  signature  by  the  President  before 
waking  Madison  from  his  dreams  of  doing  what  he 
pleased  with  Spanish  property. 

Early  in  February,  1804,  Madison  sent  these  new 
instructions  to  Pinckney,  inclosing  the  ratified  treaty, 
and  instructing  him  in  effect  to  press  the  reserved 
claims  for  French  spoliations  in  Spanish  ports.  The 
despatch  reached  Pinckney  in  May,  and  he  went  at 
once  to  Cevallos  for  the  ratification.  To  his  great 
annoyance  Cevallos  made  difficulties.  During  the 
discussion,  Cevallos  received  from  Yrujo  a  copy  of 
the  Mobile  Act,  which  he  sent  to  Pinckney  May  31, 
with  a  demand  for  explanations.  Pinckney  replied  in 
a  tone  little  short  of  dictatorial.1 

"  Permit  me  on  this  subject  to  remind  your  Excellency," 
said  he,  "  that  on  the  first  intelligence  being  received  of 
the  cession  of  Louisiana,  I  communicated  verbally  to  your 
Excellency  and  the  Prince  of  Peace  the  contents  of  an 
official  letter  I  had  received  from  Mr.  Livingston  and  Mr. 
Monroe,  informing  me  that  they  considered  a  great  part  of 
West  Florida,  as  so  called  by  the  English,  as  included. 
Such  letter  could  not  have  been  written  officially  to  me  by 
them  without  their  having  been  so  informed  by  the  French 
plenipotentiary  and  government." 

Pinckney  urged  that  the  two  subjects  should  be 
kept  separate.  "  Do  not  show  the  United  States  that 
you  have  no  confidence  either  in  their  honor  or  jus 
tice, —  qualities  on  which  they  value  themselves  more 
than  on  power  or  wealth." 

1  Pinckney  to  Cevallos,  June  1,  1804;  State  Papers,  ii.  618. 


280        HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.       CH.  12. 

Unfortunately  Pinckney's  note  obliged  Spain  to 
show  want  of  confidence  in  the  "  honor  or  justice  "  of 
the  United  States,  unless  indeed  she  meant  to  acqui 
esce  in  losing  Florida  as  well  as  Louisiana.  Pinckney 
next  appealed  to  the  French  ambassador  for  help.1 
"  I  took  the  course  of  giving  Mr.  Pinckney  an  oblig 
ing  but  vague  answer,"  said  Beurnonville,  writing  for 
instructions  to  Talleyrand.  Cevallos,  on  his  side, 
wrote  to  Admiral  Gravina,  the  Spanish  ambassador  at 
Paris,  instructing  him  to  remonstrate  with  Talleyrand 
against  Pinckney's  conduct.  After  a  month's  delay, 
Cevallos,  in  answer  to  Pinckney's  letters,  sent  a  sharp 
note,2  offering  to  ratify  the  convention  on  three  condi 
tions,  —  one  being  that  the  reserved  claim  for  French 
spoliations  should  be  abandoned,  and  another  that  the 
Mobile  Act  should  be  revoked. 

Without  waiting  for  further  instructions,  or  even 
consulting  Monroe  at  London,  Pinckney  next  wrote 
to  Cevallos  a  letter  which  surpassed  all  indiscre 
tions  that  Madison  could  have  imagined.  Requesting 
Cevallos  "  merely  to  answer  this  question,"  whether 
ratification  was  refused  except  on  the  conditions 
specified,  he  added:3  — 

*'  I  wish  to  have  your  Excellency's  answer  as  quickly 
as  possible,  as  on  Tuesday  I  send  a  courier  with  circular 
letters  to  all  our  consuls  in  the  ports  of  Spain,  stating  to 

1  Beurnonville  to  Talleyrand,  18  Prairial,  An  xii.  (June  7, 
1804)  ;  Archives  des  Aff.  Etr.,  MSS. 

a  Cevallos  to  Pinckney,  July  2,  1804  ;  State  Papers,  ii.  619. 
*  Pinckney  to  Cevallos,  July  5,  1804;  State  Papers,  ii.  620. 


1804. 


PINCKNEY'S  DIPLOMACY.  281 


them  the  critical  situation  of  things  between  Spain  and 
the  United  States,  the  probability  of  a  speedy  and  serious 
misunderstanding,  and  directing  them  to  give  notice 
thereof  to  all  our  citizens ;  advising  them  so  to  arrange 
and  prepare  their  affairs  as  to  be  able  to  move  off  within 
the  time  limited  by  the  treaty,  should  things  end  as  I 
now  expect.  I  am  also  preparing  the  same  information 
for  the  commander  of  our  squadron  in  the  Mediterranean, 
for  his  own  notice  and  government,  and  that  of  all  the 
American  merchant-vessels  he  may  meet." 

Cevallos  immediately  answered  J  that  as  he  could 
not  comprehend  the  motive  for  "  breaking  out  in  the 
decisions,  not  to  say  threats,"  of  this  letter,  or  how  it 
was  possible  that  Pinckney  could  have  the  authority 
of  his  government  for  such  conduct,  he  should  by  the 
King's  order  transfer  the  negotiation  to  Washington. 
Pinckney  rejoined  by  despatching  his  circular  letter, 
which  created  a  panic  in  the  Mediterranean.  He  then 
informed  Cevallos  that  so  soon  as  his  affairs  could  be 
arranged,  he  should  send  for  his  passports  and  quit 
Madrid.2 

Although  this  step  was  in  the  highest  degree 
improper,  Pinckney  had  some  excuse  for  his  conduct. 
Left  without  instructions  in  the  face  of  an  emergency 
which  might  have  been  foreseen  at  Washington,  he 
argued  that  his  government,  which  had  officially  an 
nexed  West  Florida,  meant  to  support  its  acts  with 
a  strong  hand.  He  thought  that  the  issue  presented 

1  Cevallos  to  Pinckney,  July  8,  1804  ;  State  Papers,  ii.  620. 

2  Pinckney  to  Cevallos,  July  14,  1804  ;  State  Papers,  ii.  621. 


282       HISTORY  OF   THE  UNITED   STATES.      CH.  12. 

by  Cevallos  was  such  as  the  President  was  bound 
to  take  up,  and  he  knew  that  the  only  chance  of  car 
rying  the  points  which  the  President  had  at  heart 
was  in  energetic  action.  For  three  years  he  had 
watched  the  peremptory  tone  of  France  and  England 
at  Madrid,  and  had  been  assured  by  the  common 
voice  of  his  diplomatic  colleagues  that  threats  alone 
could  extort  action  from  the  Spanish  government. 
He  had  seen  the  Prince  of  Peace,  after  resorting 
to  one  subterfuge  after  another,  repeatedly  forced 
to  cower  before  the  two  great  robbers  who  were 
plundering  Spain,  and  he  explained  to  Madison  the 
necessity  of  imitating  their  example  if  the  President 
meant  that  Spain  should  cower  before  the  United 
States.  Perhaps  he  felt  that  Godoy  looked  on  the 
President  at  "Washington  as  the  jackal  of  Bonaparte, 
and  he  may  have  wished  to  prove  that  America 
could  act  alone.  His  eager  ambition  to  make  himself 
as  important  as  the  representatives  of  France  and 
England  in  the  eyes  of  Europe  might  imply  vanity, 
but  rested  also  on  logic. 

The  first  result  of  this  energetic  tone  was  not 
what  Pinckney  had  hoped.  Cevallos  was  outwardly 
unmoved ;  Pinckney 's  violence  only  caused  him  to 
lay  aside  that  courtesy  which  was  the  usual  mark 
of  Spanish  manners.  His  official  notes  were  in  out 
ward  form  still  civil  enough,  but  in  two  or  three 
conversations  Pinckney  listened  to  a  series  of  re 
marks  as  blunt  as  though  Lord  Harrowby  were  the 
speaker.  Pinckney  reported  to  Madison  the  tenor  of 


1804.  PINCKNEY'S  DIPLOMACY.  283 

these  rough  rejoinders.1  Cevallos  told  him  that  the 
Americans,  ever  since  their  independence,  had  been 
receiving  the  most  pointed  proofs  of  friendship  and 
generosity  from  Spain,  who,  as  was  well  known,  re 
ceived  no  benefit  from  them,  —  on  the  contrary,  their 
commerce  was  extremely  injurious  to  Spain ;  the 
Spanish  government  had  ten  times  more  trouble  with 
them  than  with  any  other  nation,  and  for  his  part,  he 
did  not  wish  to  see  the  trade  with  the  United  States 
extended.  Spain  had  nothing  to  fear  from  the  United 
States,  and  had  heard  with  contempt  the  threats 
of  senators  like  Ross  and  Gouverneur  Morris.  The 
Americans  had  no  right  to  expect  much  kindness 
from  the  King;  in  the  purchase  of  Louisiana  they 
had  paid  no  attention  to  his  repeated  remonstrances 
against  the  injustice  and  nullity  of  that  transaction, 
whereas  if  they  had  felt  the  least  friendship  they 
would  have  done  so.  They  were  well  known  to  be  a 
nation  of  calculators,  bent  on  making  money  and 
nothing  else ;  the  French,  and  probably  in  the  result 
all  the  nations  having  possessions  in  the  West  Indies, 
would  be  materially  injured  by  them,  for  without  a 
doubt  it  was  entirely  owing  to  the  United  States  that 
St.  Domingo  was  in  its  present  situation. 

Pinckney  received  2  at  the  same  time  what  he  called 
secret  intelligence  on  which  he  could  implicitly  rely, 

1  Pinckney  to  Madison,  July  20, 1804  ;  MSS.  State  Department 
Archives. 

2  Pinckney  to  Madison,  July  20,  1804;  MSS.  State  Depart 
ment  Archives. 


284        HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.       CH.  12. 

that  Cevallos  meant  to  create  indefinite  delays  to  the 
ratification,  for  Yrujo  had  written  that  neither  these 
nor  the  French  spoliation  claims,  nor  West  Florida, 
would  induce  the  American  government  to  depart  from 
its  pacific  system.  France  had  indeed  gone  to  the  point 
of  advising  and  even  commanding  Spain  to  relinquish 
her  claim  on  Louisiana,  and  this  was  the  reason  why 
Spain  had  so  quietly  given  it  up;  but  in  regard  to 
the  spoliations,  France  preferred  not  to  see  them  paid, 
as  the  more  money  Spain  paid  America  the  less  she 
could  pay  France,  and  France  knew  as  well  as  Spain 
how  little  serious  was  the  American  government  in 
the  idea  of  abandoning  its  neutrality. 

Pinckney  having  done  his  worst,  found  himself  in 
a  position  extremely  awkward.  Although  he  threat 
ened  to  leave  Spain,  and  proclaimed  that  he  meant 
soon  to  demand  his  passports,  he  did  not  venture  to 
take  this  last  step  without  instructions.  Cevallos, 
excessively  perplexed  by  his  conduct,  could  not  con 
ceive  that  he  should  act  thus  without  some  definite 
authority.  Boldly  as  Cevallos  talked,  he  was  in  truth 
greatly  alarmed  by  the  idea  of  war.  The  French  rep 
resentative  at  Madrid  wrote  to  Talleyrand  that  Pinck 
ney  had  terrified  the  secretary  beyond  reason  : l  — 

"  The  difficulty  of  making  himself  understood  by  M. 
de  Cevallos  in  a  language  with  which  he  is  not  familiar, 
excites  Mr.  Pinckney  to  fly  out  in  terms  beyond  modera 
tion  and  proper  civility.  He  positively  threatens  war, 

1  Vandeul  to  Talleyrand,  7  Thermidor,  An  xii.  (July  26, 
1804)  ;  Archives  des  Aff.  Etr.,  MSS. 


1804.  PINCKNEY'S  DIPLOMACY.  285 

and  loudly  announces  his  resolution  shortly  to  demand 
his  passports.  The  truth  is  that  he  is  preparing  to  de 
part,  and  finds  himself  almost  deprived  of  power  to  re 
main,  not  only  in  consequence  of  his  personal  altercation 
with  the  minister,  but  also  of  the  care  with  which  he  has 
taken  the  public  into  his  confidence.  .  .  .  M.  de  Cevallos 
seems  to  me  to  be  quite  seriously  alarmed  at  the  results 
this  may  have." 

Ten  days  later  the  Frenchman  reported  that 
Cevallos  was  more  uneasy  than  ever.1 

"  '  If  the  Emperor,'  added  M.  de  Cevallos,  '  would  but 
say  a  word,  and  let  the  United  States  understand  that  he 
is  not  pleased  at  seeing  them  abuse  the  advantages  which 
they  owe  to  their  strength  and  to  the  nearness  of  their 
resources  over  an  ally  of  France,  this  would  reconcile  all 
difficulties,  and  save  his  Majesty  the  necessity  of  exacting 
satisfaction  for  an  insult  which  is  as  good  as  inflicted.'  " 

The  Frenchman,  having  no  instructions,  contented 
himself  with  suggesting  that  the  Emperor  had  more 
pressing  matters  on  hand.  " '  So,'  said  M.  de  Cevallos, 
'France  will  have  caused  our  actual  misunderstanding 
with  our  neighbors,  and  we  are  to  expect  no  service 
from  her  influence ! ' 

While  Cevallos  thus  invoked  the  aid  of  France,  the 
news  of  Pinckney's  war  slowly  crossed  the  Atlantic. 
No  sooner  did  it  arrive  than  Yrujo  in  the  middle 
of  October,  shortly  after  his  attempt  to  seduce  the 
patriotism  of  Major  Jackson,  wrote  to  the  Secretary 

1  Vandeul  to  Talleyrand,  18  Thermidor,  An  xii.  (Aug.  6, 
1804)  ;  Archives  dcs  Aff.  £tr.,  MSS. 


286        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  1Z 

of  State  a  formal  letter,1  repeating  what  had  already 
been  said  to  Pinckney  at  Madrid.  Madison's  reply 
was  studiously  moderate  and  conciliatory.2  He  ex 
plained  as  best  he  could  the  offensive  language  of 
the  Mobile  Act,  and  announced  that  a  special  min 
ister  would  soon  reach  Madrid,  to  hasten  the  adjust 
ment  of  all  territorial  disputes  ;  he  deprecated  the 
demand  for  an  abandonment  of  the  French  claims, 
and  argued  that  such  a  condition  of  ratification  was 
not  supported  by  international  law  ;  he  urged  Yrujo 
to  give  assurances  of  an  unqualified  ratification,  but 
he  said  not  a  word  about  Pinckney's  performances, 
and  gave  it  to  be  understood  that  Pinckney  would  be 
recalled.  A  few  days  afterward  he  wrote  to  Monroe, 
ordering  him  in  haste  to  Spain.  u  The  turn  which 
our  affairs  at  Madrid  have  taken  renders  it  expe 
dient  in  the  judgment  of  the  President  that  you 
should  proceed  thither  without  delay."3  In  another 
letter,  written  at  nearly  the  same  time,  he  was  more 
explicit : 4  — 

"  Pinckney's  recall  has  been  asked  by  the  Spanish 
government,  and  a  letter  of  leave  goes  to  him.  I  sus 
pect  he  will  not  return  in  good  humor.  I  could  not 
permit  myself  to  flatter  him,  and  truth  would  not  permit 
me  to  praise  him.  He  is  well  off  in  escaping  reproof,  for 
his  agency  has  been  very  faulty  as  well  as  feeble." 

1  Yrujo  to  Madison,  Oct.  13,  1804  ;  State  Papers,  ii.  624. 
a  Madison  to  Yrujo,  Oct.  15,  1804;  State  Papers,  ii.  625. 
8  Madison  to  Monroe,  Oct.  26,  1804  ;  State  Papers,  ii.  631. 
4  Madison  to  Monroe,  Nov.  9,  1804  ;  Works,  ii.  208. 


1804.  PINCKNEY'S  DIPLOMACY.  287 

The  first  attempts  to  overawe  Spain  had  failed. 
Pinckney,  not  disavowed  but  ignored,  fell  into  the 
background  ;  and  once  more  Monroe  stepped  forward 
to  rescue  the  Administration.  When  these  instruc 
tions  were  written,  he  had  already  reached  Paris 
on  his  way  to  Madrid  ;  but  Madison,  undeterred  by 
Pinckney's  disaster,  still  persisted  in  advising  him  to 
place  his  main  reliance  "  in  a  skilful  appeal  to  the 
fears  of  Spain."  * 

1  Madison  to  Monroe,  Nov.  9,  1804;  Works,  ii.  208. 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

HARDLY  was  the  Louisiana  treaty  sent  to  America 
in  May,  1803,  when  Monroe  began  preparations  for  a 
journey  to  Madrid.  The  outbreak  of  temper  with 
which  Godoy  and  Cevallos  received  the  news  that 
Spain  had  been  secretly  deprived  of  Louisiana,  caused 
Bonaparte  to  feel  that  further  maltreatment  of  his 
ally  was  for  the  moment  unwise  ;  and  he  interposed 
a  sudden  veto  on  Monroe's  journey.  "  With  respect 
to  Florida,  this  is  not  the  time  to  pursue  that  ob 
ject,"  said  he,  when  Monroe  came  to  take  leave.1 
The  Consul  Cambace'res  echoed  the  warning :  "  You 
must  not  go  to  Spain  at  present ;  it  is  not  the  time ; 
you  had  better  defer  it."  The  Third  Consul  Lebrun 
spoke  in  the  same  tone.  Monroe  took  the  advice, 
and  abandoned  the  journey  to  Madrid.  In  July  he 
crossed  the  Channel  to  London,  and  Aug.  17,  1803; 
was  duly  presented  to  George  III.  as  the  successor 
of  Rufus  King,  who  had  already  returned  to  America. 
Livingston  remained  at  Paris  to  manage  the  relations 
with  Napoleon. 

1  Monroe  to  Madison,  July  20,  1803  ;  MSS.  State  Department 
Archives. 


1804.  MONROE   AND   TALLEYRAND.  289 

In  spite  of  success  that  should  have  filled  his  cup 
of  ambition  to  overflowing,  Livingston  was  far  from 
satisfied.  Neither  the  President  nor  the  Secretary  of 
State  liked  him ;  and  to  the  latter  he  was  a  possible 
rival,  who  might  become  dangerous  if  the  authority 
of  President  Jefferson,  which  was  Madison's  great 
support,  should  wane,  and  should  New  York  claim 
the  presidency  from  Virginia.  Monroe  distrusted 
Livingston,  believing  him  to  grasp  at  the  whole  credit 
of  the  Louisiana  treaty,  and  to  be  intriguing  to  with 
draw  the  Florida  negotiation  from  Monroe's  hands 
by  causing  its  transfer  from  Madrid  to  Paris.1  The 
Secretary  of  State  was  perpetually  annoyed  by  his 
minister.  Sometimes  Livingston  experimented  on 
Spain,  sometimes  on  England.  At  one  moment  he 
sent  to  the  First  Consul  an  indiscreet  memorial  that 
brought  a  remonstrance  from  the  British  government ; 
at  another  he  fell  into  a  virulent  quarrel  with  the 
American  claims  commissioners  under  the  Louisiana 
treaty.  His  claims  convention  was  admitted  to  be 
full  of  mistakes  which  he  did  not  himself  attempt  to 
defend,  while  the  American  consul  at  Paris  declared 
that  his  conduct  in  regard  to  certain  claims  was  dic 
tated  by  blind  and  insatiable  vanity,  if  not  by  corrupt 
and  criminal  motives.2 

Mistakes  cost  Livingston  little  serious  annoyance ; 

1  Monroe's  Memoranda,  Monroe  MSS.,  State  Department 
Archives. 

*  Skip  with   to   Madison,   Feb.   21,    1804  ;  State  Department 

Archives. 

TOL.  II.  —  19 


290        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  13. 

but  although  he  could  afford  to  disregard  British 
complaints  or  Consul  Skipwith's  abuse,  or  even  the 
severe  criticisms  of  the  claims  commissioners,  he  must 
have  had  more  than  human  patience  to  sit  quiet 
under  the  superiority  of  Monroe.  He  knew  that  what 
ever  diplomatic  credit  was  due  for  the  Louisiana  ne 
gotiation  rightly  belonged  to  him,  and  that  Monroe 
had  no  claim  to  any  part  of  it,  except  that  of  support 
ing  and  approving  what  was  already  accomplished  ; 
yet  he  saw  the  Administration  and  the  public  attribute 
the  chief  honor  to  his  rival.  He  showed  his  wounded 
self-esteem  in  protests  and  statements  to  which  the 
world  was  deaf.  His  old  Federalist  friends  took  ma 
licious  pleasure  in  telling  him  that  his  triumph  had 
offended  the  vanity  of  Jefferson.1 

Consoling  himself  with  the  reflection  that  he  should 
insist  on  returning  to  America  in  the  autumn  of  1804, 
Livingston  endured  these  annoyances  as  he  best 
could,  and  found  in  the  society  of  Robert  Fulton  and 
Joel  Barlow  the  hope  of  greater  fame  and  profit  than 
political  distinctions  could  possibly  bring.  While  he 
watched  and  encouraged  Fulton's  experiments  with 
the  steamboat,  clouds  gathered  more  and  more  thickly 
round  his  diplomatic  path.  The  First  Consul  had 
never  inspired  him  with  much  confidence  ;  but  after 
the  rupture  of  the  Peace  of  Amiens,  in  May,  1803, 
Bonaparte's  acts  became  more  and  more  alarming 
to  every  Republican.  He  passed  the  autumn  of  1803 

1  Gouverneur  Morris  to  Livingston,  Nov.  28, 1803  ;  Sparks's 
Morris,  iii.  188. 


1804.  MONROE  AND  TALLEYRAND.  291 

in  preparations  for  a  descent  on  England.  He  next 
effected,  in  February,  1804,  the  arrest,  trial,  and 
banishment  of  Moreau.  The  seizure  and  arbitrary 
execution  of  the  Due  d'Enghien  followed  a  month 
afterward,  and  finally,  in  May,  1804,  the  proclamation 
of  the  Empire. 

In  the  midst  of  these  events  Livingston  received 
from  home  the  letter  already  quoted,  in  which  Madi 
son  told  the  story  of  the  Mobile  Act,  and  complained 
of  Yrujo's  violent  conduct.  "  The  correspondence  is 
chiefly  of  importance,"  said  the  Secretary  of  State, 
"  as  it  urges  the  expediency  of  cultivating  the  dis 
position  of  the  French  government  to  take  our  side 
of  the  question."  Livingston  was  personally  rather 
inclined  to  the  opposite  course.  He  had  little  faith 
in  obtaining  favors  from  the  Emperor,  and  no  dispo 
sition  to  place  the  United  States  in  the  attitude  of 
begging  for  them ;  but  he  had  not  the  chief  share 
in  shaping  action.  A  few  weeks  after  receiving  these 
instructions,  when  he  heard  of  the  quasi  war  which 
Pinckney  in  July  declared  at  Madrid,  Livingston  was 
already  expecting  the  arrival  of  his  successor,  General 
Armstrong,  in  the  autumn. 

The  news  from  Spain  reaching  London,  startled 
Monroe  from  his  repose.  As  soon  as  he  could  make 
ready,  Oct.  8,  1804,  placing  his  legation  in  charge  of 
a  secretary,  Monroe  left  London.  While  he  waited  in 
Paris  to  sound  the  disposition  of  Talleyrand,  General 
Armstrong  arrived  to  relieve  Livingston.  Thus  it 
happened  that  three  American  ministers  —  Monroe, 


292        HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.       CH.  13. 

Livingston,  and  Armstrong  —  met  at  Paris  in  Novem 
ber,  1804,  to  cope  with  Talleyrand,  in  whose  hands 
lay  the  decision  of  Jefferson's  quarrel  with  Spain. 

The  question  to  be  decided  was  whether  the  United 
States  government  should  disregard  its  obligations 
to  Napoleon  and  act  independently,  or  whether  the 
President  should  defer  to  the  opinion  of  Talleyrand 
and  to  the  Emperor's  will.  The  story  of  diplomatic 
adventure,  which  has  so  often  an  interest  beyond 
what  could  be  supposed  possible  from  the  contact  of 
three  or  four  quiet  and  elderly  gentlemen  meeting 
about  a  green  table,  or  writing  letters  inordinately 
long,  owes  that  interest  in  most  cases  to  a  hope  or  a 
despair,  to  a  mystery  or  an  elucidation ;  but  Monroe's 
labors  at  that  time  offered  little  mystery,  and  less 
hope.  Although  he  did  not  know  all  that  was  hap 
pening  behind  the  diplomatic  curtain,  he  knew  enough 
to  be  aware  that  his  negotiation  for  Florida,  on  the 
ground  chosen  by  the  President,  was  hopeless. 

Three  months  had  passed  since  Cevallos  made 
his  appeal  to  Talleyrand  for  help.  "  If  the  Emperor 
would  but  say  a  word,"  Cevallos  urged ; l  "if  he 
would  make  the  United  States  understand  that  he 
will  not  be  pleased  at  seeing  them  abuse  their  ad 
vantages,"  —  this  would  put  an  end  to  insults  like 
the  Mobile  Act  and  Pinckney's  threats.  Talleyrand's 
answer  could  not  be  doubtful.  Angry  with  Jefferson, 
Madison,  Monroe,  and  Livingston  for  their  attack  on 

1  Vandeul  to  Talleyrand,  July  26  and  Aug.  6, 1804 ;  Archives 
des  Aff.  Etr.,  MSS. 


1804.  MONROE  AND  TALLEYRAND.  293 

West  Florida,  into  which  his  own  and  his  master's 
finessing  had  drawn  them  ;  still  angrier  with  Pinck- 
ney  for  the  burlesque  of  Napoleonic  manners  with 
which  he  alarmed  the  government  of  Spain ;  hostile 
at  heart  to  Bonaparte's  ultimate  schemes  against  the 
Spanish  empire,  but  determined  that  if  Spain  were  to 
be  plundered  France  should  have  the  booty  ;  willing 
to  repay  a  part  of  the  humiliation  and  disappoint 
ment  which  the  United  States  had  twice  inflicted  upon 
him,  —  the  instant  the  Spanish  ambassador  at  Paris 
brought  the  Mobile  Act  to  his  notice,  Talleyrand 
assured  him  with  emphasis  that  the  Emperor  would 
formally  oppose  such  pretensions  on  the  part  of  the 
United  States  ; 1  and  when  Pinckney's  conduct  was 
reported  to  him,  with  the  request  that  the  Emperor 
would  instruct  his  minister  at  Washington  to  act 
in  concert  with  Yrujo  in  order  to  prevent  a  rupture, 
Talleyrand  hastened  to  meet  the  wish  of  the  Spanish 
government. 

Cevallos  made  other  requests.  After  narrating  the 
history  of  Pinckney's  claims  convention,  he  touched 
briefly  on  the  claim  for  French  spoliations  which  the 
Americans  so  warmly  urged  against  Spain,  and  he 
asserted  that  Lucien  Bonaparte  had  given  an  assur 
ance  that  these  claims  were  covered  by  the  Franco- 
American  treaty  of  1800,  and  therefore  could  not  be 
pressed  against  Spain.  He  complained  that  Pinckney 

1  Gravina  to  Talleyrand,  July  24,  1804;  Archives  des  Aff.  £tr., 
MSS.  Cevallos  to  Monroe  and  Pinckney,  16  Feb.  1805;  State 
Papers,  ii.  643. 


294         HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  la 

had  used  "  language  the  most  gross,  the  most  insult 
ing,  and,  so  to  speak,  the  most  audacious  and  men 
acing."  He  called  attention  to  the  dangers  which 
would  result  from  allowing  the  boundary  of  Louisiana 
to  be  extended  toward  either  Florida  or  Mexico ;  and 
he  begged  "  that  orders  might  be  sent  to  the  French 
commissioner  Laussat  in  Louisiana,  enjoining  him  to 
restrain  the  pretensions  of  the  Americans  regarding 
the  limits  of  that  province,  and  not  to  show  himself 
favorable  to  the  wishes  of  the  Americans,  as  there 
is  reason  to  suspect  him  of  doing,  according  to  his 
correspondence  with  the  Spanish  commissioner." 

Laussat's  offence  consisted  in  telling  the  American 
commissioners  that  his  instructions  fixed  the  Rio 
Bravo  as  the  western  boundary  of  Louisiana.  Ceval- 
los  made  no  protest  to  Talleyrand  against  the  truth  of 
Laussat's  statement.  He  tacitly  admitted  that  Laussat 
was  right ;  but  he  invited  Talleyrand  to  join  in  de 
priving  the  United  States  of  Texas,  which  the  United 
States  had  bought,  and  the  price  of  which  they  had 
paid  to  France.  That  Godoy  should  conspire  for  this 
purpose  was  natural,  for  he  had  no  reason  to  respect 
the  Louisiana  cession,  and  he  had  pledged  his  honor 
in  no  way  to  the  United  States ;  but  that  he  should 
ask  Napoleon  to  deprive  the  United  States  of  property 
which  Napoleon  himself  had  bought  from  Spain  and 
sold  to  the  United  States,  and  for  which  he  had  re 
ceived  some  millions  of  coin  for  his  personal  objects 
and  ambitions,  showed  that  the  Prince  of  Peace  under 
stood  the  characters  of  Bonaparte  and  Talleyrand. 


1804.  MONROE   AND   TALLEYRAND.  295 

Talleyrand,  who  held  that  Bonaparte  had  made  a 
mistake  in  selling  Louisiana  to  the  United  States,  and 
who  looked  upon  himself  as  having  no  responsibility 
for  the  transaction,  was  glad  to  restrict  what  he 
thought  the  evil  that  had  been  done.  Taking  the 
complaints  of  Spain  to  the  Emperor,  he  received  per 
mission  to  do  what  Spain  requested ;  and  during  the 
month  of  August  he  sent  from  the  Foreign  Office  a 
series  of  documents  that  disposed  for  the  time  of  any 
hopes  still  nourished  by  Jefferson's  diplomacy. 

These  three  papers  were  too  important  to  be  forgot 
ten.  French  diplomatic  writings  were  models  of  con 
cise,  impassive  clearness,  contrasting  with  the  diffuse 
and  argumentative,  if  not  disputatious,  style  which 
sometimes  characterized  American  and  Spanish  official 
correspondence.  These  three  short  letters  offered  ex 
amples  of  French  methods.  The  first  was  addressed 
to  General  Turreau  at  Washington,  and  concerned  the 
boundaries  of  Louisiana  toward  the  west : l  — 

"  If  the  Mississippi  and  the  Iberville  trace  with  pre 
cision  the  eastern  boundary  of  that  colony,  it  has  less 
precise  limits  to  the  westward.  No  river,  no  chain  of 
mountains,  separates  it  from  the  Spanish  possessions ; 
and  between  the  last  settlements  of  Louisiana  and  the 
first  of  those  in  the  Spanish  colonies  are  frequently  to  be 
found  intervals  so  great  as  to  make  a  line  of  demarcation 
difficult  to  agree  upon.  So  Spain  already  appears  to 
fear  that  the  United  States,  who  show  an  intention  of 

1  Talleyrand  to  Turreau  (No.  99),  20  Thermidor,  An  xii. 
(Aug.  8,  1804)  ;  Archives  des  Aff.  fitr.,  MSS. 


296        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.IS. 

forcing  back  the  western  limits  of  Louisiana,  may  propose 
to  advance  in  this  direction  to  the  ocean,  and  establish 
themselves  on  that  part  of  the  American  coast  which  lies 
north  of  California." 

Turreau  was  directed  to  divert  the  United  States 
government  from  the  idea  of  extension  toward  the 
west  and  northwest  in  any  manner  that  might  annoy 
Spain.  He  was  to  employ  means  of  persuasion  and 
friendly  influence  for  this  purpose,  rather  than  to  act 
officially ;  all  official  action  being  reserved  for  objects 
directly  interesting  France. 

The  second  document1  was  also  addressed  to  Tur 
reau,  but  was  more  decided  in  tone,  as  though  the 
Emperor  himself  had  dictated  its  language.  After 
a  brief  allusion  to  Pinckney's  claims  convention  and 
the  American  theory  that  Spain  was  responsible  for 
French  spoliations  which  she  had  not  prevented, 
Talleyrand  continued :  — 

"  That  convention,  made  under  date  of  Aug.  11,  1802, 
is  posterior  by  —  months  to  that  which  France  concluded 
with  the  United  States,  the  8th  Vendemiaire,  An  ix.  (30 
Sept.  1800),  and  which  declared  that  no  indemnity  should 
be  given  for  prizes  made  by  either  of  the  two  Powers. 
This  Article  ought  to  leave  the  Americans  no  hope  that 
prizes  made  against  them  on  Spanish  shores  would  be 
excepted  and  paid  for ;  it  would  be  useless  for  them  to 
suppose  that  it  is  Spain  from  whom  they  seek  these  in 
demnities  :  Spain,  who  would  have  only  the  advances  to 

1  Talleyrand  to  Turreau  (No.  101),  27  Thermidor,  An  xii. 
(Aug.  15,  1804);  Archives  des  Aff.  £tr.,  MSS. 


1804.  MONROE  AND  TALLEYRAND.  297 

pay,  would  afterward  recur  to  France  for  reimbursement. 
It  is,  then,  upon  France  that  this  charge  would  ultimately 
fall ;  and  as  we  are  relieved  by  the  convention  of  Sept. 
30,  1800,  from  every  kind  of  debt  relating  to  prizes,  we 
can  only  with  some  surprise  see  the  United  States  seeking 
to  obtain  from  another  government  a  part  of  the  indem 
nities  which  they  had  decidedly  renounced  in  their  con 
vention  with  France.  Spain  had  doubtless  lost  sight  of 
these  considerations,  and  had  not  in  view  this  convention 
of  ours,  when  her  plenipotentiary  signed  that  of  Aug.  11, 
1802,  which  the  United  States  now  require  her  to  ratify. 
Circumstances  which  have  since  taken  place  have,  for 
tunately,  furnished  Spain  with  an  occasion  for  retracing 
the  false  step  she  took  in  signing  this  convention.  The 
Federal  government,  which  by  different  acts  relative  to 
the  Floridas  has  violated  the  sovereign  rights  of  Spain, 
and  which  for  more  than  eighteen  months  has  refused  to 
ratify  its  convention  with  her,  has  lost  the  right  to  com 
plain  because  the  Court  of  Madrid  now  imitates  its  re 
fusal,  and  insists  upon  making  such  modifications  in  this 
treaty  as  the  lapse  of  time  may  make  it  think  necessary 
and  better  suited  to  its  rights  and  dignity." 

After  sending  these  instructions  to  Turreau,  the 
French  Minister  for  Foreign  Relations  next  turned  to 
Spain,  and  wrote  a  note  intended  to  reassure  Cevallos. 
The  peculiar  interest  of  this  document  lay  in  the  spirit 
it  showed  toward  the  United  States.  Cevallos  had 
invited  an  understanding  as  to  the  boundaries  of  Loui 
siana  to  be  alleged  against  the  United  States.  These 
boundaries,  defined  eighteen  months  before  in  the 
secret  instructions  for  Victor,  a  copy  of  which  was 


298        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  13. 

given  to  Laussat,  declared  the  Rio  Bravo  to  be  the 
western  limit  of  Louisiana : l  "  Bounded  on  the  west 
by  the  river  called  Rio  Bravo,  from  the  mouth  of  this 
stream  up  to  the  30th  parallel,  beyond  this  point  the 
line  of  demarcation  ceases  to  be  traced,  and  it  seems 
that  there  has  never  been  an  agreement  as  to  this  part 
of  the  frontier."  That  Laussat  meant  to  act  on  these 
instructions  was  proved  by  his  language  to  Governor 
Claiborne  and  General  Wilkinson.2  "  M.  Laussat  con 
fidentially  signified  "  to  these  two  American  commis 
sioners  that  the  territory  "  did  not  comprehend  any 
part  of  West  Florida ;  adding  at  the  same  time  that 
it  extended  westwardly  to  the  Rio  Bravo,  otherwise 
called  Rio  del  Norte."  Although  Cevallos  had  re 
monstrated  against  the  indiscretion  of  this  statement, 
he  had  not  suggested  that  Laussat  was  in  error ; 3  he 
merely  invited  Talleyrand  to  check  a  subordinate 
officer,  in  order  to  limit  American  pretensions.  In 
accordance  with  this  hint,  Talleyrand  marked  for  the 
Spanish  government  the  line  it  was  to  take  in  resist 
ing  the  American  claim  to  territory  for  which  France 
had  received  the  purchase  money. 

After  defining  the  eastern  boundary  of  Florida  as 

1  Instructions  secretes  pour  le  Capitaine-General  de  la  Loui- 
eiane,  approuvees  par  le   Premier  Consul  le  5  Frimaire,  An  xi. 
(Nov.  26,  1802),  Archives  de  la  Marine,  MSS. 

2  Madison   to   Livingston,    March    31,    1804;    State    Papers, 
ii.  575. 

*  Cf.  Memoir  upon  the  Negotiations  between  Spain  and  the 
United  States  of  America.  By  Don  Luis  de  Onia-  Madrid,  1820 
Washington,  1821;  pp.  146,  I-TJ. 


1804.  MONROE  AND  TALLEYRAND.  299 

fixed  by  treaty  at  the  Iberville  and  the  Mississippi 
rivers,  the  French  minister  instructed  the  Spanish 
government  as  follows  : 1  — 

"  The  western  limit  of  Louisiana  not  having  been  fixed 
in  a  manner  equally  precise  by  the  treaties  which  pre 
ceded  that  of  March  21,  1801,  nor  by  that  treaty  itself, 
the  uncertainty  which  prevailed  in  regard  to  the  direction 
of  its  frontiers  has  necessarily  continued  since  the  cession 
made  to  the  United  States.  France  could  not  even  take 
upon  herself  to  indicate  to  the  United  States  what  ought 
to  be  that  precise  limit,  for  fear  of  wounding  on  this 
point  the  pretensions  of  one  or  the  other  Power  directly 
interested  in  this  question.  It  would  have  become  the 
object  of  negotiation  between  his  Imperial  and  his  Cath 
olic  Majesties.  To-day  it  can  be  treated  only  between 
Spain  and  the  United  States.  Nevertheless,  as  the 
Americans  derive  their  rights  from  France,  I  have  been 
enabled  to  express  to  his  Imperial  Majesty's  minister 
plenipotentiary  near  the  United  States  the  chief  bases  on 
which  the  Emperor  would  have  planted  himself  in  the 
demand  for  a  demarcation  of  boundaries.  Starting  from 
the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  we  should  have  sought  to  distin 
guish  between  settlements  that  belong  to  the  kingdom 
of  Mexico,  and  settlements  that  had  been  formed  by  the 
French  or  by  those  who  succeeded  them  in  this  colony. 
This  distinction  between  settlements  formed  by  the 
French  or  by  the  Spaniards  would  have  been  made  equally 
in  ascending  northwards.  All  those  which  are  of  French 
foundation  would  have  belonged  to  Louisiana  ;  and  since 
European  settlements  in  the  interior  are  rare  and  scat- 

1  Talleyrand  to  Gravina,  12  Fructidor,  An  xii.  (Aug.  30, 
1804);  Archives  des  AS.  E~tr.,  MSS. 


300        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  13. 

tered,  we  might  have  imagined  direct  lines  drawn  from 
one  to  the  other  to  connect  them  ;  and  it  is  to  the  west 
of  this  imaginary  line  that  the  boundary  between  Loui 
siana  and  the  Spanish  possessions  would  have  been 
traced  at  such  distance  and  in  such  direction  as  France 
and  Spain  should  have  agreed.  The  great  spaces  which 
sometimes  exist  between  the  last  French  settlements  and 
the  last  Spanish  missions  might  have  left  still  some 
doubts  on  the  direction  of  the  boundary  to  be  traced  be 
tween  them,  but  with  the  views  of  friendship  and  concili 
ation  which  animate  their  Majesties,  these  difficulties 
would  have  been  soon  smoothed  away." 

Such  were,  according  to  Talleyrand,  the  concilia 
tory  intentions  which  should  have  animated  his  Im 
perial  Majesty.  They  were  widely  different  from  the 
positive  instructions  formally  approved  by  the  First 
Consul  Nov.  26,  1802,  which  ordered  Victor  and 
Laussat  to  consider  the  Rio  Bravo  as  the  boundary 
of  their  command.  The  difference  was  the  whole 
province  of  Texas. 

On  another  point  Talleyrand  reassured  the  Spanish 
government. 

"  In  any  case,"  said  he,  "  the  Court  of  Madrid  would 
appear  to  have  no  ground  for  the  fear  it  shows  that  the 
United  States  may  make  use  of  their  possession  of  Loui 
siana  in  order  to  form  settlements  on  the  northwest  coast 
of  America.  Whatever  boundary  may  be  agreed  upon 
between  Spain  and  the  United  States,  the  line  will  neces 
sarily  be  so  far  removed  from  the  western  coast  of 
America  as  to  relieve  the  Court  of  Madrid  from  any 
anxiety  on  that  score." 


1804.  MONROE  AND  TALLEYRAND.  301 

Yet  no  one  knew  better  than  Talleyrand  the  in 
stincts  of  the  American  people,  and  their  ambition 
to  use  the  entire  continent  for  their  experiments ! 
He  knew  that  the  First  Consul,  by  his  instructions 
to  Laussat,  had  given,  so  far  as  he  could,  the  author 
ity  of  both  French  and  Spanish  governments  to  the 
claim  of  the  United  States  that  Louisiana  stretched 
westwardly  to  the  Rio  Bravo,  and  on  the  northwest 
indefinitely  to  a  line  yet  to  be  fixed.  He  knew  that 
Laussat,  who  hated  the  Spaniards  more  than  he  did 
the  Americans,  had  betrayed  the  secret.  If  Talleyrand 
hoped  to  repress  American  ambition,  he  must  have 
calculated  on  the  effects  of  force  or  fear,  or  he  must 
have  been  overwhelmed  by  the  immensity  of  the  scale 
on  which  the  Americans  were  acting.  The  doctrine 
of  contiguity,  on  which  the  United  States  could  rest 
their  most  plausible  claim  to  Oregon,  was  as  valid 
then  as  it  ever  afterward  became  ;  and  if  Talleyrand 
did  not  appreciate  it,  Godoy  proved  himself  the  more 
sagacious  statesman. 

By  Sept.  1,  1804,  these  precautionary  measures 
were  completed,  and  Talleyrand  could  wait  for  the 
coming  of  Monroe  and  Armstrong.  About  the  mid 
dle  of  October  Monroe  appeared  in  Paris.  His  in 
structions,  sent  from  Washington  before  the  news 
of  Pinckney's  extravagances  had  reached  America, 
obliged  him  to  insist  upon  the  right  to  West  Florida 
as  "  a  sine  qud  non,  and  no  price  to  be  given  for  it ; " 1 
to  insist,  also,  upon  the  right  to  Texas,  but  with  a 
1  Jefferson  to  Madison,  July  5,  1804  ;  Works,  iv.  650. 


302        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  13. 

border-land  to  be  kept  unsettled  for  thirty  years  ;  and 
to  offer  two  million  dollars  for  East  Florida  beyond 
the  Perdido.  The  Cabinet  then  for  the  first  time 
decided  to  commit  itself  to  the  doctrine  that  "West 
Florida  was  a  part  of  the  Louisiana  purchase,1  alleg 
ing  as  its  ostensible  reason,  not  so  much  the  abstract 
justice  of  the  title,  as  the  wish  to  avoid  acknowledg 
ing  Spanish  land-grants  made  in  Florida  since  the 
Louisiana  cession. 

"  It  is  indispensable,"  wrote  Madison,  April  15,  1804, 
"that  the  United  States  be  not  precluded  from  such  a 
construction  [of  the  treaty], — first,  because  they  con 
sider  the  right  as  well  founded  ;  secondly  and  principally, 
because  it  is  known  that  a  great  proportion  of  the  most 
valuable  lands  between  the  Mississippi  and  the  Perdido 
have  been  granted  by  Spanish  officers  since  the  cession 
was  made  by  Spain.  These  illicit  speculations  cannot 
otherwise  be  frustrated  than  by  considering  the  territory 
as  included  in  the  cession  made  by  Spain." 

The  hope  that  Spain  might  submit  to  these  conces 
sions  rested  on  the  belief  that  she  could  not  afford 
to  quarrel  with  the  United  States.  Foreseeing  that 
she  must  soon  be  drawn  into  the  war  with  England, 
the  President  from  the  first  looked  forward  to  that 
event,  believing  that  the  same  reasons  which  as  he 
supposed  had  forced  Bonaparte  to  cede  Louisiana, 
must  reconcile  Spain  to  the  cession  of  Florida. 

1  Madison  to  Monroe,  April  15,  1804  ;  State  Papers,  ii.  627. 
Madison  to  Monroe  and  Pinckney,  July  8,  1804  ;  State  Papers,  ii. 
630. 


1804.  MONROE  AND  TALLEYRAND.  303 

"  Should  she  be  engaged  in  the  war,"  wrote  Madison 
to  Monroe,  "  or  manifestly  threatened  with  that  situation, 
she  cannot  fail  to  be  the  more  anxious  for  a  solid  accom 
modation  on  all  points  with  the  United  States,  and  the 
more  willing  to  yield,  for  that  purpose,  to  terms  which, 
however  proper  in  themselves,  might  otherwise  be  re 
jected  by  her  pride  and  misapplied  jealousy." 

The  first  part  of  this  calculation  was  realized  even 
before  Monroe  quitted  London.  Oct.  1,  1804,  a  Brit 
ish  squadron  seized  the  Spanish  treasure-ships  on 
their  voyage  from  America ;  and  no  one  doubted  that 
Spain  must  declare  war.  She  did  so  a  few  weeks 
later,  December  12,  before  Monroe  reached  Madrid. 
The  effect  of  this  new  disaster  on  what  Madison 
called  her  "  misapplied  jealousy "  remained  to  be 
seen. 

The  only  published  record  of  Monroe's  stay  in  Paris 
is  contained  in  a  note  dated  Nov.  8,  1804,  which 
he  persuaded  Livingston  to  convey  to  Talleyrand. 
Although  Livingston's  temper  was  peculiar,  and  his 
diplomacy  under  ordinary  circumstances  restless, 
he  was  well  acquainted  with  the  men  who  governed 
France ;  and  he  had  little  faith  in  another  man's 
ability  to  do  what  he  had  himself  attempted  in  vain. 
That  Livingston  should  be  jealous  of  Monroe's  pres 
ence  in  Paris  was  natural ;  for  the  American  minister 
at  London  was  not  accredited  to  the  Emperor,  and 
his  interference  could  do  nothing  but  harm  to  the 
actual  minister  at  Paris.  When  asked  to  act  as 
medium  for  Monroe's  proposed  communications  with 


HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED  STATES.       CH.  13. 

Talleyrand,  Livingston  made  objections.  Not  until 
Armstrong  arrived,  about  November  1,  did  the  min 
isters  agree  upon  the  terms  of  the  note,  and  send  it 
to  its  address.  Monroe  had  then  been  one  month 
absent  from  London. 

Nothing  could  be  more  courteous  than  the  tone  of 
Monroe's  letter,  which  ignored  Pinckney's  conduct, 
and  breathed  a  spirit  of  benevolence.1  The  object  of 
writing  was  to  ask  the  Emperor's  good  offices  in  sup 
port  of  the  negotiation  to  be  opened  at  Madrid  ;  and 
in  order  to  reach  this  end,  Monroe  touched  on  the 
story  of  his  present  mission,  recounting  the  causes 
of  the  previous  quarrel  with  Spain,  and  alluding  to 
West  Florida,  the  spoliation  claims,  the  claims  for 
damages  rising  from  Morales's  occlusion  of  the  Mis 
sissippi,  and  to  the  Mobile  Act,  which,  as  Monroe 
admitted,  was  intended  to  authorize  the  taking  im 
mediate  possession  of  Florida.  The  only  offensive 
idea  suggested  in  the  note  was  that  the  Spanish 
occupation  of  Florida  implied  an  aggression  against 
the  United  States,  "  which  tends  to  provoke  hostility 
and  lead  to  war." 

The  note  combining  the  diplomacy  of  three  minis 
ters  was  sent;  and  the  three  diplomatists  waited  in 
fear  of  what  would  follow,  dreading  nothing  so  much 
as  Talleyrand's  answer.  They  had  reason  to  know 
that  it  would  be  unfavorable,  and  that  at  least  on 
the  question  of  West  Florida  Talleyrand  had  already 
committed  himself  against  the  United  States.  They 

1  Monroe  to  Talleyrand,  Nov.  8,  1804  ;  State  Papers,  ii.  634. 


1804.  MONROE  AND  TALLEYRAND.  305 

were  told,  too,  that  on  reading  their  note  Napoleon 
showed  great  irritation.  Besides  this,  they  had  other 
causes  of  alarm.  Within  three  days  after  Monroe's 
arrival  at  Paris,  Marbois,  his  best  friend  among  Napo 
leon's  ministers,  told  him  that  the  question  was  one 
of  money  : l  "  Such  was  the  situation  of  Spain  at  this 
time,  that  he  was  persuaded  if  we  would  make  her 
suitable  pecuniary  accommodations  we  might  succeed." 
M.  Hauterive,  another  gentleman  within  the  circle  of 
government,  soon  afterward  repeated  the  remark : 
"  Spain  must  cede  territory  ;  the  United  States  must 
pay  money."  Care  was  taken  to  let  Monroe  under 
stand  that  once  this  principle  should  be  agreed  upon, 
France  would  cause  the  negotiation  to  be  transferred  to 
Paris.  Armstrong  soon  afterward  wrote  to  Madison, 
alluding  to  the  story  in  regard  to  the  Emperor : 2  — 

"  This  country  has  determined  to  convert  the  negotia 
tion  into  a  job,  and  to  draw  from  it  advantages  merely 
pecuniary  to  herself,  or,  in  other  language,  to  her  agents. 
It  is  this  venality  that  explains  her  present  reserve,  the 
degree  of  excitement  displayed  by  the  Emperor  on  read 
ing  the  note,  and  the  marked  incivility  with  which  Mr. 
Monroe  was  treated  by  Talleyrand.  Since  his  departure, 
repeated  intimations  have  been  given  to  me  that  if  certain 
persons  could  be  sufficiently  gratified,  the  negotiation 
should  be  transferred  hither,  and  brought  to  a  close  with 
which  we  should  have  no  reason  to  find  fault." 

1  Monroe  to  Madison,  Dec.  16,  1804;  MSS.  State  Department 
Archives. 

2  Armstrong  to  Madison,  Dec.  24,  1804  ;  MSS.  State  Depart 
ment  Archives. 

VOL.  ii.  — 20 


806        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  13. 

Monroe,  though  honest  as  any  man  in  public  life, 
and  more  courageous  in  great  emergencies  than  some 
of  his  friends  or  rivals,  was  commonly  not  quick  at 
catching  an  idea,  nor  did  he  see  it  at  last  from  a 
great  elevation  ;  but  in  this  instance  the  idea  was 
thrust  so  persistently  into  his  face,  that  had  he  been 
blind  he  could  not  have  missed  it.  Nothing  could 
more  clearly  explain  his  situation  than  the  language 
of  the  diary  in  which  he  recorded,  for  the  President's 
benefit,  the  daily  course  of  his  conduct. 

"  No  other  alternative,"  he  explained,1  "presented 
itself  to  me  than  to  abandon  the  object  and  return  to 
London,  or  to  submit  to  the  terms  which  it  was  suffi 
ciently  well  understood  France  was  willing  to  accept,  and 
seemed  in  some  measure  to  dictate,  which  amounted  to 
this :  that  we  should  create  a  new  loan  of  about  seventy 
millions  of  livres,  and  transfer  the  same  to  Spain,  who 
would  immediately  pass  them  over  to  France,  in  consid 
eration  of  which  we  should  be  put  in  possession  of  the 
disputed  territory,  under  stipulations  which  should  pro 
vide  for  the  adjustment  of  the  ultimate  right  there,  and 
reimbursement  of  the  money  by  instalment  in  seven 
years." 

"  To  submit  to  the  terms  proposed  was  altogether 
out  of  the  question,"  continued  Monroe.  Having  led 
his  Government  to  take  the  ground  that  West  Florida 
had  already  been  bought,  he  could  not  enter  into  a 
negotiation  to  buy  it  a  second  time.  His  instructions 

1  Diary  at  Aranjuez,  April  22,  1805 ;  MSS.  State  Department 
Archives. 


1304.  MONROE  AND  TALLEYRAND.  307 

made  this  point  a  sine  qud  non  of  negotiation.  Re 
cognizing  that  under  these  circumstances  further 
effort  was  useless,  or  in  his  own  words  that  no  other 
alternative  presented  itself  but  to  abandon  the  object 
and  return  to  London,  Monroe  intimated  to  Talley 
rand  that  he  meant  not  only  to  pay  no  money,  but 
also  to  negotiate  in  spite  of  Napoleon ;  and  started 
for  Madrid. 

"I  did  not  hesitate,"  he  wrote  home,1  "  in  many  in 
formal  communications,  the  substance  of  which  I  was 
persuaded  were  made  known  to  those  in  power,  to  declare 
most  solemnly  that  I  would  sanction  no  measure  which 
contemplated  a  payment  of  money  to  Spain  in  any  tran 
saction  we  might  have  with  her  in  the  affair,  —  by  which 
was  meant,  by  creation  of  stock  or  otherwise  which  took 
the  money  from  our  people ;  that  neither  the  state  of 
things  between  the  parties,  the  example  of  France  in 
a  similar  case,  or  my  instructions,  permitted  it.  These 
conversations  were  with  a  person  who  possessed  the 
confidence  of  certain  persons  in  power,  as  well  as  my 
own,  though  they  were  not  of  a  nature  to  compromit 
either  party.  That  circumstance  enabled  me  to  speak 
with  the  utmost  freedom,  and  perhaps  to  say  things 
which  it  might  have  been  difficult  to  press  directly  in  the 
same  manner  to  the  parties  themselves." 

In  thus  defying  France,  Monroe,  if  he  resembled 
European  diplomatists,  must  have  aimed  at  giving 
his  Government  an  opportunity  to  break  with  the 
Emperor  and  to  proceed  against  Florida  by  means 

1  Monroe  to  Madison,  Dec.  16,  1804;  MSS.  State  Department 
Archives. 


308        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  13. 

of  force.  That  he  should  have  still  hoped  for  sue 
cess  in  negotiating  at  Madrid  was  hardly  possible. 
Armstrong  thought  his  chance  desperate.1 

"  Mr.  Monroe  has  no  doubt  communicated  to  you," 
he  wrote  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  "  the  motives  which 
induced  him  to  leave  England  in  prosecution  of  his 
mission  to  Spain,  and  while  here  to  attempt  to  draw 
from  this  Government  some  new  declaration  in  support 
of  our  construction  of  the  late  treaty.  With  this  view  a 
note  was  prepared  and  transmitted  through  Livingston, 
the  receipt  of  which  was  acknowledged  by  Mr.  Talleyrand 
with  a  promise  that  '  an  answer  should  be  given  to  it  as 
soon  as  the  Emperor  should  have  signified  his  will  on  the 
subject.'  Having  waited  nearly  a  month,  and  no  answer 
being  given,  having  some  reason  to  believe  that  any  de 
claration  from  this  Court  now  would  be  less  favorable 
than  those  already  made,  and  fearful  lest  something 
might  be  lost  at  Madrid,  while  nothing  could  be  gained 
here,  he  set  out  on  the  8th  instant  for  Spain.  I  have 
but  little  hope,  however,  that  he  will  be  able  to  do  more 
than  fulfil  the  forms  of  his  mission." 

Armstrong  preferred,  as  he  expressed  it,  "  an  effort 
(which  cannot  fail)  to  do  the  business  at  home." 
He  had  already  discovered  that  the  Emperor  was 
personally  irritated  with  the  Americans,  that  he  took 
no  pains  to  conceal  it,  and  that  this  irritation  was  a 
cause  of  his  reserve. 

"  I  have  employed  every  means  in  my  power  to  ascer 
tain  the  cause  of  this  cause,  and  have  learned  from  a 

1  Armstrong  to  Madison,  Dec.  24,  1804  ;  MSS.  State  Depart 
ment  Archives. 


1804.  MONROE   AND   TALLEYRAND.  309 

person  sufficiently  near  him  to  know  the  fact,  that  this 
temper  originated  in  representations  made  by  Leclerc 
and  others  from  St.  Domingo ;  that  it  has  since  been 
kept  alive  by  the  incident  of  the  war  in  that  country,  the 
trade  carried  on  between  it  and  the  United  States,  the 
freedom  with  which  he  is  treated  in  our  press,  the  matri 
monial  connection  of  Jerome,  and,  above  all,  the  support 
which  principles  he  wishes  to  extinguish  in  France  receive 
from  the  progressing  prosperity  of  the  United  States." 

"With  Napoleon  in  this  frame  of  mind  ;  with  Godoy 
and  Cevallos  in  a  humor  far  worse ;  and  with  Talley 
rand  in  such  a  temper  as  not  to  allow  of  his  treating 
Monroe  with  civility,  —  the  American  plenipotentiary 
departed  to  Madrid,  hoping  that  something  might 
occur  to  overcome  his  difficulties.  During  his  jour 
ney,  Charles  IV.  declared  war  against  England.  This 
long-foreseen  event,  which  should  have  brought  Spain 
to  terms  with  the  United  States,  in  fact  threw  her 
only  at  the  feet  of  Napoleon.  Henceforward  every 
offence  to  Spain  was  an  offence  to  France,  which  the 
Emperor  was  the  more  bound  to  resent  because  by 
treaty  he  must  regard  a  war  upon  Charles  IV.  as  a 
war  upon  himself. 

Talleyrand  was  not  vindictive,  but  he  had  been 
twice  mortified  by  the  failure  of  his  policy  toward 
America.  If  his  callous  cheek  could  burn,  it  was 
still  red  with  the  blow  which  the  last  President  of 
the  United  States  had  struck  it ;  and  no  waters  of 
oblivion  could  drown  in  his  memory  the  cry  of  dis 
tress  with  which  he  had  then  begged  for  mercy.  He 


310        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  13. 

had  been  again  overthrown  by  the  present  President, 
and  obliged  to  sell  Louisiana,  turn  his  back  on  the 
traditions  of  France,  and  shut  up  his  far-reaching 
mind  within  the  limit  of  his  master's  artillery  politics. 
Day  by  day  he  saw  more  clearly  that  soldiership,  and 
not  statecraft,  was  to  guide  the  destinies  of  France, 
and  that  the  new  regime  was  but  revolution  without 
ideas.  He  had  probably  begun  already  to  feel  that 
the  presence  of  his  coldly  silent  face  was  becoming 
irksome  to  a  will  which  revolted  at  the  memory  of 
a  remonstrance.  Talleyrand  was  corrupt,  —  perhaps 
he  thought  himself  more  corrupt  than  he  was  ;  but 
his  political  instincts  were  sounder  than  his  private 
morality.  He  was  incarnate  conservatism ;  but  he 
was  wider-minded  and  more  elevated  in  purpose  than 
Napoleon.  He  had  no  faith  in  Napoleon's  methods, 
and  was  particularly  hostile  to  his  projects  against 
Spain ;  but  in  respect  to  Monroe  and  his  mission, 
Talleyrand's  ideas  coincided  with  those  of  the  Em 
peror  ;  and  when  two  such  men  marked  out  a  victim, 
his  chance  of  escape  was  small. 

Talleyrand  was  not  to  blame  that  Monroe's  note  re 
mained  unanswered  before  Monroe  left  Paris.  About 
ten  days  after  receiving  it  Talleyrand  made  to  the 
Emperor  a  report  on  the  subject,  so  cool  and  clear  as 
to  read  like  a  mathematical  demonstration.1 

"  The  United  States,"  he  began,  "  who  wish  to  nego 
tiate  at  Madrid  under  the  auspices  of  France  for  the  ac- 

1  Rapport  a  1'Empereur,  28  Brumaire,  An  xii.  (Nov.  19,  1804); 
Archives  des  Aff.  Etr.,  MSS. 


1804.  MONROE  AND  TALLEYRAND.  311 

quisition  of  Florida,  have  acquired  little  title  to  the  good 
offices  of  the  Emperor  by  the  sharpness  of  tone  and  the 
want  of  civility  (egards}  with  which  they  have  conducted 
themselves  toward  Spain." 

After  enumerating  the  threats  and  aggressions  of 
the  United  States  government  against  Spain  during 
the  last  three  years,  the  report  disposed  of  the  Ameri 
can  claims,  one  by  one,  in  few  words.  First,  the 
spoliations,  which  had  been  formally  abandoned  by 
treaty ;  second,  the  claim  for  losses  rising  from  the 
interruption  of  entrepot  at  New  Orleans,  which  "  should 
be  terminated  by  the  treaty  of  cession,  —  the  acqui 
sition  of  an  immense  country  might  throw  out  of 
view  some  anterior  losses ; "  finally,  the  claim  to  West 
Florida,  —  a  species  of  attack  on  the  Emperor's  dig 
nity  and  good  faith  which  merited  some  expression 
of  his  displeasure.  To  support  this  view,  Talleyrand 
related  the  history  of  the  French  negotiation  for  West 
Florida  and  its  failure,  commenting  on  the  manner  in 
which  the  Americans  had  fabricated  their  claim,  and 
coming  at  last  to  a  conclusion  studiously  moderate, 
and  evidently  in  harmony  with  the  views  of  Hauterive 
as  expressed  to  Monroe.  Talleyrand  rarely  wrote 
such  papers  with  his  own  hand ;  probably  they  were 
drawn  up  under  his  directions  by  Hauterive,  or  some 
other  subordinate  of  the  Office,  in  the  form  of  sug 
gestions  rather  than  advice. 

"According  to  such  evidence,  no  one  can  suppose  the 
United  States  to  be  convinced  of  the  justice  of  their 
rights  ;  and  we  are  warranted  in  thinking  that  the  Federal 


312        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  13. 

government,  as  a  result  of  confidence  in  its  own  strength, 
of  its  ambition,  and  its  ascendency  in  America,  raises 
pretensions  to  a  part  of  Florida  in  order  to  show  itself 
afterward  more  exacting  toward  Spain.  The  Emperor 
will  feel  that  justice  requires  him  not  to  recognize  such 
pretensions.  If  he  should  assist  by  his  good  offices  an  ar 
rangement  between  the  United  States  and  Spain,  he  would 
wish  good  faith  and  impartiality  for  its  base. 

Only  in  case  the  United  States  should  desist  from 
their  unjust  pretensions  to  West  Florida,  and  return 
to  the  forms  of  civility  and  decorum,  —  from  which  in 
their  relations  with  each  other  governments  should  never 
depart,  —  could  the  Emperor  allow  himself  to  second  at 
the  Court  of  Madrid  the  project  of  acquisition  of  the 
two  Floridas.  Then  perhaps  the  Emperor  might  think 
that  this  country  is  less  suited  to  Spain  now  that  it  is 
separated  from  her  other  colonies,  and  that  it  is  better 
suited  to  the  United  States  because  a  part  of  their 
Western  rivers  cross  the  Floridas  before  flowing  into 
the  Gulf  of  Mexico ;  and  finally,  that  Spain  may  see 
in  her  actual  situation,  and  in  the  expenses  entailed  on 
her  by  the  war,  some  motives  for  listening  to  the  offers 
of  the  Federal  government." 

Talleyrand  had  great  need  to  insist  on  "  the  forms 
of  civility  and  decorum  from  which  governments 
should  never  depart "  !  Perhaps  Talleyrand  already 
foresaw  the  scene,  said  to  have  occurred  some  two 
years  later,  when  Napoleon  violently  denounced  him 
to  his  face  as  "  a  silk  stocking  stuffed  with  filth," 
and  the  minister  coldly  retaliated  by  the  famous 
phrase,  "  Pity  that  so  great  a  man  should  be  so  ill 
brought  up ! "  The  task  of  teaching  manners  to 


1804.  MONROE  AND  TALLEYRAND.  313 

Jefferson  was  not  Napoleon's  view  of  his  own  func 
tions  in  the  world.  He  probably  gave  more  attention 
to  the  concluding  lines  of  the  report,  which  suggested 
that  he  should  decide  whether  a  Spanish  colony,  made 
worthless  by  an  arbitrary  act  of  his  own,  could  be 
usefully  employed  in  sustaining  his  wars. 

This  report,  dated  Nov.  19,  1804,  lay  some  weeks  in 
the  Emperor's  hands.  Monroe  left  Paris  for  Madrid 
December  8,  and  still  no  answer  had  been  sent  to  his 
note.  He  wrote  from  Bordeaux,  December  16,  a  long 
and  interesting  letter  to  Madison,  and  resumed  his 
journey.  He  could  hardly  have  crossed  the  Bidassoa 
when  Armstrong  received  from  Talleyrand,  Decem 
ber  21,  the  long-expected  answer,1  which  by  declaring 
the  claim  to  West  Florida  emphatically  unfounded 
struck  tne  ground  from  under  Monroe's  feet,  and  left 
him  to  repent  at  leisure  his  defiance  of  Talleyrand's 
advice.  Under  the  forms  of  perfect  courtesy,  this  let 
ter  contained  both  sarcasm  and  menace.  Talleyrand 
expressed  curiosity  to  learn  the  result  of  Monroe's 
negotiation :  — 

"  This  result  his  Imperial  Majesty  will  learn  with  real 
interest.  He  saw  with  pain  the  United  States  commence 
their  difficulties  with  Spain  in  an  unusual  manner,  and 
conduct  themselves  toward  the  Floridas  by  acts  of  vio 
lence  which,  not  being  founded  in  right,  could  have  no 
other  effect  but  to  injure  the  lawful  owner.  Such  an  ag 
gression  gave  the  more  surprise  to  his  Majesty  because 

1  Talleyrand  to  Armstrong,  Dec.  21,  1804 ;  State  Papers, 
ii.  635. 


314        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  13. 

the  United  States  seemed  in  this  measure  to  avail  them 
selves  of  their  treaty  with  France  as  an  authority  for 
their  proceedings,  and  because  he  could  scarcely  recon 
cile  with  the  just  opinion  which  he  entertains  of  the 
wisdom  and  fidelity  of  the  Federal  government  a  course 
of  proceedings  which  nothing  can  authorize  toward  a 
Power  which  has  long  occupied,  and  still  occupies,  one 
of  the  first  ranks  in  Europe." 

Madison  and  Monroe,  as  well  as  Jefferson,  in  the 
course  of  their  diplomacy  had  many  mortifications  to 
suffer  ;  but  they  rarely  received  a  reprimand  more 
keen  than  this.  Yet  its  sharpness  was  so  delicately 
covered  by  the  habitual  forms  of  Talleyrand's  diplo 
macy  that  Americans,  who  were  accustomed  to  hear 
and  to  use  strong  language,  hardly  felt  the  wound 
it  was  intended  to  inflict.  After  hearing  Yrujo  de 
nounce  an  act  of  their  government  as  an  "  atrocious 
libel,"  they  were  not  shocked  to  hear  Talleyrand 
denounce  the  same  act  as  one  of  violence  which 
nothing  could  authorize.  The  force  of  Talleyrand's 
language  was  more  apparent  to  Godoy  than  to  Madi 
son,  for  it  bore  out  every  expression  of  Yrujo  and 
Cevallos.  The  Prince  of  Peace  received  a  copy  of 
Talleyrand's  note  at  the  moment  when  Monroe,  af 
ter  almost  a  month  of  weary  winter  travel,  joined 
Pinckney,  who  had  for  six  months  been  employed 
only  in  writing  letter  after  letter  begging  for  succor 
and  support.  Don  Pedro  Cevallos,  with  this  public 
pledge  in  his  hand,  and  with  secret  French  pledges 
covering  every  point  of  the  negotiation  in  his  desk, 


1804.  MONROE  AND  TALLEYRAND.  315 

could  afford  to  meet  with  good  humor  the  first  visit 
of  the  new  American  plenipotentiary. 

Pinckney's  humiliation  was  extreme.  After  break 
ing  off  relations  with  Cevallos  and  pledging  himself 
to  demand  his  passports  and  to  leave  Spain,  he  had 
been  reduced  to  admit  that  his  Government  disa 
vowed  him  ;  and  not  only  was  he  obliged  to  remain 
at  Madrid,  but  also  to  sue  for  permission  to  resume 
relations  with  Cevallos.  The  Spanish  government 
good-naturedly  and  somewhat  contemptuously  per 
mitted  him  to  do  so ;  and  he  was  only  distressed  by 
the  fear  that  Monroe  might  refuse  to  let  him  take 
part  in  the  new  negotiation,  for  he  was  with  reason 
confident  that  Monroe  would  be  obliged  to  follow  in 
his  own  footsteps,  —  that  the  United  States  could 
save  its  dignity  and  influence  only  by  war. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  new  year,  Jan.  2,  1805, 
Monroe  entered  Madrid  to  snatch  Florida  from  the 
grasp  of  Spain  and  France.  The  negotiation  fell 
chiefly  within  Jefferson's  second  term,  upon  which 
it  had  serious  results.  But  while  Monroe,  busy  at 
Madrid  with  a  quarrel  which  could  lead  only  to  disap 
pointment  or  war,  thus  left  the  legation  at  London 
for  eight  months  to  take  care  of  itself,  events  were 
occurring  which  warned  President  Jefferson  that  the 
supreme  test  of  his  principles  was  near  at  hand, 
and  that  a  storm  was  threatening  from  the  shores  of 
Great  Britain  compared  with  which  all  other  dangers 
were  trivial. 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

FOB  eighteen  years  after  1783  William  Pitt  guided 
England  through  peace  and  war  with  authority  almost 
as  absolute  as  that  of  Don  Carlos  IV.  or  Napoleon 
himself.  From  him  and  from  his  country  President 
Jefferson  had  much  to  fear  and  nothing  to  gain  beyond 
a  continuance  of  the  good  relations  which  President 
Washington,  with  extreme  difficulty,  had  succeeded 
in  establishing  between  the  two  peoples.  So  far  as 
England  was  concerned,  this  understanding  had  been 
the  work  of  Pitt  and  Lord  Grenville,  who  rather 
imposed  it  on  their  party  than  accepted  it  as  the 
result  of  any  public  will.  The  extreme  perils  in  which 
England  then  stood  inspired  caution ;  and  of  this  cau 
tion  the  treaty  of  1794  was  one  happy  result.  So 
long  as  the  British  government  remained  in  a  cau 
tious  spirit,  America  was  safe ;  but  should  Pitt  or  his 
successors  throw  off  the  self-imposed  restraints  on 
England's  power,  America  could  at  the  utmost,  even 
by  a  successful  war,  gain  nothing  materially  better 
than  a  return  to  the  arrangements  of  1794. 

The  War  of  Independence,  which  ended  in  the 
definitive  treaty  of  1783,  naturally  left  the  English 
people  in  a  state  of  irritation  and  disgust  toward 


1783-1800.        RELATIONS  WITH  ENGLAND.  317 

America ;  and  the  long  interregnum  of  the  Confedera 
tion,  from  1783  to  1789,  allowed  this  disgust  to  ripen 
into  contempt.  When  at  length  the  Constitution  of 
1789  restored  order  in  the  American  chaos,  England 
felt  little  faith  in  the  success  of  the  experiment.  She 
waited  for  time  to  throw  light  on  her  interests. 

This  delay  was  natural ;  for  American  independence 
had  shattered  into  fragments  the  commercial  system 
of  Great  Britain,  and  powerful  interests  were  combined 
to  resist  further  concession.  Before  1776  the  colonies 
of  England  stretched  from  the  St.  Lawrence  to  the 
Mississippi,  and  across  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  to  the  coast 
of  South  America,  mutually  supporting  and  strength 
ening  each  other.  Jamaica  and  the  other  British 
islands  of  the  West  Indies  drew  their  most  necessary 
supplies  from  the  Delaware  and  the  Hudson.  Boston 
and  New  York  were  in  some  respects  more  important 
to  them  than  London  itself.  The  timber,  live-stock, 
and  provisions  which  came  from  the  neighboring  con 
tinent  were  essential  to  the  existence  of  the  West  In 
dian  planters  and  negroes.  When  war  cut  off  these 
supplies,  famine  and  pestilence  followed.  After  the 
peace  of  1783  even  the  most  conservative  English 
statesmen  were  obliged  to  admit  that  the  strictness  of 
their  old  colonial  system  could  not  be  maintained,  and 
that  the  United  States,  though  independent,  must  be 
admitted  to  some  of  the  privileges  of  a  British  colony. 
The  government  unwillingly  conceded  what  could  not 
be  refused,  and  the  West  Indian  colonists  compelled 
Parliament  to  relax  the  colonial  svstem  so  far  as  to 


318        HISTORY  OF  THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  H. 

allow  a  restricted  intercourse  between  their  islands 
and  the  ports  of  the  United  States.  The  relaxation 
was  not  a  favor  to  the  United  States,  —  it  was  a  con 
dition  of  existence  to  the  West  Indies  ;  not  a  boon, 
but  a  right  which  the  colonists  claimed  and  an  Act  of 
Parliament  defined.1 

The  right  was  dearly  paid  for.  The  islands  might 
buy  American  timber  and  grain,  but  they  were  allowed 
to  make  return  only  in  molasses  and  rum.  Payment 
in  sugar  would  have  been  cheaper  for  the  colonists, 
and  the  planters  wished  for  nothing  more  earnestly 
than  to  be  allowed  this  privilege ;  but  as  often  as  they 
raised  the  prayer,  English  shipowners  cried  that  the 
navigation  laws  were  in  peril,  and  a  chorus  of  familiar 
phrases  filled  the  air,  all  carrying  a  deep  meaning  to 
the  English  people.  "  Nursery  of  seamen "  was  one 
favorite  expression ;  "  Neutral  frauds "  another  ;  and 
all  agreed  in  assuming  that  at  whatever  cost,  and  by 
means  however  extravagant,  the  navy  must  be  fed 
and  strengthened.  Under  the  cover  of  supporting  the 
navy  any  absurdity  could  be  defended ;  and  in  the 
case  of  the  West  Indian  trade,  the  British  shipowner 
enjoyed  the  right  to  absurdities  sanctioned  by  a  cen 
tury  and  a  half  of  law  and  custom.  The  freight  on 
British  sugars  belonged  of  right  to  British  shippers, 
who  could  not  be  expected  to  surrender  of  their  own 
accord,  in  obedience  to  any  laws  of  political  economy, 
a  property  which  was  the  source  of  their  incomes. 
The  colonists  asked  permission  to  refine  their  own 
1  28  George  III.  c.  6. 


1783-1800.        RELATIONS  WITH   ENGLAND.  319 

sugar ;  but  their  request  not  only  roused  strong  oppo 
sition  from  the  shipowners  who  wanted  the  bulkier 
freight,  but  started  the  home  sugar-refiners  to  their 
feet,  who  proved  by  Acts  of  Parliament  that  sugar- 
refining  was  a  British  and  not  a  colonial  right.  The 
colonist  then  begged  a  reduction  of  the  heavy  duty  on 
sugar;  but  English  country  gentlemen  cried  against 
a  measure  which  might  lead  to  an  increase  of  the 
income-tax  or  the  imposition  of  some  new  burden  on 
agriculture.  In  this  dilemma  the  colonists  frankly 
said  that  only  their  weakness,  not  their  will,  prevented 
them  from  declaring  themselves  independent,  like  their 
neighbors  at  Charleston  and  Philadelphia. 

Even  when  the  qualified  right  of  trade  was  conceded, 
the  colonists  were  not  satisfied ;  and  the  concession 
itself  laid  the  foundation  of  more  serious  changes. 
From  the  moment  that  American  produce  was  admitted 
to  be  a  necessity  for  the  colonists,  it  was  clear  that 
the  Americans  must  be  allowed  a  voice  in  the  British 
system.  Discussion  whether  the  Americans  had  or 
had  not  a  right  to  the  colonial  trade  was  already  a 
long  step  toward  revolution.  One  British  minister 
after  another  resented  the  idea  that  the  Americans 
had  any  rights  in  the  matter ;  yet  when  they  came 
to  practical  arrangements  the  British  statesmen  were 
obliged  to  concede  that  they  were  mistaken.  From 
the  necessity  of  the  case,  the  Americans  had  rights 
which  never  could  be  successfully  denied.  Parliament 
struggled  to  prevent  the  rebel  Americans  from  sharing 
in  the  advantages  of  the  colonial  system  from  which 


320        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  14. 

they  had  rebelled ;  but  unreasonable  as  it  was  that 
the  United  States  should  be  rewarded  for  rebellion  by 
retaining  the  privileges  of  subjects,  this  was  the  inevi 
table  result.  Geography  and  Nature  were  stronger 
than  Parliament  and  the  British  navy. 

At  first  Pitt  hoped  that  the  concession  to  the  colo 
nists  might  entail  no  concession  to  the  United  States ; 
while  admitting  a  certain  hiatus  in  the  colonial  sys 
tem,  he  tried  to  maintain  the  navigation  laws  in  their 
integrity.  The  admission  of  American  produce  into 
the  West  Indies  was  no  doubt  an  infraction  of  the  pro 
tectionist  principle  on  which  all  the  civilized  world, 
except  America,  founded  its  economical  ideas ;  but  in 
itself  it  was  not  serious.  To  allow  the  flour,  potatoes, 
tobacco,  timber,  and  horses  of  the  American  conti 
nent  to  enter  the  harbors  of  Barbadoes  and  Jamaica ; 
to  allow  in  turn  the  molasses  and  rum  of  the  islands 
to  be  sent  directly  to  New  York  and  Boston,  —  harmed 
no  one,  and  was  advantageous  to  all  parties,  so  long 
as  British  ships  were  employed  to  carry  on  the  trade. 
At  first  this  was  the  case.  The  Act  of  Parliament 
allowed  only  British  subjects,  in  British-built  ships,  to 
enter  colonial  ports  with  American  produce.  Whether 
the  United  States  government  would  long  tolerate 
such  legislation  without  countervailing  measures  was 
a  question  which  remained  open  for  a  time,  while  the 
system  itself  had  a  chance  to  prove  its  own  weakness. 
The  British  shipping  did  not  answer  colonial  objects. 
Again  and  again  the  colonists  found  themselves  on 
the  verge  of  starvation ;  and  always  in  this  emer- 


1783-1800.         RELATIONS  WITH   ENGLAND.  321 

gency  the  colonial  governors  threw  open  their  ports  by 
proclamation  to  American  shipping,  while  with  equal 
regularity  Parliament  protected  the  governors  by  Acts 
of  Indemnity.  To  this  extent  the  navigation  system 
suffered  together  with  the  colonial  system,  but  in 
theory  it  was  intact.  Ministry,  Parliament,  and  people 
clung  to  the  navigation  laws  as  their  ark  of  safety ; 
and  even  the  colonists  conceded  that  although  they 
had  a  right  to  eat  American  wheat  and  potatoes, 
they  had  no  right  to  eat  those  which  came  to  them 
in  the  hold  of  a  Marblehead  schooner. 

Such  a  principle,  however  convenient  to  Great  Brit 
ain,  was  not  suited  to  the  interests  of  New  England 
shippers.  In  peace  their  chances  were  comparatively 
few,  and  the  chief  diplomatic  difficulties  between  Euro 
pean  governments  and  the  United  States  had  their 
source  in  the  American  attempt  to  obtain  legal  recog 
nition  of  trade  which  America  wished  to  maintain  with 
the  colonies  ;  but  in  war  the  situation  changed,  and 
more  serious  disputes  occurred.  Then  the  French  and 
Spanish  West  Indian  ports  were  necessarily  thrown 
open  to  neutral  commerce,  because  their  own  ships 
were  driven  from  the  ocean  by  the  superiority  of  the 
British  navy.  Besides  the  standing  controversy  about 
the  admission  of  American  produce  to  British  islands, 
the  British  government  found  itself  harassed  by  doubts 
to  what  extent  it  might  safely  admit  the  Americans 
into  the  French  or  Spanish  West  Indies,  and  allow 
them  to  carry  French  property,  as  though  their  flag 
were  competent  to  protect  whatever  was  under  it. 

VOL.  II.  —  21 


822        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  14. 

Granting  that  an  article  like  French  sugar  might  be 
carried  in  a  neutral  vessel,  there  were  still  other  arti 
cles,  called  contraband,  which  ought  not  to  be  made 
objects  of  neutral  commerce;  and  England 'was  obliged 
to  define  the  nature  of  contraband.  She  was  also 
forced  to  make  free  use  of  the  right  of  blockade. 
These  delicate  questions  were  embittered  by  another 
and  more  serious  quarrel.  The  European  belligerents 
claimed  the  right  to  the  military  service  of  their  sub 
jects,  and  there  was  no  doubt  that  their  right  was 
perfect.  In  pursuance  of  the  claim  they  insisted  upon 
taking  their  seamen  from  American  merchant-vessels 
wherever  met  on  the  high  seas.  So  far  as  France  was 
concerned,  the  annoyance  was  slight ;  but  the  identity 
of  race  made  the  practice  extremely  troublesome  as 
concerned  England. 

At  the  outbreak  of  the  French  wars,  Nov.  6, 1793, 
the  British  government  issued  instructions  directing 
all  British  armed  vessels  to  seize  every  neutral  ship 
they  should  meet,  loaded  with  the  produce  of  a  French 
colony  or  carrying  supplies  for  its  use.1  These  orders 
were  kept  secret  for  several  weeks,  until  the  whole 
American  commerce  with  the  Antilles,  and  all  Ameri 
can  ships  found  on  the  ocean,  laden  in  whole  or  in 
part  with  articles  of  French  colonial  produce  or  for 
French  colonial  use,  were  surprised  and  swept  into 
British  harbors,  where  they  were  condemned  by  British 
admiralty  courts,  on  the  ground  known  as  the  "  Rule 
of  the  War  of  1756,"  —  that  because  trade  between 

1  Additional  Instructions  of  Nov.  6,  1793;  State  Papers,  i.  430. 


1783-1800.         RELATIONS   WITH   ENGLAND.  323 

the  French  colonies  and  the  United  States  was  illegal 
in  peace,  it  was  illegal  in  war.  From  the  point  of 
view  in  which  European  Powers  regarded  their  colo 
nies,  much  could  be  said  in  support  of  this  rule. 
A  colony  was  almost  as  much  the  property  of  its 
home  government  as  a  dockyard  or  a  military  station. 
France  and  Spain  could  hardly  complain  if  England 
chose  to  treat  the  commerce  of  such  government- 
stations  as  contraband  ;  but  a  rule  which  might  per 
haps  be  applied  by  European  governments  to  each 
other  worked  with  great  injustice  when  applied  to 
the  United  States,  who  had  no  colonies,  and  made  no 
attempt  to  build  up  a  navy  or  support  an  army  by 
such  means.  Taken  in  its  broadest  sense,  the  Euro 
pean  colonial  system  might  be  defined  by  the  descrip 
tion  which  the  best  of  British  commentators  gave  to 
that  of  England,1  —  a  "  policy  pursued  for  rendering 
the  foreign  trade  of  the  whole  world  subservient  to  the 
increase  of  her  shipping  and  navigation."  American 
Independence  was  a  protest  against  this  practice ;  and 
the  first  great  task  of  the  United  States  was  to  over 
throw  and  destroy  the  principle,  in  order  to  substi 
tute  freedom  of  trade.  America  naturally  objected  to 
becoming  a  martyr  to  the  rules  of  a  system  which  she 
was  trying  to  revolutionize. 

When  these  British  instructions  of  Nov.  26,  1793, 
became  known  in  the  United  States,  the  Government 
of  President  Washington  imposed  an  embargo,  threat 
ened  retaliation,  and  sent  Chief- Justice  Jay  to  London 

1  Reeves's  Law  of  Shipping  and  Navigation,  part  ii.  chap.  iii. 


324         HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.       CH.  14. 

as  a  last  chance  of  maintaining  peace.  On  arriving 
there,  Jay  found  that  Pitt  had  already  voluntarily  re 
treated  from  his  ground,  and  that  new  Orders,  dated 
Jan.  8,  1794,  had  been  issued,  exempting  from  seizure 
American  vessels  engaged  in  the  direct  trade  from 
the  United  States  to  the  French  West  Indies.  In  the 
end,  the  British  government  paid  the  value  of  the  con 
fiscated  vessels.  The  trade  from  the  United  States  to 
Europe  was  not  interfered  with ;  and  thus  American 
ships  were  allowed  to  carry  French  colonial  produce 
through  an  American  port  to  France,  while  Russian 
or  Danish  ships  were  forbidden  by  England  to  carry 
such  produce  to  Europe  at  all,  although  their  flags  and 
harbors  were  as  neutral  as  those  of  the  United  States. 
America  became  suddenly  a  much  favored  nation,  and 
the  enemies  of  England  attributed  this  unexpected 
kindness  to  fear.  In  truth  it  was  due  to  a  natural 
mistake.  The  British  Treasury  calculated  that  the 
expense  and  trouble  of  carrying  sugar  and  coffee  from 
Martinique  or  St.  Domingo  to  Boston,  of  landing  it, 
paying  duties,  re-embarking  it,  receiving  the  drawback  j 
and  then  carrying  it  to  Bordeaux  or  Brest,  would  be 
such  as  to  give  ample  advantages  to  English  vessels 
which  could  transship  more  conveniently  at  London. 
The  mistake  soon  became  apparent.  The  Americans 
quickly  proved  that  they  could  under  these  restrictions 
carry  West  Indian  produce  to  Europe  not  only  more 
cheaply  than  British  ships  could  do  it,  but  almost  as 
quickly  ;  while  it  was  a  positive  advantage  on  the 
return  voyage  to  make  double  freight  by  stopping  at 


1783-1800.         RELATIONS  WITH  ENGLAND.  325 

an  American  port.  The  consequence  of  this  discovery 
was  seen  in  the  sudden  increase  of  American  shipping, 
and  was  largely  due  to  the  aid  of  British  seamen,  who 
found  in  the  new  service  better  pay,  food,  and  treatment 
than  in  their  own,  and  comparative  safety  from  the 
press-gang  and  the  lash.  At  the  close  of  the  century 
the  British  flag  seemed  in  danger  of  complete  exclu 
sion  from  the  harbors  of  the  United  States.  In  1790 
more  than  550  British  ships,  with  a  capacity  of  more 
than  115,000  tons,  had  entered  inward  and  outward, 
representing  about  half  that  number  of  actual  ves 
sels;  in  1799  the  custom-house  returns  showed  not  100 
entries,  and  in  1800  about  140,  representing  a  capacity 
of  40,000  tons.  In  the  three  years  1790-1792,  the 
returns  showed  an  average  of  some  280  outward  and 
inward  entries  of  American  ships  with  a  capacity  of 
54,000  tons ;  in  1800  the  entries  were  1,057,  with  a 
capacity  of  236,000  tons.  The  Americans  were  not 
only  beginning  to  engross  the  direct  trade  between 
their  own  ports  and  Europe,  but  were  also  rapidly  ob 
taining  the  indirect  carrying-trade  between  the  West 
Indies  and  the  European  continent,  and  even  between 
one  European  country  and  another.  The  British  gov 
ernment  began  to  feel  seriously  uneasy.  At  a  fright 
ful  cost  the  people  of  England  were  striving  to  crush 
the  navies  and  commerce  of  France  and  Spain,  only 
to  build  up  the  power  of  a  dangerous  rival  beyond 
the  ocean. 

Doubtless  the  British  government  would  have  taken 
measures  to  correct  its  mistake,  if  the  political  situ- 


326        HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.       CH.  14. 

ation  had  not  hampered  its  energies.  Chief-Justice 
Jay,  in  1794,  negotiated  a  treaty  with  Lord  Grenville 
which  was  in  some  respects  very  hard  upon  the  United 
States,  but  was  inestimably  valuable  to  them,  because 
it  tied  Pitt's  hands  and  gave  time  for  the  new  Ameri 
can  Constitution  to  acquire  strength.  Ten  years  of 
steady  progress  were  well  worth  any  temporary  con 
cessions,  even  though  these  concessions  exasperated 
France,  and  roused  irritation  between  her  and  the 
United  States  which  in  1798  became  actual  hostility. 
The  prospect  that  the  United  States  would  become  the 
ally  of  England  was  so  fair  that  Pitt  dared  not  dis 
turb  it.  His  government  was  in  a  manner  forced  to 
give  American  interests  free  play,  and  to  let  American 
shipping  gain  a  sudden  and  unnatural  enlargement. 
His  liberality  was  well  paid.  For  a  moment  France 
drove  the  United  States  to  reprisals ;  and  as  the 
immediate  consequence,  St.  Domingo  became  practi 
cally  independent,  owing  to  the  support  given  by  the 
United  States  to  Toussaint.  Even  the  reconciliation 
of  France  with  America  effected  by  Bonaparte  and 
Talleyrand  in  1800  did  not  at  first  redress  the  bal 
ance.  Not  till  the  Peace  of  Amiens,  in  1802,  did 
France  recover  her  colonies ;  and  not  till  a  year  later 
did  Bonaparte  succeed,  by  the  sacrifice  of  Louisiana,  in 
bringing  the  United  States  back  to  their  old  attitude 
of  jealousy  toward  England. 

Nevertheless,  indications  had  not  been  wanting  that 
England  was  aware  of  the  advantage  she  had  given  to 
American  commerce,  and  still  better  of  the  advantages 


1783-1800.         RELATIONS  WITH   ENGLAND.  327 

which  had  been  given  it  by  Nature.  All  the  Acts  of 
Parliament  on  the  statute-book  could  not  prevent  the 
West  Indies  from  being  largely  dependent  on  the 
United  States ;  yet  the  United  States  need  not  be 
allowed  the  right  to  carry  West  Indian  produce  to 
France,  —  a  right  which  depended  only  on  so-called 
international  law,  and  was  worthless  unless  supported 
by  the  stronger  force.  A  new  Order  was  issued, 
Jan.  25,  1798,  which  admitted  European  neutrals  to 
enemies'  colonies,  and  allowed  them  to  bring  French 
colonial  produce  to  England  or  to  their  own  ports. 
This  Order  was  looked  upon  as  a  side-blow  at  Ameri 
can  shipping,  which  was  not  allowed  the  same  privilege 
of  sailing  direct  from  the  Antilles  to  Europe.  The 
new  Order  was  justified  on  the  ground  that  the  old 
rule  discriminated  in  favor  of  American  merchants, 
whose  competition  might  be  injurious  to  the  commer 
cial  interests  of  England.1 

Further  than  this  the  British  government  did  not 
then  go;  on  the  contrary, it  officially  confirmed  the  ex 
isting  arrangement.  The  British  courts  of  admiralty 
conformed  closely  to  the  rules  of  their  political  chiefs. 
Sir  William  Scott,  better  known  as  Lord  Stowell,  whose 
great  reputation  as  a  judge  was  due  to  the  remarkable 
series  of  judgments  in  which  he  created  a  new  system 
of  admiralty  law,  announced  with  his  usual  clearness 
the  rules  by  which  he  meant  to  be  guided.  In  the 
case  of  the  "  Emmanuel,"  in  November,  1799,  he  ex 
plained  the  principle  on  which  the  law  permitted 
1  Appendix  to  4  Robinson,  6. 


328         HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED  STATES.       CH.  14. 

neutrals  to  carry  French  produce  from  their  own 
country  to  France.  "  By  importation,"  he  said,  "  the 
produce  became  part  of  the  national  stock  of  the  neu 
tral  country ;  the  inconveniences  of  aggravated  delay 
and  expense  were  a  safeguard  against  this  right  be 
coming  a  special  convenience  to  France  or  a  serious 
abridgement  of  belligerent  rights."  Soon  afterward, 
in  the  case  of  the  "  Polly,"  April  29,  1800,  he  took 
occasion  to  define  what  he  meant  by  importation  into 
a  neutral  country.  He  said  it  was  not  his  business  to 
decide  what  was  universally  the  test  of  a  bona  fide 
importation  ;  but  he  was  strongly  disposed  to  hold 
that  it  would  be  sufficient  if  the  goods  were  proved 
to  have  been  landed  and  the  duties  paid ;  and  he 
did  accordingly  rule  that  such  proof  was  sufficient 
to  answer  the  fair  demands  of  his  court. 

Rufus  King,  then  American  minister  in  London, 
succeeded  in  obtaining  from  Pitt  an  express  accept 
ance  of  this  rule  as  binding  on  the  government.  On 
the  strength  of  a  report1  from  the  King's  Advocate, 
dated  March  16,  1801,  the  British  Secretary  of  State 
notified  the  American  minister  that  what  Great  Britain 
considered  as  the  general  principle  of  colonial  trade 
had  been  relaxed  in  a  certain  degree  in  consideration 
of  the  present  state  of  commerce.  Neutrals  might 
import  French  colonial  produce,  and  convey  it  by  re 
exportation  to  France.  Landing  the  goods  and  paying 
the  duties  in  America  legalized  the  trade,  even  though 

1  Advocate-General's  Report,  March  16,  1801;  State  Papers, 
ii.  491. 


1801.  RELATIONS  WITH  ENGLAND.  329 

these  goods  were  at  once  re-shipped  and  forwarded  to 
France  on  account  of  the  same  owners. 

With  this  double  guaranty  Jefferson  began  his  ad 
ministration,  and  the  American  merchants  continued 
their  profitable  business.  Not  only  did  they  build 
and  buy  large  numbers  of  vessels,  and  borrow  all  the 
capital  they  could  obtain,  but  doubtless  some  French 
and  Spanish  merchants,  besides  a  much  greater  num 
ber  of  English,  made  use  of  the  convenient  American 
flag.  The  Yankees  exulted  loudly  over  the  decline  of 
British  shipping  in  their  harbors ;  the  British  masters 
groaned  to  see  themselves  sacrificed  by  their  own 
government ;  and  the  British  admirals  complained 
bitterly  that  their  prize-money  was  cut  off,  and  that 
they  were  wearing  out  their  lives  in  the  hardest 
service,  in  order  to  foster  a  commerce  of  smugglers 
and  perjurers,  whose  only  protection  was  the  flag 
of  a  country  that  had  not  a  single  line-of-battle  ship 
to  fly  it. 

Yet  President  Jefferson  had  reason  to  weigh  long 
and  soberly  the  pointed  remark  with  which  the  King's 
Advocate  began  his  report,  —  that  the  general  princi 
ple  with  respect  to  the  colonial  trade  had  been  to  a 
certain  extent  relaxed  in  consideration  of  the  present 
state  of  commerce.  No  doubt  the  British  pretension, 
as  a  matter  of  international  law,  was  outrageous.  The 
so-called  rule  of  1756  was  neither  more  nor  less  than 
a  rule  of  force ;  but  when  was  international  law  itself 
anything  more  than  a  law  of  force  ?  The  moment 
a  nation  found  itself  unable  to  show  some  kind  of 


330        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED   STATES.      CH.  14. 

physical  defence  for  its  protection,  the  wisdom  of 
Grotius  and  Bynkershoek  could  not  prevent  it  from 
being  plundered;  and  how  could  President  Jefferson 
complain  merely  because  American  ships  were  forbid 
den  by  England  to  carry  French  sugars  to  France, 
when  he  looked  on  without  a  protest  while  England 
and  France  committed  much  greater  outrages  on 
every  other  country  within  their  reach  ? 

President  Jefferson  believed  that  the  United  States 
had  ample  means  to  resist  any  British  pretension. 
As  his  letters  to  Paine  and  Logan  showed,  he  felt 
that  European  Powers  could  be  controlled  through 
the  interests  of  commerce.1  He  was  the  more  firmly 
convinced  by  the  extraordinary  concessions  which  Pitt 
had  made,  and  by  the  steady  encouragement  he  gave 
to  the  American  merchant.  Jefferson  felt  sure  that 
England  could  not  afford  to  sacrifice  a  trade  of  some 
forty  million  dollars,  and  that  her  colonies  could  not 
exist  without  access  to  the  American  market.  What 
need  to  spend  millions  on  a  navy,  when  Congress,  as 
Jefferson  believed,  already  grasped  England  by  the 
throat,  and  could  suffocate  her  by  a  mere  turn  of 
the  wrist! 

This  reasoning  had  much  in  its  favor.  To  Pitt  the 
value  of  the  American  trade  at  a  time  of  war  with 
France  and  Spain  was  immense  ;  and  when  taken 
in  connection  with  the  dependence  of  the  West  In 
dian  colonies  on  America,  it  made  a  combination  of 
British  interests  centring  in  the  United  States  which 
1  See  vol.  i.  p.  214. 


1801.  RELATIONS  WITH  ENGLAND.  331 

much  exceeded  the  entire  value  of  all  England's  other 
branches  of  foreign  commerce.  Its  prospective  value 
was  still  greater  if  things  should  remain  as  they  were, 
and  if  England  should  continue  to  undersell  all  rivals 
in  articles  of  general  manufacture.  England  could 
well  afford  to  lose  great  sums  of  money  in  the  form 
of  neutral  freights  rather  than  drive  Congress  to  a 
protective  system  which  should  create  manufactures 
of  cotton,  woollen,  and  iron.  These  were  motives 
which  had  their  share  in  the  civility  with  which 
England  treated  America ;  and  year  by  year  their 
influence  should  naturally  have  increased. 

Of  all  British  markets  the  American  was  the  most 
valuable  ;  but  next  to  the  American  market  was  that 
of  the  West  Indies.  In  some  respects  the  West  Indian 
was  of  the  two  the  better  worth  preserving.  From 
head  to  foot  the  planters  and  their  half-million  negroes 
were  always  clad  in  cottons  or  linens  made  by  the 
clothiers  of  Yorkshire,  Wiltshire,  or  Belfast.  Every 
cask  and  hoop,  every  implement  and  utensil,  was  sup 
plied  from  the  British  Islands.  The  sailing  of  a  West 
Indian  convoy  was  "  an  epoch  in  the  diary  of  every 
shop  and  warehouse  throughout  the  Kingdom." 1  The 
West  Indian  colonies  employed,  including  the  fisheries, 
above  a  thousand  sail  of  shipping  and  twenty-five 
thousand  seamen.  While  America  might,  and  one 
day  certainly  would,  manufacture  for  herself,  the  West 
Indies  could  not  even  dream  of  it;  there  the  only 
profitable  or  practicable  industry  was  cultivation  of 

1  Thoughts  on  Commerce  and  Colonies,  by  Charles  Bosanquet. 


332        HISTORY  OF   THE  UXITED  STATES.      CH.  14. 

the  soil,  and  the  chief  article  of  cultivation  was  the 
sugar-cane.  Rival  industries  to  those  of  Great  Britain 
were  impossible ;  the  only  danger  that  threatened 
British  control  was  the  loss  of  naval  supremacy  or  the 
revolt  of  the  negroes. 

A  great  majority  of  British  electors  would  certainly 
have  felt  no  hesitation  in  deciding,  as  between  the 
markets  of  the  United  States  and  of  the  West  Indies, 
that  if  a  choice  must  be  made,  good  policy  required 
the  government  to  save  at  all  hazards  the  West 
Indies.  Both  as  a  permanent  market  for  manufac 
tures  and  as  a  steady  support  for  shipping,  the  West 
Indian  commerce  held  the  first  place  in  British  inter 
ests.  This  fact  needed  to  be  taken  into  account  by 
the  United  States  government  before  relying  with 
certainty  on  the  extent  to  which  Great  Britain  could 
be  controlled  by  the  interests  involved  in  the  American 
trade.  At  the  most  critical  moment  all  Jefferson's 
calculations  might  be  upset  by  the  growth  of  a  con 
viction  in  England  that  the  colonial  system  was  in 
serious  danger ;  and  to  make  this  chance  stronger, 
another  anxiety  was  so  closely  connected  with  it  as 
to  cause  incessant  alarm  in  the  British  mind. 

The  carrying-trade  between  the  French  West  Indies 
and  Europe  which  had  thus  fallen  into  American 
hands,  added  to  the  natural  increase  of  national  ex 
ports  and  imports,  required  a  large  amount  of  addi 
tional  shipping ;  and  what  was  more  directly  hostile 
to  English  interests,  it  drew  great  numbers  of  Brit 
ish  sailors  into  the  American  merchant-service.  The 


1801.  RELATIONS  WITH  ENGLAND.  333 

desertion  of  British  seamen  and  the  systematic  encour 
agement  offered  to  deserters  in  every  seaport  of  the 
Union  were  serious  annoyances,  which  the  American 
government  was  unable  to  excuse  or  correct.  Be 
tween  1793  and  1801  they  reached  the  proportions 
of  a  grave  danger  to  the  British  service.  Every  Brit 
ish  government  packet  which  entered  the  port  of 
New  York  during  the  winter  before  Jefferson's  acces 
sion  to  power  lost  almost  every  seaman  in  its  crew ; 
and  neither  people  nor  magistrates  often  lent  help  to 
recover  them.  At  Norfolk  the  crew  of  a  British  ship 
deserted  to  an  American  sloop-of-war,  whose  com 
mander,  while  admitting  the  fact,  refused  to  restore 
the  men,  alleging  his  construction  of  official  orders  in 
his  excuse.1  In  most  American  harbors  such  protec 
tion  as  the  British  shipmaster  obtained  sprang  from 
the  personal  good-will  of  magistrates,  who  without 
strict  legal  authority  consented  to  apply,  for  the  bene 
fit  of  the  foreign  master,  the  merchant-shipping  law 
of  the  United  States ;  but  in  one  serious  case  even 
this  voluntary  assistance  was  stopped  by  the  authority 
of  a  State  government. 

This  interference  was  due  to  the  once  famous  dis 
pute  over  Jonathan  Bobbins,  which  convulsed  party 
politics  in  America  during  the  heated  election  of  1800. 
Thomas  Nash,  a  boatswain  on  the  British  frigate 
"  Hcrmione,"  having  been  ringleader  in  conspiracy  and 
murder  on  the  high  seas,  was  afterward  identified  in 
the  United  States  under  the  name  and  with  the  papers 

1  Thornton  to  Grenville,  March  7, 1801;  MSS.  British  Archives. 


HISTORY  OF  THE   UNITED  STATES.      CH.  14. 

of  Jonathan  Robbins  of  Danbury,  in  Connecticut.  On 
a  requisition  from  the  British  minister,  dated  June  3, 
1799,  he  was  delivered  under  the  extradition  clause 
of  Jay's  treaty,  and  was  hung.  The  Republican  party, 
then  in  opposition,  declared  that  Robbins,  or  Nash,  was 
in  their  belief  an  American  citizen  whose  surrender 
was  an  act  of  base  subservience  to  Great  Britain. 
An  effigy  of  Robbins  hanging  to  a  gibbet  was  a  fa 
vorite  electioneering  device  at  public  meetings.  The 
State  of  Virginia,  having  a  similar  grievance  of  its 
own,  went  so  far  as  to  enact  a  law  1  which  forbade, 
under  the  severest  penalties,  any  magistrate  who 
acted  under  authority  of  the  State  to  be  instrumental 
in  transporting  any  person  out  of  its  jurisdiction. 
As  citizens  of  the  Union,  sworn  to  support  the  Con 
stitution,  such  magistrates  were  equally  bound  with 
the  Federal  judges  to  grant  warrants  of  commit 
ment,  under  the  Twenty-seventh  Article  of  Jay's 
treaty,  against  persons  accused  of  specified  crimes. 
The  Virginia  Act  directly  contravened  the  treaty ; 
while  indirectly  it  prevented  magistrates  from  grant 
ing  warrants  against  deserters  and  holding  them  in 
custody,  so  that  every  English  vessel  which  entered  a 
Virginia  port  was  at  once  abandoned  by  her  crew, 
who  hastened  to  enter  the  public  or  private  ships  of 
the  United  States.2 

The   captain   of   any  British  frigate  which   might 

1  Act  of  Jan.  21,  1801,  Statutes  at  Large  of  Virginia,  New 
Series,  ii.  302. 

3  Thornton  to  Grenville,  June  1, 1802;  MSS.  British  Archive*. 


1801.  RELATIONS  WITH  ENGLAND.  335 

happen  to  run  into  the  harbor  of  New  York,  if  he 
went  ashore,  was  likely  to  meet  on  his  return  to  the 
wharf  some  of  his  boat's  crew  strolling  about  the 
town,  every  man  supplied  with  papers  of  American 
citizenship.  This  was  the  more  annoying,  because 
American  agents  in  British  ports  habitually  claimed 
and  received  the  benefit  of  the  British  law ;  while  so 
far  as  American  papers  were  concerned,  no  pretence 
was  made  of  concealing  the  fraud,  but  they  were 
issued  in  any  required  quantity,  and  were  transferred 
for  a  few  dollars  from  hand  to  hand. 

Not  only  had  the  encouragement  to  desertion  a 
share  in  the  decline  of  British  shipping  in  American 
harbors,  but  it  also  warranted,  and  seemed  almost 
to  render  necessary,  the  only  countervailing  measure 
the  British  government  could  employ.  Whatever  hap 
pened  to  the  merchant-service,  the  British  navy  could 
not  be  allowed  to  suffer.  England  knew  no  con 
scription  for  her  armies,  because  for  centuries  she 
had  felt  no  need  of  general  military  service ;  but  at 
any  moment  she  might  compel  her  subjects  to  bear 
arms,  if  circumstances  required  it.  Her  necessities 
were  greater  on  the  ocean.  There,  from  time  imme 
morial,  a  barbarous  sort  of  conscription,  known  as 
impressment,  had  been  the  ordinary  means  of  sup 
plying  the  royal  navy  in  emergencies ;  and  every 
seafaring  man  was  liable  to  be  dragged  at  any  moment 
from  his  beer-cellar  or  coasting-vessel  to  man  the  guns 
of  a  frigate  on  its  way  to  a  three-years'  cruise  in  the 
West  Indies  or  the  Mediterranean.  Mere  engage- 


336        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  14. 

ment  in  a  foreign  merchant-service  did  not  release 
the  British  sailor  from  his  duty.  When  the  captain 
of  a  British  frigate  overhauled  an  American  merchant- 
vessel  for  enemy's  property  or  contraband  of  war,  he 
sent  an  officer  on  board  who  mustered  the  crew,  and 
took  out  any  seamen  whom  he  believed  to  be  British. 
The  measure,  as  the  British  navy  regarded  it,  was 
one  of  self-protection.  If  the  American  government 
could  not  or  would  not  discourage  desertion,  the  naval 
commander  would  recover  his  men  in  the  only  way 
he  could.  Thus  a  circle  of  grievances  was  established 
on  each  side.  Pitt's  concessions  to  the  United  States 
irritated  the  British  navy  and  merchant-marine,  while 
they  gave  great  profits  to  American  shipping ;  the 
growth  of  American  shipping  stimulated  desertions 
from  the  British  service  to  the  extent  of  injuring  its 
efficiency  ;  and  these  desertions  in  their  turn  led  to 
a  rigorous  exercise  of  the  right  of  impressment.  To 
find  some  point  at  which  this  vicious  circle  could  be 
broken  was  a  matter  of  serious  consequence  to  both 
countries,  but  most  so  to  the  one  which  avowed  that 
it  did  not  mean  to  protect  its  interests  by  force. 

Great  Britain  could  have  broken  the  circle  by  in 
creasing  the  pay  and  improving  the  condition  of  her 
seamen ;  but  she  was  excessively  conservative,  and  the 
burdens  already  imposed  on  her  commerce  were  so 
great  that  she  could  afford  to  risk  nothing.  In  the 
face  of  a  combined  navy  like  that  of  Spain  and  France, 
her  control  of  the  seas  at  any  given  point,  such  as 
the  West  Indies,  was  still  doubtful ;  and  in  the  face 


1801.  RELATIONS  WITH  ENGLAND.  337 

of  American  competition,  her  huge  convoys  suffered 
under  great  disadvantage.  Conscious  of  her  own 
power,  she  thought  that  the  United  States  should  be 
first  to  give  way.  Had  the  American  government  been 
willing  to  perform  its  neutral  obligations  strictly,  the 
circle  might  have  been  broken  without  much  trouble ; 
but  the  United  States  wished  to  retain  their  advan 
tage,  and  preferred  to  risk  whatever  England  might 
do  rather  than  discourage  desertion,  or  enact  and  en 
force  a  strict  naturalization  law,  or  punish  fraud. 
The  national  government  was  too  weak  to  compel  the 
States  to  respect  neutral  obligations,  even  if  it  had 
been  disposed  to  make  the  attempt. 

The  practice  of  impressment  brought  the  two  gov 
ernments  to  a  deadlock  on  an  issue  of  law.  No  one 
denied  that  every  government  had  the  right  to  com 
mand  the  services  of  its  native  subjects,  and  as  yet 
no  one  ventured  to  maintain  that  a  merchant-ship  on 
the  high  seas  could  lawfully  resist  the  exercise  of  this 
right ;  but  the  law  had  done  nothing  to  define  the 
rights  of  naturalized  subjects  or  citizens.  The  British 
government  might,  no  doubt,  impress  its  own  sub 
jects;  but  almost  every  British  sailor  in  the  American 
service  carried  papers  of  "American  citizenship,  and 
although  some  of  these  were  fraudulent,  many  were 
genuine.  The  law  of  England,  as  declared  from  time 
out  of  mind  by  every  generation  of  her  judges,  held 
that  the  allegiance  of  a  subject  was  indefeasible,  and 
therefore  that  naturalization  was  worthless.  The  law 
of  the  United  States, "as  declared  by  Chief-Justice 

VOL.  ii.  —  22 


338        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  14. 

Ellsworth  in  1799,  was  in  effect  the  same ; 1  he  held 
that  no  citizen  could  dissolve  the  compact  of  protec 
tion  and  defence  between  himself  and  society  without 
the  consent  or  default  of  the  community.  On  both 
sides  the  law  was  emphatic  to  the  point  that  natu 
ralization  could  not  bind  the  government  which  did 
not  consent  to  it ;  and  the  United  States  could  hardly 
require  England  to  respect  naturalization  papers  which 
the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  declared  itself 
unable  to  respect  in  a  similar  case.  Nevertheless, 
while  courts  and  judges  declare  what  the  law  is  or 
ought  to  be,  they  bind  only  themselves,  and  their 
decisions  have  no  necessary  effect  on  the  co-ordinate 
branches  of  government.  While  the  judges  laid  down 
one  doctrine  in  Westminster  Hall,  Parliament  laid 
down  another  in  St.  Stephen's  chapel ;  and  no  one 
could  say  whether  the  law  or  the  statute  was  final. 
The  British  statute-book  contained  Acts  of  Parlia 
ment  as  old  as  the  reign  of  Queen  Anne  2  to  encour 
age  the  admission  of  foreign  seamen  into  the  British 
navy,  offering  them  naturalization  as  an  inducement. 
American  legislation  went  not  quite  so  far,  but  by 
making  naturalization  easy  it  produced  worse  results. 
A  little  perjury,  in  no  wise  unsafe,  was  alone  required 
in  order  to  transform  British  seamen  into  American 
citizens ;  and  perjury  was  the  commonest  commodity 
in  a  seaport.  The  British  government  was  forced  to 

1  Trial  of  Isaac  Williams,  Hartford,  1799;  Wharton's   State 
Trials,  653.     Shanks  v.  Dupont,  3  Peters,  242. 
a  6  Anne,  c.  20. 


1801.  RELATIONS  WITH  ENGLAND.  339 

decide  whether  papers  so  easily  obtained  and  trans 
ferred  should  be  allowed  to  bar  its  claims  on  the  ser 
vices  of  its  subjects,  and  whether  it  could  afford  to 
become  a  party  to  the  destruction  of  its  own  marine, 
even  though  the  United  States  should  join  with  France 
and  carry  on  endless  war. 

That  there  were  some  points  which  not  even  the 
loss  of  American  trade  would  bring  England  to  con 
cede  was  well  known  to  Jefferson ;  and  on  these 
points  he  did  not  mean  to  insist.  Setting  the  matter 
of  impressment  aside,  the  relations  between  England 
and  America  had  never  been  better  than  when  the 
new  President  took  office  March  4, 1801.  The  British 
government  seemed  earnest  in  conciliation,  and  lost 
no  opportunity  of  showing  its  good- will.  Under  the 
Sixth  Article  of  Jay's  treaty,  a  commission  had  been 
appointed  to  settle  long-standing  debts  due  to  Brit 
ish  subjects,  but  held  in  abeyance  by  State  legislation 
in  contravention  of  the  treaty  of  1783.  After  long 
delays  the  commission  met  at  Philadelphia  and  set 
to  work,  but  had  made  little  progress  when  the  two 
American  commissioners,  with  the  President's  ap 
proval,  in  the  teeth  of  the  treaty  which  created  the 
Board,  refused  to  accept  its  decisions,  and  seceded. 
This  violent  measure  was  not  taken  by  the  Admin 
istration  without  uneasiness,  for  England  might  rea 
sonably  have  resented  it ;  but  after  some  further  delay 
the  British  government  consented  to  negotiate  again, 
and  at  last  accepted  a  round  sum  of  three  million 
dollars  in  full  discharge  of  the  British  claim.  This 


340        HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.       CH.  14. 

was  a  case  in  which  England  was  the  aggrieved  party; 
she  behaved  equally  well  in  other  cases  where  the 
United  States  were  aggrieved.  Rufus  King  complained 
that  her  admiralty  courts  in  the  West  Indies  and  at 
Halifax  were  a  scandal ;  in  deference  to  his  remon 
strances  these  courts  were  thoroughly  reformed  by  Act 
of  Parliament.  The  vice-admiralty  court  at  Nassau 
condemned  the  American  brigantine  "  Leopard,"  en 
gaged  in  carrying  Malaga  wine  from  the  United  States 
to  the  Spanish  West  Indies.  The  American  minister 
complained  of  the  decision,  and  within  three  days  the 
King's  Advocate  reported  in  his  favor.1  The  report 
was  itself  founded  on  Sir  William  Scott's  favora 
ble  decision  in  the  case  of  the  "  Polly."  Soon  after 
ward  the  American  minister  complained  that  Captain 
Pellew,  of  the  "  Cleopatra,"  and  Admiral  Parker  had 
not  effectually  restrained  their  subordinates  on  the 
American  station ;  both  officers  were  promptly  re 
called.  Although  the  Ministry  had  not  yet  consented 
to  make  any  arrangement  on  the  practice  of  im 
pressment,  Rufus  King  felt  much  hope  that  they 
might  consent  even  to  this  reform ;  meanwhile  Lord 
Grenville  checked  the  practice,  and  professed  a  strong 
wish  to  find  some  expedient  that  should  take  its 
place. 

There  was  no  reason  to  doubt  the  sincerity  of  the 
British  Foreign  Office  in  wishing  friendship.  Its  pol 
icy  was  well  expressed  in  a  despatch  written  from 
Philadelphia  by  Robert  Liston,  the  British  minister, 

1  Rufus  King  to  Madison,  April  12, 1801;  State  Papers,  ii.  490. 


1801.  RELATIONS  WITH  ENGLAND.  341 

shortly  before   he   left  the  United  States  to  return 
home : J  — 

"The  advantages  to  be  ultimately  reaped  from  a  per 
severance  in  the  line  of  conduct  which  Great  Britain  has 
adopted  for  the  last  four  years  appear  to  my  mind  to  be 
infallible  and  of  infinite  magnitude  ;  the  profitable  conse 
quences  of  a  state  of  hostility,  small  and  uncertain.  I 
have  been  pleasing  my  imagination  with  looking  forward 
to  the  distant  spectacle  of  all  the  northern  continent  of 
America  covered  with  friendly  though  not  subject  States, 
consuming  our  manufactures,  speaking  our  language, 
proud  of  their  parent  State,  attached  to  her  prosperity. 
War  must  bring  with  it  extensive  damage  to  our  naviga 
tion,  the  probable  loss  of  Canada,  and  the  world  behind 
it,  the  propagation  of  enmity  and  prejudices  which  it  may 
be  impossible  to  eradicate.  The  system  of  the  American 
government  does  not  strike  me,  with  the  near  view  I  have 
of  it,  as  being  in  so  perilous  a  situation  as  is  imagined  in 
Europe.  I  am  willing  to  avoid  political  prophecies,  but 
I  confess  I  think  it  will  get  on  well  enough  if  the  country 
remains  in  peace ;  and  if  they  go  to  war,  the  fabric  may 
acquire  strength.  God  forbid  that  it  should  be  to  our 
detriment,  and  to  the  triumph  of  our  enemies ! " 

1  Listen  to  Qrenville  (private),  May  7,  1800;  MSS.  British 
Archives. 


CHAPTER  XV. 

FEBRUARY  4, 1801,  one  month  before  the  inaugura 
tion  of  President  Jefferson,  Pitt  suddenly  retired  from 
office,  and  was  succeeded  by  a  weak  ministry,  in  which 
Mr.  Addington,  afterward  Lord  Sidmouth,  took  the 
post  vacated  by  Pitt.  No  event  could  have  been  hap 
pier  for  the  prospects  of  President  Jefferson,  who 
might  fairly  count  upon  Addington's  weakness  to 
prevent  his  interference  in  American  affairs. 

Knowing  himself  to  be  universally  regarded  as  the 
friend  and  admirer  of  France,  Jefferson  was  the 
more  anxious  not  to  be  classed  by  the  British  gov 
ernment  among  the  enemies  of  England.  Even  be 
fore  he  was  inaugurated,  he  took  occasion  to  request 
Edward  Thornton,  the  British  chargg,  — 

"  With  great  earnestness,  to  assure  his  Majesty's  gov 
ernment  that  it  should  experience  during  his  adminis 
tration  as  cordial  and  sincere  acts  of  friendship  as  had 
ever  been  received  under  that  of  his  predecessors.  "  I 
am  aware,"  said  the  President  elect,  "that  I  have  been 
represented  as  hostile  to  Great  Britain  ;  but  this  has  been 
done  only  for  electioneering  purposes,  and  I  hope  hence 
forward  such  language  will  be  used  no  longer.  I  can  ap 
peal  to  all  my  past  conduct  that  in  everything  in  which  I 


1801.  CORDIALITY  WITH   ENGLAND.  343 

have  been  engaged  relatively  to  England,  I  have  always 
been  guided  by  a  liberal  policy.  I  wish  to  be  at  the 
head  of  affairs  no  longer  than  while  I  am  influenced  by 
such  sentiments  of  equal  liberality  toward  all  nations. 
There  is  nothing  to  which  I  have  a  greater  repugnance 
than  to  establish  distinctions  in  favor  of  one  nation 
against  another." 

The  day  after  his  inauguration  he  returned  to  the 
subject :  — 

"  There  is  nothing  I  have  more,  or  I  may  say  so  much, 
at  heart  as  to  adjust  happily  all  differences  between  us, 
and  to  cultivate  the  most  cordial  harmony  and  good 
understanding.  The  English  government  is  too  just,  I 
am  persuaded,  to  regard  newspaper  trash,  and  the  asser 
tions  contained  in  them  that  I  am  a  creature  of  France 
and  an  enemy  of  Great  Britain.  For  republican  France 
I  may  have  felt  some  interest ;  but  that  is  long  over  ;  and 
there  is  assuredly  nothing  in  the  present  government  of 
that  country  which  could  naturally  incline  me  to  show 
the  smallest  undue  partiality  to  it  at  the  expense  of  Great 
Britain,  or  indeed  of  any  other  country." ' 

Thornton  felt  no  great  confidence  in  the  new  Presi 
dent's  protests,  and  thought  it  possible  that  Jefferson 
had  "  on  this,  as  he  seems  to  have  done  on  many  late 
public  occasions,  taxed  his  imagination  to  supply 
the  deficiency  of  his  feelings."  All  Englishmen  were 
attached  to  the  Federalist  and  New  England  inter 
est  ;  they  could  not  understand  that  Virginia  should 
be  a  safer  friend  than  Massachusetts.  Yet  in  truth 

1  Thornton  to  Grenville,  March  7,  1801  j  MSS.  British 
Archives. 


344        HISTORY  OF  THE   UNITED  STATES.      CH.  15. 

Jefferson  never  was  more  serious  than  when  he  made 
these  professions.  The  Southern  republicans  had 
nothing  to  gain  from  a  quarrel  with  England ;  they 
neither  wished  for  Canada,  nor  aspired  to  create  ship 
ping  or  manufactures  :  their  chief  antagonist  was  not 
England,  but  Spain.  The  only  Power  which  could 
seriously  injure  them  was  Great  Britain ;  and  the 
only  injury  they  could  inflict  in  return  was  by  con 
quering  Canada  for  the  benefit  of  Northern  influence, 
or  by  building  up  manufactures  which  they  disliked, 
or  by  cutting  off  their  own  markets  for  tobacco  and 
cotton.  Nothing  warranted  a  belief  that  men  like 
Jefferson,  Madison,  and  Gallatin  would  ever  seek  a 
quarrel  with  England. 

The  British  Ministry  soon  laid  aside  any  doubts 
they  might  have  felt  on  the  subject.  Lord  Grenville, 
who  retired  with  Pitt,  was  succeeded  as  Foreign  Sec 
retary  by  Lord  Hawkesbury,  afterward  better  known 
as  Lord  Liverpool.  The  new  Ministry  negotiated 
for  peace  with  Bonaparte.  Oct.  1,  1801,  the  prelimi 
naries  were  signed,  and  the  world  found  itself  again 
in  a  sort  of  repose,  broken  only  by  the  bloody  doings 
at  St.  Domingo  and  Guadeloupe.  England  returned, 
like  France  and  Spain,  to  the  rigor  of  the  colonial 
system.  The  customs  entries  of  New  York,  Boston, 
and  Philadelphia  rapidly  diminished  in  number ; 
American  shipping  declined  ;  but  Madison  was  re 
lieved  from  the  burden  of  belligerent  disputes,  which 
had  been  the  chief  anxiety  of  his  predecessors  in  the 
State  Department. 


1801.  CORDIALITY  WITH  ENGLAND.  345 

Yet  peace  did  not  put  an  end  to  all  difficulties. 
Rufus  King  continued  to  negotiate  in  London  in 
regard  to  the  outstanding  British  debts,  twice  recog 
nized  by  treaty,  yet  still  unpaid  by  the  United  States  ; 
in  regard  to  the  boundary  of  Maine  and  that  of  the 
extreme  northwest  territory  at  the  source  of  the 
Mississippi ;  and  finally,  in  regard  to  impressments ; 
while  Edward  Thornton  at  Washington  complained 
that,  in  spite  of  peace  and  the  decline  of  American 
shipping,  encouragement  was  still  offered  to  the  de 
sertion  of  British  seamen  in  every  port  of  the  United 
States,  —  in  fact  that  this  means  was  systematically 
used  to  prevent  British  shipping  from  entering  Ameri 
can  ports  in  competition  with  the  shipping  of  America. 
When  Madison  alleged  that  the  national  government 
had  no  share  in  such  unfriendly  conduct,  Thornton 
thrust  under  his  eyes  the  law  of  Virginia,  —  a  law 
enacted  by  President  Jefferson's  political  friends  in 
his  political  interests, —  which  forbade,  under  penalty 
of  death,  any  magistrate  of  Virginia  to  be  instru 
mental  in  surrendering  deserters  or  criminals,  even 
in  cases  where  they  were  bound  by  treaty  to  do  so. 
Madison  could  not  deny  that  this  legislation  was 
contrary  to  a  treaty  right  which  the  United  States 
government  was  bound  to  enforce.  He  admitted  that 
American  shipmasters  and  consuls  in  British  ports 
habitually  asked  the  benefit  of  the  British  law,  and 
received  it ;  but  he  could  hold  out  only  a  remote  hope 
that  mutual  legislation  might  solve  the  difficulty  by 
applying  the  merchant-seamen  laws  of  the  two  coun- 


346         HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      Cn.16. 

tries  reciprocally.  In  conversation  with  Thornton 
he  lamented,  with  every  appearance  of  sincerity  and 
candor,  the  deficiency  of  the  existing  laws,  and  did 
not  dispute  that  Great  Britain  could  hardly  be  blamed 
for  refusing  the  surrender  of  seamen  on  her  side  ; 
but  when  Thornton  asked  him  to  order  the  return  of 
a  man  who  under  aggravated  circumstances  had  de 
serted  from  the  British  ship-of-war  "  Andromache " 
in  the  port  of  Norfolk,  and  had  been  immediately 
engaged  on  the  United  States  revenue  cutter  there, 
Madison  replied  in  a  note  coldly  reiterating  the  fact, 
with  which  both  parties  were  already  acquainted, 
that  neither  the  law  of  nations  nor  the  provisions  of 
any  treaty  enjoined  the  mutual  restitution  of  seamen. 
This  recognized  formula,  under  which  governments 
commonly  express  a  refusal  to  act,  was  understood 
by  Thornton  as  equivalent  to  an  avowal  that  the  new 
Administration,  controlled  by  Virginians,  would  not 
venture,  even  in  the  future  emergency  of  a  demand 
for  extradition  under  treaty,  to  risk  the  displeasure  of 
Virginia.1  Desertion,  therefore,  received  no  discour 
agement  from  the  United  States  government ;  on  the 
contrary,  deserters,  known  to  be  such,  were  received 
at  once  into  the  national  service,  and  their  surrender 
refused.  Under  such  circumstances  the  British  gov 
ernment  was  not  likely  to  be  more  accommodating 
than  the  American. 

As    the   summer    of   1802    approached,   President 

1  Thornton  to  Hawkesbury,  Oct.  25  and  Nov.  26, 1802  :  MSS. 
British  Archives. 


1802.  CORDIALITY  WITH  ENGLAND.  347 

Jefferson  drew  into  closer  and  more  confidential  re 
lations  with  Thornton.  During  the  Federalist  rule 
the  two  countries  were  never  on  more  affectionate 
terms.  At  London  Rufus  King  and  Christopher  Gore 
received  courteous  attention  from  Lord  Hawkesbury. 
At  Washington,  Thornton's  intimacy,  at  the  White 
House  roused  the  jealousy  and  alarm  of  Pichon.  As 
Bonaparte's  projects  against  Louisiana  disclosed  them 
selves,  and  as  Leclerc's  first  successes  at  St.  Domingo 
opened  the  French  path  to  New  Orleans,  Jefferson  be 
gan  to  pay  sudden  and  almost  eager  court  to  Thorn 
ton,  who  was  a  little  embarrassed  by  the  freedom 
with  which  the  President  denounced  the  First  Consul. 
The  preliminary  articles  of  peace  between  France  and 
England  had  been  signed  Oct.  1,  1801  ;  but  the  treaty 
of  Amiens,  which  made  these  articles  definitive,  was 
signed  only  March  25,  1802.  Addington  was  natu 
rally  anxious  that  the  peace  should  be  maintained ; 
indeed,  no  one  could  doubt  that  the  existence  of  his 
Ministry  depended  on  maintaining  it.  Thornton  had 
no  instructions  which  warranted  him  in  intriguing 
against  the  First  Consul,  or  in  making  preparations 
for  a  new  war  ;  and  yet  hardly  was  the  treaty  of 
Amiens  made  public,  when  President  Jefferson  be 
gan  to  talk  as  though  England  were  still  at  war, 
and  it  were  only  a  question  of  time  when  the  United 
States  must  become  her  ally.  The  Louisiana  ques 
tion  excited  him,  In  April  he  wrote  his  letters  to 
Dupont  and  Livingston.  At  about  the  same  time  he 
took  Thornton  into  his  confidence. 


348        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      Cn.lS. 

"  I  have  had  many  occasions  since  it  was  first  started," 
wrote  Thornton,1  "of  conversing  freely  with  Mr.  Jeffer 
son  on  this  topic,  which  is  indeed  peculiarly  interesting 
to  him,  and  his  reflections  on  which  he  utters  with  perhaps 
too  little  caution  to  persons  who  are  not  disposed  to  think 
very  favorably  of  any  change  of  sentiments  with  respect 
to  France.  He  not  only  regards  the  cession  of  Louisiana 
and  New  Orleans  as  a  certain  cause  of  future  war  between 
the  two  countries,  but  makes  no  scruple  to  say  that  if  the 
force  of  the  United  States  should  be  unable  to  expel  the 
French  from  those  settlements,  they  must  have  recourse 
to  the  assistance  of  other  Powers,  meaning  unquestionably 
Great  Britain.  With  regard  to  France  and  the  person 
who  is  at  the  head  of  its  government,  whether  in  conse 
quence  of  the  projected  cession  of  Louisiana  or  of  the 
little  account  which  seems  to  be  made  of  the  United 
States  as  well  at  Paris  as  by  French  officers  in  other  parts 
of  the  world,  Mr.  Jefferson  speaks  in  very  unqualified 
terms  of  the  usurpation  of  Bonaparte,  of  the  arbitrary 
nature  and  spirit  of  his  government,  of  his  love  of  flattery 
and  vain  pomp,  —  features,  according  to  Mr.  Jefferson, 
which  indicate  the  frivolous  character  of  his  mind  rather 
than  a  condescension  to  the  taste  of  the  French  people. 
The  presses  in  America  devoted  to  the  President's  Ad 
ministration  make  use  of  the  same  language ;  and  with 
out  pretending  to  say  that  this  party  is  cured  of  its 
bitterness  against  Great  Britain,  I  can  safely  venture  to 
assure  your  Lordship  that  its  predilection  for  France 
scarcely  exists  even  in  name." 

After  the  stoppage  of  the  entrepot  at  New  Orleans, 
when  public  opinion  seemed  intent  on  driving  Jeffer- 

1  Thornton  to  Hawkesbury,  July  3,  1802  ;  MSS.  British 
Archives. 


1802.  CORDIALITY  WITH  ENGLAND.  349 

son  into  the  war  with  France  which  he  had  predicted, 
Thornton  found  himself  and  his  government  in  favor 
at  Washington.  The  Republicans  were  even  better 
disposed  than  the  Federalists.  Jefferson  was  willing 
to  abolish  between  England  and  America  the  discrimi 
nating  duties  on  shipping  which  the  New  England 
Federalists  had  imposed,  and  which  they  still  wished 
to  maintain  for  use  in  the  disputed  West  Indian  trade. 
He  told  Thornton  that  he  could  no  doubt  carry  the 
repeal  of  these  countervailing  duties  through  Congress 
over  the  heads  of  the  opposition,1  "  but  he  wished  it 
to  be  adopted  in  consequence  of  their  own  convic 
tion,  rather  than  by  a  contrary  conduct  to  afford 
them  the  least  ground  for  asserting  that  the  Southern 
States  were  carrying  into  execution  their  scheme  of 
ruin  against  the  navigation  and  commerce  of  their 
Eastern  brethren."  Jefferson  was  rapidly  becoming 
the  friend  and  confidant  of  England.  Thornton,  natu 
rally  delighted  with  his  own  success,  and  with  the 
mortifications  and  anxieties  of  Yrujo  and  Pichon, 
went  so  far  as  to  urge  his  government  to  help  the 
views  of  the  United  States  against  Louisiana:2  — 

"  I  should  hope,  my  Lord,  that  by  having  some  share 
in  the  delivery  of  this  Island  of  New  Orleans  to  the 
United  States,  which  it  will  be  impossible  to  keep  from 
them  whenever  they  choose  to  employ  force,  his  Majesty's 

1  Thornton  to  Hawkesbury,   Dec.   31,   1802  ;   MSS.   British 
Archives. 

2  Thornton  to    Hawkesbury,   Jan,   3,   1803 ;    MSS.    British 
Archives. 


350        HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  15. 

government  may  hereafter  attach  still  more  this  country 
to  our  interests,  and  derive  all  the  advantage  possible 
from  the  intercourse  with  that  important  part  of  the 
world.  A  very  great  change  has  gradually  taken  place 
in  the  opinions  of  all  ranks  in  this  government  in  favor 
of  Great  Britain,  which  has  struck  observers  more  likely 
to  be  impartial  than  myself.  A  sense  of  a  common  in 
terest  has  a  great  share  in  the  change  ;  but  the  conduct 
of  France  in  all  her  relations  has  not  failed  to  produce 
its  full  effect ;  and  I  find  men,  formerly  the  most  vehe 
ment  in  their  politics,  asserting  in  the  most  unqualified 
terms  the  necessity  of  a  union  among  all  the  members 
of  the  civilized  world  to  check  her  encroachments  and  to 
assure  the  general  tranquillity." 

A  few  days  later  the  President  nominated  Monroe 
to  act  with  Livingston  and  Pinckney  in  an  attempt  to 
purchase  New  Orleans.  This  step,  which  was  openly 
avowed  to  be  the  alternative  and  perhaps  the  ante-, 
cedent  of  war  with  France,  brought  Thornton  into 
still  more  confidential  relations  with  the  Government. 
Finding  that  the  Secretary  of  State  was  as  cautious 
as  the  President  was  talkative,  Thornton  carried  on 
an  active  intercourse  with  the  latter.  He  first  offered 
to  detain  the  British  government  packet  for  Monroe's 
use ;  but  it  was  found  that  a  month  or  two  of  delay 
would  be  necessary.  Then,  without  instructions  from 
his  Government,  Thornton  took  a  bolder  step : l  — 

"  This  state  of  things  has  naturally  excited  a  sentiment 
of  common  interest,  and  has  encouraged  me  to  enter  with 

1  Thornton  to   Hawkesbury,   Jan.   31,   1803 ;    MSS.   British 
Archives. 


1803.  CORDIALITY  WITH   ENGLAND.  351 

more  freedom  into  the  subject,  as  well  with  the  Presi 
dent  as  with  Mr.  Madison,  than  I  should  otherwise  have 
thought  right,  without  being  acquainted  with  the  views  of 
his  Majesty's  government.  Under  this  impression,  I  ven 
tured,  immediately  after  the  nomination  and  before  the 
first  arrival  of  Mr.  Monroe,  to  inquire  of  the  President 
whether  it  was  his  intention  to  let  him  pass  over  to  Eng 
land,  and  hold  any  conversation  with  his  Majesty's  min 
isters  upon  the  general  question  of  the  free  navigation  of 
the  Mississippi.  The  inquiry  was  somewhat  premature, 
and  I  made  it  with  some  apology.  Mr.  Jefferson  replied, 
however,  unaffectedly,  that  at  so  early  a  stage  of  the 
business  he  had  scarcely  thought  himself  what  it  might 
be  proper  to  do ;  ...  that,  on  the  whole,  he  thought  it 
very  probable  that  Mr.  Mom-oe  might  cross  the  Channel. 
.  .  .  Some  time  after  Mr.  Monroe's  arrival,  actuated  by 
the  same  view,  I  mentioned  to  Mr.  Jefferson  that  it  would 
give  me  pleasure  to  furnish  the  former  with  an  introduc 
tion  to  his  Majesty's  ambassador  at  Paris,  as  it  would 
afford  me  the  occasion  of  making  Lord  Whitworth  ac 
quainted  with  the  nature  of  the  object  in  dispute  between 
this  country,  France,  and  Spain,  and  would  give  to  Mr. 
Monroe,  if  he  were  disposed  of  himself,  or  were  instructed 
by  his  Government  to  seek  it,  a  more  ready  pretext  for 
opening  himself  to  his  Lordship,  and  of  keeping  him 
apprised  of  the  progress  and  turn  of  the  negotiation. 
Mr.  Jefferson  seemed  pleased  with  this  offer,  and  said 
he  was  sure  Mr.  Monroe  would  accept  it  with  great 
thankfulness." 

Madison  talked  less  freely  than  his  chief,  and  con 
tented  himself  with  explaining  to  the  British  rep 
resentative  that  the  views  of  the  Government  in 


352        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  15. 

sending  Monroe  to  France  were  limited  to  the  hope  of 
inducing  the  First  Consul  by  money,  or  other  means 
of  persuasion,  to  cede  in  Louisiana  a  place  of  deposit 
over  which  the  United  States  might  have  absolute 
jurisdiction.  He  did  not  tell  Thornton  of  the  decision 
made  by  the  Cabinet,  and  the  instructions  given  to 
Monroe,  April  18,  1803,  to  offer  terms  of  alliance  with 
England  in  case  the  First  Consul  should  make  war ; 1 
but  the  tone  of  cordiality  in  Government  and  people, 
both  in  public  and  private,  in  New  York,  Boston,  and 
Philadelphia,  as  in  the  South  and  West,  was  gratify 
ing  to  British  pride,  and  would  have  been  still  more 
so  had  not  the  community  somewhat  too  openly 
avowed  the  intention  of  leaving  England,  if  possible, 
to  fight  alone.  At  the  first  news  of  the  approaching 
rupture  between  France  and  England,  this  wish  began 
to  appear  so  plainly  that  Thornton  was  staggered  by 
it.  The  Americans  took  no  trouble  to  conceal  the 
hope  that  England  would  have  to  fight  their  battles 
for  them.2 

"  The  manifest  advantage  that  such  a  state  of  things  is 
calculated  to  give  to  their  negotiation  with  France,  and 
which  is  already  sensibly  felt  in  the  altered  tone  and  con 
duct  of  the  French  government,  .  .  .  will  sufficiently  ac 
count  for  their  wishes  and  for  this  belief.  But  possessing 
the  same  opinion  of  the  encroachments  of  France,  and  of 
the  barrier  which  Great  Britain  alone  places  between  her 
and  the  United  States,  and  actuated,  as  I  really  believe 

1  See  p.  2. 

2  Thornton  to  Hawkesbury,   May  30,  1803;   MSS.  British 
Archives. 


1803.  CORDIALITY  WITH  ENGLAND.  353 

they  are,  by  sincere  wishes  for  our  success,  I  am  afraid 
they  begin  to  see  more  clearly  that  in  a  state  of  war  we 
are  effectually  fighting  their  battles,  without  the  neces 
sity  of  their  active  interference ;  and  they  recur  once 
more  to  the  flattering  prospect  of  peace  and  a  lucrative 
neutrality." 

In  this  state  of  doubt  President  Jefferson  continued 
his  intimate  relations  with  Thornton. 

"He  expressed  himself  very  freely,"  wrote  Thornton, 
May  30,  1803,  "  on  the  contemptible  and  frivolous  con 
duct,  as  he  termed  it,  of  a  Government  that  could  alter 
its  language  so  entirely  on  the  prospect  of  an  approaching 
rupture  with  another  nation,  —  which  he  acknowledged 
instantly,  on  my  mention  of  it,  had  been  the  case  toward 
Mr.  Livingston." 

Jefferson  attributed  Bonaparte's  returning  courtesy 
to  fear  rather  than  to  foresight.  Thornton  himself 
began  to  feel  the  danger  that  Bonaparte,  after  all, 
might  outwit  him.  He  revised  his  opinion  about  Lou 
isiana.  England,  he  saw,  had  the  strongest  motives 
for  wishing  France  to  keep  that  province. 

"The  most  desirable  state'  of  things,"  he  wrote, 
"seems  to  be  that  France  should  become  mistress  of 
Louisiana,  because  her  influence  in  the  United  States 
would  be  by  that  event  lost  forever,  and  she  could  only 
be  dispossessed  by  a  concert  between  Great  Britain  and 
America  in  a  common  cause,  which  would  produce  an 
indissoluble  bond  of  union  and  amity  between  the  two 
countries." 

This  cordiality  between  England  and  the  United 
States  lasted  without  interruption  until  midsummer. 

VOL.  ii.  — 23 


354        HISTORY  OF  THE   UNITED  STATES.      CH.  15. 

Pichon  complained,  as  has  been  shown,  of  the  atten 
tions  paid  to  Thornton  by  the  President.1  "I  re 
marked  at  table  that  he  redoubled  his  courtesies 
and  attentions  toward  the  British  chargS."  The 
dinner  was  in  the  month  of  January ;  in  the  fol 
lowing  June  Pichon  wrote  that  the  President  had 
begun  to  accept  the  idea  of  seeing  the  British  at 
New  Orleans:2  — 

''Mr.  Jefferson  told  me  a  few  days  ago  that  he  was 
engaged  in  letting  that  Power  know  that  her  presence 
there  would  be  seen  with  regret ;  but  I  perceive  that, 
little  by  little,  people  are  familiarizing  themselves  with 
this  eventuality,  as  their  fears  increase  in  regard  to  us. 
They  are  so  convinced  that  England  sees  more  and  more 
her  true  interests  in  relation  to  the  United  States,  and  is 
resolved  to  conciliate  them,  that  they  have  no  doubt  of 
her  lending  herself  to  some  arrangement.  What  they  fear 
most  is  that,  as  the  price  of  this  accommodation,  she  may 
require  the  United  States  to  take  an  active  part  in  the 
indispensable  war ;  and  this  is  what  they  ardently  wish 
to  avoid." 

Until  July  3, 1803,  the  relations  between  President 
Jefferson's  government  and  that  of  Great  Britain  were 
so  cordial  as  to  raise  a  doubt  whether  the  United 
States  could  avoid  becoming  an  ally  of  England,  and 
taking  part  in  the  war  with  France.  Suddenly  came 
the  new  convulsion  of  Europe. 

1  Pichon  to  Talleyrand,  8  Pluviose,  An  xi.  (Jan.  28,  1803); 
Archives  des  Aff.  Etr.,  MSS. 

2  Pichon  to  Talleyrand,  14  Prairial,  An  xii.  (June  3,  1803) ; 
Archives  des  Aff.  Etr.,  MSS. 


1803.  CORDIALITY  WITH  ENGLAND.  355 

"It  was  on  the  third  of  this  month,"  wrote  Pichon 
July  7,  1803,  "  the  eve  of  the  anniversary  of  Indepen 
dence,  that  we  received  two  pieces  of  news  of  the  deepest 
interest  for  this  country,  —  that  of  the  rupture  between 
France  and  England,  proclaimed  by  the  latter  on  May 
16,  and  that  of  the  cession  of  Louisiana  and  New  Orleans, 
made  by  us  on  April  30." 1 

The  next  day,  when  Pichon  attended  the  usual 
reception  at  the  White  House,  he  found  himself  re 
ceived  in  a  manner  very  different  from  that  to  which 
he  had  been  of  late  accustomed. 

The  two  events,  thus  coming  together,  were  sure 
to  affect  seriously  the  attitude  of  the  United  States 
toward  England.  Not  only  did  Jefferson  no  longer 
need  British  aid,  but  he  found  himself  in  a  position 
where  he  could  afford  with  comparative  freedom  to 
insist  upon  his  own  terms  of  neutrality.  He  had 
always  felt  that  Great  Britain  did  not  sufficiently 
respect  this  neutrality  ;  he  never  failed  to  speak  of 
Jay's  treaty  in  terms  of  vehement  dislike ;  and  he 
freely  avowed  his  intention  of  allowing  all  commercial 
treaties  to  expire.  The  relation  between  these  trea 
ties  and  the  rights  of  neutrality  was  simple.  Jeffer 
son  wanted  no  treaties  which  would  prevent  him  from 
using  commercial  weapons  against  nations  that  vio 
lated  American  neutrality  ;  and  therefore  he  reserved 
to  Congress  the  right  to  direct  commerce  in  whatever 
paths  the  Government  might  prefer. 

1  Pichon  to  Talleyrand,  18  Messidor,  An  xii.  (July  7,  1803); 
Archives  des  Aff.  Etr.,  MSS. 


356        HISTORY   OF   THE   UX1TED   STATES.       Cn.  15. 

"On  the  subject  of  treaties,"  he  wrote,1  "our  sys 
tem  is  to  have  none  with  any  nation,  as  far  as  can  be 
avoided.  The  treaty  with  England  has  therefore  not 
been  renewed,  and  all  overtures  for  treaty  with  other 
nations  have  been  declined.  We  believe  that  with  na 
tions,  as  with  individuals,  dealings  may  be  carried  on 
as  advantageously,  perhaps  more  so,  while  their  continu 
ance  depends  on  a  voluntary  good  treatment,  as  if  fixed 
by  a  contract,  which,  when  it  becomes  injurious  to  either, 
is  made  by  forced  constructions  to  mean  what  suits 
them,  and  becomes  a  cause  of  war  instead  of  a  bond 
of  peace." 

Such  a  system  was  best  suited  to  the  strongest 
nations,  and  to  those  which  could  control  their  deal 
ings  to  most  advantage.  The  Administration  believed 
that  the  United  States  stood  in  this  position. 

The  President  and  Secretary  Madison  were  inclined 
to  assert  authority  in  their  relations  with  foreign 
Powers.  Even  so  early  as  the  preceding  February, 
before  Monroe  sailed  for  Europe,  Madison  told  Pichon 
of  this  intention.2  "  He  added,"  wrote  Pichon  to  Tal 
leyrand,  "  that  if  war  should  be  renewed,  as  seemed 
probable,  the  United  States  would  be  disposed  to  take 
a  higher  tone  than  heretofore,  that  Europe  had  put 
their  spirit  of  moderation  to  proofs  that  would  be 
no  longer  endured."  Immediately  after  hearing  of 
the  Louisiana  cession,  Pichon  wrote  that  the  same 

1  Jefferson  to  Mazzei,  July  18,  1804 ;  Works,  iv.  552. 
1  Pichon  to  Talleyrand,  1  Ventose,  An  xi.  (Feb.  20,  1803); 
Archives  dee  Aff.  fitr.,  MSS. 


1803.  CORDIALITY  WITH  ENGLAND.  357 

spirit  continued  to  animate  the  Government.1  "  It  is 
certain  that  they  propose  to  cause  the  neutrality  of 
the  United  States  to  be  more  exactly  respected  by  the 
belligerent  Powers  than  in  the  last  war.  The  Gov 
ernment  has  often  shown  its  intentions  in  this  respect, 
from  the  time  when  everything  pointed  to  an  infal 
lible  rupture  between  us  and  England."  President 
Jefferson,  while  avowing  a  pacific  policy,  explained 
that  his  hopes  of  peace  were  founded  on  his  power  to 
affect  the  interests  of  the  belligerents.  At  the  same 
moment  when  Pichon  wrote  thus  to  Talleyrand,  the 
President  wrote  to  the  Earl  of  Buchan:2  — 

"  My  hope  of  preserving  peace  for  our  country  is  not 
founded  in  the  Quaker  principle  of  non-resistance  under 
every  wrong,  but  in  the  belief  that  a  just  and  friendly 
conduct  on  our  part  will  procure  justice  and  friendship 
from  others.  In  the  existing  contest,  each  of  the  com 
batants  will  find  an  interest  in  our  friendship." 

He  was  confident  that  he  could  control  France  and 
England : 3  "  I  do  not  believe  we  shall  have  as  much 
to  swallow  from  them  as  our  predecessors  had." 

The  Louisiana  question  being  settled,  the  field  was 
clear  for  the  United  States  to  take  high  ground  in 
behalf  of  neutral  rights ;  and  inevitably  the  first  step 
must  be  taken  against  England.  No  one  denied  that 
thus  far  the  administration  of  Addington  had  be- 

1  Pichon  to  Talleyrand,  18  Messidor,  An  xii.  (July  7,  1803); 
Archives  des  Aff.  Etr.,  MSS. 

•  Jefferson  to  Earl  of  Buchan,  July  10,  1803  ;  Works,  iv.  493. 

•  Jefferson  to  General  Gates,  July  11,  1803;  Works,  iv.  494. 


358         HISTORY  OF   THE  UNITED   STATES.       CH.  15. 

haved  well  toward  the  United  States.  Rufus  King 
brought  to  America  at  the  same  time  with  news  of 
the  Louisiana  treaty,  or  had  sent  shortly  before,  two 
conventions  by  which  long-standing  differences  were 
settled.  One  of  these  conventions  disposed  of  the 
old  subject  of  British  debts,  —  the  British  govern 
ment  accepting  a  round  sum  of  six  hundred  thousand 
pounds  on  behalf  of  the  creditors.1  The  other  cre 
ated  two  commissions  for  running  the  boundary  line 
between  Maine  and  Nova  Scotia,  and  between  the 
Lake  of  the  Woods  and  the  Mississippi  River.2  King 
went  so  far  as  to  express  the  opinion  that  had  he 
not  been  on  the  eve  of  his  departure,  he  might  have 
succeeded  in  making  some  arrangement  about  im 
pressments  ;  and  he  assured  Gallatin  that  the  actual 
Administration  in  England  was  the  most  favorable 
that  had  existed  or  could  exist  for  the  interests  of 
the  United  States ;  its  only  misfortune  was  its  weak 
ness.3  The  conduct  of  the  British  government  in 
regard  to  Louisiana  proved  the  truth  of  King's  asser 
tion.  Not  only  did  it  offer  no  opposition  to  the  sale, 
but  it  lent  every  possible  assistance  to  the  transfer ; 
and  under  its  eye,  with  its  consent,  Alexander  Baring 
made  the  financial  arrangements  which  were  to  fur 
nish  Bonaparte  with  ten  million  American  dollars 
to  pay  the  preliminary  expenses  of  an  invasion  of 
England. 

1  State  Papers,  ii.  382.  a  State  Papers,  ii.  584. 

«  Gallatin  to  Jefferson,  Aug.  18,   1803;  Gallatin's  Worka,  i. 
140. 


1803.  CORDIALITY  WITH  ENGLAND.  359 

Nevertheless,  if  the  United  States  government  in 
tended  to  take  a  high  tone  in  regard  to  neutral  rights, 
it  must  do  so  from  the  beginning  of  the  war.  Aware 
that  success  in  regard  to  England,  as  in  regard  to 
Spain,  depended  on  asserting  at  the  outset,  and  main 
taining  with  obstinacy,  the  principles  intended  to 
be  established,  the  President  and  Secretary  Madison 
lost  no  time  in  causing  their  attitude  to  be  clearly 
understood.  An  opportunity  of  asserting  this  authori 
tative  tone  was  given  by  the  appearance  of  a  new 
British  minister  at  Washington ;  and  thus  it  hap 
pened  that  at  the  time  when  the  Secretary  of  State 
was  preparing  for  his  collision  with  the  Marquis  of 
Casa  Yrujo  and  the  Spanish  empire,  he  took  on  his 
hands  the  more  serious  task  of  curbing  the  preten 
sions  of  Anthony  Merry  and  the  King  of  England. 


CHAPTER  XY1. 

ONE  of  Addington's  friendly  acts  was  the  appoint 
ment  of  Anthony  Merry  as  British  minister  to  the 
United  States.  For  this  selection  Rufus  King  was 
directly  responsible.  Two  names  were  mentioned  to 
him  by  the  Foreign  Office  as  those  of  the  persons 
entitled  to  claim  the  place ;  one  was  that  of  Merry, 
the  other  was  that  of  Francis  James  Jackson. 

"As  I  have  had  the  opportunity  of  knowing  both 
these  gentlemen  during  my  residence  here,"  wrote  Min 
ister  King  to  Secretary  Madison,1  "it  was  not  without 
some  regret  that  I  heard  of  the  intention  to  appoint  Mr. 
Jackson  in  lieu  of  Mr.  Merry.  From  this  information  I 
have  been  led  to  make  further  inquiry  concerning  their 
reputations,  and  the  result  has  proved  rather  to  increase 
than  to  lessen  my  solicitude.  Mr.  Jackson  is  said  to  be 
positive,  vain,  and  intolerant.  He  is  moreover  filled  with 
English  prejudices  in  respect  to  all  other  countries,  and 
as  far  as  bis  opinions  concerning  the  United  States  are 
known,  seems  more  likely  to  disserve  than  to  benefit  a 
liberal  intercourse  between  them  and  his  own  country. 
On  the  other  hand,  Mr.  Merry  appears  to  be  a  plain, 
unassuming,  and  amiable  man,  who  having  lived  for 

1  King  to  Madison,  April  10,  1802 ;  MSS.  State  Department 
Archives. 


1803.  ANTHONY  MERRY.  361 

many  years  in  Spain  is  in  almost  every  point  of  charac 
ter  the  reverse  of  Mr.  Jackson,  who  were  he  to  go  to 
America  would  go  for  the  sake  of  present  employment 
and  with  the  hope  of  leaving  it  as  soon  as  he  could  re 
ceive  a  similar  appointment  in  Europe ;  while  Mr.  Merry 
wishes  for  the  mission  with  the  view  of  obtaining  what 
he  believes  will  prove  to  be  an  agreeable  and  permanent 
residence." 

In  deference  to  Rufus  King's  wishes  or  for  some 
other  reason  Merry  received  the  appointment.  Doubt 
less  he  came  to  America  in  the  hope  of  finding  a 
"  permanent  residence,"  as  King  remarked ;  but  it 
could  hardly  be  agreeable,  as  he  hoped.  He  was  a 
thorough  Englishman,  with  a  wife  more  English  than 
himself.  He  was  not  prepared  for  the  isolation  of 
the  so-called  Federal  City,  and  he  did  not  expect 
to  arrive  at  a  moment  when  the  United  States  govern 
ment,  pleased  with  having  curbed  Bonaparte,  was  pre 
paring  to  chasten  Spain  and  to  discipline  England. 

Landing  at  Norfolk  from  a  ship  of  war  Nov.  4, 1803, 
Merry  was  obliged  to  hire  a  vessel  to  carry  himself 
and  his  belongings  to  Washington,  where,  after  a 
tempestuous  voyage,  he  at  last  arrived,  November  26. 
Possibly  Mr.  and  Mrs.  Merry,  like  other  travellers, 
would  have  grumbled  even  though  Washington  had 
supplied  them  with  Aladdin's  palace  and  Aladdin's 
lamp  to  furnish  it ;  but  the  truth  was  not  to  be  denied 
that  the  Federal  City  offered  few  conveniences,  and 
was  better  suited  for  members  of  Congress,  who  lived 
without  wives  in  boarding-houses,  than  for  foreign 


362        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  16. 

ministers,  with  complaining  wives,  who  were  required 
to  set  up  large  establishments  and  to  entertain  on  a 
European  scale. 

"I  cannot  describe  to  you,"  wrote  Merry  privately,1 
"  the  difficulty  and  expense  which  I  have  to  encounter  in 
fixing  myself  in  a  habitation.  By  dint  of  money  I  have 
just  secured  two  small  houses  on  the  common  which  is 
meant  to  become  in  time  the  city  of  "Washington.  They 
are  mere  shells  of  houses,  with  bare  walls  and  without 
fixtures  of  any  kind,  even  without  a  pump  or  well,  all 
which  I  must  provide  at  my  own  cost.  Provisions  of  any 
kind,  especially  vegetables,  are  frequently  hardly  to  be 
obtained  at  any  price.  So  miserable  is  our  situation." 

Had  these  been  the  worst  trials  that  awaited  the 
new  British  minister,  he  might  have  been  glad  to 
meet  them ;  for  when  once  surmounted,  they  favored 
him  by  preventing  social  rivalry.  Unfortunately  he 
met  more  serious  annoyances.  Until  his  arrival, 
Yrujo  was  the  only  minister  of  full  rank  in  the 
United  States ;  and  Yrujo's  intimate  relations  at  the 
White  House  had  given  him  family  privileges.  For 
this  reason  the  Spanish  minister  made  no  struggle 
to  maintain  etiquette,  but  living  mostly  in  Phila 
delphia  disregarded  the  want  of  what  he  considered 
good  manners  at  Washington,  according  to  which  he 
was  placed  on  the  same  social  footing  with  his  own 
secretary  of  legation.  Yet  Yrujo,  American  in  many 
respects,  belonged  to  the  school  of  Spanish  diplo 
macy  which  had  for  centuries  studied  points  of  honor. 

1  Merry  to  Hammond,  Dec.  7,  1803 ;  MSS.  British  Archives. 


1803.  ANTHONY  MERRY.  363 

He  might  well  have  made  with  his  own  mouth  the 
celebrated  retort  which  one  of  his  predecessors  made 
to  Philip  II.,  who  reproached  him  with  sacrificing  an 
interest  to  a  ceremony :  "  How  a  ceremony  ?  Your 
Majesty's  self  is  but  a  ceremony  ! "  Although  Yrujo 
submitted  to  Jefferson,  he  quarrelled  with  Pichon  on 
this  point,  for  Pichon  was  only  a  secretary  in  charge 
of  the  French  legation.  In  November,  1803,  Yrujo's 
friendship  for  Jefferson  was  cooling,  and  he  waited 
the  arrival  of  Merry  in  the  hope  of  finding  a  cham 
pion  of  diplomatic  rights.  Jefferson,  on  the  other 
hand,  waited  Merry's  arrival  in  order  to  establish, 
once  for  all,  a  new  social  code ;  and  that  there 
•might  be  no  misunderstanding,  he  drafted  with  his 
own  hand  the  rules  which  were  to  control  Executive 
society,  —  rules  intended  to  correct  a  tendency 
toward  monarchical  habits  introduced  by  President 
Washington. 

In  1801  on  coming  into  power  Jefferson  announced 
that  he  would  admit  not  the  smallest  distinction  that 
might  separate  him  from  the  mass  of  his  fellow- 
citizens.  He  dispensed  with  the  habit  of  setting 
apart  certain  days  and  hours  for  receiving  visits  of 
business  or  curiosity,  announcing  that  he  would  on 
any  day  and  at  any  hour  receive  in  a  friendly  and 
hospitable  manner  those  who  should  call  upon  him.1 
He  evidently  wished  to  place  the  White  House  on 
the  footing  of  easy  and  generous  hospitality  which 

1  Thornton  to  Hawkesbury,  Dec.  9,  1801;  MSS.  British 
Archives. 


364        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  16. 

was  the  pride  of  every  Virginia  gentleman.  No  man 
should  be  turned  away  from  its  doors;  its  table, 
liberal  and  excellent,  should  be  filled  with  equal 
guests,  whose  self-respect  should  be  hurt  by  no  arti 
ficial  rules  of  precedence.  Such  hospitality  cost  both 
time  and  money ;  but  Washington  was  a  petty  village, 
society  was  very  small,  and  Jefferson  was  a  poor 
economist.  He  entertained  freely  and  handsomely. 

"  Yesterday  I  dined  with  the  President,"  wrote  Senator 
Plumer  of  New  Hampshire,  Dec.  25,  1802. 1  "His  rule 
is  to  have  about  ten  members  of  Congress  at  a  time. 
We  sat  down  to  the  table  at  four,  rose  at  six,  and 
walked  immediately  into  another  room  and  drank  coffee. 
We  had  a  very  good  dinner,  with  a  profusion  of  fruits 
and  sweetmeats.  The  wine  was  the  best  I  ever  drank, 
particularly  the  champagne,  which  was  indeed  delicious. 
I  wish  his  French  politics  were  as  good  as  his  French 
wines." 

So  long  as  this  manner  of  life  concerned  only  the 
few  Americans  who  were  then  residents  or  visitors 
at  Washington,  Jefferson  found  no  great  difficulty 
in  mixing  his  company  and  disregarding  precedence. 
Guests  accommodated  themselves  to  the  ways  of  the 
house,  took  care  of  their  own  comfort,  went  to  table 
without  special  request,  and  sat  wherever  they  found 
a  vacant  chair  ;  but  foreigners  could  hardly  be  ex 
pected  at  first  to  understand  what  Jefferson  called 
the  rule  of  pell-mell.  Thornton  and  Pichon,  being 
only  secretaries  of  legation,  rather  gained  than  lost 
1  Life  of  William  Plumer,  p.  245. 


1803.  ANTHONY  MERRY.  365 

by  it ;  but  Yrujo  resented  it  in  secret ;  and  all  eyes 
were  turned  to  see  how  the  new  British  minister 
would  conduct  himself  in  the  scramble. 

A  month  afterwards  the  President  drew  up  the  Code 
which  he  called  "  Canons  of  Etiquette  to  be  observed 
by  the  Executive,"  1  and  which  received  the  approval  of 
the  Cabinet.  Foreign  ministers,  he  said,  were  to  pay 
the  first  visit  to  the  "  ministers  of  the  nation ; "  their 
wives  were  to  receive  the  first  visit  from  the  wives  of 
"  national  ministers."  No  grades  among  diplomatic 
members  were  to  give  precedence  ;  "  all  are  perfectly 
equal,  whether  foreign  or  domestic,  titled  or  untitled, 
in  or  out  of  office."  Finally,  "  to  maintain  the  prin 
ciple  of  equality,  or  of  pele-mele,  and  prevent  the 
growth  of  precedence  out  of  courtesy,  the  members 
of  the  Executive  will  practise  at  their  own  houses, 
and  recommend  an  adherence  to,  the  ancient  usage 
of  the  country,  —  of  gentlemen  in  mass  giving  prece 
dence  to  the  ladies  in  mass  in  passing  from  one  apart 
ment  where  they  are  assembled  into  another."  Such, 
according  to  Rufus  King,  whose  aid  was  invoked  on 
this  occasion,  was  the  usage  in  London.2 

Merry  duly  arrived  in  Washington,  and  was  told  by 
Madison  that  the  President  would  receive  his  letter 
of  credence  Nov.  29,  according  to  the  usual  formality. 
At  the  appointed  hour  the  British  minister,  in  diplo 
matic  uniform,  as  was  required  in  the  absence  of  any 
hint  to  the  contrary,  called  upon  Madison,  and  was 

1  Jefferson's  Works,  ix.  454. 

2  King  to  Madison,  22  Dec.,  1803;  MSS.  State  Department 
Archives. 


366         HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  16. 

taken  to  the  White  House,  where  he  was  received 
by  the  President.  Jefferson's  manner  of  receiving 
guests  was  well  known,  although  this  was  the  first 
occasion  on  which  he  had  given  audience  to  a  new 
foreign  minister.  Among  several  accounts  of  his 
appearance  at  such  times,  that  of  Senator  Plumer 
was  one  of  the  best. 

"In  a  few  moments  after  our  arrival,"  said  the  sena 
tor,  writing  two  years  before  Merry's  mishap,1  "a  tall, 
high-boned  man  came  into  the  room.  He  was  dressed, 
or  rather  undressed,  in  an  old  brown  coat,  red  waistcoat, 
old  corduroy  small-clothes  much  soiled,  woollen  hose,  and 
slippers  without  heels.  I  thought  him  a  servant,  when 
General  Varnum  surprised  me  by  announcing  that  it  was 
the  President." 

The  "  Evening  Post,"  about  a  year  later,  described 
him  as  habitually  appearing  in  public  "  dressed  in 
long  boots  with  tops  turned  down  about  the  ankles 
like  a  Virginia  buck  ;  overalls  of  corduroy  faded,  by 
frequent  immersions  in  soap  suds,  from  yellow  to  a 
dull  white ;  a  red  single-breasted  waistcoat ;  a  light 
brown  coat  with  brass  buttons,  both  coat  and  waist 
coat  quite  threadbare  ;  linen  very  considerably  soiled ; 
hair  uncombed  and  beard  unshaven."  In  truth  the 
Virginia  republicans  cared  little  for  dress.  "  You 
know  that  the  Virginians  have  some  pride  in  appear 
ing  in  simple  habiliments,"  wrote  Joseph  Story  in 
regard  to  Jefferson,  "  and  are  willing  to  rest  their 
claim  to  attention  upon  their  force  of  mind  and  sua- 
1  Life  of  William  Plumer,  p.  242. 


1803.  ANTHONY   MERRY.  367 

vity  of  manners."  Indeed,  "  Virginia  carelessness  " 
was  almost  a  proverb.1 

On  the  occasion  of  Merry's  reception,  the  Presi 
dent's  chief  offence  in  etiquette  consisted  in  the 
slippers  without  heels.  No  law  of  the  United  States 
or  treaty  stipulation  forbade  Jefferson  to  receive 
Merry  in  heelless  slippers,  or  for  that  matter  in  bare 
feet,  if  he  thought  proper  to  do  so.  Yet  Virginia 
gentlemen  did  not  intentionally  mortify  their  guests ; 
and  perhaps  Madison  would  have  done  better  to  re 
lieve  the  President  of  such  a  suspicion  by  notifying 
Merry  beforehand  that  he  would  not  be  expected 
to  wear  full  dress.  In  that  case  the  British  minister 
might  have  complimented  Jefferson  by  himself  ap 
pearing  in  slippers  without  heels. 

A  card  of  invitation  was  next  sent,  asking  Mr.  and 
Mrs.  Merry  to  dine  at  the  White  House,  December  2. 
Such  an  invitation  was  in  diplomatic  usage  equivalent 
to  a  command,  and  Merry  at  once  accepted  it.  The 
new  minister  was  then  told  that  he  must  call  on  the 
heads  of  departments.  He  remonstrated,  saying  that 
Liston,  his  predecessor,  had  been  required  to  make 
the  first  visit  only  to  the  Secretary  of  State ;  but  he 
was  told,  in  effect,  that  what  had  been  done  under 
the  last  Administration  was  no  rule  for  the  present 
one.  Merry  acquiesced,  and  made  his  calls.  These 
pin-thrusts  irritated  him ;  but  he  was  more  seriously 
inconvenienced  by  the  sudden  withdrawal  of  dip 
lomatic  privileges  by  the  Senate,  although  Vice- 
1  Life  of  Joseph  Story,  pp.  151,  158. 


368        HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.       CH.  16. 

President  Burr  took  occasion  to  explain  that  the 
Senate's  action  was  quite  unconnected  with  the 
President's  "  canons  of  etiquette,"  and  was  in  truth 
due  to  some  indiscretion  of  Yrujo  in  the  House  of 
Representatives. 

Meanwhile  the  President  took  an  unusual  step. 
When  two  countries  were  at  war,  neutral  govern 
ments  commonly  refrained  from  inviting  the  represen 
tative  of  one  belligerent  to  meet  the  representative  of 
the  other,  unless  on  formal  occasions  where  the  entire 
diplomatic  body  was  invited,  or  in  crowds  where  con 
tact  was  not  necessary.  Still  more  rarely  were  such 
incongruous  guests  invited  to  an  entertainment  sup 
posed  to  be  given  in  honor  of  either  individual.  No 
one  knew  this  rule  better  than  Jefferson,  who  had 
been  himself  four  years  in  diplomatic  service  at  Paris, 
besides  being  three  years  Secretary  of  State  to  Presi 
dent  Washington  at  Philadelphia.  He  knew  that 
the  last  person  whom  Merry  would  care  to  meet  was 
Pichon,  the  French  chargS ;  yet  he  not  only  invited 
Pichon,  but  pressed  him  to  attend.  The  Frenchman, 
aware  that  Merry  was  to  be  mortified  by-  the  etiquette 
of  the  dinner,  and  watching  with  delight  the  process 
by  which  Jefferson,  day  after  day,  took  a  higher  tone 
toward  England,  wrote  an  account  of  the  affair  to 
Talleyrand.1  He  said :  — 

"  I  was  invited  to  this  dinner.  I  had  learned  from 
the  President  what  was  the  matter  (ce  qui  en  etait), 

1  Pichon  to  Talleyrand,  15  Pluviose,  An  xii.  (Feb.  5,  1804)  ; 
Archives  des  Aff.  Etr.,  MSS. 


1803.  ANTHONY  MERRY.  369 

when  I  went  to  tell  him  that  I  was  going  for  some 
days  to  Baltimore,  where  I  was  called  by  the  affairs  of 
the  frigate  '  La  Poursuivante.'  The  President  was  so 
obliging  as  to  urge  my  return  in  order  to  be  present 
with  Mme.  Pichon  at  the  dinner  ( Le  President  eut 
I'honnetett,  de  me  presser  de  revenir  pour  &tre  au  diner) . 
1  came  back  here,  although  business  required  a  longer 
stay  at  Baltimore.  Apart  from  the  reason  of  respect  due 
to  the  President,  I  had  that  of  witnessing  what  might 
happen  (J'avais  celle  de  connaltre  ce  qui  se  passeratt) ." 

Pichon  accordingly  hurried  back  from  Baltimore, 
especially  at  the  President's  request,  in  order  to  have 
the  pleasure  of  seeing  Jefferson  humiliate  his  own 
guest  in  his  own  house. 

Pichon  was  gratified  by  the  result.  At  four  o'clock 
on  the  afternoon  of  Dec.  2,  1803,  this  curious  party 
assembled  at  the  White  House,  —  Mr.  and  Mrs.  Merry, 
the  Marquis  Yrujo  and  his  American  wife,  M.  Pichon 
and  his  American  wife,  Mr.  and  Mrs.  Madison,  and 
some  other  persons  whose  names  were  not  mentioned. 
When  dinner  was  announced,  the  President  offered 
his  hand  to  Mrs.  Madison  and  took  her  to  table, 
placing  her  on  his  right.  Mme.  Yrujo  took  her  seat 
on  his  left. 

"Mrs.  Merry  was  placed  by  Mr.  Madison  below  the 
Spanish  minister,  who  sat  next  to  Mrs.  Madison.  With 
respect  to  me,"  continued  the  British  minister  in  his 
account  of  the  affair,1  "  I  was  proceeding  to  place  my 
self,  though  without  invitation,  next  to  the  wife  of  the 

1  Merry     to    Hawkesbmy,     Dec.    6,     1803 ;     MSS.    British 

Archives. 

YOL.  II.  —  24 


370        HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  16. 

Spanish  minister,  when  a  member  of  the  House  of  Rep 
resentatives  passed  quickly  by  me  and  took  the  seat,  with 
out  Mr.  Jefferson's  using  any  means  to  prevent  it,  or 
taking  any  care  that  I  might  be  otherwise  placed.  .  . 

"  I  will  beg  leave  to  intrude  a  moment  longer  on  your 
Lordship's  time,"  continued  Merry's  report,  "  by  adding 
to  this  narrative  that  among  the  persons  (none  of  those 
who  were  of  this  country  were  the  principal  officers  of 
the  government  except  Mr.  Madison)  whom  the  Presi 
dent  selected  for  a  dinner  which  was  understood  to  be 
given  to  me,  was  M.  Pichon  the  French  charge  d'affaires. 
I  use  the  word  selected,  because  it  could  not  be  considered 
as  a  diplomatic  dinner,  since  he  omitted  to  invite  to  it 
the  Danish  charge  d  'affaires,  who,  with  the  Spanish  min 
ister,  form  the  whole  body." 

Merry's  report  was  brief ;  but  Yrujo,  who  also 
made  an  official  report  to  his  Government,  after  men 
tioning  the  neglect  shown  to  Merry  before  dinner, 
added  a  remark  that  explained  the  situation  more 
exactly  : l  — 

"  I  observed  immediately  the  impression  that  such  a 
proceeding  of  the  President  must  have  on  Mr.  and  Mrs. 
Merry  ;  and  their  resentment  could  not  but  be  increased 
at  seeing  the  manifest,  and  in  my  opinion  studied,  pre 
ference  given  by  the  President  throughout  to  me  and  my 
wife  over  him  and  Mrs.  Merry." 

There  the  matter  might  have  rested,  had  not  Madi 
son  carried  the  new  "  canons  "  beyond  the  point  of 
endurance.  December  6,  four  days  after  the  dinner 
at  the  White  House,  the  British  minister  was  to  dine 

1  Yrujo  to  Cevallos,  Feb.  7,  1804  ;   MSS.  Spanish  Archives. 


1803.  ANTHONY  MERRY.  371 

with  the  Secretary  of  State.  Pichon  and  Yrujo  were 
again  present,  and  all  the  Cabinet  with  their  wives. 
Yrujo's  report  described  the  scene  that  followed. 

"  I  should  observe,"  said  he,  "  that  until  then  my 
wife  and  I  had  enjoyed  in  the  houses  of  Cabinet  ministers 
the  precedence  of  which  we  had  been  deprived  in  the 
President's  house  ;  but  on  this  day  the  Secretary  of  State 
too  altered  his  custom,  without  informing  us  beforehand 
of  his  resolution,  and  took  to  table  the  wife  of  the  Secre 
tary  of  the  Treasury.  This  unexpected  conduct  pro 
duced  at  first  some  confusion,  during  which  the  wife  of 
the  British  minister  was  left  without  any  one  giving  her 
his  hand,  until  her  husband  advanced,  with  visible  indig 
nation,  and  himself  took  her  to  table." 

Even  Pichon,  though  pleased  to  see  the  British 
minister  humbled,  felt  his  diplomatic  pride  a  little 
scandalized  at  this  proceeding.  He  admitted  that  it 
was  an  innovation,  and  added, — 

"  There  is  no  doubt  that  Mr.  Madison  in  this  instance 
wished  to  establish  in  his  house  the  same  formality  as  at 
the  President's,  in  order  to  make  Mr.  Merry  feel  more 
keenly  the  scandal  he  had  made ;  but  this  incident 
increased  it." 

The  scandal  which  Merry  had  made  consisted  in 
saying  that  he  believed  his  treatment  at  the  White 
House  was  a  premeditated  insult  against  his  country. 
Madison's  course  took  away  any  remaining  doubt  on 
the  subject  in  his  mind.  Merry  became  bitter.  He 
wrote  home  informally  : l  — 

1  Merry  to  Hammond,  Dec.  7,  1803  ;  MSS.  British  Archiref. 


372        HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.       CH.  16. 

u  On  this  occasion,  also,  the  pas  and  the  preference  in 
every  respect  was  taken  by,  and  given  to,  the  wives  of 
the  Secretaries  of  the  Departments  (a  set  of  beings  as 
little  without  the  manners  as  without  the  appearance  of 
gentlewomen),  the  foreign  ministers  and  their  wives 
being  left  to  take  care  of  themselves.  In  short  the  latter 
are  now  placed  here  in  a  situation  so  degrading  to  the 
countries  they  represent,  and  so  personally  disagreeable 
to  themselves,  as  to  have  become  almost  intolerable. 
The  case  yesterday  was  so  marked  and  so  irritating  that 
I  determined  to  hand  Mrs.  Merry  myself  to  the  table, 
and  to  place  ourselves  wherever  we  might  conveniently 
find  seats." 

Merry  then  received  an  official  explanation  that 
Jefferson  invariably  gave  precedence  to  the  wives  of 
his  Cabinet  ministers,  and  that  he  made  no  excep 
tions  in  favor  of  foreigners  in  his  rule  of  pele-m£le.1 
Merry  notified  Lord  Hawkesbury  to  that  effect.  He 
did  not  fail  to  point  out  the  signs  which  indicated 
to  him  that  these  proceedings  were  but  part  of  a 
general  plan  intended  to  press  on  the  British  gov 
ernment.  In  truth,  the  whole  issue  lay  in  the 
question  whether  that  intent  influenced  Jefferson's 
behavior. 

A  sort  of  civil  war  ensued  in  the  little  society  of 
Washington,  in  which  the  women  took  prominent 
part,  and  Mrs.  Merry  gave  back  with  interest  the 
insults  she  considered  herself  to  have  received.  The 

1  Madison  to  Monroe,  19  Jan.,  1804.  Madison  MSS.,  State 
Department  Archives.  Merry  to  Hawkesbury,  30  Jan.,  1801. 
MSS.  British  Archives. 


1803.  ANTHONY  MERRY.  373 

first  serious  evil  was  an  alliance  between  Merry  and 
Yrujo,  the  two  men  whom  Jefferson  had  most  in 
terest  in  keeping  apart.  Pichon  wrote  home  a  lively 
account  of  the  hostilities  that  followed.1 

"  M.  Yrujo,  who  is  vanity  itself,  blew  the  flame  more 
vigorously  than  ever.  .  .  .  He  concerted  reprisals  with 
Mr.  Merry,  and  it  was  agreed  that  whenever  they  should 
entertain  the  secretaries  and  their  wives,  they  should  take 
none  of  them  to  table,  but  should  give  their  hands  to 
their  own  wives.  This  resolution  was  carried  out  at  a 
dinner  given  some  days  afterward  by  M.  Yrujo.  Mr. 
and  Mrs.  Merry  were  next  invited  by  the  Secretary  of 
the  Navy.  Mrs.  Merry  refused ;  yet  this  minister,  a 
very  well-bred  man  (homme  fort  poli),  had  so  arranged 
things  as  to  give  her  his  hand.  Apparently  what  had 
taken  place  at  Mr.  Madison's  was  thought  harsh  (dur) , 
and  it  was  wished  to  bring  Mr.  and  Mrs.  Merry  back  to 
a  reconciliation.  The  Cabinet  took  up  the  question,  as 
reported  in  the  newspaper  of  which  I  sent  you  an  extract, 
and  it  was  resolved  that  hereafter  the  President  should 
give  his  hand  to  the  lady  who  might  happen  to  be  nearest 
him,  and  that  there  should  be  no  precedence.  Mr.  Merry 
was  invited  to  a  tea  by  the  Secretary  of  War  and  by  the 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury.  To  avoid  all  discussion  he 
wholly  refused  the  first,  and  after  accepting  the  second 
he  did  not  come.  Finally,  New  Year's  Day  gave  another 
occasion  for  scandal.  On  this  day,  as  on  the  Fourth 
of  July,  it  is  the  custom  to  call  upon  the  President ;  and 
even  the  ladies  go  there.  This  year  neither  Mme.  Yrujo 
nor  Mrs.  Merry  went,  and  the  Marquis  took  care  to 

1  Pichon  to  Talleyrand,  15  Pluvi6ae,  An  xii.  (Feb.  5,  1804); 
Archives  des  Aff.  £tr.,  MSS. 


374        HISTORY  OP  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  16. 

answer  every  one  who  inquired  after  his  wife's  health, 
that  she  was  perfectly  well.  Since  then  Washington 
society  is  turned  upside  down  ;  all  the  women  are  to  the 
last  degree  exasperated  against  Mrs.  Merry ;  the  Federal 
newspapers  have  taken  up  the  matter,  and  increased  the 
irritation  by  sarcasms  on  the  Administration  and  by  mak 
ing  a  burlesque  of  the  facts,  which  the  Government  has 
not  thought  proper  to  correct.  The  arrival  of  M.  Bona 
parte  with  his  wife  in  the  midst  of  all  this  explosion  has 
furnished  Mr.  Merry  with  new  griefs.  The  President 
asked  M.  and  Mme.  Bonaparte  to  dinner,  and  gave  his 
hand  to  Madame.  There  was,  however,  this  difference 
between  the  two  cases,  —  the  President  had  invited  on 
this  day,  besides  myself  and  Mme.  Pichon,  only  the 
two  Messrs.  Smith  and  their  wives,  who  are  of  Mme. 
Bonaparte's  family.  But  when  Mr.  Merry  heard  of  it, 
he  remarked  that  Mme.  Bonaparte  had  on  this  occasion 
taken  precedence  of  the  wife  of  the  Secretary  of  the 
Navy.  .  .  I  am  aware,"  continued  the  delighted  Pichon, 
"  that  with  tact  on  the  part  of  Mr.  Jefferson  he  might 
have  avoided  all  these  scandals." 

The  British  minister  wrote  to  Lord  Hawkesbury 
a  brief  account  of  his  reception,  closing  with  the 
remark : 1  — 

"  Under  these  circumstances,  my  Lord,  I  have  thought 
it  advisable  to  avoid  all  occasions  where  I  and  my  wife 
might  be  exposed  to  a  repetition  of  the  same  want  of 
distinction  toward  us  until  I  shall  have  received  author 
ity  from  you  to  acquiesce  in  it,  by  a  signification  of  his 
Majesty's  pleasure  to  that  effect." 

1  Merry  to  Hawkesbury,  Dec.  31,  1803;  MSS.  British 
Archives. 


1803.  ANTHONY  MERRY.  375 

Accordingly,  when  the  President  invited  the  two 
ministers  to  dine  at  the  White  House  without  their 
wives,  they  replied  that  they  could  not  accept  the 
invitation  until  after  receiving  instructions  from 
their  Governments.  Jefferson  regarded  this  con 
certed  answer  as  an  insult.1  He  too  lost  his  tem 
per  so  far  as  to  indulge  in  sharp  comments,  and 
thought  the  matter  important  enough  to  call  for 
explanation.  In  a  private  letter  to  Monroe,  dated 
Jan.  8,  1804,  he  wrote:2  — 

"  Mr.  Merry  is  with  us,  and  we  believe  him  to  be  per 
sonally  as  desirable  a  character  as  could  have  been  sent 
us  ;  but  he  is  unluckily  associated  with  one  of  an  opposite 
character  in  every  point.  She  has  already  disturbed  our 
harmony  extremely.  He  began  by  claiming  the  first  visit 
from  the  national  ministers.  He  corrected  himself  in 
this  ;  but  a  pretension  to  take  precedence  at  dinner,  etc., 
over  all  others  is  persevered  in.  We  have  told  him  that 
the  principle  of  society  as  well  as  of  government  with 
us  is  the  equality  of  the  individuals  composing  it ;  that 
no  man  here  would  come  to  a  dinner  where  he  was  to  be 
marked  with  inferiority  to  any  other ;  that  we  might  as 
well  attempt  to  force  our  principle  of  equality  at  St. 
James's  as  he  his  principle  of  precedence  here.  I  had 
been  in  the  habit  when  I  invited  female  company  (having 
no  lady  in  my  family)  to  ask  one  of  the  ladies  of  the 
four  Secretaries  to  come  and  take  care  of  my  company, 

1  Pichon  to  Talleyrand,  27  Pluviose,  An  xii.  (Feb.  13,  1804)  ; 
Archives  des  Aff.  fitr.,  MSS. 

a  Jefferson  to  Monroe,  Jan.  8,  1804 ;  Jefferson's  Writings 
(Ford),  viii.  286.  Cf.  Madison  to  Monroe,  16  Feb.  1804.  Mad 
ison's  Works,  ii.  195-199. 


376        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  16. 

and  as  she  was  to  do  the  honors  of  the  table  I  handed 
her  to  dinner  myself.  That  Mr.  Merry  might  not  con 
strue  this  as  giving  them  a  precedence  over  Mrs.  Merry 
I  have  discontinued  it,  and  here  as  in  private  houses  the 
pele-mele  practice  is  adhered  to.  They  have  got  Yrujo 
to  take  a  zealous  part  in  the  claim  of  precedence.  It  has 
excited  generally  emotions  of  great  contempt  and  indig 
nation  (in  which  the  members  of  the  Legislature  partici 
pate  sensibly)  that  the  agents  of  foreign  nations  should 
assume  to  dictate  to  us  what  shall  be  the  laws  of  our 
society.  The  consequence  will  be  that  Mr.  and  Mrs. 
Merry  will  put  themselves  into  Coventry,  and  that  he  will 
lose  the  best  half  of  his  usefulness  to  his  nation,  —  that 
derived  from  a  perfectly  familiar  and  private  intercourse 
with  the  Secretaries  and  myself.  The  latter,  be  assured, 
is  a  virago,  and  in  the  short  course  of  a  few  weeks  has 
established  a  degree  of  dislike  among  all  classes  which 
one  would  have  thought  impossible  in  so  short  a  time. 
.  .  .  With  respect  to  Merry,  he  appears  so  reasonable 
and  good  a  man  that  I  should  be  sorry  to  lose  him  as 
long  as  there  remains  a  possibility  of  reclaiming  him 
to  the  exercise  of  his  own  dispositions.  If  his  wife  per 
severes  she  must  eat  her  soup  at  home,  and  we  shall  en 
deavor  to  draw  him  into  society  as  if  she  did  not  exist." 

Of  all  American  hospitality  none  was  so  justly 
famous  as  that  of  Virginia.  In  this  State  there  was 
probably  not  a  white  man,  or  even  a  negro  slave,  but 
would  have  resented  the  charge  that  he  was  capable 
of  asking  a  stranger,  a  foreigner,  a  woman,  under 
his  roof,  with  the  knowledge  that  he  was  about  to 
inflict  what  the  guest  would  feel  as  a  humiliation. 
Still  less  would  he  have  selected  his  guest's  only 


1803.  ANTHONY  MERRY.  377 

enemy,  and  urged  him  to  be  present  for  the  purpose 
of  witnessing  the  slight.  Reasons  of  state  sometimes 
gave  occasion  for  such  practices,  but  under  the  most 
favorable  conditions  the  tactics  were  unsafe.  Napo 
leon  in  the  height  of  his  power  insulted  queens,  brow 
beat  ambassadors,  trampled  on  his  ministers,  and 
made  his  wife  and  servants  tremble  ;  but  although 
these  manners  could  at  his  slightest  hint  be  imitated 
by  a  million  soldiers,  until  Europe,  from  Cadiz  to 
Moscow,  cowered  under  his  multiplied  brutality,  the 
insults  and  outrages  recoiled  upon  him  in  the  end. 
Jefferson  could  not  afford  to  adopt  Napoleonic  habits. 
His  soldiers  were  three  thousand  in  number,  and  his 
own  training  had  not  been  that  of  a  successful  gen 
eral  ;  he  had  seven  frigates,  and  was  eager  to  lay  them 
up  in  a  single  dry-dock.  Peace  was  his  passion. 

To  complicate  this  civil  war  in  the  little  society  of 
Washington,  Jerome  Bonaparte  appeared  there,  and 
brought  with  him  his  young  wife,  Elizabeth  Patterson, 
of  Baltimore.  Jerome  married  this  beautiful  girl 
against  the  remonstrances  of  Pichon ;  but  after  the 
marriage  took  place,  not  only  Pichon,  but  also  Yrujo 
and  Jefferson,  showed  proper  attention  to  the  First 
Consul's  brother,  who  had  selected  for  his  wife  a 
niece  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  and  of  so  influen 
tial  a  senator  as  General  Smith.  Yet  nothing  irri 
tated  Napoleon  more  than  Jerome's  marriage.  In 
some  respects  it  was  even  more  objectionable  to  him 
than  that  of  Lucien,  which  gave  rise  to  a  family  feud. 
Pichon  suspected  what  would  be  the  First  Consul's 


378        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED   STATES.      CH.  16. 

feelings,  and  wrote  letter  after  letter  to  clear  himself 
of  blame.  In  doing  so  he  could  not  but  excite  Napo 
leon's  anger  against  American  society,  and  especially 
against  the  family  of  his  new  sister-in-law. 

"  It  appears,  Citizen  Minister,"  wrote  Pichon  to  Talley 
rand,1  "  that  General  Smith,  who  in  spite  of  the  contrary 
assurances  he  has  given  me,  has  always  had  this  alliance 
much  at  heart,  has  thrown  his  eyes  on  the  mission  to 
Paris  as  a  means  of  appeasing  (ramener)  the  First 
Consul.  He  has  long  since  aimed  at  the  diplomatic 
career,  for  which  he  is  little  qualified  ;  this  motive  and 
the  near  return  of  Mr.  Livingston  have  decided  his  taste. 
For  some  time  there  has  been  much  question  of  this 
nomination  among  the  friends  of  General  Smith.  There 
is  also  question  of  promoting,  on  the  part  of  the  First 
Consul,  for  minister  to  this  country,  a  selection  which 
should  be  connected  with  the  other.  It  is  thought  that 
the  appointment  of  M.  Jerome  Bonaparte  would  be  an 
honorable  mode  of  leaving  the  First  Consul's  brother 
time  to  have  his  fault  forgotten,  and  of  preparing  his 
return  to  favor." 

Such  readiness  among  Jefferson's  advisers  to  court 
the  favors  of  the  young  First  Consul  was  sure  not  to 
escape  the  eyes  of  the  embittered  Federalists.  Pich- 
on's  account,  although  sharp  in  allusions  to  General 
Smith's  "  vanity,"  was  mild  compared  with  the  scorn 
of  the  New  Englanders.  Apparently  the  new  matri 
monial  alliance  was  taken  seriously  by  prominent 
Republican  leaders.  One  of  the  Massachusetts  sena- 

1  Pichon  to  Talleyrand,  30  Pluviose,  An  xii.  (Feb.  16,  1804); 
Archives  des  Aff.  E~tr.,  MSS. 


1803.  ANTHONY  MERRY.  379 

tors  mentioned  in  his  diary l  a  "  curious  conversation 
between  S.  Smith,  Breckenridge,  Armstrong,  and 
Baldwin,  about  '  Smith's  nephew,  the  First  Consul's 
brother.'  Smith  swells  upon  it  to  very  extraordinary 
dimensions."  Pichon  openly  spoke  of  the  whole 
family  connection,  including  both  Robert  and  Samuel 
Smith,  and  even  Wilson  Gary  Nicholas,  as  possessed 
with  "  an  inconceivable  infatuation  "  for  the  match ; 
"  it  was  really  the  young  man  who  was  seduced." 
Nothing  that  Pichon  could  say  affected  them.  Sena 
tor  J.  Q.  Adams  remarked :  "  the  Smiths  are  so  elated 
with  their  supposed  elevation  by  this  adventure,  that 
one  step  more  would  fit  them  for  the  discipline  of 
Dr.  Willis,"  —  the  famous  English  expert  in  mental 
diseases.2 

The  President  and  his  friends  might  not  know 
enough  of  Napoleon's  character  to  foresee  the  irri 
tation  which  such  reports  would  create  in  his  mind, 
but  they  were  aware  of  the  contrast  between  their 
treatment  of  Jerome  Bonaparte  and  their  slights  to 
Anthony  Merry.  Had  they  felt  any  doubt  upon  the 
subject,  the  free  comments  of  the  British  minister 
and  his  wife  would  have  opened  their  eyes.  In 
truth,  no  doubt  existed.  Washington  society  was 
in  a  manner  ordered  to  proscribe  the  Merrys  and 
Yrujo,  and  pay  court  to  Jerome  and  the  Smiths. 

Had  this  been  all,  the  matter  would  have  ended  in 
a  personal  quarrel  between  the  two  envoys  and  the 

1  Diary  of  J.  Q.  Adams  (Jan.  7,  1804),  i.  284. 
1  Ibid. 


380         HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  16. 

two  Virginians,  with  which  the  public  would  have 
had  no  concern.  Jefferson's  "  canons  of  etiquette " 
would  in  such  a  case  have  had  no  further  importance 
than  as  an  anecdote  of  his  social  habits.  The  serious 
ness  of  Jefferson's  experiments  in  etiquette  consisted 
in  the  belief  that  they  were  part  of  a  political  system 
which  involved  a  sudden  change  of  policy  toward  two 
great  Powers.  The  "  canons "  were  but  the  social 
expression  of  an  altered  feeling  which  found  its  politi 
cal  expression  in  acts  marked  by  equal  disregard  of 
usage.  The  Spanish  minister  had  already  reason  to 
know  what  he  might  expect;  for  six  weeks  before 
Merry's  dinners  John  Randolph  proclaimed  in  the 
House  that  West  Florida  belonged  to  the  United 
States,  and  within  the  week  that  preceded  Merry's 
reception,  he  brought  in  the  Bill  which  authorized  the 
President  to  annex  Mobile.  After  such  a  proceeding, 
no  diplomatist  would  have  doubted  what  meaning  to 
put  upon  the  new  code  of  Republican  society.  Merry's 
arrival,  at  the  instant  of  this  aggression  upon  Spain, 
was  the  signal  for  taking  toward  England  a  higher 
tone. 

Merry  could  not  fail  to  see  what  lay  before  him. 
From  the  President,  notwithstanding  heelless  slippers 
and  "  canons  of  etiquette,"  the  British  minister  heard 
none  but  friendly  words.  After  the  formal  ceremony 
of  delivering  the  letter  of  credence  was  over,  — 

"  He  desired  me  to  sit  down,"  wrote  Merry,1  "  when 

we  conversed  for  some  time  on  general   affairs.      The 

1  Merry  to  Hawkesbury,  Dec.  6,  1803;  MSS.  British  Archives. 


1803.  ANTHONY  MERRY.  381 

sentiments  which  he  expressed  respecting  those  of  Europe 
appeared  very  properly  to  be  by  no  means  favorable  to 
the  spirit  of  ambition  and  aggrandizement  of  the  present 
ruler  in  France,  or  to  the  personal  character  in  any  res 
pect  of  the  First  Consul,  and  still  less  so  to  his  conduct 
toward  all  nations." 

From  this  subject  the  President  passed  to  Spanish 
affairs  and  to  the  Spanish  protest  against  the  Loui 
siana  cession,  founded  on  Bonaparte's  pledge  never  to 
alienate  that  province. 

"  This  circumstance,"  continued  Merry,  "  as  well  as 
the  resistance  altogether  which  Spain  had  unexpectedly 
brought  forward  in  words,  Mr.  Jefferson  considered  as 
highly  ridiculous,  and  as  showing  a  very  pitiful  conduct 
on  her  part,  since  she  did  not  appear  to  have  taken  any 
measures  to  support  it  either  by  preparation  of  defence 
on  the  spot,  or  by  sending  there  a  force  to  endeavor  to 
prevent  the  occupation  of  the  country  by  the  troops  of 
the  United  States.  He  concluded  by  saying  that  posses 
sion  of  it  would,  at  all  events,  be  taken." 

If  Merry  did  not  contrive,  after  his  dinner  at  the 
White  House,  to  impart  this  conversation  to  his  col 
leagues  Yrujo  and  Pichon,  he  must  have  been  a  man 
remarkably  free  from  malice.  Meanwhile  he  had  his 
own  affairs  to  manage,  and  Madison  was  not  so  for 
bearing  as  the  President.  Merry's  first  despatch  an 
nounced  to  his  Government  that  Madison  had  already 
raised  his  tone.  Without  delay  the  matter  of  im 
pressments  was  brought  into  prominence.  The  "pre 
tended  "  blockade  of  Martinique  and  Guadeloupe  was 
also  strongly  characterized. 


382         HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  16. 

*'  It  is  proper  for  me  to  notice,"  said  Merry  in  his 
report  of  these  remonstrances,1  "  that  Mr.  Madison  gave 
great  weight  to  them  by  renewing  them  on  every  occasion 
of  my  seeing  him,  and  by  his  expressing  that  they  were 
matters  upon  which  this  Government  could  not  possibly 
be  silent  until  a  proper  remedy  for  the  evil  should  be 
applied  by  his  Majesty's  government.  His  observations 
were,  however,  made  with  great  temper,  and  accompanied 
with  the  strongest  assurances  of  the  disposition  of  this 
Government  to  conciliate,  and  to  concur  in  whatever 
means  could  be  devised  which  should  not  be  absolutely 
derogatory  to  their  independence  and  interests,  to  estab 
lish  principles  and  rules  which  should  be  satisfactory 
to  both  parties.  .  .  .  But,  my  Lord,  while  it  is  my  duty 
to  do  justice  to  Mr.  Madison's  temperate  and  conciliatory 
language,  I  must  not  omit  to  observe  that  it  indicated 
strongly  a  design  on  the  part  of  this  Government  to 
avail  themselves  of  the  present  conjuncture  by  persist 
ing  steadily  in  their  demands  of  redress  of  their  pre 
tended  grievances,  in  the  hope  of  obtaining  a  greater 
respect  to  their  flag,  and  of  establishing  a  more  conve 
nient  system  of  neutral  navigation  than  the  interests 
of  the  British  empire  have  hitherto  allowed  his  Majesty 
to  concur  in." 

The  British  government  was  aware  that  its  so-called 
right  of  impressment  and  its  doctrine  of  blockade 
rested  on  force,  and  could  not  be  maintained  against 
superior  force ;  but  this  consciousness  rendered  Eng 
land  only  the  more  sensitive  in  regard  to  dangers  that 
threatened  her  supremacy.  Knowing  that  the  United 

1  Merry  to  Hawkesbury,  Dec.  6,  1803  ;  MSS.  British 
Archives. 


1803.  ANTHONY  MERRY.  383 

States  would  be  justified  in  declaring  war  at  any 
moment,  Great  Britain  looked  uneasily  for  the  first 
symptoms  of  retaliation.  When  Madison  took  so 
earnest  a  tone,  Merry  might  reasonably  expect  that 
his  words  would  be  followed  by  acts. 

These  shocks  were  not  all  that  the  new  British 
minister  was  obliged  to  meet  at  the  threshold  of  his 
residence  in  Washington.  At  the  moment  when  he 
was,  as  he  thought,  socially  maltreated,  and  when  he 
was  told  by  Madison  that  America  meant  to  insist 
on  her  neutral  rights,  he  learned  that  the  Government 
did  not  intend  to  ratify  Rufus  King's  boundary  con 
vention.  The  Senate  held  that  the  stipulations  of 
its  fifth  article  respecting  the  Mississippi  might  em 
barrass  the  new  territory  west  of  the  river.  King 
had  not  known  the  Louisiana  cession  when  he  signed 
the  Treaty ;  and  the  Senate,  under  the  lead  of 
General  Smith,1  preferred  to  follow  its  own  views  on 
the  subject,  as  it  had  done  in  regard  to  the  second 
article  of  the  treaty  with  France,  Sept.  30,  1800,  and 
as  it  was  about  to  do  in  regard  to  Pinckney's  claims 
convention,  Aug.  11,  1802,  with  Spain.  Merry  was 
surprised  to  find  that  Madison,  instead  of  explain 
ing  the  grounds  of  the  Senate's  hesitation,  or  enter 
ing  into  discussion  of  the  precise  geographical  diffi 
culty,  contented  himself  with  a  bald  statement  of  the 
fact.  The  British  minister  thought  that  this  was  not 
the  most  courteous  way  of  dealing  with  a  treaty 
negotiated  after  a  full  acquaintance  with  all  the  cir- 
1  Diary  of  J.  Q.  Adams  (Oct.  31,  1803),  i.  269. 


384        HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.       CH.  16. 

cumstances,  and  he  wrote  to  his  Government  to  be  on 
its  guard  : l  — 

"  Notwithstanding  Mr.  Madison's  assurances  to  the 
contrary,  I  have  some  reason  to  suspect  that  ideas  of  en 
croachment  on  his  Majesty's  just  rights  are  entertained 
by  some  persons  who  have  a  voice  in  deciding  upon  the 
question  of  the  ratification  of  this  convention,  not  to  say 
that  I  have  much  occasion  to  observe,  from  circumstances 
in  general,  that  there  exists  here  a  strong  impression  of 
the  consequence  which  this  country  is  supposed  to  have 
acquired  by  the  recent  additions  to  the  territory  of  the 
United  States,  as  well  as  by  the  actual  situation  of  affairs 
in  Europe." 

In  view  of  the  Mobile  Act,  introduced  into  Congress 
by  Randolph  on  behalf  of  the  government  a  week 
before  this  letter  was  written,  Merry's  suspicions 
could  hardly  be  called  unreasonable.  A  like  stretch 
of  authority  applied  to  the  northwest  territory  would 
have  produced  startling  results. 

Merry's  suspicions  that  some  assault  was  to  be 
made  upon  England  were  strengthened  when  Madi 
son,  December  5,  in  pursuance  of  a  call  from  the 
Senate,  sent  a  list  of  impressments  reported  to  the 
Department  during  the  last  year.  According  to  this 
paper  the  whole  number  of  impressments  was  forty- 
six,  —  three  of  which  were  made  by  France  and  her 
allies ;  while  of  the  forty-three  made  by  Great 
Britain  twenty-seven  of  the  seamen  were  not  Ameri 
can  citizens.  Of  the  entire  number,  twelve  were 

1  Merry  to  Hawkesbury,  Dec.  6,  1803;  MSS.  British  Archives. 


1803. 


ANTHONY  MERRY.  385 


stated  to  have  had  American  papers ;  and  of  the 
twelve,  nearly  half  were  impressed  on  land  within 
British  jurisdiction.  The  grievance,  serious  as  it 
was,  had  not  as  yet  reached  proportions  greater  than 
before  the  Peace  of  Amiens.  Merry  drew  the  infer 
ence  that  Jefferson's  administration  meant  to  adopt 
stronger  measures  than  had  hitherto  been  thought 
necessary.  He  soon  began  to  see  the  scope  which 
the  new  policy  was  to  take. 

Dec.  22,  1803,  Madison  opened  in  a  formal  confer 
ence  the  diplomatic  scheme  which  was  the  outcome 
of  these  preliminary  movements.1  Beginning  with  a 
repetition  of  complaints  in  regard  to  impressments, 
and  dwelling  upon  the  great  irritation  created  by 
such  arbitrary  acts,  the  secretary  next  remonstrated 
against  the  extent  given  to  the  law  of  blockade  by 
British  cruisers  in  the  "West  Indies,  and  at  length 
announced  that  the  frequent  repetition  of  these  griev 
ances  had  rendered  it  necessary  for  the  United  States 
to  take  immediate  steps  to  find  a  remedy  for  them. 
Instructions  would  therefore  be  shortly  sent  to  Mon 
roe  at  London  to  negotiate  a  new  convention  on  these 
subjects.  The  American  government  would  wish 
that  its  flag  should  give  complete  protection  to  what 
ever  persons  might  be  under  it,  excepting  only  mili 
tary  enemies  of  the  belligerent.  Further,  it  would 
propose  that  the  right  of  visiting  ships  at  sea  should 
be  restrained ;  that  the  right  of  blockade  should  be 
more  strictly  defined,  and  American  ships  be  allowed, 

1  Merry  to  Hawkesbury,  Dec.  31,  1803;  MSS.  British  Archives. 
VOL.  ii.  —  25 


386        HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  16. 

in  consideration  of  the  distance,  to  clear  for  block 
aded  ports  on  the  chance  of  the  blockade  being  re 
moved  before  they  arrived ;  and  finally  that  the  direct 
trade  between  the  West  Indies  and  Europe  should  be 
thrown  open  to  American  commerce  without  requiring 
it  to  pass  through  a  port  of  the  United  States. 

In  return  Madison  offered  to  the  British  govern 
ment  the  unconditional  surrender  of  deserters  by  sea 
and  land,  together  with  certain  precautions  against 
the  smuggling  of  articles  contraband  of  war. 

Although  Madison  pressed  the  necessity  of  an  im 
mediate  understanding  on  these  points,  he  did  so  in 
his  usual  temperate  and  conciliatory  manner ;  while 
Merry  frankly  avowed  that  he  could  give  no  hopes  of 
such  propositions  being  listened  to.  He  did  this  the 
more  decisively  because  Congress  seemed  about  to 
take  the  matter  of  impressments  into  its  own  hands, 
and  was  already  debating  a  Bill  for  the  protection  of 
seamen  by  measures  which  tended  to  hostilities. 
Madison  disavowed  responsibility  for  the  legislation, 
although  he  defended  it  in  principle.1  Merry  con 
tented  himself  for  the  time  by  saying  that  if  the 
United  States  government  sought  their  remedy  in 
municipal  law,  the  matter  would  immediately  cease 
to  be  a  subject  of  negotiation. 

Thus,  in  one  short  month,  the  two  governments 
were  brought  to  what  the  British  minister  supposed  to 
be  the  verge  of  rupture.  That  any  government  should 

1  Merry  to  Hawkesbury,  Jan.  20, 1804  ;  Jan.  30,  1804  ;  MSS. 
British  Archive*. 


1803.  ANTHONY  MERRY.  387 

take  so  well-considered  a  position  without  meaning  to 
support  it  by  acts,  was  not  probable.  Acts  of  some 
kind,  more  or  less  hostile  in  their  nature,  were  cer 
tainly  intended  by  the  United  States  government  in 
case  Great  Britain  should  persist  in  contempt  for  neu 
tral  rights  ;  the  sudden  change  of  tone  at  Washington 
left  no  doubt  on  this  point.  Edward  Thornton,  who 
had  not  yet  been  transferred  to  another  post,  wrote 
in  consternation  to  the  Foreign  Office,  fearing  that 
blame  might  be  attached  to  his  own  conduct  while  in 
charge  of  the  legation : 1  — 

"  When  I  compare  the  complexion  of  Mr.  Merry's  cor 
respondence  with  that  of  my  own,  particularly  during  the 
course  of  the  last  summer,  before  the  intelligence  of  the 
Louisiana  purchase  reached  this  country,  I  can  scarcely 
credit  the  testimony  of  my  own  senses  in  examining  the 
turn  which  affairs  have  taken,  and  the  manifest  ill-will 
discovered  toward  us  by  the  Government  at  the  present 
moment.  ...  I  believe  that  the  simple  truth  of  the  case 
is,  after  all,  the  circumstance  .  .  .  that  a  real  change 
has  taken  place  in  the  views  of  this  Government,  which 
may  be  dated  from  the  first  arrival  of  the  intelligence 
relative  to  the  Louisiana  purchase,  and  which  has  since 
derived  additional  force  and  acrimony  from  the  opinion 
that  Great  Britain  cannot  resist,  under  her  present  pres 
sure,  the  new  claims  of  the  United  States,  and  now,  from 
the  necessity  they  are  under  of  recurring  to  the  influence 
of  France  in  order  to  support  their  demands  against 
Spain.  .  .  .  The  cession  of  Louisiana,  notwithstanding 
that  the  circumstances  under  which  it  was  made  ought  to 

1  Thornton  to  Hammond,  Jan.  29,  1804  ;  MSS.  British 
Archives. 


388        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  16. 

convince  the  vainest  of  men  that  he  was  not  the  sole 
agent  in  the  transaction,  has  elevated  the  President  be 
yond  imagination  in  his  own  opinion ;  and  I  have  no 
doubt  that  he  thinks  of  securing  himself  at  the  next 
election  by  having  to  boast  of  concessions  and  advantages 
derived  from  us,  similar  to  those  he  has  gained  from 
France,  —  that  is,  great  in  appearance,  and  at  a  compara 
tively  insignificant  expense." 

From  such  premises,  the  conclusion,  so  far  as  con 
cerned  England,  was  inevitable  ;  and  Thornton  agreed 
with  Merry  in  affirming  it  without  reserve  :  — 

"  Everything,  as  it  relates  to  this  government,  now  de 
pends  on  our  firmness.  If  we  yield  an  iota  without  a  real 
and  perfect  equivalent  (not  such  imaginary  equivalents  as 
Mr.  Madison  mentions  to  Mr.  Merry),  we  are  lost." 


CHAPTER   XVII. 

WHATEVER  objects  the  President  and  the  Secretary 
of  State  may  have  expected  to  gain  by  their  change 
of  tone  in  the  winter  of  1803-1804  toward  Spain  and 
England,  they  must  have  been  strangely  free  from 
human  passions  if  they  were  unconscious  of  making 
at  least  two  personal  enemies  upon  whose  ill-will 
they  might  count.  If  they  were  unaware  of  giving 
their  victims  cause  for  bitterness,  —  or  if,  as  seemed 
more  probable,  they  were  indifferent  to  it,  —  the  fre 
quent  chances  of  retaliation  which  the  two  ministers 
enjoyed  soon  showed  that  in  diplomacy  revenge  was 
not  only  sweet  but  easy.  Even  the  vehement  Spanish 
hatred  felt  by  Yrujo  for  Madison  fell  short  of  the 
patient  Anglo-Saxon  antipathy  rooted  in  the  minds 
of  the  British  minister  and  his  wife.  When  Yrujo, 
in  March,  1804,  burst  into  the  State  Department  with 
the  Mobile  Act  in  his  hand  and  denounced  Madison 
to  his  face  as  party  to  an  "  infamous  libel,"  he  suc 
ceeded  in  greatly  annoying  the  secretary  without  vio 
lating  Jefferson's  "  canons  of  etiquette."  Under  the 
code  of  republican  manners  which  the  President  and 
his  secretary  had  introduced,  they  could  not  fairly 
object  to  anything  which  Yrujo  might  choose  to  say 


390        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  17. 

or  do.  Absolute  equality  and  "  the  rule  of  pele-mele  " 
reached  their  natural  conclusion  between  such  hosts 
and  guests  in  freedom  of  language  and  vehemence  of 
passion.  What  might  have  been  Merry's  feelings  or 
conduct  had  he  met  with  more  cordiality  and  courtesy 
was  uncertain ;  but  the  mortifications  of  his  first 
month  at  Washington  embittered  his  temper,  and 
left  distinct  marks  of  acrimony  in  the  diplomacy 
of  America  and  England,  until  war  wiped  out  the 
memory  of  reciprocal  annoyances.  The  Spaniard's 
enmity  was  already  a  peril  to  Madison's  ambition, 
and  one  which  became  more  threatening  every  day  ; 
but  the  Englishman's  steady  resentment  was  per 
haps  more  mischievous,  if  less  noisy.  The  first 
effect  of  Jefferson's  tactics  was  to  ally  the  British 
minister  with  Yrujo ;  the  second  bound  him  to  Sen 
ator  Pickering  and  Representative  Griswold ;  the 
third  united  his  fortunes  with  those  of  Aaron  Burr. 
Merry  entered  the  path  of  secret  conspiracy ;  he  be 
came  the  confidant  of  all  the  intriguers  in  Wash 
ington,  and  gave  to  their  intrigues  the  support  of  his 
official  influence. 

The  Federalists  worked  mischievously  to  widen  the 
breach  between  the  British  minister  and  the  Presi 
dent.  They  encouraged  Merry's  resentment.  Late 
in  January,  nearly  two  months  after  the  first  pele- 
mele  ,  Madison  officially  informed  Merry  for  the  first 
time  that  the  President  meant  to  recognize  no  prece 
dence  between  foreign  ministers,  but  that  all,  even 
including  secretaries  of  legation  in  charge,  were  to  be 


1804.  JEFFERSON'S  ENEMIES.  391 

treated  with  perfect  equality,  or  what  Madison  termed 
"  a  complete  pell-mell,"  and  would  be  received,  even 
at  their  first  audience,  with  no  more  ceremony  than 
was  practised  toward  any  other  individual.  Merry 
replied  that  this  notice  should  have  been  given  to 
him  on  his  arrival,  and  that  he  could  not  acqui 
esce  in  it  without  instructions.  He  then  wrote  to 
his  Government,1  — 

"  I  have  now  but  too  much  reason  to  fear,  what  I  did 
not  at  first  suspect,  that  the  marked  inattention  toward 
me  of  the  present  Administration  of  this  country  has 
been  a  part  of  their  unfriendly  disposition  toward  his 
Majesty  and  toward  the  nation  which  I  have  the 
honor  to  represent." 

At  the  same  moment,  in  January  and  February, 
1804,  Pickering  and  Griswold  were  plotting  their  New 
England  confederacy.  Merry  was  taken  by  them  into 
the  secret,  and  gave  them  aid.  The  Senate,  February 
9,  voted  to  strike  out  the  fifth  article  of  Rufus 
King's  boundary  convention,  and  to  approve  the 
other  articles,  which  provided  for  fixing  the  dis 
puted  boundary-line  of  Maine,  New  Hampshire,  and 
Vermont.  Merry  wrote  to  his  Government  that  the 
object  of  cancelling  the  fifth  article  was  to  deprive 
Great  Britain  of  her  treaty  right  to  navigate  the 
Mississippi : 2  — 

1  Merry  to  Hawkesbury,  Jan.  30,  1804  ;  MSS.  British 
Archives. 

a  Merry  to  Hawkesbury,  March  1,  1804 ;  MSS.  British 
Archives. 


392        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  17. 

"It  is  hardly  necessary  for  me  to  point  out  to  your 
Lordship  that  the  other  articles  of  the  convention  are  of 
great  importance  to  the  Eastern  States  of  America,  which 
are  much  interested  in  the  immediate  settlement  of  the 
eastern  boundary.  I  am  led  to  believe  from  the  language 
of  some  of  the  members  of  this  State  [Massachusetts] 
that  their  anxiety  on  this  head  is  so  great  that  the  rejec 
tion  of  those  articles  by  his  Majesty  would,  as  having 
been  occasioned  by  the  exclusion  on  the  part  of  this 
government  of  the  fifth  article,  prove  to  be  a  great 
exciting  cause  to  them  to  go  forward  rapidly  in  the  steps 
which  they  have  already  commenced  toward  a  separation 
from  the  Southern  part  of  the  Union.  The  members  of 
the  Senate  have  availed  themselves  of  the  opportunity  of 
their  being  collected  here  to  hold  private  meetings  on  this 
subject,  and  I  learn  from  them  that  their  plans  and  cal 
culations  respecting  the  event  have  been  long  seriously 
resolved.  They  think  that  whenever  it  shall  take  place 
it  will  happen  suddenly,  yet  with  quietness  and  the 
universal  concurrence  of  the  people.  Although  it  does 
not  appear  to  be  their  opinion  that  any  external  secret 
agency  would  accelerate  the  moment,  they  naturally  look 
forward  to  Great  Britain  for  support  and  assistance 
whenever  the  occasion  shall  arrive." 

As  the  summer  of  1804  came  on,  Merry's  despatches 
grew  more  sombre.  He  reported  that  at  Norfolk 
twelve  British  ships  were  detained  at  one  time  in 
consequence  of  the  desertion  of  their  seamen,  several 
of  whom  had  entered  the  United  States  service  on  the 
frigates  which  were  under  orders  for  Tripoli.  Six 
British  seamen  having  deserted  at  Charleston  and 


1804.  JEFFERSON'S  ENEMIES.  393 

re-enlisted  in  the  same  way,  Merry  remonstrated.  He 
was  told  that  the  seamen,  having  voluntarily  enlisted 
in  the  United  States  service,  could  not  be  restored, 
because  the  British  government  never  restored  Ameri 
can  seamen  who  had  voluntarily  enlisted.  Merry  could 
only  reply  that  the  British  government  did  not  know 
ingly  enlist  deserters.  On  the  other  hand,  Madison 
remonstrated  in  "  high  language,"  "  accompanied  even 
with  some  degree  of  menace,"  against  the  conduct  of 
Captain  Bradley  of  the  frigate  "  Cambrian,"  one  of  the 
British  squadron  cruising  off  Sandy  Hook,  for  tak 
ing  a  British  seaman  out  of  a  British  vessel  within 
American  jurisdiction.  Merry  added  that  in  contrast 
to  this  strictness  toward  England  the  authorities  had 
allowed  the  officers  of  the  French  frigate  "  La  Pour- 
suivante,"  at  Baltimore,  to  send  armed  parties  on 
shore  at  night  for  the  purpose  of  seizing  French  sea 
men,  one  of  whom  they  had  actually  taken  by  force 
from  a  Spanish  vessel  lying  at  the  wharf. 

"  From  this  government  having  brought  into  such 
serious  discussion  objects  which  would  certainly  have 
passed  unnoticed  had  they  occurred  in  relation  to  the 
King's  enemies,  his  Majesty's  ministers  may  be  led  to 
suspect  that  such  a  resolution  has  been  dictated  by  some 
hostile  design,"  wrote  Merry,  with  increasing  solemnity ; 
"  but  it  is  proper  for  me  to  observe  that  ...  I  cannot 
persuade  myself  that  they  will  dare  to  provoke  hostilities 
with  his  Majesty,  at  least  before  Mr.  Jefferson's  re-elec 
tion  to  the  Presidency  shall  have  taken  place."  1 

1  Merry  to  Harrowby,  July  18,  1804;  MSS.  British  Archives. 


394         HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  17. 

Merry  made  a  representation  to  Madison  on  im 
pressments  ;  but  his  arguments  did  not  satisfy  the 
secretary.  "  This  specimen  of  Merry  shows  him  to 
be  a  mere  diplomatic  pettifogger,"  wrote  Madison  pri 
vately  to  the  President.1 

Merry's  temper  was  in  this  stage  of  ever-increasing 
irritability,  when  an  event  occurred  which  gave  him, 
as  it  seemed,  a  chance  to  gratify  his  resentments. 
After  the  adjournment  of  Congress  in  March  the 
British  minister  heard  nothing  from  Pickering  and 
Griswold.  Early  in  June  he  wrote  home  that  the 
democrats  were  carrying  all  the  elections : 2  — 

"  In  addition  to  this  triumph  of  the  reigning  party, 
there  have  lately  appeared  in  the  prints  of  this  country, 
which  are  generally  made  the  instruments  of  the  measures 
of  all  parties,  publications  of  the  discovery  that  has  been 
made  of  secret  meetings  held  at  this  place  by  some  of  the 
Federal  members  during  the  last  sitting  of  Congress  for 
the  purpose  of  consulting  upon  the  important  point  of  the 
separation  of  the  Eastern  from  the  Southern  States,  which 
publications  seem  to  have  imposed  a  complete  silence 
upon  the  Federal  adherents." 

A  few  weeks  afterward,  July  11,  occurred  the  duel 
between  Burr  and  Hamilton.  Merry  had  no  relations 
with  Hamilton,  and  felt  no  peculiar  interest  in  his 
fate  ;  but  he  had  become  intimate  with  Burr  at  Wash 
ington,  and  watched  his  career  with  the  curiosity  which 

1  Madison  to  Jefferson,  Aug.  28,  1804;  Jefferson  MSS. 
*  Merry    to    Hawkesbury,    June    2,    1804 ;    MSS.    British 
Archives. 


1804.  JEFFERSON'S  ENEMIES.  395 

was  the  natural  result  of  their  common  hatred  of 
Jefferson.  July  21  Burr  fled  from  New  York,  and 
a  few  days  afterward  reached  Philadelphia,  where 
Merry  was  passing  the  summer.  While  there,  Burr 
sent  one  of  his  friends  —  an  Englishman  named  Wil 
liamson —  to  the  British  minister  with  a  startling 
message,  which  Merry  immediately  transmitted  to 
his  Government : 1  — 

"I  have  just  received  an  offer  from  Mr.  Burr,  the 
actual  Vice-President  of  the  United  States  (which  situa 
tion  he  is  about  to  resign),  to  lend  his  assistance  to  Ms 
Majesty's  government  in  any  manner  in  which  they  may 
think  fit  to  employ  him,  particularly  in  endeavoring  to 
effect  a  separation  of  the  western  part  of  the  United 
States  from  that  which  lies  between  the  Atlantic  and  the 
mountains,  in  its  whole  extent.  His  proposition  on  this 
and  other  subjects  will  be  fully  detailed  to  your  Lordship 
by  Colonel  AVilliamson,  who  has  been  the  bearer  of  them 
to  me,  and  who  will  embark  for  England  in  a  few  days. 
It  is  therefore  only  necessary  for  me  to  add  that  if  after 
what  is  generally  known  of  the  profligacy  of  Mr.  Burr's 
character,  his  Majesty's  minister  should  think  proper  to 
listen  to  his  offer,  his  present  situation  in  this  country, 
where  he  is  now  cast  off  as  much  by  the  democratic  as 
by  the  Federal  party,  and  where  he  still  preserves  con 
nections  with  some  people  of  influence,  added  to  his  great 
ambition  and  spirit  of  revenge  against  the  present 
Administration,  may  possibly  induce  him  to  exert  the 
talents  and  activity  which  he  possesses  with  fidelity  to 
his  employers." 

1  Merry  to  Harrowby,  Aug.  6,  1804  ;  MSS.  British  Archives. 


396        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  IT. 

Meanwhile  a  change  of  ministry  occurred  in  Eng 
land.  Pitt  returned  to  power,  representing  a  state 
of  feeling  toward  America  very  different  from  that 
which  prevailed  under  the  mild  rule  of  Addington. 
Subordinates  were  quick  to  feel  such  changes  in 
the  temper  of  their  superiors.  Every  British  officer 
knew  that  henceforth  he  had  behind  him  an  ener 
getic  government,  which  required  vigorous  action  in 
maintaining  what  it  claimed  as  British  rights.  Merry 
felt  the  new  impulse  like  the  rest ;  but  Pitt's  return 
acted  most  seriously  on  the  naval  service.  After  the 
renewal  of  the  war  in  May,  1803,  a  small  British 
squadron  cruised  off  Sandy  Hook,  keeping  a  sharp 
look-out  for  French  frigates  in  New  York  Harbor, 
and  searching  every  merchant-vessel  for  enemy's 
property.  During  the  summer  of  1804  this  annoy 
ance  became  steadily  greater,  until  the  port  of  New 
York  was  almost  blockaded,  and  every  vessel  that 
sailed  out  or  in  was  liable  not  only  to  be  stopped 
and  searched,  but  to  lose  some  part  of  its  crew  by 
impressment.  The  British  ministry  did  indeed  in 
stantly  recall  Captain  Bradley  of  the  "  Cambrian  "  for 
violating  American  jurisdiction,  and  gave  strict  or 
ders  for  the  lenient  exercise  of  belligerent  rights  ;  but 
all  the  more  it  showed  the  intention  of  insisting 
upon  the  submission  of  America  to  such  rules  as  Eng 
land  should  prescribe.  The  President,  already  in 
trouble  with  Spain,  began  to  feel  the  double  peril ; 
but  Congress  pressed  him  forward,  and  even  while 
busy  with  the  trial  of  Judge  Chase  it  found  time  for 


1804.  JEFFERSON'S   ENEMIES.  397 

two  measures   which   greatly   disturbed  the   British 
envoy. 

The  first  of  these  measures  was  an  "Act  for  the 
more  effectual  preservation  of  peace  in  the  ports  and 
harbors  of  the  United  States."  Under  this  law  any 
United  States  marshal,  on  the  warrant  of  any  United 
States  judge,  was  bound  to  board  any  British  or  other 
foreign  ship-of-war  lying  in  American  waters,  and 
seize  every  person  charged  with  having  violated  the 
peace.  If  the  marshal  should  be  resisted,  or  if  sur 
render  was  not  made,  he  must  call  in  the  military 
power,  and  compel  surrender  by  force  of  arms.  If 
death  should  ensue,  he  should  be  held  blameless  ; 
but  the  resisting  party  should  be  punished  as  for 
felonious  homicide.  Further,  the  President  was  au 
thorized  to  interdict  at  will  the  ports  of  the  United 
States  to  all  or  any  armed  vessels  of  a  foreign 
nation ;  and  to  arrest  and  indict  any  foreign  officer 
who  should  come  within  the  jurisdiction  after  com 
mitting  on  the  high  seas  "  any  trespass  or  tort,  or  any 
spoliation,  on  board  any  vessel  of  the  United  States, 
or  any  unlawful  interruption  or  vexation  of  trading- 
vessels  actually  coming  to  or  going  from  the  United 
States." 

Such  laws  were  commonly  understood  in  diplomacy 
as  removing  the  subject  in  question  from  the  field 
of  negotiation,  preliminary  to  reprisals  and  war. 
The  Act  was  passed  with  little  debate  in  the  last 
hours  of  the  session,  in  the  midst  of  the  confu 
sion  which  followed  the  acquittal  of  Judge  Chase. 


398         HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  17. 

Merry  immediately  called  on  the  Secretary  of  State, 
and  asked  him  for  some  assurance  that  might  serve 
to  quiet  the  apprehensions  which  his  Government 
would  feel  on  reading  the  Act.1  Madison  could  give 
none,  except  that  the  President  would  probably  not 
exercise  for  the  present  his  discretionary  powers. 
As  for  the  words,  "any  trespass  or  tort,"  Madison 
frankly  avowed  "  he  could  not  but  confess  they  were 
meant  to  imply  the  impressment  of  any  individual 
whatsoever  from  on  board  an  American  vessel,  the 
exercise  of  which  pretended  right  on  the  part  of  his 
Majesty's  officers  was  a  matter,  he  said,  which  the 
sense  of  the  people  at  large  would  never  allow  the 
government  of  this  country  to  acquiesce  in." 

To  this  announcement  Merry  replied  in  substance 
that  the  right  was  one  which  would  certainly  never 
be  abandoned  by  his  Government ;  and  there  the 
matter  rested  at  the  close  of  Jefferson's  first  term. 
Madison  assured  the  British  minister  that  the  author 
ity  granted  to  the  President  by  Congress  over  foreign 
ships  of  war  in  American  waters  would  not  at  present 
be  enforced.  He  went  even  a  step  further  toward 
conciliation.  The  Legislature  of  Virginia  was  in 
duced  quietly  to  modify  the  Act  which  had  hitherto 
offered  so  much  encouragement  to  the  desertion  of 
British  seamen.2 

The  second  threatening  measure  was  a  Resolution 
of  the  Senate,  March  2, 1805,  calling  upon  the  Secre- 

1  Merry  to  Harrowby,  March  4,  1805;  MSS.  British  Archives. 
a  Merry  to  Harrowby,  March  29,  1805;  MSS.  British  Archives. 


1804.  JEFFERSON'S  ENEMIES.  399 

tary  of  State  for  such  Acts  of  the  British  Parliament 
as  imposed  heavier  duties  on  the  exportation  of  mer 
chandise  to  the  United  States  than  on  similar  goods 
exported  to  the  nations  of  Europe.  Such  an  ex 
port  duty  upon  merchandise  for  the  United  States 
and  the  West  Indies  had  in  fact  been  imposed  by 
Parliament  some  two  years  before  ;  and  this  Reso 
lution  foreshadowed  some  commercial  retaliation 
by  Congress. 

While  sending  to  his  Government  these  warnings 
to  expect  from  Jefferson's  second  administration  a 
degree  of  hostility  more  active  than  from  the  first, 
Merry  suggested  means  of  giving  the  United  States 
occupation  that  should  induce  them  to  leave  England 
alone.  A  new  element  of  conspiracy  disclosed  itself 
to  the  British  minister. 

Under  the  Louisiana  treaty  of  cession,  the  United 
States  government  had  promised  that  "  the  inhabi 
tants  of  the  ceded  territory  shall  be  incorporated  in 
the  Union  of  the  United  States,  and  admitted  as  soon 
as  possible,  according  to  the  principles  of  the  Federal 
Constitution,  to  the  enjoyment  of  all  the  rights,  ad 
vantages,  and  immunities  of  citizens  of  the  United 
States."  This  pledge  had  been  broken.  The  usual 
display  of  casuistry  had  been  made  to  prove  that  the 
infraction  of  treaty  was  no  infraction  at  all ;  but 
the  more  outspoken  Republicans  avowed,  as  has  been 
already  shown,  that  the  people  of  Louisiana  could  not 
be  trusted,  or  in  the  commoner  phrase  that  they  were 
unfit  for  self-government,  and  must  be  treated  as  a 


400         HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  17. 

conquered  race  until  they  learned  to  consider  them 
selves  American  citizens. 

The  people  of  New  Orleans  finding  themselves  in  a 
position  of  dependence,  which,  owing  chiefly  to  their 
hatred  of  Governor  Claiborne,  seemed  more  irritating 
than  their  old  Spanish  servitude,  sent  three  represen 
tatives  to  Washington  to  urge  upon  Congress  the  duty 
of  executing  the  treaty.  Messieurs  Sauvd,  Derbigny, 
and  Destrdhan  accordingly  appeared  at  Washington, 
and  in  December,  1804,  presented  a  remonstrance  so 
strong  that  Government  was  greatly  embarrassed  to 
deal  with  it.1  Any  reply  that  should  repudiate  either 
the  treaty  obligation  or  the  principles  of  American 
liberty  and  self-government  was  out  of  the  question ; 
any  reply  that  should  affirm  either  the  one  or  the 
other  was  fatal  to  the  system  established  by  Congress 
in  Louisiana.  John  Randolph,  on  whose  shoulders 
the  duty  fell,  made  a  report  on  the  subject.  "  It  is 
only  under  the  torture,"  said  he,  "  that  this  article 
of  the  treaty  of  Paris  can  be  made  to  speak  the  lan 
guage  ascribed  to  it  by  the  memorialists  ; "  but  after 
explaining  in  his  own  way  what  the  article  did  not 
mean,  he  surprised  his  audience  by  admitting  in 
effect  that  the  law  of  the  last  session  was  repugnant 
to  the  Constitution,  and  that  the  people  of  Louisiana 
had  a  right  to  self-government.2  Senator  Giles  said 

1  Remonstrance  of  the  People  of  Louisiana,  Dec.  31,  1804; 
Annals  of  Congress,  1804-1805,  Appendix,  p.  1597. 

8  Report  of  Committee,  Jan.  25,  1805;  Annals  of  Congress, 
1804-1805,  p.  1014. 


1804.  JEFFERSON'S  ENEMIES.  401 

in  private  that  Randolph's  report  was  "  a  perfect 
transcript  of  Randolph's  own  character ;  it  began 
by  setting  the  claims  of  the  Louisianians  at  defi 
ance,  and  concluded  with  a  proposal  to  give  them 
more  than  they  asked."1 

Under  these  influences  the  three  delegates  from  the 
Creole  society  succeeded  in  getting,  not  what  they 
asked,  but  a  general  admission  that  the  people  of 
Louisiana  had  political  rights,  which  Congress  recog 
nized  by  an  Act,  approved  March  2,  1805,  to  the 
extent  of  allowing  them  to  elect  a  General  Assembly 
of  twenty-five  representatives,  and  of  promising  them 
admission  into  the  Union  whenever  their  free  inhab 
itants  should  reach  the  number  of  sixty  thousand. 
Considering  that  the  people  of  Louisiana  were  sup 
posed  to  be  entitled  to  "  all  the  rights,  advantages,  and 
immunities  of  citizens,"  Messieurs  Sauve",  Derbigny, 
and  Destrelian  thought  the  concession  too  small,  and 
expressed  themselves  strongly  on  the  subject.  Natu 
rally  the  British  minister,  as  well  as  other  ill-affected 
persons  at  Washington,  listened  eagerly  to  the  discon 
tent  which  promised  to  breed  hostility  to  the  Union. 

"  The  deputies  above  mentioned,"  wrote  Merry  to  his 
Government,2  "  who  while  they  had  any  hopes  of  ob 
taining  the  redress  of  then-  grievances  had  carefully 
avoided  giving  any  umbrage  or  jealousy  to  the  Govern 
ment  by  visiting  or  holding  any  intercourse  with  the 

1  Diary  of  J.  Q.  Adams  (Feb.  1,  1805),  i.  342. 
3  Merry  to  Harrowby,  (No.  14),  March  29,  1805;  MSS.  British 
Archives. 

VOL.  ii.  —  26 


402        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  17. 

agents  of  foreign  Powers  at  this  place,  when  they  found 
that  their  fate  was  decided,  although  the  law  had  not  as 
yet  passed,  no  longer  abstained  from  communicating  with 
those  agents,  nor  from  expressing  very  publicly  the  great 
dissatisfaction  which  the  law  would  occasion  among  their 
constituents,  —  going  even  so  far  as  to  say  that  it  would 
not  be  tolerated,  and  that  they  would  be  obliged  to  seek 
redress  from  some  other  quarter ;  while  they  observed 
that  the  opportunity  they  had  had  of  obtaining  a  correct 
knowledge  of  the  state  of  things  in  this  country,  and  of 
witnessing  the  proceedings  of  Congress,  afforded  them 
no  confidence  in  the  stability  of  the  Union,  and  furnished 
them  with  such  strong  motives  to  be  dissatisfied  with  the 
form  and  mode  of  government  as  to  make  them  regret 
extremely  the  connection  which  they  had  been  forced  into 
with  it.  These  sentiments  they  continued  to  express  till 
the  moment  of  their  departure  from  hence,  which  took 
place  the  day  after  the  close  of  the  session." 

Another  man  watched  the  attitude  of  the  three 
delegates  with  extreme  interest,  Aarnri  Bnrrr  March 
v/  4,  1805,  ceased  to  hold  the  office  of  Vice-president. 
Since  the  previous  August  he  had  awaited  the  report 
of  his  friend  Colonel  Williamson,  who  entered  into 
conferences  with  members  of  the  British  ministry, 
hoping  to  gain  their  support  for  Burr's  plan  of  creating 
a  Western  Confederacy  in  the  Valley  of  the  Ohio. 
No  sooner  was  Burr  out  of  office  than  he  went  to 
Merry  with  new  communications,  which  Merry  has 
tened  to  send  to  his  Government  in  a  despatch 
marked  "  Most  secret "  in  triplicate.1 

1  Merry  to  Harrowby,  (No.  15),  most  secret,  March  29,  1805. 


1804  JEFFERSON'S   ENEMIES.  403 

"  Mr.  Burr  (with  whom  I  know  that  the  deputies  be 
came  very  intimate  during  their  residence  here)  has  men 
tioned  to  me  that  the  inhabitants  of  Louisiana  seem 
determined  to  render  themselves  independent  of  the 
United  States,  and  that  the  execution  of  their  design  is 
only  delayed  by  the  difficulty  of  obtaining  previously  an 
assurance  of  protection  and  assistance  from  some  foreign 
Power,  and  of  concerting  and  connecting  their  indepen 
dence  with  that  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  western  parts 
of  the  United  States,  who  must  always  have  a  command 
over  them  by  the  rivers  which  communicate  with  the  Mis 
sissippi.  It  is  clear  that  Mr.  Burr  (although  he  has  not 
as  yet  confided  to  me  the  exact  nature  and  extent  of  his 
plan)  means  to  endeavor  to  be  the  instrument  of  effecting 
such  a  connection." 

For  this  purpose  Burr  asked  the  aid  of  the  British 
government,  and  defined  the  nature  of  the  assistance 
he  should  need,  —  a  British  squadron  at  the  mouth  of 
the  Mississippi,  and  a  loan  of  half  a  million  dollars. 

' '  I  have  only  to  add  that  if  a  strict  confidence  could 
be  placed  in  him,  he  certainly  possesses,  perhaps  in  a 
much  greater  degree  than  any  other  individual  in  this 
country,  all  the  talents,  energy,  intrepidity,  and  firmness 
which  are  required  for  such  an  enterprise." 

Pending  an  answer  to  this  proposal,  Burr  was  to 
visit  New  Orleans  and  make  himself  the  head  of 
Creole  disaffection. 

Merry  was  launched  into  the  full  tide  of  conspiracy. 
At  the  close  of  Jefferson's  first  term  he  saw  reason  to 
hope  that  he  might  soon  repay  with  interest  the  debt 
of  personal  and  political  annoyance  which  he  owed. 


404        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  17. 

While  Yrujo  was  actively  engaged  in  bringing  upon 
Madison  the  anger  of  Spain  and  France,  Merry 
endeavored  to  draw  his  Government  into  a  system 
of  open  and  secret  reprisals  upon  the  President. 

That  the  new  French  minister  was  little  better  dis 
posed  than  Merry  and  Yrujo  has  been  already  shown; 
but  his  causes  for  ill-will  were  of  a  different  and  less 
personal  nature.  Before  Turreau's  arrival  at  Wash 
ington  in  November,  1804,  Pichon  in  one  of  his  last 
despatches  declared  that  Jefferson  had  already  alien 
ated  every  foreign  Power  whose  enmity  could  be 
dangerous  to  the  United  States. 

"The  state  of  foreign  relations  offers  a  perspective 
which  must  put  Mr.  Jefferson's  character  to  proof," 
Pichon  wrote  to  Talleyrand  in  September,  1804.1  "The 
United  States  find  themselves  compromised  and  at  odds 
with  France,  England,  and  Spain  at  the  same  time.  This 
state  of  things  is  in  great  part  due  to  the  indecision  of 
the  President,  and  to  the  policy  which  leads  him  to  sacri 
fice  everything  for  the  sake  of  his  popularity." 

The  complaint  was  common  to  all  French  ministers 
in  the  United  States,  and  meant  little  more  than  that 
all  Presidents  and  policies  displeased  them  by  stop 
ping  short  of  war  on  England,  which  was  the  object 
of  French  diplomacy  ;  but  this  letter  also  showed  that 
in  Pichon's  eyes  the  President  had  no  friends.  When 
Turreau  arrived,  a  few  weeks  afterward,  he  quickly 
intimated  that  the  President  need  expect  from  him 

1  Pichon  to  Talleyrand,  16  Fructidor,  An  xii.  (Sept.  3,  1804); 
Archives  des  Aff.  Etr.,  MSS. 


1804.  JEFFERSON'S  ENEMIES.  405 

not  even  such  sentimental  sympathy  as  had  been 
so  kindly  given  by  Pichon. 

At  the  same  moment  it  was  noticed  that  Jefferson 
changed  his  style  of  dress.  "  He  has  improved  much 
in  the  article  of  dress,"  wrote  Senator  Plumer  in 
December,  1804  ; 1  "he  has  laid  aside  the  old  slippers, 
red  waistcoat,  and  soiled  corduroy  small-clothes,  and 
was  dressed  all  in  black,  with  clean  linen  and  pow 
dered  hair."  Apparently  the  President  had  profited 
by  the  criticisms  of  the  British  minister,  and  was 
willing  to  avoid  similar  comments  from  the  new 
French  envoy  ;  but  he  supposed  that  the  Frenchman 
would  show  equal  civility,  and  assume  an  equally  re 
publican  style.  He  was  mistaken.  November  23, 
undisturbed  by  Merry's  experience,  Turreau  presented 
himself  at  his  first  audience  in  full  regimentals,  and 
with  so  much  gold  lace  that  Jefferson  was  half  in 
clined  to  resent  it  as  an  impertinence.2  Turreau 
next  refused  to  meet  Merry  at  dinner.  He  followed 
up  these  demonstrations  by  embracing  the  cause  of 
Yrujo,  and  ridiculing  Madison  to  his  face.  He  began 
by  warning  his  Government  that  "  these  people  have 
been  thoroughly  spoiled  ;  it  is  time  to  put  them  back 
into  their  place."  3 

Turreau  became  intimate  with  the  deputies  from 
Louisiana,  and  notified  Talleyrand  that  a  separation  of 

1  Life  of  Plumer,  p.  326. 

2  Diary  of  J.  Q.  Adams  (Nov.  23,  1804),  i.  316. 

8  Turreau  to  Talleyrand,  27  Janvier,  1805  ;  Archives  des  AfE 
Etr.,  MSS. 


406        HISTORY  OF  THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  17. 

the  western  country  from  the  Union  was  universally 
expected.  Already,  within  three  months  of  his  arrival, 
he  put  his  finger  on  the  men  who  were  to  accomplish 
it.1  Destre'han,  he  said,  was  a  man  of  high  merit ; 
"  but  being  only  moderately  ambitious,  and  head  of  a 
numerous  family,  —  having  acquired,  too,  a  great  per 
sonal  esteem,  —  he  is  not  likely  to  become  the  princi 
pal  mover  in  innovations  which  are  always  dangerous 
without  a  combination  of  evidently  favorable  chances. 
It  is  still  less  likely  that  he  will  ever  be  the  instru 
ment  of  strangers  who  should  seek  to  excite  troubles 
for  their  personal  advantage."  As  for  Sauve',  much 
inferior  to  his  colleague  in  abilities,  he  would  be 
guided  by  Destrdhan's  influence.  Derbigny  was  dif 
ferent.  "  Young  still,  with  wit,  ready  expression, 
and  French  manners,  I  believe  him  to  be  greedy  of 
fortune  and  fame ;  I  suspect  that  every  rdle  will  suit 
him,  in  order  to  acquire  the  one  or  the  other;  but 
there  are  men  of  more  importance  whom  circum 
stances  are  taking  to  Louisiana." 

Then  Turreau,  for  the  information  of  Talleyrand, 
drew  a  portrait  of  the  military  commander  of  Upper 
Louisiana,  who  had  his  headquarters  at  St.  Louis,  and 
whose  influence  on  future  events  was  to  be  watched. 

"General  Wilkinson  is  forty-eight  years  of  age.  He 
has  an  amiable  exterior.  Though  said  to  be  well-informed 
in  civil  and  political  matters,  his  military  capacity  is 
small.  Ambitious  and  easily  dazzled,  fond  of  show  and 

1  Turreau  to  Talleyrand,  9  Mars,  1805  ;  Archives  des  Aff.  EtrM 

MSS. 


1804.  JEFFERSON'S  ENEMIES.  407 

appearances,  he  complains  rather  indiscreetly,  and  espe 
cially  after  dinner,  of  the  form  of  his  government,  which 
leaves  officers  few  chances  of  fortune,  advancement,  and 
glory,  and  which  does  not  pay  its  military  chiefs  enough 
to  support  a  proper  style.  He  listened  with  pleasure,  or 
rather  with  enthusiasm,  to  the  details  which  I  gave  him 
in  regard  to  the  organization,  the  dress,  and  the  force 
of  the  French  army.  My  uniform,  the  order  with  which 
I  am  decorated,  are  objects  of  envy  to  him ;  and  he 
seems  to  hold  to  the  American  service  only  because  he 
can  do  no  better.  General  "Wilkinson  is  the  most  inti 
mate  friend,  or  rather  the  most  devoted  creature,  of 
Colonel^Burr." 

Talleyrand  had  become  acquainted  with  Burr  in 
the  United  States,  and  needed  no  warnings  against 
him;  but  Turreau  showed  himself  well-informed: 

"  Mr.  Burr's  career  is  generally  looked  upon  as  fin 
ished  ;  but  he  is  far  from  sharing  that  opinion,  and  I 
believe  he  would  rather  sacrifice  the  interests  of  his 
country  than  renounce  celebrity  and  fortune.  Although 
Louisiana  is  still  only  a  Territory,  it  has  obtained  the  right 
of  sending  a  delegate  to  Congress.  Louisiana  is  therefore 
to  become  the  theatre  of  Mr.  Burr's_new  intrigues ;  he 
is  going  there  under  the  aegis  of  General  Wilkinson." 

Perhaps  Turreau  received  this  information  from 
Derbigny,  which  might  account  for  his  estimate  of 
the  young  man.  Certainly  Derbigny  knew  all  that 
Turreau  reported,  for  in  an  affidavit J  two  years  after 
ward  he  admitted  his  knowledge. 

1  Affidavit  of  Peter  Derbigny,  Aug.  27,  1807.  Clark's  Proofo 
against  Wilkinson;  Note  18.  App.  p.  38. 


408        HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.       CH.  17. 

"  In  the  winter  of  1804-1805,"  Derbiguy  made  oath, 
"being  then  at  Washington  City  in  the  capacity  of  a 
deputy  from  the  inhabitants  of  Louisiana  to  Congress, 
jointly  with  Messrs.  Destrehan  and  Sauv£,  he  was  intro 
duced  to  Colonel  Burr,  then  Vice-president  of  the  United 
States,  By  Greneral  Wilkinson,  who  strongly  recom 
mended  to  this  deponent,  and  as  he  believes  to  his  col 
leagues,  to  cultivate  the  acquaintance  of  Colonel  Burr,  — 
whom  he  used  to  call  '  the  first  gentleman  in  America,' 
telling  them  that  he  was  a  man  of  the  most  eminent 
talents  both  as  a  politician  and  as  a  military  character ; 
and  .  .  .  General  Wilkinson  told  him  several  times  that 
Colonel  Burr,  so  soon  as  his  Vice-presidency  would  be  at 
an  end,  would  go  to  Louisiana,  where  he  had  certain  pro 
jects,  adding  that  he  was  such  a  man  as  to  succeed  in 
anything  he  would  undertake,  and  inviting  this  deponent 
to  give  him  all  the  information  in  his  power  respecting 
that  country ;  which  mysterious  hints  appeared  to  this 
deponent  very  extraordinary,  though  he  could  not  then 
understand  them." 

What  Derbigny  in  1807  professed  not  to  have 
understood,  seemed  in  1804  clear  to  Turreau  and 
Merry  as  well  as  to  others.  Turreau  closed  his 
catalogue  by  the  significant  remark :  "  I  am  not 
the  only  person  who  thinks  that  the  assemblage  of 
such  men  in  a  country  already  discontented  is  enough 
to  give  rise  to  serious  troubles  there."  The  treason 
able  plans  of  Burr  and  Wilkinson  were  a  matter  of 
common  notoriety,  and  roused  anxious  comment 
even  in  the  mind  of  John  Randolph,  who  was  nurs 
ing  at  home  the  mortification  of  Judge  Chase's 


1804.  JEFFERSON'S   ENEMIES.  409 

acquittal.1  Randolph  complained  of  "  the  easy  cre 
dulity  of  Mr.  Jefferson's  temper,"  which  made  the 
President  a  fit  material  for  intriguers  to  work  upon. 
Certainly  at  the  close  of  his  first  administration 
Jefferson  seemed  surrounded  by  enemies.  The  New 
England  Federalists,  the  Louisiana  Creoles,  Burr  and 
his  crew  of  adventurers  in  every  part  of  the  Union, 
joined  hands  with  the  ministers  of  England  and 
Spain  to  make  a  hostile  circle  round  the  President ; 
while  the  minister  of  France  looked  on  without  a 
wish  to  save  the  government  whose  friendship  Bona 
parte  had  sought  to  obtain  at  the  cost  of  the  most 
valuable  province  and  the  most  splendid  traditions  of 
the  French  people. 

1  Adame's  Randolph,  p.  157. 


CHAPTER  XVIII. 

AFTER  aiding  to  negotiate  the  Louisiana  treaty  at 
Paris,  in  April  and  May,  1803,  Monroe,  as  the  story 
has  already  told,  being  forbidden  by  Bonaparte  to 
pursue  his  journey  to  Madrid,  followed  his  alternative 
instructions,  to  take  the  post  which  Rufus  King  was 
vacating  in  London.  King  left  England  in  the  middle 
of  May,  1803 ;  Monroe  arrived  in  London  July  18, 
when  the  war  between  England  and  France  was 
already  two  months  old. 

The  mild  Addington  ministry  was  still  in  power, 
and  nothing  had  yet  happened  to  excite  Monroe's 
alarm  in  regard  to  British  policy  in  the  United  States. 
On  the  contrary,  the  ministry  aided  the  Louisiana 
purchase  with  readiness  that  might  reasonably  have 
surprised  an  American  minister,  while  the  friendliest 
spirit  was  shown  by  Lord  Hawkesbury  in  all  matters 
of  detail.  Except  the  standing  dispute  about  impress 
ments,  every  old  point  of  collision  had  been  success 
fully  removed  by  King,  whose  two  conventions,  —  the 
one  for  discharging  British  debts  recognized  by  treaty, 
the  other  for  settling  the  boundaries  of  New  England 
and  of  the  northwest  territory,  —  seemed  to  free  the 
countries  for  the  first  time  from  the  annoying  inheri- 


1804.  ENGLAND  AND  TRIPOLI.  411 

tance  of  disputes  entailed  by  the  definitive  treaty 
which  closed  the  Revolutionary  War  in  1783.  The 
calm  which  seemed  to  prevail  throughout  England 
in  regard  to  her  relations  with  America  contrasted 
sharply  with  the  excitement  shown  by  the  English 
people  in  all  their  allusions  to  the  Corsican  demon, 
as  they  thought  him,  whose  regiments,  gathering  at 
Boulogne,  they  might  expect  to  see  at  any  moment 
encamped  at  Hastings,  where  no  hostile  camp-fire  had 
burned  since  the  night,  seven  hundred  years  before, 
when  the  body  of  an  English  king,  hedged  about  with 
the  dead  bodies  of  a  whole  English  aristocracy,  lay 
stiff  and  stark  on  the  bloody  hillside,  victims  of 
another  French  adventurer.  England  was  intent  on 
her  own  imminent  dangers ;  and  under  the  strain 
which  the  renewal  of  her  painful  efforts  brought  with 
it,  she  was  glad  to  leave  America  alone. 

Yet  calm  as  the  atmosphere  appeared  to  be,  signs 
of  future  storm  were  not  wholly  wanting.  Had 
Monroe  been  naturally  anxious,  he  might,  without 
seeking  far,  have  found  cause  for  anxiety  serious 
enough  to  take  away  all  appetite  for  Spanish  travel, 
and  to  hold  him  close  to  his  post  until  some  one 
should  consent  to  relieve  him  from  an  ungrateful  and 
unpromising  duty.  The  American  minister  at  Lon 
don  in  1804  could  hope  to  gain  nothing  either  for  his 
country  or  for  himself,  and  he  stood  always  on  the 
verge  of  disaster ;  but  when  he  was  required  to  take 
a  "  high  tone  "  in  the  face  of  a  nation  almost  insane 
with  anxiety,  he  challenged  more  chances  of  mortifi- 


412        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  18. 

cation  than  any  but  a  desperate  politician  would  have 
cared  to  risk. 

Monroe  had  at  first  nothing  to  do  but  to  watch  the 
course  of  public  opinion  in  England.  During  the 
autumn  of  1803,  while  President  Jefferson  and  Sec 
retary  Madison  at  Washington  received  Merry  with 
a  changed  policy,  and  all  through  the  winter,  while 
Washington  was  torn  by  "  canons  of  etiquette "  and 
by  contests  of  strength  between  Jefferson,  Madison, 
Casa  Yrujo,  and  Merry,  the  United  States  minister 
in  London  was  left  at  peace  to  study  the  political 
problems  which  bore  on  his  own  fortunes  and  on 
those  of  his  friends  at  home,  as  well  as  on  the 
interests  of  the  Union. 

Beneath  the  calm  of  general  society  mutterings  of 
discontent  from  powerful  interests  could  be  heard,  — 
occasional  outbursts  of  jealousy,  revivals  of  old  and 
virulent  passions,  inveterate  prejudices,  which  made 
as  yet  but  little  noise  in  the  Press  or  in  Parliament, 
but  which  rankled  in  the  breasts  of  individuals.  One 
of  the  earlier  symptoms  of  trouble  came  in  a  familiar 
shape.  For  twenty  years,  whenever  a  question  had 
arisen  of  hostility  to  American  trade  or  of  prejudice 
against  American  character,  the  first  of  Englishmen 
to  stimulate  it,  and  the  loudest  to  proclaim  the 
dangers  of  Great  Britain,  had  been  John  Baker 
Holroyd,  Earl  of  Sheffield,  whose  memory  might 
have  been  lost  under  the  weight  of  his  pamphlets 
had  it  not  been  embalmed  in  the  autobiography  of 
Gibbon.  Lord  Sheffield  felt  such  devotion  to  the 


1804.  ENGLAND  AND  TRIPOLI.  413 

British  navigation  laws  as  could  be  likened  only  to 
the  idolatry  which  a  savage  felt  toward  his  fetich ; 
one  might  almost  have  supposed  that  to  him  the 
State,  the  Church,  and  the  liberties  of  England,  the 
privileges  of  her  nobility,  and  even  the  person  of  her 
sovereign,  were  sacred  chiefly  because  they  guaranteed 
the  safety  of  her  maritime  system.  This  fanaticism 
of  an  honest  mind  led  to  results  so  extravagant  as  to 
become  at  times  ridiculous.  The  existence  of  the 
United  States  was  a  protest  against  Lord  Sheffield's 
political  religion  ;  and  therefore  in  his  eyes  the  United 
States  were  no  better  than  a  nation  of  criminals, 
capable  of  betraying  their  God  for  pieces  of  silver. 
The  independence  of  America  had  shattered  the  navi 
gation  system  of  England  into  fragments  ;  but  Lord 
Sheffield  clung  the  more  desperately  to  his  broken 
idol.  Among  the  portions  which  had  been  saved  were 
the  West  Indian  colonies.  If  at  that  day  the  naviga 
tion  laws  had  one  object  more  important  than  another, 
it  was  to  foster  the  prosperity  of  these  islands,  in 
order  that  their  sugar  and  molasses,  coffee  and  rum, 
might  give  freight  to  British  shippers  and  employ 
ment  to  British  seamen ;  but  to  Lord  Sheffield  the 
islands  were  only  a  degree  less  obnoxious  than  the 
revolted  United  States,  for  they  were  American  at 
heart,  complaining  because  they  were  forbidden  to 
trade  freely  with  New  York  and  Boston,  and  even 
asserting  that  when  the  navigation  laws  were  strictly 
enforced  their  slaves  died  of  starvation  and  disease. 
Lord  Sheffield  seriously  thought  them  ungrateful  to 


414         HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  18. 

murmur,  and  held  it  their  duty  to  perish  in  silence 
rather  than  ask  a  relaxation  of  the  law. 

The  rupture  of  the  Peace  of  Amiens,  in  May,  1803, 
set  Lord  Sheffield  again  at  work ;  and  unfortunately 
the  material  lay  ready  to  his  hand.  The  whole  sub 
ject  of  his  discourse  related  to  a  single  fact ;  but  this 
fact  was  full  of  alarm  to  the  English  people.  The 
extraordinary  decrease  of  British  tonnage  in  the 
American  trade,  the  corresponding  increase  of  Ameri 
can  shipping,  and  the  loud  exultation  of  the  Yankees 
over  the  British  shipmasters  were  proofs  of  the 
danger  which  menaced  England,  whose  existence 
depended  on  maritime  strength.  In  the  month  of 
February,  1804,  Lord  Sheffield  published  a  pamphlet,1 
which  dwelt  on  these  calamities  as  due  to  the  wanton 
relaxation  of  the  navigation  laws  and  the  senseless 
clamor  of  the  colonies.  He  was  answered  in  a 
pamphlet 2  written  by  one  of  the  colonial  agents  ;  and 
the  answer  was  convincing,  so  far  as  Lord  Sheffield's 
argument  was  concerned,  but  his  array  of  statistics 
remained  to  disturb  the  British  mind. 

Monroe  might  therefore  count  on  having,  some  day, 
to  meet  whatever  mischief  the  shipping  interest  of 
Great  Britain  could  cause.  No  argument  was  needed 
to  prove  that  the  navy  would  support  with  zeal  what 
ever  demands  should  be  made  by  the  mercantile 

1  Strictures,  etc.,  on  the  Navigation  and  Colonial  System  of 
Great  Britain.  London,  1804. 

*  Claims  of  the  British  West  Indian  Colonists.  By  G.  W. 
Jordan.  London,  1804. 


1804. 


ENGLAND  AND   TRIPOLI.  415 


marine.  There  remained  the  immense  influence  of 
the  West  Indian  colonies  to  consider;  and  if  this 
should  be  brought  into  active  sympathy  with  the  ship 
owners  and  the  royal  marine  against  American  trade, 
no  minister  in  England — not  even  Pitt  himself  at 
the  height  of  his  power  —  would  be  strong  enough  to 
resist  the  combination. 

The  staple  product  of  the  West  Indian  islands  was 
sugar,  and  owing  to  several  causes  the  profits  of  the 
planters  had  until  1798  been  large.  The  insurrection 
of  the  Haytian  negroes  in  1792  annihilated  for  the 
time  the  supply  of  sugar  from  St.  Domingo ;  prices 
rose  in  consequence,  and  a  great  increase  in  the 
number  of  sugar  plantations  naturally  followed.  Sev 
eral  of  the  Dutch  and  French  islands  fell  into  the 
hands  of  England,  and  adventurers  flocked  to  them, 
eager  to  invest  British  capital  in  new  sugar-fields. 
Under  this  impulse  the  supply  again  increased. 
Cuba,  Porto  Rico,  Guadeloupe,  and  at  last  St.  Domingo 
itself  under  Toussaint's  rule  poured  sugar  into  the 
market.  American  ships  carried  French  and  Spanish 
sugar  to  Europe  until  it  became  a  drug.  The  high 
price  lasted  till  1798  ;  in  that  year  Pitt  even  imposed 
a  heavy  additional  duty  upon  it  as  a  sure  source  of 
revenue.  In  1799  the  effect  of  over-production  first 
became  apparent.  During  the  next  few  years  the 
price  of  sugar  fell,  until  great  suffering  began  to  pre 
vail  in  the  islands,  and  the  planters  wrote  piteous 
letters  of  distress  to  England.  Their  agents  wrote 
back  that  the  English  market  was  flooded  with 


416        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  18. 

colonial  produce :  "  Send  no  more  sugar  home  ;  give  it 
away  rather !  "  was  their  advice,  —  and  the  colonists, 
without  the  means  of  purchasing  even  the  necessaries 
of  life,  supplicated  government  to  let  them  send  their 
sugar  to  the  United  States,  to  be  exchanged  for 
American  produce.1 

This  the  government  dared  not  do,  for  the  shipping 
interest  must  in  such  a  case  be  sacrificed.  Debarred 
from  this  outlet  for  their  produce,  the  colonists  looked 
about  them  for  some  other  resource  ;  and  since  they 
were  not  allowed  to  act  independently  of  the  ship 
masters,  they  saw  no  other  course  than  to  join  hands 
with  the  shipping  interest,  and  to  invoke  the  aid  of 
the  navigation  laws.  The  glut  of  the  European  mar 
ket  was  caused  by  American  neutrals,  who  were 
allowed  to  carry  French  and  Spanish  sugars  from  the 
West  Indies  to  Europe.  If  this  neutral  trade  could 
be  stopped,  the  supply  of  French  and  Spanish  sugar 
would  be  left  to  rot  in  Cuba  and  Guadeloupe,  while 
British  colonial  produce  would  enjoy  a  monopoly 
throughout  Europe. 

Even  before  the  Peace  of  Amiens  this  policy  gained 
many  adherents,  and  the  Peace  tended  to  strengthen 
their  influence.  The  Addington  ministry  was  not 
only  weak  in  character,  but  timid  in  policy ;  and  by 
a  natural  reaction  it  threw  restless  and  ambitious 
younger  statesmen  into  an  attitude  of  protest.  A 
new  departure  was  felt  to  be  necessary ;  and  the 
nervous  energy  of  England,  strained  almost  to  in- 
1  Lowe's  Enquiry,  4th  edition,  1808. 


1804.  ENGLAND  AND   TRIPOLI.  417 

sanity  by  the  anxieties  of  ten  years'  desperate  dan 
ger,  exhausted  itself  in  the  cry  for  one  great  com 
manding  spirit,  who  should  meet  Bonaparte  with 
his  own  weapons  on  his  own  field. 

This  cry  produced  George  Canning.  Of  him  and 
his  qualities  much  will  be  said  hereafter,  when  his 
rise  to  power  shall  have  made  him  a  more  prominent 
figure  ;  here  need  be  noticed  only  the  forces  which 
sought  assertion  through  him,  and  the  nature  of  the 
passions  which  he  was  peculiarly  qualified  to  express. 
At  all  times  nations  have  been  most  imperilled  by 
the  violence  of  disappointed  or  terrified  interests  ; 
but  the  danger  was  never  so  great  as  when  these  in 
terests  joined  to  a  greed  for  selfish  gain  the  cry  for 
an  unscrupulous  chief.  Every  American  schoolboy 
once  knew  by  heart  the  famous  outburst  of  Canning, 
which  began,  "  Away  with  the  cant  of  '  measures,  not 
men ' ! "  but  of  the  millions  of  persons  who  read  or 
heard  this  favorite  extract  few  understood  its  mean 
ing  to  American  interests  and  feelings.  This  cele 
brated  speech,  made  Dec.  8,  1802,  at  a  time  when 
Addington's  cautious  ministry  still  held  office,  was 
intended  to  dwarf  Addington  and  elevate  Pitt,  —  to 
ridicule  caution  and  extol  violence.  "  Sir,"  cried 
Canning,  "  to  meet,  to  check,  to  resist,  to  stand  up 
against  Bonaparte,  we  want  arms  of  the  same  kind. 
I  vote  for  the  large  military  establishments  with 
all  my  heart ;  but  for  the  purpose  of  coping  with 
Bonaparte,  one  great,  commanding  spirit  is  worth 
them  all." 

VOL.  ii.  — 27 


418        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  18. 

"  Arms  of  the  same  kind  "  were,  speaking  generally, 
irresponsible  violence  and  disregard  of  morality.  The 
great,  commanding  spirit  of  the  moment  was  Mr. 
Pitt ;  but  between  the  lines  of  this  speech,  by  the 
light  of  its  author's  whole  career,  the  secret  was  easily 
read  that  in  his  opinion  the  man  of  the  future  who 
could  best  meet  Bonaparte  on  his  own  ground  with 
his  own  weapons  was  not  William  Pitt,  but  George 
Canning. 

After  many  months  of  warfare  against  Addington, 
Canning  was  gratified.  In  May,  1804,  Addington 
retired  from  office,  carrying  into  the  House  of  Lords 
the  new  title  of  Lord  Sidmouth,  while  Pitt  returned 
to  power.  No  one  of  note  returned  with  him.  His 
old  colleague,  Lord  Grenville,  refused  to  join  his 
Administration,  and  Charles  James  Fox  was  person 
ally  excluded  by  King  George.  To  fill  the  Foreign 
Office  Pitt  could  find  no  better  man  than  Lord  Har- 
rowby,  —  a  personage  of  very  second-rate  importance 
in  politics.  With  a  Cabinet  so  weak  as  to  command 
little  respect,  and  reactionary  as  was  required  to  suit 
the  King's  growing  prejudices,  Pitt  was  obliged  to 
disguise  his  feebleness  by  the  vigor  of  his  measures. 
While  creating,  by  expenditure  of  money,  a  new 
coalition  against  Napoleon,  he  was  unable  to  disre 
gard  the  great  moneyed  and  social  interests  which 
were  clamoring  for  a  spirited  policy  against  neu 
trals  and  especially  against  America.  In  private  he 
avowed  his  determination  to  re-establish  the  old  sys 
tem,  and  his  regret  that  he  should  ever  have  been, 


1804.  ENGLAND  AND  TRIPOLI.  419 

most  reluctantly,  induced  to  relax  the  maritime  rights 
of  Britain.1 

That  Monroe  should  have  been  the  last  person  in 
London  to  know  the  secret  thoughts  of  Pitt  was  not 
surprising.  The  Board  of  Trade  commonly  exerted 
more  influence  than  the  Foreign  Office  over  the  rela 
tions  of  England  with  the  United  States ;  and  George 
Rose,  Vice-President  of  the  Board  of  Trade,  Pitt's  de 
voted  friend  and  a  Tory  after  Lord  Sheffield's  heart, 
would  never  have  chosen  Monroe  as  a  confidant  of 
schemes  under  discussion  in  his  department.  Lord 
Harrowby  was  but  the  mouthpiece  of  other  men. 
From  him  Monroe  could  expect  to  hear  only  what 
had  already  been  decided.  Nevertheless  a  little  study 
of  the  mercantile  interests  of  the  city,  and  a  careful 
inquiry  into  the  private  opinions  of  men  like  Rose 
and  Canning,  might  have  thrown  some  light  on  the 
future,  and  would  naturally  have  roused  anxiety  in 
the  mind  of  Monroe. 

Pitt's  return  to  power,  with  the  intention  of  chan 
ging  the  American  policy  which  had  been  pursued 
since  the  negotiation  of  Jay's  treaty,  happened  very 
nearly  to  coincide  with  the  arrival  at  the  Foreign 
Office  of  Merry's  most  alarming  despatches,  announ 
cing  that  Madison  required  the  total  abandonment  of 
impressments,  the  restriction  of  blockades  and  the 

1  Anti-Jacobin  Review,  August,  1807,  p.  368;  Introduction  to 
Reports,  etc.,  on  Navigation,  p.  22;  Atcheson's  American  En 
croachments,  London,  1808,  p.  lixvii;  Baring's  Inquiry,  London, 
1808,  p.  73. 


420       HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  18. 

right  of  search,  and  complete  freedom  in  the  colonial 
trade,  as  the  conditions  on  which  the  friendship  of 
the  United  States  could  be  preserved.  The  announce 
ment  of  President  Jefferson's  high  tone  was  accom 
panied  by  the  British  minister's  account  of  his  own 
social  mortifications  by  the  President  and  the  Secre 
tary  of  State  ;  of  the  Senate's  refusal  to  approve  the 
fifth  article  of  Rufus  King's  boundary  convention, 
in  order  to  attack  the  British  right  of  navigating  the 
Mississippi ;  and  by  drafts  of  bills  pending  in  Con 
gress,  under  which  any  British  admiral,  even  though 
it  were  Nelson  himself,  who  should  ever  have  taken  a 
seaman  out  of  an  American  vessel,  was  to  be  arrested 
in  the  streets  of  the  first  American  port  where  he 
might  go  ashore,  and  to  suffer  indefinite  imprison 
ment  among  thieves  and  felons  in  the  calaboose. 

May  30,  1804,  Monroe  had  his  first  interview  with 
Lord  Harrowby.  In  such  cases  the  new  secretary, 
about  to  receive  a  foreign  minister,  commonly  sent 
for  the  late  correspondence,  in  order  to  learn  some 
thing  about  the  subjects  on  which  he  was  to  have  an 
opinion.  Beyond  a  doubt  Lord  Harrowby  had  on  his 
table  the  despatches  of  Merry,  written  between  Novem 
ber  and  April,  which  he  probably  finished  reading  at 
about  the  moment  when  Monroe  was  announced  at 
the  door. 

Under  such  circumstances,  Monroe  reported  to  his 
Government  that  Lord  Harrowby's  manners  were  de 
signedly  unfriendly  ;  his  reception  was  rough,  his  com 
ments  on  the  Senate's  habit  of  mutilating  treaties 


1804.  ENGLAND  AND  TRIPOLI.  421 

were  harsh,  his  conduct  throughout  the  interview 
was  calculated  to  wound  and  to  irritate.1  After  this 
unpromising  experience,  two  months  were  allowed  to 
pass  without  further  demonstration  on  either  side. 
Then  Lord  Harrowby  called  Monroe's  attention  to  the 
twelfth  article  of  Jay's  treaty,  which  regulated  the 
commercial  relations  between  the  British  West  Indies 
and  the  United  States,  and  which  had  expired  by 
limitation.  He  suggested  its  renewal,  according  to 
its  old  terms,  until  two  years  after  the  next  general 
peace.  To  this  offer  Monroe  replied,  with  the  utmost 
frankness,  "  that  the  President  wished  to  postpone 
this  matter  until  he  could  include  impressment  and 
neutral  rights  in  the  treaty ;  that  we  must  begin  de 
novo ;  that  America  was  a  young  and  thriving  coun 
try  ;  that  in  1794  she  had  had  little  experience,  since 
then  she  understood  her  interests  better ;  and  that  a 
new  treaty  should  omit  certain  things  from  that  of 
1794,  and  include  others.  The  most  urgent  part  was 
that  which  respected  our  seamen."  2 

An  approaching  contact  of  opposite  forces  always 
interests  men's  imagination.  On  one  side,  Pitt  and 
Lord  Harrowby  stood  meditating  the  details  of  meas 
ures,  which  they  had  decided  in  principle,  for  taking 
from  the  United  States  most  of  the  commercial  ad 
vantages  hitherto  enjoyed  by  them ;  on  the  other  side 
stood  Monroe  and  Jefferson,  equally  confident,  telling 
the  Englishmen  that  very  much  greater  advantages 

1  Monroe  to  Madison,  June  3,  1804;  State  Papers,  iii.  92. 

2  Monroe  to  Madison,  Aug.  7,  1804;  State  Papers,  iii.  94. 


422        HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.       CH.  18. 

must  be  conceded.  That  one  or  the  other  of  these 
forces  must  very  soon  give  way  was  evident ;  and  if 
ever  an  American  minister  in  London  needed  to  be 
on  the  alert,  with  every  faculty  strained  to  its  utmost, 
the  autumn  of  1804  was  such  a  moment.  Monroe, 
aware  of  his  danger,  gave  full  warning  to  the  Presi 
dent.  Even  as  early  as  June  3,  after  his  first  inter 
view  with  Lord  Harrowby,  he  wrote  that  a  change 
of  policy  was  imminent.  "  My  most  earnest  advice 
is  to  look  to  the  possibility  of  such  a  change."  l 

Lord  Harrowby  also  gave  every  reasonable  warning. 
His  reply  to  Monroe's  demands  for  further  negotiation 
was  simple,  —  nothing  need  be  expected  from  him. 
He  refused  to  do  any  business  at  all,  on  the  plea  of 
other  occupations  incident  to  the  formation  of  a  new 
ministry.2  Monroe  sent  him  the  draft  of  the  com 
prehensive  treaty  which  Madison  had  forwarded,  but 
Lord  Harrowby  declined  for  the  present  to  discuss  it. 
Then  Monroe  came  to  the  conclusion  that  his  presence 
in  London  was  no  longer  necessary ;  and  accordingly, 
Oct.  8, 1804,  he  started  for  Paris  and  Madrid.  Until 
July  23,  1805,  the  legation  at  London  was  left  in 
charge  of  a  secretary. 

A  month  after  his  departure,  Lord  Harrowby  wrote 
a  letter  of  instructions  3  to  Merry  in  reply  to  the  series 
of  despatches  received  from  Washington. 

1  Monroe  to  Madison,  June  3,  1804;  State  Papers,  iii.  92. 
9  Monroe  to  Madison,  Sept.  8,  1804;  MSS.  State  Department 
Archives. 

»  Harrowby  to  Merry,  Nov.  7,  1804;  MSS.  British  Archives. 


1804.  ENGLAND  AND  TRIPOLI.  423 

"  His  Majesty's  government,"  he  said,  "  have  perceived 
with  considerable  concern,  from  some  of  your  most  recent 
despatches,  the  increasing  acrimony  which  appears  to  per 
vade  the  representations  that  have  been  made  to  you  by 
the  American  Secretary  of  State  on  the  subject  of  the 
impressment  of  seamen  from  on  board  of  American  ships. 
The  pretension  advanced  by  Mr.  Madison  that  the  Ameri 
can  flag  should  protect  every  individual  sailing  under  it 
on  board  of  a  merchant-ship  is  too  extravagant  to  require 
any  serious  refutation.  In  the  exercise  of  the  right,  which 
has  been  asserted  by  his  Majesty  and  his  predecessors  for 
ages,  of  reclaiming  from  a  foreign  service  the  subjects  of 
Great  Britain,  whether  they  are  found  on  the  high  seas 
or  in  the  ports  of  his  own  dominions,  irregularities  must 
undoubtedly  frequently  occur ;  but  the  utmost  solicitude 
has  been  uniformly  manifested  by  his  Majesty's  govern 
ment  to  prevent  them  as  far  as  may  be  possible,  and  to 
repress  them  whenever  they  have  actually  taken  place." 

Intending  to  pursue  the  same  course  in  the  future, 
the  Government  would  without  delay  give  the  strictest 
orders  to  its  naval  officers  "to  observe  the  utmost 
lenity  in  visiting  ships  on  the  high  seas,  and  to  ab 
stain  from  impressments  in  the  ports  of  the  United 
States." 

In  regard  to  commercial  questions,  Lord  Harrowby 
offered  to  consider  the  treaty  of  1794  as  in  force  until 
some  new  arrangement  could  be  formed.  Until  the 
decision  of  the  President  should  be  known,  it  was  "  in 
tended  to  propose  to  Parliament  to  lodge  the  power 
of  regulating  the  commerce  with  America  in  the  King 
in  Council,  in  the  same  manner  as  before  the  treaty 


424        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  18. 

of  1794."  The  offer  of  considering  the  treaty  as  in 
force  "  must  be  regarded  as  a  boon  to  America ;  and 
it  was  made  merely  under  the  persuasion  that  if 
accepted  it  would  be  accepted  with  a  view  to  main 
tain  a  friendly  relation  between  the  two  countries, 
and  to  avoid  in  the  interval  everything  which  could 
lead  to  interrupt  it.  If  this  system  is  followed  in 
America,  it  will  be  followed  here  in  every  respect 
with  an  anxious  desire  for  the  continuance  of  har 
mony  and  cordiality." 

The  same  conditional  and  semi-threatening  dispo 
sition  toward  good-will  ran  through  the  rest  of  these 
instructions.  In  regard  to  the  boundary  convention, 
his  Majesty's  government  would  at  all  times  be  ready 
to  reopen  the  whole  subject ;  "  but  they  can  never 
acquiesce  in  the  precedent  which  in  this  as  well  as 
in  a  former  instance  the  American  government  has 
endeavored  to  establish,  of  agreeing  to  ratify  such 
parts  of  a  convention  as  they  may  select,  and  of 
rejecting  other  stipulations  of  it,  formally  agreed 
upon  by  a  minister  invested  with  full  powers  for  the 
purpose." 

Finally,  Merry  was  to  "  avoid,  as  far  as  possible, 
any  language  which  might  be  conceived  to  be  of  a 
menacing  or  hostile  tendency,  or  which  might  be 
construed  into  an  indication  of  a  desire  on  the  part 
of  his  Majesty's  government  to  decline  any  discus 
sion  of  the  several  points  now  pending  between  the 
two  countries."  Lord  Harrowby  clearly  wished  to 
encourage  discussion  to  the  utmost.  He  left  the 


1804.  ENGLAND  AND  TRIPOLI.  425 

"  canons  of  etiquette "  unnoticed,  and  offered  not 
even  a  hint  at  any  change  of  policy  meditated  by  his 
Government. 

So  matters  remained  in  England  during  the  last 
months  of  President  Jefferson's  first  term.  On  both 
sides  new  movements  were  intended  ;  but  while  those 
of  the  United  States  government  were  foreseen  and 
announced  in  advance  by  Merry,  those  of  the  Brit 
ish  ministry  were  hidden  under  a  veil  of  secrecy, 
which  might  perhaps  have  been  no  more  pene 
trable  to  Monroe  had  he  remained  in  London  to 
watch  them  than  they  were  to  him  in  his  retreat  at 
Aranjuez. 

To  the  world  at  large  nothing  in  the  relations  of 
the  United  States  with  England,  France,  or  Spain 
seemed  alarming.  The  world  knew  little  of  what  was 
taking  place.  Only  men  who  stood  between  these 
forces  could  understand  their  movements  and  predict 
the  moment  of  collision ;  but  if  these  men,  like  Merry, 
Turreau,  and  Yrujo,  had  been  asked  March  3, 1805, 
to  point  out  the  brightest  part  of  Jefferson's  political 
horizon,  they  would  probably  have  agreed  with  one 
voice  that  everything  in  Europe  threatened  disaster, 
and  that  the  only  glimpse  of  blue  sky  was  to  be  seen 
on  the  shores  of  Africa.  The  greatest  triumph  to 
be  then  hoped  from  Jefferson's  peace  policy  was  the 
brilliant  close  of  his  only  war. 

During  the  year  1804  the  little  American  fleet  in 
the  Mediterranean  made  famous  some  names  which 
within  ten  years  were  to  become  more  famous  still. 


426        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  18. 

"With  the  "  Constitution,"  the  only  heavy  frigate  on 
the  station  after  the  loss  of  the  "  Philadelphia,"  and 
with  half-a-dozen  small  brigs  and  schooners,  Preble 
worked  manfully  at  his  task  of  annoying  the  Pacha  of 
Tripoli.  Three  years'  experience  showed  that  a  mere 
blockade  answered  no  other  purpose  than  to  protect 
in  part  American  commerce.  It  had  not  shaken  the 
Pacha  in  the  demand  of  black-mail  as  his  condition  of 
peace.  Bainbridge,  still  held  a  prisoner  in  the  town, 
believed  that  Jefferson  must  choose  between  paying 
what  the  Pacha  asked,  or  sending  eight  or  ten  thou 
sand  men  to  attack  him  in  his  castle.  Black-mail  was 
the  life  of  the  small  pirate  rulers,  and  they  could  not 
abandon  it  without  making  a  precedent  fatal  to  them 
selves,  and  inviting  insurrection  from  their  subjects. 
Preble  could  only  strike  the  coast  with  fear ;  and  dur 
ing  the  summer  of  1804  he  began  a  series  of  dashing 
assaults  with  the  "  Constitution,"  helped  by  four  new 
craft,  —  the  "  Argus  "  and  "  Syren,"  fine  sixteen-gun 
brigs  ;  the  "  Nautilus  "  and  "  Vixen,"  fourteen-gun 
schooners ;  the  "  Enterprise,"  of  twelve  guns,  and  a 
captured  Tripolitan  brig  of  sixteen  guns,  re-named  the 
"  Scourge,"  —  all  supported  by  eight  small  gunboats 
borrowed  from  the  King  of  Naples  who  was  also  at 
war  with  Tripoli.  Thus  commanding  a  force  of  about 
one  hundred  and  fifty  guns,  and  more  than  a  thou 
sand  men,  August  3,  carrying  his  flag-ship  into  the 
harbor,  Preble  engaged  the  Tripolitan  batteries  at 
very  short  range  for  two  hours.  Fortunately,  the 
Mussulmans  could  not  or  did  not  depress  their  guns 


1804.  ENGLAND  AND  TRIPOLI.  427 

enough  to  injure  the  frigate,  and  after  throwing 
many  broadsides  into  the  batteries  and  town,  Preble 
retired  without  losing  a  man.  His  gunboat  flotilla 
was  equally  daring,  but  not  so  lucky.  One  division 
was  commanded  by  Lieutenant  Somers,  the  other  by 
Stephen  Decatur.  They  attacked  the  Tripolitan  gun 
boats  and  captured  three,  besides  sinking  more ;  but 
James  Decatur  was  killed.  A  few  days  afterward, 
August  7,  the  attack  was  repeated,  and  some  five  hun 
dred  24-lb.  shot  were  thrown  into  the  batteries  and 
town.  August  24  a  third  bombardment  took  place 
within  the  month  ;  and  although  Preble  knew  that 
Barron  was  near  at  hand  with  a  strong  reinforce 
ment,  August  29  he  carried  his  flotilla  a  fourth  time 
into  the  harbor,  and  again  threw  several  hundred 
solid  shot  into  the  town.  A  fifth  bombardment,  the 
heaviest  of  all,  took  place  early  in  September.  In 
these  affairs,  so  poor  was  the  Tripolitan  gunnery  or 
courage  that  the  Americans  suffered  almost  no  loss 
beyond  that  of  a  few  spars.  The  only  serious  dis 
aster,  besides  the  death  of  James  Decatur,  was  never 
explained.  Preble,  wishing  to  try  the  effect  of  a  fire- 
ship,  on  the  night  of  September  4  sent  one  of  his  best 
officers,  Lieutenant  Somers,  into  the  harbor  with  the 
ketch  "Intrepid"  filled  with  powder, bombs, and  shell. 
The  "  Argus,"  "  Vixen,"  and  "  Nautilus  "  escorted 
Somers  to  shoal  water,  and  waited  for  him  to  rejoin 
them  in  his  boats.  They  saw  the  batteries  fire  upon 
him  ;  then  they  heard  a  sudden  and  premature  explo 
sion.  All  night  the  three  cruisers  waited  anxiously 


428        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  18. 

outside,  but  Somers  never  returned.  He  and  his  men 
vanished  ;  no  vestige  or  tidings  of  them  could  ever 
be  found. 

Considering  Preble's  narrow  means,  the  economy  of 
the  Department,  and  the  condition  of  his  small  vessels, 
nothing  in  American  naval  history  was  more  credita 
ble  than  the  vigor  of  his  blockade  in  the  summer  of 
1804  ;  but  he  could  not  confidently  assert  that  any 
number  of  such  attacks  would  force  the  Pacha  to 
make  peace.  A  week  after  the  loss  of  Somers  in 
the  "  Intrepid  "  Commodore  Samuel  Barron  arrived, 
bringing  with  him  nearly  the  whole  available  navy 
of  the  United  States,  and  relieved  Preble  from  the 
command.  Preble  returned  home,  and  was  rewarded 
for  his  services  by  a  gold  medal  from  Congress.  Two 
years  afterward  he  died  of  consumption. 

Barron  had  with  him  such  a  force  as  the  United 
States  never  before  or  since  sent  in  hostile  array 
across  the  ocean,  —  two  forty-fours,  the  "  Constitu 
tion  "  and  the  "  President ; "  two  thirty-eight  gun 
frigates,  the  "  Constellation  "  and  the  "  Congress ; " 
the  "  Essex,"  of  thirty-two  guns ;  the  new  brigs, 
"  Hornet "  of  eighteen,  and  the  "  Syren  "  and  "  Ar 
gus  "  of  sixteen ;  the  twelve-gun  schooners  "  Vixen," 
"  Nautilus,"  and  "  Enterprise  ;  "  ten  new,  well-built 
American  gunboats ;  and  two  bomb-vessels.  With  the 
exception  of  the  frigates  "  Chesapeake  "  and  "  United 
States,"  hardly  a  sea-going  vessel  was  left  at  home. 
Commanded  by  young  officers  like  John  Rodgers  and 
Stephen  Decatur,  Chauncey,  Stewart,  and  Isaac  Hull, 


1804.  ENGLAND  AND  TRIPOLI.  429 

such  a  squadron  reflected  credit  on  Robert  Smith's 
administration  of  the  navy. 

Nevertheless  the  Pacha  did  not  yield,  and  Barren 
was  obliged  by  the  season  to  abandon  hope  of  making 
his  strength  immediately  felt.  Six  months  later  the 
commodore,  owing  to  ill-health,  yielded  the  command 
to  John  Rodgers,  while  the  Pacha  was  still  unin 
jured  by  the  squadron.  As  the  summer  of  1805 
approached,  fear  of  Rodgers's  impending  attack  pos 
sibly  helped  to  turn  the  Pacha's  mind  toward  conces 
sion  ;  but  his  pacific  temper  was  also  much  affected 
by  events  on  land,  in  which  appeared  so  striking  a 
combination  of  qualities,  —  enterprise  and  daring  so 
romantic  and  even  Quixotic  that  for  at  least  half  a 
century  every  boy  in  America  listened  to  the  story 
with  the  same  delight  with  which  he  read  the  Arabian 
Nights. 

A  Connecticut  Yankee,  William  Eaton,  was  the  hero 
of  the  adventure.  Born  in  1764,  Eaton  had  led  a 
checkered  career.  At  nineteen  he  was  a  sergeant 
in  the  Revolutionary  army.  After  the  peace  he  per 
sisted,  against  harassing  difficulties,  in  obtaining  what 
was  then  thought  a  classical  education ;  in  his  twenty- 
seventh  year  he  took  a  degree  at  Dartmouth.  He  next 
opened  a  school  in  Windsor,  Vermont,  and  was  chosen 
clerk  to  the  Vermont  legislature.  Senator  Bradley, 
.in  1792,  procured  for  him  a  captain's  commission  in 
the  United  States  army.  His  career  in  the  service 
was  varied  by  insubordination,  disobedience  to  orders, 
charges,  counter-charges,  a  court-martial,  and  a  sen- 


430        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  18. 

tence  of  suspension  not  confirmed  by  the  Secretary 
of  War.  In  1797  he  was  sent  as  consul  to  Tunis, 
where  he  remained  until  the  outbreak  of  the  war 
with  Tripoli  in  1801.  Tunis  was  the  nearest  neigh 
bor  to  Tripoli,  about  four  hundred  miles  away;  and 
the  consul  held  a  position  of  much  delicacy  and  im 
portance.  In  the  year  1801  an  elder  brother  of  the 
reigning  Pacha  of  Tripoli  resided  in  Tunis,  and  to  him 
Eaton  turned  in  the  hope  of  using  his  services.  This 
man,  Hamet  Caramelli,  the  rightful  Pacha  of  Tripoli, 
had  been  driven  into  exile  some  eight  or  nine  years 
before  by  a  rebellion  which  placed  his  younger  brother 
Yusuf  on  the  throne.  Eaton  conceived  the  idea  of 
restoring  Hamet,  and  by  this  act  of  strength  impress 
ing  all  the  Mahometan  Powers  with  terror  of  the 
United  States.  In  pursuit  of  this  plan  he  spent  more 
than  twenty  thousand  dollars,  embroiled  himself  with 
the  Bey  of  Tunis,  quarrelled  with  the  naval  command 
ers,  and  in  1803  returned  to  America  to  lay  his  case 
before  the  President  and  Congress. 

Although  no  one  could  be  surprised  that  the  Presi 
dent  and  his  Cabinet  hesitated  to  put  themselves 
without  reserve  in  the  hands  of  an  adventurer, 
Eaton's  anger  was  extreme  at  finding  the  Govern 
ment  earnest  for  peace  rather  than  war.  Himself 
a  Connecticut  Federalist,  a  close  friend  of  Timothy 
Pickering,  he  expressed  his  feelings  in  his  private 
letters  with  the  bitterness  as  well  as  with  the  humor 
of  his  class.1 

1  Life  of  General  William  Eaton,  Brookfield,  1813,  p.  262. 


1804.  ENGLAND  AND  TRIPOLI.  431 

"  I  waited  on  the  President  and  the  Attorney-General. 
One  of  them  was  civil,  and  the  other  grave.  ...  I  en 
deavored  to  enforce  conviction  on  the  mind  of  Mr.  Lincoln 
of  the  necessity  of  meeting  the  aggressions  of  Barbary  by 
retaliation.  He  waived  the  subject,  and  amused  me  with 
predictions  of  a  political  millennium  which  was  about  to 
happen  in  the  United  States.  The  millennium  was  to 
usher  in  upon  us  as  the  irresistible  consequence  of  the 
goodness  of  heart,  integrity  of  mind,  and  correctness  of 
disposition  of  Mr.  Jefferson.  All  nations,  even  pirates 
and  savages,  were  to  be  moved  by  the  influence  of  his 
persuasive  virtue  and  masterly  skill  in  diplomacy." 

Eaton's  interviews  probably  took  place  at  the  mo 
ment  when  the  Louisiana  treaty  confirmed  the  Cabi 
net  in  its  peace  policy  and  in  reliance  on  diplomacy. 
In  March,  1804,  Eaton  succeeded  in  returning  to  the 
Mediterranean  as  naval  agent,  but  without  special 
powers  for  the  purpose  he  had  in  mind. 

"  The  President  becomes  reserved ;  the  Secretary  of 
"War  '  believes  we  had  better  pay  tribute,'  —  he  said  this 
to  me  in  his  own  office.  Gallatin,  like  a  cowardly  Jew, 
shrinks  behind  the  counter.  Mr.  Madison  '  leaves  every 
thing  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  Department.'  And 
I  am  ordered  on  the  expedition  by  Secretary  Smith,  — 
who,  by  the  by,  is  as  much  of  a  gentleman  and  a  soldier 
as  his  relation  with  the  Administration  will  suffer, — with 
out  any  special  instructions  to  regulate  my  conduct." 

With  no  other  authority  to  act  as  a  military  offi 
cer  than  a  vague  recommendation  from  the  President 
as  a  man  who  was  likely  to  be  extremely  useful  to 
Barron,  Eaton  returned  with  Barren's  large  squadron. 


432        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  18. 

He  felt  himself  ill-treated,  for  he  was  irritable  and 
self-asserting  by  nature,  and  was  haunted  by  a  fixed 
idea  too  unreasonable  for  the  President  to  adopt ;  but 
he  chose  to  act  without  authority  rather  than  not  act 
at  all,  for  he  was  born  an  adventurer,  and  difficulties 
which  seemed  to  cooler  heads  insurmountable  were 
nothing  in  his  eyes.  Sept.  5,  1804,  he  arrived  at 
Malta,  and  thence  sailed  to  Alexandria;  for  in  the 
meanwhile  Hamet  had  been  driven  to  take  refuge  in 
Egypt,  and  Eaton  on  reaching  Cairo,  Dec.  8,  1804, 
found  that  the  object  of  his  search  was  shut  up  in 
Minyeh  on  the  Nile  with  some  rebellious  Mamelukes, 
besieged  by  the  viceroy's  troops.  After  infinite  exer 
tions  and  at  no  little  personal  danger,  Eaton  brought 
Hamet  to  Alexandria,  where  they  collected  some  five 
hundred  men,  of  whom  one  hundred  were  Christians 
recruited  on  the  spot.  Eaton  made  a  convention 
with  Hamet,  arranged  a  plan  of  joint  operations  with 
Barren,  and  then  at  about  the  time  when  President 
Jefferson  was  delivering  his  second  Inaugural  Address, 
the  navy  agent  led  his  little  army  into  the  desert  with 
the  courage  of  Alexander  the  Great,  to  conquer  an 
African  kingdom. 

So  motley  a  horde  of  Americans,  Greeks,  Tripolitans, 
and  Arab  camel-drivers  had  never  before  been  seen 
on  the  soil  of  Egypt.  Without  discipline,  cohesion,  or 
sources  of  supply,  even  without  water  for  days,  their 
march  of  five  hundred  miles  was  a  sort  of  miracle. 
Eaton's  indomitable  obstinacy  barely  escaped  ending 
in  his  massacre  by  the  Arabs,  or  by  their  desertion  in 


1805.  ENGLAND  AND  TRIPOLI.  433 

a  mass  with  Hamet  at  their  head ;  yet  in  about  six 
weeks  they  succeeded,  April  17,  1805,  in  reaching 
Bomba,  where  to  Eaton's  consternation  and  despair 
he  found  no  American  ships.1 

"  Nothing  could  prevail  on  our  Arabs  to  believe  that 
any  had  been  there.  They  abused  us  as  impostors  and 
infidels,  and  said  we  had  drawn  them  into  that  situation 
with  treacherous  views.  All  began  now  to  think  of  the 
means  of  individual  safety ;  and  the  Arabs  came  to  a 
resolution  to  separate  from  us  the  next  morning.  I  re 
commended  an  attempt  to  get  into  Derne.  This  was 
thought  impracticable.  I  went  off  with  my  Christians, 
and  kept  up  fires  upon  a  high  mountain  in  our  rear  all 
night.  At  eight  the  next  morning,  at  the  instant  when 
our  camp  was  about  breaking  up,  the  Pacha's  casnadar, 
Zaid,  who  had  ascended  the  mountain  for  a  last  look-out, 
discovered  a  sail !  It  was  the  '  Argus  ; '  Captain  Hull 
had  seen  our  smokes,  and  stood  in.  Language  is  too 
poor  to  paint  the  joy  and  exultation  which  this  messenger 
of  life  excited  in  every  breast." 

Drawing  supplies  from  the  brig  the  little  army 
rested  a  few  days  ;  and  then,  April  25,  moved  against 
Derne,  where  they  found  the  town  held  by  a  garrison 
of  eight  hundred  men  who  had  thrown  up  earthworks 
and  loopholed  the  terraces  and  houses  for  musketry. 
Eaton  sent  to  the  governor  a  flag  of  truce,  which  was 
sent  back  with  the  Eastern  message,  —  "  My  head,  or 
yours !  "  Three  cruisers,  the  "  Nautilus,"  "  Argus," 
and  "  Hornet,"  acted  in  concert  with  Eaton,  and  a 
vigorous  combined  attack,  April  27,  drove  the  governor 

1  Life  of  Eaton,  p.  328. 
VOL.  ii.  — 28 


434        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  18. 

and  his  garrison  from  the  town.  Eaton  received  a 
ball  through  the  left  wrist,  but  could  not  afford  to  be 
disabled,  for  on  the  news  of  his  arrival  a  large  force 
was  sent  from  Tripoli  to  dislodge  him ;  and  he  was 
obliged  to  fight  another  little  battle,  May  13,  which 
would  have  been  a  massacre  had  not  the  ships'  guns 
held  the  Tripolitans  in  awe.  Skirmishing  continued 
another  month  without  further  results.  Eaton  had 
not  the  force  to  advance  upon  Tripoli,  which  was 
nearly  seven  hundred  miles  to  the  westward,  and 
Hamet  found  no  such  popular  support  at  Derne  as 
he  had  hoped. 

What  influence  Eaton's  success  at  Derne  had  on 
the  Pacha  at  Tripoli  was  never  perfectly  understood ; 
but  the  Pacha  knew  that  Rodgers  was  making  ready 
for  an  assault,  beside  which  the  hottest  of  Preble's 
bombardments  would  seem  gentle ;  Eaton  at  Derne 
with  Hamet  was  an  incessant  and  indefinite  threat; 
his  own  subjects  were  suffering,  and  might  at  any 
moment  break  into  violence ;  a  change  of  ruler  was 
so  common  a  matter,  as  Yusuf  had  reason  to  re 
member,  that  in  the  alternative  of  losing  his  throne 
and  head  in  one  way  or  the  other,  he  decided  that 
peace  was  less  hazardous  than  war.  Immediately 
upon  hearing  that  his  troops  had  failed  to  retake 
Derne,  he  entered  into  negotiations  with  Tobias  Lear, 
the  American  Consul-General  at  Algiers,  who  had 
come  to  Tripoli  for  the  purpose  ;  and  on  this  occa 
sion  the  Pacha  negotiated  with  all  the  rapidity  that 
could  be  wished.  June  3, 1805,  he  submitted  to  the 


1805. 


ENGLAND  AND  TRIPOLI.  435 


disgrace  of  making  peace  without  being  expressly 
paid  for  it,  and  Lear  on  his  side  consented  to  ran 
som  the  crew  of  the  "  Philadelphia "  for  sixty  thou 
sand  dollars. 

When  Eaton  learned  what  Lear  had  done,  his  anger 
was  great  and  not  unreasonable.  That  Lear  should 
have  made  a  treaty  which  sacrificed  Eaton's  Mahom 
etan  allies,  and  paid  sixty  thousand  dollars  for  the 
imprisoned  seamen  at  a  moment  when  Eaton  held 
Derne,  and  could,  as  he  thought,  with  two  hundred 
marines  on  shore  and  an  immense  fleet  at  sea  drive 
the  Pacha  out  of  his  dominions  within  six  weeks, 
was  astonishing.  Lear's  only  excuse  was  the  fear  of 
causing  a  massacre  of  the  "  Philadelphia's  "  crew,  — 
a  reason  which  Eaton  thought  unfounded  and  insuffi 
cient,  and  which  was  certainly,  from  a  military  point 
of  view,  inadmissible.  The  treaty  left  the  Mahome 
tan  allies  at  Derne  to  be  massacred,  and  threw  Hamet 
on  Eaton's  hands.  Deposited  at  Syracuse  with  a  suite 
of  thirty  persons  without  means  of  support,  Caramelli 
became  a  suppliant  for  alms  to  the  United  States 
Congress.  Eaton  declared  the  treaty  disgraceful,  and 
thenceforth  his  grievances  against  the  government 
took  an  acute  form.  The  settlement  of  his  accounts 
was  slow  and  difficult.  He  returned  to  America  and 
received  great  attentions,  which  made  him  none  the 
less  loud  in  complaint,  until  at  last  he  died  in  1811  a 
victim  to  drink  and  to  craving  for  excitement.  Eaton 
was  beyond  question  a  man  of  extraordinary  energies 
and  genius ;  he  had  even  the  rare  courage  to  dis- 


436         HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  18. 

please  his  own  Federalist  friends  in  1807,  because  of 
defending  Jefferson  who  had  done  nothing  for  him, 
but  who  at  a  critical  moment  represented  in  his  eyes 
the  Union. 

Meanwhile  peace  with  Tripoli  was  obtained  without 
tribute,  but  at  the  cost  of  sixty  thousand  dollars,  and 
at  the  expense  of  Eaton  and  his  desperate  band  of 
followers  at  Derne.  Hamet  Caramelli  received  at  last 
a  small  sum  of  money  from  Congress,  and  through 
American  influence  was  some  years  afterward  made 
governor  of  Derne.  Thus  after  four  years  of  unceas 
ing  effort  the  episode  of  the  Tripolitan  war  came  to 
a  triumphant  end.  Its  chief  result  was  to  improve 
the  navy  and  give  it  a  firmer  hold  on  popular  sym 
pathy.  If  the  once  famous  battles  of  Truxton  and 
the  older  seamen  were  ignored  by  the  Republicans, 
Preble  and  Rodgers,  Decatur  and  Hull,  became  bril 
liant  names  ;  the  midnight  death  of  Somers  was  told 
in  every  farmhouse ;  the  hand-to-hand  struggles  of 
Decatur  against  thrice  his  numbers  inflamed  the 
imagination  of  school-boys  who  had  never  heard  that 
Jefferson  and  his  party  once  declaimed  against  a 
navy.  Even  the  blindest  could  see  that  one  more 
step  would  bring  the  people  to  the  point  so  much 
dreaded  by  Jefferson,  of  wishing  to  match  their  forty- 
fours  against  some  enemy  better  worthy  of  their 
powers  than  the  pirates  of  Tripoli. 

There  was  strong  reason  to  think  that  this  wish 
might  soon  be  gratified ;  for  on  the  same  day  when 
Lear,  in  the  "  Essex,"  appeared  off  Tripoli  and  began 


1805.  ENGLAND  AND   TRIPOLI.  437 

his  negotiation  for  peace,  Monroe's  travelling-carriage 
rumbled  through  the  gates  of  Madrid  and  began  its 
dusty  journey  across  the  plains  of  Castile,  bearing  an 
angry  and  disappointed  diplomatist  from  one  humilia 
tion  to  another. 


INDEX  TO  YOLS.  I.  AND  II. 


ABOLITION  SOCIETY,  an  early,  i.  128. 

Acts  of  Congress,  of  Sept.  24,  1789, 
to  establish  the  Judiciary,  i.  259, 
260,  275,  276 ;  of  June  13,  1798,  to 
suspend  intercourse  with  France, 
383;  of  June  25,  1798,  concerning 
aliens,  140,  141,  206,  207,  259,  286; 
of  July  14,  1798,  concerning  sedi 
tion,  140,  141,  206,  207,  259,  261, 
286;  of  Feb.  9, 1799,  further  to  sus 
pend  intercourse  with  France,  384; 
of  Feb.  13,  1801,  to  provide  for  the 
more  convenient  organization  of 
the  courts,  274-276,  278,  280,  288, 
293,  297;  of  Jan.  14,  1802,  for  the 
apportionment  of  representatives, 
301 ;  of  March  8, 1802,  to  repeal  the 
Judiciary  Act  of  1801, 280, 281, 284- 
298 ;  of  March  16,  1802,  fixing  the 
military  peace  establishment,  301; 
of  April  6,  1802,  to  repeal  the  in 
ternal  taxes,  272;  of  April  29, 1802, 
for  the  redemption  of  the  public 
debt,  272;  of  April  29,  1802,  to 
amend  the  judicial  system,  298;  of 
April  30,  1802,  to  enable  Ohio  to 
form  a  State  government,  302;  of 
Feb.  28,  1803,  for  building  four 
sloops-of-war  and  fifteen  gunboats, 
ii.  77;  of  Oct.  31, 1803,  to  take  pos 
session  of  Louisiana,  119,  120;  of 
Feb.  24,  1804,  for  collecting  duties 
within  the  territories  ceded  to  the 
United  States,  257,  260-263,  291, 


293,  304,  380;  of  March  25,  1804, 
to  establish  the  Mediterranean 
Fund,  141 ;  of  March  26,  1804,  for 
the  temporary  government  of  Loui 
siana,  120-129 ;  of  Jan.  19, 1805,  to 
erect  a  dam  from  Mason's  island, 
209 ;  of  March  2,  1805,  further  pro 
viding  for  the  government  of  Or 
leans  Territory,  401 ;  of  March  3, 
1805,  for  the  more  effectual  preser 
vation  of  peace  in  the  ports  and  har 
bors  of  the  United  States,  397,  398. 

Acts  of  Parliament,  on  navigation, 
ii.  319,  320,  327;  on  naturaliza 
tion,  338,  413,  414;  on  merchant- 
shipping,  345. 

Adams,  John  Quincy,  senator  from 
Massachusetts,  ii.  110,  117,  184, 
379;  proposes  draft  of  Constitu 
tional  amendment,  118,  160,  164. 

Addington  ministry,  ii.  358,  416. 

Addington,  Henry  (Lord  Sidmouth), 
succeeds  Pitt,  ii.  342,  347;  retires 
from  office,  418. 

Addison,  Judge,  impeached,  ii.  195. 

Admiralty  courts  in  the  West  Indies, 
ii.  340. 

Albany  in  1800,  i.  3. 

Alien  and  sedition  laws,  i.  140,  206, 
259.  (See  Acts  of  Congress.) 

Allston,  Washington,  i.  149. 

Alquier,  French  minister  at  Madrid, 
i.  363,  368. 

Alaop,  Richard,  i.  102. 


440 


INDEX  TO  VOLS.  I.  AND  IL 


Amendment  to  the  Constitution,  the 
twelfth,  ii.  132. 

"American  Citizen,"  the,  i.  331. 

Ames,  Fisher,  i.  82,  83;  his  opinion 
of  democracy,  84;  in  conversation, 
86;  speech  of,  on  the  British  treaty, 
88,  93;  his  language  toward  oppo 
nents,  119;  ii.  164. 

Amiens,  peace  of,  i.  370;  ii.  59,  290, 
326,  347,  385.  (See  Treaties.) 

Amusements  in  1800,  in  New  Eng 
land,  i.  50;  in  Virginia,  51. 

Anderson,  Joseph,  senator  from  Ten 
nessee,  ii.  157. 

"Aristides."  Pamphlet  by  W.  P. 
Van  Ness,  ii.  73,  172. 

Armstrong,  General  John,  senator 
•  from  New  York,  i.  108,  113,  230, 
234,  281 ;  ii.  157 ;  succeeds  Living 
ston  at  Paris,  291,  308. 

Army,  chaste  reformation  of,  i.  238; 
peace  establishment  in  1801,  242, 
261,  272,  301. 

Ashe,  an  English  traveller,  i.  43,  52, 
53,  54. 

Astor,  John  Jacob,  i.  28. 

"Aurora"  newspaper,  i.  118,  121. 


BAILEY,  THEODORUS,  i.231, 266, 296. 
Bainbridge,  Captain,  ii.  137,  426. 
Baldwin,    Abraham,    senator    from 

Georgia,  i.  305. 
Ballston  Spa,  i.  92. 
Baltimore  in  1800,  i.  29, 131. 
Banks,  in  Boston  in  1800,  i.  22;  in 

New  York,  25;  in  the  South,  31; 

hostility  to,  65. 

Baptists  in  New  England,  i.  89. 
Barbary  Powers,  war  with  the,  i.  244 

et  seq. ;  ii.  425  et  seq. 
Baring,  Alexander,  ii.  358. 
Barlow,  Joel,  i.  69,  99;  his  "  Colum- 

biad,"  103  et  seq.,  106,  182. 
Barron,  Commodore  Samuel,  at  Tri 
poli,  ii.  428;  yields  the  command 

to  Rodgers,  429. 


Bartram,  William,  i.  124. 

Bayard,  James  A.,  member  of  Con 
gress  from  Delaware,  i.  269,  271; 
his  reply  to  Giles,  291  et  seq.  ; 
beaten  by  Caesar  A.  Rodney,  retires 
to  the  Senate,  ii.  76;  re-elected  to 
the  House,  201 ;  moves  the  form 
of  question  in  the  Chase  impeach 
ment,  237,  241. 

Beaujour,  Felix  de,  quoted,  i.  46, 165. 

Belknap,  Jeremy,  i.  93. 

Bernadotte,  General,  appointed  min 
ister  at  Washington,  ii.  10;  Talley 
rand's  instructions  to,  11. 

Berthier,  General,  Napoleon's  agent 
for  the  retrocession  of  Louisiana, 
i.  366. 

Beurnonville,  French  ambassador  at 
Madrid,  ii.  59,  277. 

Bishop,  Abraham,  collector  of  New 
Haven,  i.  226. 

Blockade,  law  of,  ii.  385;  of  Marti 
nique  and  Guadeloupe,  381 ;  of 
New  York,  396. 

Bonaparte.     (See  Napoleon.) 

Bonaparte,  Jerome,  his  marriage  to 
Miss  Patterson  and  his  reception 
by  the  President,  ii.  377  et  seq. 

Bonaparte,  Joseph,  negotiates  treaty 
of  Morfontaine,  i.  360,  362;  scene 
of,  with  Napoleon,  ii.  35  et  seq. 

Bonaparte,  Lucien,  appointed  ambas 
sador  at  Madrid,  i.  371,  373;  op 
poses  the  cession  of  Louisiana,  ii. 
34 ;  scene  of,  with  Napoleon,  35  et 
seq. 

Boston,  population  and  appearance 
of,  in  1800,  i.  20;  business,  21;  an 
intellectual  centre  in  1800,75;  sen 
timent  of,  87;  social  customs  of, 
in  1800,  91;  a  summer  watering- 
place,  92. 

Bowditch,  Nathaniel,  i.  93. 

Boyle,  John,  ii.  228. 

Brackenridge,  H.  H.,  author  of 
"Modern  Chivalry,"  i.  124;  ii. 
195. 


INDEX  TO  VOLS.  I.  AND  II. 


441 


Bradley,  Captain,  of  the  "Cam 
brian,"  ii.  393,  396. 

Bradley,  Stephen  R.,  senator  from 
Vermont,  ii.  157,  218,  238,  259. 

Breckenridge,  John,  senator  from 
Kentucky,  i.  269 ;  moves  the  re 
peal  of  the  Judiciary  Act,  278, 
280;  ii.  85,  94;  on  the  admission 
of  Louisiana  to  the  Union,  108; 
his  bill  for  the  territorial  govern 
ment  of  Louisiana,  120. 

British  claims,  ii.  339. 

Brown,  Charles  Brockden,  i.  123. 

Brown,  James,  secretary  of  the  Loui 
siana  Territory,  ii.  220. 

Bryant,  William  Cullen,  i.  110,  133. 

Buckminster,  Joseph,  i.  81. 

Buckminster,  Joseph  Stevens,  i.  90, 
162. 

Billow,  Heinrich  Wilhelm,  i.  41,  48. 

Burr,  Aaron,  Vice-President,  i.  65, 
93,  109,  112;  his  character,  195; 
centre  of  intrigue,  229  et  seq. ;  his 
hatred  of  Virginia,  279;  his  toast 
at  the  Federalist  dinner,  282 ;  at 
tacked  by  the  "American  Citizen" 
and  "Aurora,"  283;  ii.  154;  in 
voked  by  Pickering  and  Griswold, 

171  ;  his  defence  by  "  Aristides," 

172  ;    his    interview    with    Jeffer 
son,  175;  nominated  for  governor 
of  New  York,   177;   confers   with 
Griswold,  183;  defeated,  185;  his 
hostility    to    Hamilton,    185  ;    his 
duel  with   Hamilton,  187  et  seq.  ; 
presides  at  the  Chase  impeachment, 
227,  238,  368;   communicates  with 
Merry,  395 ;   his  plan  of  creating 
a  western  confederacy,  402;   asks 
the  aid  of  the  British  government, 
403;  Turreau's  opinion  of,  407;  his 
plan,  408. 

Butler,  Pierce,  ii.  95. 


CABOT,  GEORGE,  his  opinion  of  de 
mocracy,  i.  84,  86  et  seq,;  letter 


of,  opposing  Pickering's  scheme, 

ii.  164 ;  inclines  to  Burr,  182. 
Calhoun,  John  C.,  i.  154. 
Callender,   James   T.,   his  libels   on 

Jefferson,  i.  322  et  seq. 
Calvinism,  popular  reaction  against, 

in  New  England,  i.  82. 
Campbell,    George   W.,    member  of 

Congress  from  Tennessee,  ii.  123; 

impeachment  of  Judge  Chase,  224, 

228,  230. 
Campbell,  Justice,  on  the  Louisiana 

case,  ii.  127. 
Campbell,    Thomas,    borrows    from 

Freneau,  i.  126. 
Canals   in   1800,  i.  8-10,  26,  29,  38, 

94. 

Canning,  George,  rise  of,  ii.  417. 
"Canons  of  Etiquette,"  the,  ii.  365. 
Capitol  at  Washington  in  1800,  i.  30, 

198 ;   designed  by  Dr.   Thornton, 

111. 

Caramelli,  Hamet,  ii.  430,  436. 
Cevallos,  Don  Pedro  de,  i.  371 ;  ii. 

23;   remonstrates  against  the  sale 

of  Louisiana,   58;   refuses   to   pay 

for  French   spoliations,  276,   279; 

his   conditions    on    ratification    of 

Spanish  claims   convention,   280  ; 

his  comments  on  the  Americans, 

282,  283;  alarmed,  284;  complains 

of  Pinckuey's  conduct,  294. 
Channing,  William  Ellery,  i.  90;  his 

impressions  of  Virginia  manners, 

132,  171. 
Charles  IV.  of  Spain,  his  character, 

i.  341;  refuses  papal  territory,  354; 

his  delight  at  the  offer  of  Tuscany, 

369;   refuses   to   sell  Florida,  401; 

delivers    Louisiana    to    Napoleon, 

401 ;    distressed  by   Napoleon,   ii. 

56;  his  demands  on  Napoleon,  59; 

withdraws  protest  against  the  sale 

of  Louisiana,  277 ;  declares  war  on 

England,  309. 
Charleston,  S.  C.,  in  1800,  i.  37  et  seq., 

92,  149. 


442 


INDEX  TO  VOLS.  I.  AND  H. 


Chase,  Justice  Samuel,  his  charge  to 
the  Baltimore  grand  jury,  ii.  147; 
his  impeachment,  149  et  seq.,  158; 
scene  of  impeachment,  227;  his 
counsel,  229 ;  the  managers  of  his 
impeachment,  229;  articles  of  im 
peachment,  229;  the  trial,  230  et 
ttq. ;  votes  on  the  articles,  238 ;  his 
acquittal,  239. 

Chauncey,  Isaac,  at  Tripoli,  ii.  428. 

Cheetham,  editor  of  the  "American 
Citizen  and  Watchtower,"  i.  121; 
attacks  Burr,  331. 

Chillicothe  in  1800,  i.  2. 

Christophe,  i.  416. 

Cincinnati  in  1800,  i.  2. 

Claiborne,  William  Charles  Cole, 
appointed  governor  of  Mississippi 
Territory,  i.  295,  403 ;  receives  pos 
session  of  Louisiana,  ii.  256;  gov 
ernor  of  Orleans  Territory,  400. 

Claims,  American,  on  France.  (See 
French  spoliations.) 

Claims,  American,  on  Spain.  (See 
Pinckney.) 

Clark,  Christopher,  ii.  228. 

Clay,  Henry,  i.  133. 

Cleveland  in  1800,  i.  3. 

Clifton,  William,  i.  98. 

Clinton,  De  Witt,  i.  112,  228,  233; 
resigns  his  senatorship  to  become 
mayor  of  New  York,  266,  281 ;  at 
tacks  Burr  through  Cheetham,  331 ; 
his  duel  with  Swartwout,  332;  ii. 
206. 

Clinton,  George,  i.  114;  governor  of 
New  York,  228;  ii.  173;  nominated 
for  Vice-President,  180. 

Cobbett,  William,  i.  46;  in  Philadel 
phia,  118. 

Cocke,  William,  senator  from  Ten 
nessee,  ii.  113 ;  censures  Randolph, 
240. 

Coleman,  William,  editor  of  the  New 
York  "Evening  Post,"  i.  119. 

Colonial  System  of  the  European 
Powers,  ii.  323. 


Colonial  trade,  ii.  319,  322,  327-329 ; 
direct  and  indirect,  324,  325 ;  West 
Indian,  value  of,  331,  332. 

Columbia  College,  i.  101. 

"Columbiad,"  the,  of  Joel  Barlow, 
i.  103  et  teq. 

Commerce,  foreign  and  domestic,  in 
1800,  i.  5,  14. 

Congregational  clergy,  5.  79. 

Congress,  the  Seventh,  first  session 
of,  i.  264-307 ;  second  session,  427- 
433;  ii.  74-77;  the  Eighth,  first 
session  of,  92,  96-159;  second  ses 
sion,  206-242,  396.  (See  Acts  of 
Congress.) 

Connecticut,  i.  105. 

"Constitution,"  the,  ii.  426. 

Cooper,  Dr.  Charles  D.,  ii.  178 ;  letter, 
186. 

Cooper,  James  Fenimore,  i.  110;  quo 
tation  from  "  Chainbearer,"  43. 


DALLAS,  ALEXANDER  JAMES,  i.  127, 
281;  ii.  198;  letter  of,  to  Gallatin, 
198. 

Dana,  Samuel,  member  of  Congress 
from  Connecticut,  i.  269,  271. 

Davis,  John,  an  English  traveller, 
i.  122;  his  account  of  Jefferson's 
inauguration,  197. 

Davis,  Matthew  L.,  231  et  seq.,  296. 

Dayton,  Jonathan,  senator  from  New 
j'ersey,  i.  280;  ii.  105. 

Dearborn,  Henry,  appointed  Secre 
tary  of  War,  i.  219;  ii.  2,  431. 

Debt,  public.    (See  Finances.) 

Decatur,  James,  killed  at  Tripoli, 
ii.  427. 

Decatur,  Stephen,  burns  the  "Phila 
delphia,"  ii.  139;  at  Tripoli,  427. 

Decres,  Napoleon's  Minister  of  Ma 
rine,  instructions  of,  to  Richepanse 
and  Leclerc,  re-establishing  slavery, 
i.  397;  denning  the  boundaries  of 
Louisiana  and  its  administration, 
ii.  5. 


INDEX  TO  VOLS.  I.  AND  IL 


443 


Democrats,  denounced  by  New  Eng 
land  clergy,  i.  79  et  seq. ;  social  in 
feriority,  92 ;  the  Northern,  264 

Dennie,  Joseph,  on  democracy,  i.  85; 
editor  of  the  "Portfolio,"  119, 
121. 

Deposit  at  New  Orleans,  the  right  of, 
granted  by  treaty,  i.  349;  taken 
away,  418;  restored,  ii.  3. 

Derbigny,  Pierre,  ii.  401,  406,  408, 

Desertion  of  British  Seamen,  ii.  333- 
335,  345,  346,  392. 

Dessalines,  i.  416. 

Destre'han,  Jean  Noel,  ii.  401,  406. 

Dexter,  Samuel,  i.  93,  192,  219. 

Dickens,  Charles,  i.  56. 

"Diomed,"  stallion,  i.  51. 

Drayton,  Governor,  of  South  Caro 
lina,  i.  151. 

Dry-dock,  Jefferson's  plan  of,  i.  428; 
i"i.  77. 

Duane,  William,  editor  of  the  "Au 
rora,"  i.  118;  his  influence  in 
Pennsylvania,  ii.  194. 

Duponceau,  Peter  S.,  i.  127;  ii.  259. 

Dupont  de  Nemours,  commissioned 
by  Jefferson  to  treat  unofficially 
with  Bonaparte,  i.  411;  letter  to, 
ii.  254. 

Dwight,  Theodore,  i.  101;  his  attack 
on  democracy,  225. 

Dwight,  President  Timothy,  quoted, 
i.  21,  23;  his  travels,  41;  describes 
popular  amusements,  49,  56;  lack 
of  roads  in  Rhode  Island,  64;  his 
poem,  "The  Conquest  of  Canaan" 
cited,  96  et  seq.  ;  his  "Greenfield 
Hill,"  98;  value  of  hia  Travels, 
100,  310. 


EARLY,  PETER,  member  of  Congress 
from  Georgia,  ii.  228,  230. 

Eaton,  William,  his  character  and 
career,  ii.  429  et  seq. ;  his  interviews 
with  Jefferson  and  the  Cabinet, 
430;  attacks  Derne,  433. 


Education  in  New  England,  i.  76,  77; 
in  New  York,  110 ;  in  New  Jersey 
and  Pennsylvania,  129;  in  Virginia. 
136. 

Election  of  1800,  i.  152, 163 ;  of  1801, 
294;  ii.  202;  of  1802,  308,  329,  330; 
of  1803,  76;  of  1804,  163,  176,  185, 
197,  201,  202,  204. 

Embargo  imposed  by  Washington, 
ii.  323. 

Emerson,  Kalph  Waldo,  i.  171. 

"Emmanuel,"  case  of,  ii.  327. 

England,  colonial  policy  of,  ii.  317; 
cordiality  with,  347;  change  of 
tone  toward,  356,  387. 

"Enterprise,"  United  States  schoon 
er,  captures  Tripolitan  corsair,  i. 
245. 

Eppes,  John  W.,  member  of  Con 
gress  from  Virginia,  ii.  95. 

Erie  Canal,  the,  i.  112. 

Essex  Junto,  the,  i.  89,  314. 

Etiquette  at  Washington,  ii.  362  et 
seq.,  380. 

Eustis,  Dr.  William,  member  of  Con 
gress  from  Boston,  i.  93,  281. 

Evans,  Oliver,  •tri*>iayentions,  i.  68, 
71,  182. 

"Evening  Post,"  the  New  York,  i. 
119,  120 ;  ii.  366. 

"Experiment,"  sloop,  i.  6. 


FEDERALISTS.     (See  Party.) 

Fight,  the  "rough-and-tumble,"  in 
the  South,  i.  52  et  seq. 

Finances  in  1801,  i.  239  et  $eq.,  253, 
270,  272;  in  1802,  ii.  75,  77;  in 
1803,  135,  136,  141;  in  1804,  206. 

Fitch,  John,  his  inventions,  i.  66  et 
seq.,  181. 

Florida  restored  by  England  to  Spain, 
i.  353;  Bonaparte's  demand  for, 
refused  by  Charles  IV.,  369;  Bona 
parte's  attempts  to  secure,  401; 
Livingston's  attempt  to  secure,  ii. 
44. 


444 


INDEX  TO  VOLS.  I.  AND  IL 


Florida,  West,  ii.  7;  claimed  by  Liv 
ingston  as  part  of  the  Louisiana 
purchase,  68;  Jefferson's  anxiety 
to  secure,  245;  scheme  for  seiz 
ing,  255;  claim  to,  273,  311,  312; 
claim  adopted  by  the  President, 
302. 

Foster,  Augustus,  his  description  of 
Jefferson,  i.  186;  of  Madisot,  190. 

Fox,  Charles  James,  ii.  418. 

Franklin,  Benjamin,  i.  60  et  seq.,  181; 
citation  from  Poor  Richard,  44. 

French  Revolution,  i.  82. 

French  spoliations,  i.  350,  361-363; 
ii.  30,  31,  40-42,  46-50,  61. 

Freneau,  Philip,  i.  125. 

Frere,  John  Hookham,  i.  402. 

Fugitive-Slave  Bill,  i.  300. 

Fulton,  Robert,  i.  69,  71,  182. 


GA ILLARD,  JOHN,  senator  from  South 
Carolina,  ii.  238. 

Gallatin,  Albert,  his  opinion  of  the 
Connecticut  River  district,  i.  19; 
on  Indian  corn,  58 ;  his  political 
doctrines,  72, 115  et  seq.,  163,  177; 
personal  characteristics  of,  190 ;  ap 
pointed  Secretary  of  the  Treasury, 
218;  supports  M.  L.  Davis,  232; 
opposes  removals  from  office,  235; 
ii.  194;  his  financial  measures,  i. 
239;  his  financial  schemes  adopted, 
272;  inserts  school  and  road  con 
tract  into  the  Ohio  Constitution, 
302;  the  Yazoo  sale,  304;  under 
estimates  the  product  of  the  taxes, 
ii.  75;  his  opinion  on  the  acquisi 
tion  of  territory,  79, 131;  success  of 
the  Treasury  Department  under, 
135;  asks  Congress  for  a  special 
tax  for  the  Barbary  war,  141,  261 ; 
attacked  by  Duane,  194,  196;  by 
Eaton,  431. 

Gelston,  Daniel,  i.  231. 

George  III.,  character  of,  i.  342. 

Georgia,  state  of,  in  1800,  i.  4,  39; 


surrenders  territory  to  the  United 
States,  303;  land  speculation  in, 
303;  Rescinding  Act,  304. 

Gerry,  Elbridge,  i.  358. 

Giles,  William  B.,  member  of  Con« 
gress  from  Virginia,  i.  209,  261, 
267;  his  political  career,  284  et  seq. ; 
debate  on  the  Judiciary  Bill,  280 
et  seq.,  299;  ii.  142;  supports  the 
impeachment  of  Judge  Chase,  221; 
his  view  of  impeachment,  223,  235, 
237,  238,  241. 

Goddard,  Calvin,  member  of  Con 
gress  from  Connecticut,  ii.  160. 

Godoy,  Don  Manuel,  Prince  of  Peace, 
i.  346  et  seq. ;  treaty  of  1795  nego 
tiated  by,  348,  369,  371;  bafilea 
Bonaparte,  374;  attempts  to  con 
ciliate  the  United  States,  ii.  21; 
protests  against  the  sale  of  Louisi 
ana,  57;  conciliates  Napoleon,  277. 

Goodrich,  Elizur,  i.  226. 

Gore,  Christopher,  ii.  347. 

Granger,  Gideon,  appointed  Post 
master-General,  i.  308;  an  active 
politician,  ii.  192;  agent  for  the 
Yazoo  claims,  212;  attacked  by 
Randolph,  213. 

Graydon,  Alexander,  i.  127. 

Gregg,  Andrew,  member  of  Congress 
from  Pennsylvania,  ii.  123. 

Gre'goire,  Abbe",  i.  105. 

Grenville,  Lord,  ii.  316,  418. 

Griswold,  Gaj-lord,  member  of  Con 
gress  from  New  York,  ii.  96. 

Griswold,  Roger,  member  of  Con 
gress  from  Connecticut,  i.  269,  299 ; 
ii.  99,  101,  133,  142,  160;  his  let 
ters  to  Oliver  Wolcott,  162,  169, 
180;  conference  of,  with  Burr,  183, 
390,  391. 


HAMILTON,  ALEXANDER,  i.  85,  86, 
108,277;  Talleyrand's  remark  con 
cerning,  352;  ii.  168;  opposes  Burr 
for  governor,  176 ;  not  in  favor  of 


INDEX  TO  VOLS.  I.  AND 


445 


disunion,  177;  projects,  184;  his 
opposition  to  Burr,  185  et  seq.  ; 
his  duel  with  Burr,  186  et  seq. ; 
mourned  by  the  Federalists,  190. 

Harper,  Robert  G.,  ii.  154,  228, 
232. 

Harrowby,  Lord,  British  Foreign  Sec 
retary,  ii.  418;  receives  Monroe, 
420;  instructions  as  to  impress 
ments  and  the  boundary  conven 
tion,  423  et  seq. 

"  Hartford  wits,"  i.  101. 

Harvard  College,  i.  77,  78,  90. 

Hastings,  Warren,  trial  of,  ii.  226. 

Hawkesbury,  Lord,  British  Foreign 
Secretary,  ii.  344,  410. 

Henry,  Patrick,  i  143. 

Higginson,  Stephen,  ii.  164. 

Hillhouse,  James,  senator  from  Con 
necticut,  ii.  160. 

Hopkins,  Lemuel,  i.  102. 

Hopkinson,  Joseph,  ii.  228,  231. 

Horses  and  horse-racing  in  New 
England,  i.  50;  in  New  York  and 
Virginia,  51. 

Hosack,  Dr.  David,  i.  111. 

Hospitals  and  asylums  in  1800,  i. 
128. 

Hull,  Isaac,  at  Tripoli,  ii.  428. 

Hunt,  Samuel,  member  of  Congress 
from  New  Hampshire,  ii.  160. 


IMPEACHMENT.    (See  Pickering  and 

Chase.) 

Impeachment,  a  scarecrow,  ii.  243. 
Impressment  of  seamen,  ii.   335   et 

seq.,  358,  384,  393,  394,  421,  423 ; 

Act  of  Congress  punishing,  ii.  397, 

420. 

Indian  corn,  i.  58. 
Indian  tribes  in  1800,  i.  4. 
Ingersoll,  C.  J.,  i.  123. 
Ingersoll,  Jared,  ii.  259. 
Inns  of  New  England  and  New  York, 

i.  21. 
Inquisitiveness,  American,  i.  55. 


Insane,  the,  treatment  of,  in  1800, 
i.  128. 

Irving,  Peter,  editor  of  the  "Morn 
ing  Chronicle,"  i.  121. 

Irving,  Washington,  i.  110. 


JACKSON,  ANDREW,  i.  54. 

Jackson,  Francis  James,  his  reputa 
tion,  ii.  360. 

Jackson,  James,  senator  from  Geor 
gia,  and  the  Yazoo  sale,  i.  305;  ii. 
95,  238. 

Jackson,  John  G.,  member  of  Con 
gress  from  Virginia,  ii.  211;  re 
plies  to  Randolph's  attack  on 
Madison,  215. 

Jackson,  Mr.,  editor  of  the  "  Politi 
cal  Register,"  ii.  265;  discloses 
Yrujo's  attempt  to  use  him,  266. 

Jacmel,  siege  of,  i.  385. 

Jay,  Chief-Justice,  i.  108;  sent  to 
England  by  Washington,  ii.  323; 
negotiates  treaty  with  Lord  Gren- 
ville,  326. 

Jay's  treaty.    (See  Treaties.) 

Jefferson,  Thomas,  i.  13,  32,  59,  65, 
67,  72,  73;  Federalist  opinion  of, 
80  et  seq.,  83,  112, 114;  opposed  to 
manufactures,  138;  chief  author  of 
the  Kentucky  Resolutions,  140  et 
seq. ;  leader  of  the  Virginia  school, 
143 ;  characteristics  of,  144  et  seq. ; 
his  political  doctrines,  146  et  seq., 
156;  Thomas  Moore's  verses  on, 
167;  visionary,  170;  his  ideas  of 
progress,  178,  179;  personal  char 
acteristics,  185  et  seq. ;  his  dress, 
187;  social  pre-eminence,  188;  his 
inauguration,  191;  his  antipathy  to 
Marshall,  192,  194;  purity  of  his 
life,  196;  his  inaugural  address, 
199  et  seq. ;  his  conception  of  gov 
ernment,  210  et  seq. ;  his  foreign 
policy,  214  et  seq. ;  his  Cabinet, 
218  et  seq. ;  his  plans  for  the 
navy,  222  et  seq. ;  his  treatment 


446 


INDEX  TO  VOLS.  I.  AND  II. 


of  patronage,  224,JJ94;  his  New 
Haven  letter,  226;  his  first  annual 
message,  248;  his  course  with  re 
gard  to  the  Judiciary,  255  et  seq. ; 
his  abnegation  of  power,  262;  his 
power,  266;  his  theory  of  internal 
politics,  272;  contradictions  in  his 
character,  277;  his  hopefulness, 
307  et  seq. ;  as  a  man  of  science, 
310 ;  his  dislike  for  New  England- 
ers,  310  et  seq. ;  his  letter  to  Paine, 
316;  attacked  by  Callender,  322; 
sensitiveness  of,  324;  his  relations 
with  Callender,  325  et  seq. ;  sends 
Lear  to  St.  Domingo,  389 ;  igno 
rant  of  Bonaparte's  schemes,  403 
et  seq. ;  his  eyes  opened,  409 ;  his 
letter  to  Dupont  de  Nemours,  410; 
writes  to  Livingston  defining  his 
position  with  respect  to  France  and 
Spain,  424;  his  annual  message, 
1802,  427;  ignores  the  war  party, 
428;  replies  to  their  demand  for 
papers  touching  the  right  of  de 
posit  at  New  Orleans,  430;  quiets 
the  West,  432;  attempts  the  pur 
chase  of  New  Orleans,  432  et  seq. ; 
his  language  to  Thornton,  436' 
prefers  Natchez  to  New  Orleans 
as  a  seat  of  trade,  443;  his  ap 
parent  inconsistency,  443  et  seq. ; 
the  essence  of  his  statesmanship, 
445;  proposes  alliance  with  Eng 
land,  ii.  1,  78;  instructs  Pinckney 
to  offer  a  consideration  to  Spain 
for  New  Orleans  and  Florida,  22; 
writes  a  defence  of  his  use  of  pat 
ronage  for  the  Boston  "  Chroni 
cle,"  82;  his  amendment  to  the 
Constitution  regarding  Louisiana, 
83;  his  letter  to  Breckenridge  on 
the  subject,  84;  to  Paine,  86;  draws 
up  a  new  amendment,  86 ;  his  re 
ply  to  W.  C.  Nicholas,  89 ;  his  mes 
sage,  Oct.  7,  1803,  92;  his  bill  for 
the  administration  of  Louisiana, 
119 ;  his  view  of  the  Louisiana 


treaty  and  legislation,  130  ;  re 
quests  Congress  to  enlarge  the 
Mediterranean  force,  140;  inter 
view  with  Burr,  175;  declines  to 
appoint  Burr  to  an  executive  office, 
176 ;  his  knowledge  of  Federalist 
schemes,  192;  his  confidence  in 
his  popularity,  202;  receives  the 
electoral  votes  of  Massachusetts 
and  New  Hampshire,  204;  his  mes 
sage,  November,  1804,  206;  his  dis 
appointment  at  the  acquittal  of 
Justice  Chase,  243;  his  authority 
in  foreign  affairs,  245;  desires  to 
obtain  West  Florida,  245;  explains 
to  Senator  Breckenridge  his  course 
toward  Spain,  248;  his  plan  to  ob 
tain  West  Florida,  249 ;  instructs 
Monroe  with  regard  to  the  Span 
ish  claims,  250;  the  harvest  season 
of  his  life,  252;  sends  troops  to 
Natchez,  254;  makes  no  demand 
for  West  Florida  when  Louisiana 
is  delivered,  256;  declares  Mobile 
within  the  United  States,  263 ; 
entertains  Yrujo  at  Monticello, 
266;  his  conviction  of  the  power 
of  American  commercial  interests, 
330;  anxious  for  friendship  with 
England,  342;  his  intimacy  with 
Thornton,  347;  his  opinion  of  Bo 
naparte,  347.  353,  381;  decides  to 
maintain  the  neutral  rights  of  the 
United  States  more  strictly,  356; 
his  social  habits,  363;  establishes 
a  new  social  code,  365;  receives 
Merry,  366 ;  invites  him  to  dinner 
with  Pichon,  369  ;  sends  list  of 
impressments  to  the  Senate,  384; 
improves  his  style  of  dress,  405; 
his  enemies,  409. 

Judiciary  Act,  the,  i.  274  et  seq. ;  re 
peal  of,  moved,  278  et  seq.,  284  et 
seq. ;  repealed,  298. 

Judiciary  sj'stem,  the,  Jefferson's 
recommendations  concerning,  i. 
255. 


INDEX  TO  VOLS.  I.  AND  II. 


447 


KENTUCKY  in  1800,  i.  2,  43;  Resolu 
tions  of  1798,  140  et  seq.,  205. 

Key,  Philip  Barton,  ii.  228. 

King,  Rufus,  American  minister  in 
London,  i.  109;  sends  the  treaty 
of  the  retrocession  of  Louisiana  to 
Jefferson,  409;  ii.  23,  178  et  seq.; 
obtains  from  Pitt  a  definition  of 
neutral  importation,  328,  340;  his 
negotiations  with  the  British  gov 
ernment,  345,  347;  returns  with 
favorable  conventions,  358;  opin 
ion  of  F.  J.  Jackson  and  Anthony 
Merry,  361 ;  leaves  England,  410. 


LANGDON,  JOHN,  i.  220. 

Latrobe,  Benjamin  H.,  report  on 
steam-engines,  i.  68,  70, 112;  letter 
of,  to  Volney,  130. 

Laussat,  prefect  in  Louisiana,  ii.  5; 
arrives  at  New  Orleans,  10,  13 ; 
defines  the  boundaries  of  the  Loui 
siana  purchase,  255 ;  declares  the 
Rio  Bravo  the  western  limit  of 
Louisiana,  298. 

Laa,  Thomas,  i.  257. 

Lear,  Tobias,  consul  'to  St.  Domingo, 
i.389;  quits  St.  Domingo,  407;  ne 
gotiates  a  treaty  with  the  Pacha  of 
Tripoli,  ii.  434. 

Leclerc,  General,  in  command  of  the 
expedition  against  Louverture,  i. 
378;  seizes  Toussaint  Louverture, 
396 ;  insults  American  shipmasters, 
407;  reports  French  losses,  414; 
blamed  by  Napoleon,  416  ;  his 
death,  418;  ii.  13. 

Lee,  Charles,  ii.  228. 

Leib,  Michael,  member  of  Congress 
from  Pennsylvania,  i.  298;  ii.  123, 
194,  196  et  seq. 

Lewis,  Morgan,  i.  108. 

Lewis,  William,  i.  127. 

Liancourt,  Due  de,  describes  Phila 
delphia,  i.  28,  117;  on  the  Virgini 
ans,  33;  on  life  in  Pennsylvania, 


42,  45,  52;    on  Virginia  culture, 
133,  157,  165. 

Libraries,  i.  61,  63,  129,  152. 

Lincoln,  Abraham,  i.  171. 

Lincoln,  Levi,  Attorney-General,  i. 
219,  304;  ii.  2;  on  the  acquisition 
of  new  territory  by  the  United 
States,  78. 

Linn,  James,  member  of  Congress 
from  New  Jersey,  i.  295. 

Linn,  John  Blair,  i.  123. 

Liston,  Robert,  British  minister,  ii. 
340,  367. 

Literature,  American,  in  1800,  i.  41, 
75  et  seq.,  93. 

Livingston,  Edward,  district-attorney 
and  mayor  of  New  York,  i.  233, 
295;  ii.  259. 

Livingston,  Robert  R.,  Chancellor, 
i.  69,  108,  112,  219;  appointed  min 
ister  to  France,  233,  295,  404 ;  dis 
cusses  the  price  of  Louisiana,  ii. 
31;  his  claims  convention,  46;  his 
estimate  of  the  importance  of  the 
cession  of  Louisiana,  67;  claims 
West  Florida,  68  et  seq. ;  his  plan 
of  gaining  West  Florida,  246,  275; 
his  situation  after  the  treaty,  289 ; 
distrusts  Napoleon,  290. 

Logan's  Act,  ii.  259. 

Longstreet,  Judge,  author  of  "  Geor 
gia  Scenes,"  i.  52. 

Louisiana,  loss  of,  regretted  by 
France,  i.  353;  retrocession  by 
Spain  to  France,  363;  Talleyrand's 
projet  of  treaty,  368;  treaty  of  re 
trocession  signed,  370;  Bonaparte 
plans  an  expedition  to  occupy, 
399;  boundaries  fixed  by  Decres, 
ii.  5  ;  commercial  relations  and 
sentiments  prescribed  toward  the 
United  States,  8 ;  treaty  of  cession 
to  the  United  States  signed,  42; 
price  of,  45;  importance  of  cession, 
49 ;  Napoleon's  reasons  for  selling, 
53;  Talleyrand's  explanation  of, 
55 ;  treble  invalidity  of  sale,  56  ; 


448 


INDEX  TO  VOLS.  I.  AND  II. 


Constitutional  question  debated  in 
Congress,  96  et  seq. ;  plans  with 
regard  to  the  status  of,  116;  admit 
ted  without  an  amendment,  118; 
bill  for  temporary  government  of, 
120;  Breckenridge's  bill  defining 
boundaries  and  government,  120  et 
teq. ;  bill  defining  territorial  gov 
ernment  of,  125,  130;  Spain  pro 
tests  against  sale  of,  252  et  seq. ; 
people  regarded  as  unfit  for  self- 
government,  399;  they  urge  the 
execution  of  the  treaty,  400;  re 
port  of  Randolph  upon  their  claims, 
400. 

"  Louisianacide,"  Napoleon's,  ii.  37. 

Louverture,  Toussaint,  i.  354;  story 
of,  378  et  seq. ;  champion  of  Re 
publican  principles,  392 ;  seized 
and  sent  to  France,  396;  his  de 
pendence  on  the  United  States 
for  supplies,  406,  416;  his  death, 
ii.  20. 

Lowndes,  William,  i.  151. 

Luisa,  Queen  of  Spain,  i.  345  et  seq. 

Lyman,  Theodore,  ii.  169. 

Lyon,  Matthew,  member  of  Congress 
from  Vermont,  i.  295;  from  Ken 
tucky,  his  attack  on  Randolph,  ii. 
123,  216. 


McKEAN,  THOMAS,  Governor  of 
Pennsylvania,  i.  228;  declines  to 
remove  Judge  Brackenridge,  ii. 
196,  259. 

Maclay,  William,  senator  from  Penn 
sylvania,  his  description  of  Jeffer- 
Bon,  i.  185. 

Macon,  Nathaniel,  of  North  Carolina, 
i.  149,  261 ;  chosen  Speaker  of  the 
House,  267;  ii.  95,  123;  opposed  to 
the  impeachment  of  Judge  Chase, 
150. 

Madison,  Bishop,  of  Virginia,  i.  136. 

Madison,  James,  and  the  Virginia 
Resolutions,  i.  140  et  seq.,  148, 177 ; 


personal  characteristics  of,  188  et 
seq. ;  appointed  Secretary  of  State, 
218;  makes  no  removals  in  the 
Department  of  State,  236:  entrust 
of,  248,  261;  a  commissioner  in 
the  Yazoo  sale,  304,  322,  332;  in 
structions  of,  respecting  the  retro 
cession  of  Louisiana.  405;  asks 
Pichon  to  remonstrate  with  Le- 
clerc,  408;  writes  to  Livingston, 
423,  426;  his  orders  to  Pinckney, 
427,  432;  invokes  Pichon's  aid, 
438,  439,  441;  writes  instructions 
for  Livingston  and  Monroe,  ii.  2; 
conversation  with  J.  Q.  Adams  re 
specting  the  Louisiana  treaty,  117; 
favors  Yazoo  compromise,  211; 
instructs  Monroe  to  bargain  with 
Spain  for  West  Florida,  248,  251; 
explains  the  failure  to  demand 
West  Florida,  256 ;  sends  the  rati 
fied  claims  convention  to  Madrid, 
260,  278,  279;  hopes  to  be  relieved 
of  Yrujo,  267  ;  communicates  with 
Livingston  respecting  West  Flor 
ida  and  Yrujo,  262 ;  attempts  to 
cajole  Turreau,  273  ;  Turreau's 
description  of  him,  274;  compro 
mised  by  Pinckney,  276;  recalls 
Pinckney  and  hurries  Monroe  to 
Spain,  286;  denies  that  the  Gov 
ernment  aids  desertion  of  seamen, 
345;  communications  to  Thornton, 
362;  proposes  a  convention  with 
regard  to  impressments  and  the 
blockade,  385;  remonstrates  with 
Merry  respecting  impressments, 
393. 

Mail  routes  in  1800,  i.  15. 

Maine,  convention  for  fixing  the 
boundary  between,  and  Nova  Sco 
tia,  ii.  358,  383. 

Maitland,  General,  at  St.  Domingo, 
i.  385. 

Malbone,  Edward  G.,  i.  149. 

Manhattan  Company  of  New  York 
city,  i.  65,  70. 


INDEX  TO  VOLS.  I.  AND  II. 


449 


Manners  and  morals,  American,  in 
1800,  i.  48  et  seq. 

Manufactures  in  New  England  in 
1800,  i.  22. 

Marbois,  Barbe,  favors  the  cession  of 
Louisiana,  ii.  26. 

Marbury  against  Madison,  case  of, 
ii.  145  et  seq. 

Marietta,  Ohio,  in  1800,  i.  2. 

Marshall,  Chief-Justice,  i.  133;  Jef 
ferson's  antipathy  to,  192;  personal 
characteristics  of,  193 ;  detests  Jef 
ferson,  194  ;  his  views  of  the  Con 
stitution,  260,  275,  290;  opinion  of, 
respecting  the  powers  of  Govern 
ment  in  the  Louisiana  case,  ii.  125; 
appointment  of,  obnoxious  to  Jef 
ferson,  145  ;  his  decision  in  the 
Marbury  case,  146 ;  his  decision  in 
the  Yazoo  case,  214. 

Martin,  Luther,  his  view  of  impeach 
ment,  ii.  223,  227,  231. 

Mason,  George,  i.  133. 

Massachusetts  society  in  1800,  i.  76. 

Meade,  Bishop,  of  Virginia,  i.  193. 

Mediterranean  Fund,  the,  ii.  141. 

Merry,  Anthony,  appointed  British 
minister  to  the  United  States,  ii. 
360;  his  arrival  and  reception  by 
Jefferson,  361  et  seq.,  380,381,  390; 
dines  at  the  White  House,  369; 
considers  himself  affronted  and 
declines  the  President's  invita 
tions,  375;  union  of,  with  Burr, 
390;  writes  to  his  Government, 
392;  remonstrates  with  Madison 
respecting  the  enlistment  of  de 
serters,  393;  receives  a  message 
from  Burr,  395;  communicates 
Burr's  plan  to  his  Government, 
403. 

"Messenger,"  stallion,  i.  51. 

Milledge,  Governor,  and  the  Yazoo 
sale,  i.  305. 

Mint,  opposition  to,  i.  299 ;  ii.  77. 

Mississippi,  district  of,  created,  ii. 
257. 

VOL.  ii.  —  29 


Mitchill,  Dr.  Samuel  L.,  i.69,93, 110; 
ii.  153,  218,  238. 

Mobile  treated  as  a  part  of  the  Uni 
ted  States,  ii.  255,  257,  260-263, 
291,  293,  304,  380. 

"Modern  Chivalry,"  i.  125. 

Monroe,  James,  and  the  Callender 
scandal,  i.  325 ;  nominated  minister 
extraordinary  to  France  and  Spain, 
433 ;  his  instructions,  442 ;  sails  for 
France,  ii.  1;  his  arrival  in  France, 
26  ;  illness  of,  in  Paris,  39  ;  his 
draft  of  claims  convention,  41 ; 
his  share  in  the  negotiation,  50; 
under  the  influence  of  other  men, 
67;  commissioned  to  negotiate  with 
Spain  for  West  Florida,  248 ;  takes 
JRufus  King's  place  in  London,  275, 
288,  410;  his  distrust  of  Living 
ston,  289;  returns  to  Paris,  292, 
301;  is  instructed  to  insist  upon 
the  right  to  West  Florida,  301; 
writes  to  Talleyrand,  304;  starts 
for  Madrid,  307,  422;  receives  an 
swer  from  Talleyrand,  313;  in 
ignorance  of  Pitt's  schemes,  419; 
interview  with  Lord  Harrowby, 
420;  warns  the  President  to  expect 
a  change  in  British  policy,  422. 

Moore,  Thomas,  i.  48;  lines  of,  on 
the  Philadelphia  literati,  122;  his 
verses  on  Jefferson,  167. 

Morfontaine,  treaty  of,  i.  362,  370, 
388;  ii.  21,  42,  46",  47,  293,  296,  297, 
383.  (See  Treaties.) 

Morocco,  ii.  137. 

Morris,  Commodore,  dismissed,  ii. 
137. 

Morris,  Gouverneur,  i.  93,  279;  as 
sails  the  Government,  435;  ii.  99, 
101,  283. 

Morse,  Jedediah,  i.  78,  93. 


NAPOLEON,  i.  334;  and  Talleyrand, 
359;  restores  peace  in  Europe,  360; 
obtains  retrocession  of  Louisiana, 


450 


INDEX  TO  VOLS.  I.  AND  II. 


363-370;  his  anger  with  Godoy, 
373-375;  makes  peace  with  Eng 
land,  374 ;  attacks  Louverture,  390 ; 
fears  a  war  with  the  United  States, 
ii.  2;  abandons  his  colonial  system, 
14  et  seq. ;  scene  with  Lord  Whit- 
worth,  19;  reveals  his  determina 
tion  to  cede  Louisiana,  25 ;  angry 
scene  with  his  brothers,  34  et  seq. ; 
his  prqjet  of  a  secret  convention 
respecting  Louisiana,  40;  objects 
to  the  paymelit  of  claims,  51;  his 
inducement  to  sell  Louisiana,  52; 
his  conduct  toward  Spain,  56;  his 
avowal  as  to  the  sale  of  Louisi 
ana,  61 ;  his  reasons  for  betraying 
Charles  IV.,  63 ;  for  selling  Loui 
siana,  63  et  seq. ;  repudiates  drafts 
on  the  public  Treasury,  270;  his 
irritation  at  Jerome's  marriage, 
379. 

Nash,  Thomas,  ii.  333. 

Natchez  delivered  to  the  United 
States,  i.  355. 

"National  Intelligencer,"  i.  121. 

Naturalization  law  adopted,  5.  301. 

Naturalization,  the  law  of,  in  Eng 
land  and  America,  ii.  337  et  seq. 

Navigation  laws,  British,  ii.  318,  321, 
413. 

Navy,  Jefferson's  opinion  of,  i.  222, 
223,  238;  Gallatin's  views  on,  222, 
240,  252;  Giles's  views  on,  287; 
Leib's  proposal  to  abolish,  299; 
condition  in  1801,  242-245;  econo 
mies  in,  272;  four  sloops-of-war 
and  fifteen  gunboats  built  in  1803, 
ii.  77;  cost  and  estimates,  77,  136; 
at  Tripoli,  137-141,  425-436. 

Nelson,  Roger,  ii.  229. 

New  England  in  1800,  i,  18;  school- 
houses,  19;  population,  20;  pov 
erty,  21;  commerce  and  manufac 
tures,  21  et  seq. ;  social  system,  76 ; 
schools,  76;  society,  organization 
of,  108. 

New  Haven,  i.  75. 


Newspapers,  American,  in  1800,  i.  41, 
120. 

New  York  city  in  1800,  tax  valuation 
of,  i.  23;  behind  New  England,  23; 
population,  24;  like  a  foreign  sea 
port,  24 ;  expenses  and  sanitary 
condition,  25;  business,  25  et  seq. ; 
society  of,  113. 

New  York  State  in  1800,  i.  3,  6,  23, 
108-114. 

Nicholas,  Wilson  Gary,  i.  221;  dis 
suades  the  President  from  raising 
Constitutional  question,  ii.  88,  94, 
111,  221. 

Nicholson,  Joseph  H.,  i.  261,268,433; 
ii.  95,  100,  124.  144;  and  the  attack 
upon  Judge  Chase,  149,  225,  228; 
offers  an  amendment  to  the  Consti 
tution,  240. 

North  Carolina  in  1800,  i.  36;  cotton 
planting,  37,  148. 


OFFICES,  Jefferson's  removals  from, 

i.  230  et  seq. 
Ohio,  admitted,  i.  302. 
Ohio  River  settlements  in  1800,  i.  2. 
Ohio,  Territory  of,  ii.  121. 
Olcott,   Simeon,  senator  from  New 

Hampshire,  ii.  160. 
Orleans,  Territory  of,  ii.  121. 
Osgood,  Samuel,  i.  108. 
Otis,  Harrison  Gray,  ii.  163. 


PAINE,  ROBERT  TREAT,  i.  330. 

Paine,  Thomas,  Jefferson's  letter  to, 
i.  316,  327. 

"Palladium,"  the,  i.  314. 

Parker,  Admiral,  ii.  340. 

Parliament.     (See  Acts  of.) 

Parma,  Duchy  of,  i.  363,  371. 

Parsons,  Chief-Justice  Theophilus, 
i.  48,  87,  89,  93;  ii.  164. 

Party,  the  Federalist,  in  New  Eng 
land,  i.  76,  82-89,  329 ;  ii.  160,  170, 
202;  in  New  York,  i.  109;  ii.  171, 


INDEX  TO  VOLS.  I.  AND  II. 


451 


191;  views  on  government,  i.  252; 
on  the  Judiciary,  273-275, 279,  280, 
297 ;  on  the  treaty -making  power, 
99-100,  105,  110,  111. 

Party,  the  Republican,  in  New  Eng 
land,  i.  76,  329,  330;  ii.  81,  201, 202; 
in  New  York,  i.  108,  109,  113,  229- 
236,  331;  ii.  171-191;  in  Pennsyl 
vania,  i.  116,  194-200;  in  Virginia, 
138-143,  145-148,  179;  in  North 
Carolina,  148;  in  South  Carolina, 
152-154;  political  principles  of, 
199-217,  238-243,  247,  251,  272, 
287;  ii.  77,  78,  130,  134,  142,  203, 
205,  254-262;  leaders  of,  in  Con 
gress,  i.  264-269;  views  of,  on  the 
Judiciary,  275,  276,  288-290,  297; 
ii.  143-159,  221-244;  on  the  treaty- 
making  power,  78-80,  83-91,  94- 
99, 100-104, 106-112;  on  the  power 
of  Congress  over  territories,  116- 
129;  on  exclusive  privileges,  208- 
210;  on  British  relations,  349,  355, 
356;  success  in  1803,  74-77;  in 
1804,  201. 

Patronage,  public,  Jefferson's  course 
regarding,  i.  224,  294. 

Patterson,  Elizabeth,  ii.  377. 

Paulus  Hook,  i.  11. 

Peace,  Prince  of.     (See  Godoy.) 

Pele-Mele,  ii.  365,  372,  390. 

Pellew,  Captain,  of  the  "Cleopatra," 
ii.  340. 

Pennsylvania  in  1800,  i.  29, 114,  115; 
schism,  the,  ii.  194  et  seq. 

Perkins,  Jacob,  i.  182. 

Philadelphia  in  1800,  i.  28,  29;  li 
brary  company,  61;  intellectual 
centre  in  1800,  117. 

"Philadelphia,"  the  frigate,  cap 
tured,  ii.  138. 

Physick,  Dr.,  i.  127. 

Pichon,  French  chargt  d'affaires, 
remonstrates  with  Leclerc  and  is 
superseded,  i.  408;  ii.  268;  com 
plains  to  Talleyrand  of  the  attitude 
of  the  United  States,  437,  439;  ob 


serves  Jefferson's  close  relations 
with  Thornton,  354  ;  invited  by 
Jefferson  to  meet  Merry  at  dinner,. 
369. 

Pickering,  Judge  John,  impeach 
ment  of,  ii.  143  et  seq.;  trial  of, 
153  et  seq. ;  irregularity  of  trial, 
158. 

Pickering,  Senator  Timothy,  i.  88; 
and  Yrujo,  425 ;  on  the  admission 
of  Louisiana  to  the  Union,  ii.  105, 
110  et  seq.,  160;  his  letter  to  George 
Cabot  on  the  impending  dangers, 
161,  164;  receives  Cabot's  reply, 
166  et  seq. ;  letter  of,  to  Rufus  King 
on  Burr's  candidacy  for  the  gov 
ernorship,  179,  390,  391. 

Pinckney,  Charles,  i.  152;  appointed 
minister  to  Madrid,  294,  427;  ob 
tains  a  convention  for  Spanish 
depredations,  ii.  249  et  seq. ;  indis 
cretions  of,  at  Madrid,  275;  com 
promises  Madison,  276  ;  adopts  a 
high  tone  with  Cevallos,  279 ;  sends 
him  a  threatening  letter,  280;  ex 
cuse  for  his  conduct,  281 ;  in  an 
awkward  situation,  284;  his  recall 
asked  for,  286;  asks  the  Spanish 
government  to  be  permitted  to 
resume  relations,  315. 

Pitt,  William,  ii.  316,  320,  324,  326, 
328,  330,  336,  342  ;  restored  to 
power,  396,  418;  determined  to  re 
establish  the  former  navigation 
laws,  419. 

Pittsburgh  in  1800,  i.  2. 

Plumer,  William,  senator  from  New 
Hampshire,  ii.  160,  364,  405. 

"Polly,"  case  of  the,  ii.  328,  340. 

Population  of  the  United  States  in 
1800,  i.  1;  centre  of,  near  Balti 
more,  1;  west  of  the  Alleghanies 
in  1800.  3;  of  cities,  59. 

"Portfolio,"  the,  i.  85,  119,  121. 

Postal  system  of  the  United  State* 
in  1800,  i.  61. 

Pozzo  di  Borgo,  ii.  66 


452 


INDEX  TO  VOLS.  I.  AND  IL 


Preble,  Commodore  Edward,  ap 
pointed  in  command  of  the  Medi 
terranean  squadron,  ii.  137  ;  at 
Tripoli,  426. 

Prevost,  J.  B.,  ii.  220. 

Priestley,  Dr.  Joseph,  i.  157. 

Prince  of  Peace.     (See  Godoy.) 

Princeton  College  in  1800,  i.  129. 

Prisons  in  1800,  i.  128. 


RAMSAT,  DAVID,  i.  151. 

Kandolph,  John,  i.  143,  209 ;  in  favor 
of  anti-Federal  declarations,  260, 
267,  296,  338;  demands  papers  re 
lating  to  the  right  of  deposit  at 
New  Orleans,  429 ;  ii.  95 ;  defends 
the  President  in  Congress,  97,  120, 
124, 133, 142, 144;  impeaches  Judge 
Chase,  151 ;  opposes  remission  of 
duties  on  school-books,  208 ;  decline 
of  his  influence,  210;  on  the  Yazoo 
claims,  210 ;  his  violent  temper, 
213;  supported  by  the  Administra 
tion,  220;  opens  the  trial  of  Judge 
Chase,  229 ;  his  closing  speech,  236 ; 
his  amendment  to  the  Constitu 
tion,  240.  241 ;  asserts  title  to  West 
Florida,  255;  complains  of  Jeffer 
son's  credulity,  409. 

Randolph,  Thomas  Mann,  ii.  95, 
124. 

Rawle,  William,  i.  127;  ii.  259. 

Reeve,  Judge  Tapping,  ii.  168. 

Representation,  ratio  of  Congres 
sional,  fixed,  i.  301. 

Republicans.    (See  Party.) 

Retaliation  acts,  ii.  397  et  seq. 

Rhode  Island,  roads  in,  i.  64. 

Rigaud,  i.  384,  386. 

Roads  in  1800,  i.  2,  5,  11  et  seq.,  14, 
63,  64;  over  the  Alleghanies  in 
1800,  2. 

Robbins,  Jonathan,  case  of,  ii.  333. 

Rocbambeau,  General,  succeeds  Le- 
clerc  at  St.  Domingo,  ii.  15. 

Rodgere,  John,  at  Tripoli,  ii.  429. 


Rodney,  Caesar  A.,  elected  to  Con 
gress  in  place  of  James  A.  Bayard, 
ii.  76,  95;  a  Republican  leader,  100; 
defends  the  Louisiana  treaty,  102; 
reports  Jefferson's  bill  for  admin 
istering  Louisiana,  119;  shares  in 
the  trial  of  Judge  Chase,  219,  228, 
234. 

Rose,  George,  vice-president  of  the 
board  of  trade,  ii.  419. 

Roume,  Citizen,  French  agent  in  St. 
Domingo,  i.  384,  387. 

Rule  of  the  war  of  1756,  ii.  322,  323, 
329. 

Rutledge,  John,  i.  269,  271. 


SAILORS,  British,  their  desertion  to 
American  service,  ii.  332  et  seq. 

St.  Cyr,  General,  pledges  France 
never  to  alienate  Louisiana,  i.  400; 
ii.  61. 

St.  Domingo  ceded  to  France,  i.  354, 
378  et  seq. ;  destruction  of  the 
French  army  in,  414;  relations  of 
United  States  to,  ii.  326. 

Saratoga,  i.  92. 

Sauve",  Pierre,  ii.  401,  406. 

Scott,  Dred,  case  of,  ii.  126,  129. 

Scott,  Walter,  i.  126. 

Scott,  Sir  William,  his  judgments  in 
admiralty  cases,  ii.  327. 

Schuylers  of  New  York,  the,  i.  108. 

Search,  right  of,  ii.  322. 

Senate,  as  a  court  of  impeachment, 
ii.  223. 

Sheffield,  Earl  of,  his  devotion  to  the 
British  navigation  laws,  ii.  413. 

Shippers,  British,  ii.  318,  320. 

Shipping,  character  of,  in  1800,  5.  6; 
American,  increase  of,  ii.  325. 

Sidmouth,  Lord.     (See  Addington.) 

Silliman,  Professor  Benjamin,  i.  310. 

Skipwith,  Fulwar,  U.  S.  consul,  at 
tacks  Livingston,  ii.  289. 

Slave-trade,  restrictions  of,  in  Louui- 
ana,  ii.  122. 


INDEX  TO  VOLS.  I.  AND 


453 


Slavery,  i.  134-136, 150,  154. 

Smith,  Senator  Israel,  of  Vermont, 
ii.  218. 

Smith,  John  Cotton,  i.  269. 

Smith,  Senator  John,  of  New  York, 
ii.  153. 

Smith,  Senator  John,  of  Ohio,  ii.  218. 

Smith,  Robert,  appointed  Secretary 
of  the  Navy,  220  et  seq.,  373,  431. 

Smith,  Samuel,  member  of  Congress 
from  Maryland,  appointed  tempo 
rarily  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  i.  219; 
his  character,  267;  moves  to  pur 
chase  Louisiana,  433  ;  his  vote  on 
Chase's  impeachment,  ii.  238;  his 
wish  to  be  minister  to  Paris,  378. 

Smiths,  the,  of  Baltimore,  i.  93. 

Somers,  Lieutenant,  at  Tripoli,  ii.  427. 

South  Carolina  in  1800,  i.  37;  bril 
liant  prospects  of,  39,  149  et  seq.  ; 
contrast  in  the  character  of  its 
people,  153  et  seq. 

Spain,  relations  of,  with  the  United 
States,  i.  337  et  seq. ;  clumsiness  of 
her  colonial  system,  419;  declares 
war  with  England,  ii.  303. 

Spanish  claims  convention,  ii.  249; 
defeated  in  the  Senate,  250;  rati 
fied,  278;  conditions  on  ratification 
imposed  by  Spain,  280. 

Spanish  depredations  claim.  (See 
Pinckney.) 

Spencer,  Ambrose,  i.  109,  112,  228, 
233. 

Stage-coaches,  travel  by,  i.  11  et  seq. 

States-rights,  asserted  by  Virginia, 
i.  138-140;  by  Kentucky,  140-143; 
by  Georgia,  304;  ii.  215;  affected 
by  Jefferson's  acts,  i.  203,  205,  254, 
255,  260,  263,  298;  ii.  78,  85,  90, 
114,  118,  125,  130,  203,  205,  210; 
Gallatin's  attitude  toward,  i.  116; 
ii.  79,  80;  Bayard  on,  i.  292;  Ran 
dolph  on,  ii.  97,  98,  104,  120,  209, 
211 ;  Nicholson  on,  102,  209 ;  Rod 
ney  on,  103,  119;  Pickering  on, 
105;  John  Taylor  of  Caroline  on, 


105-107;  Breckenridge  on,  109, 
121 ;  W.  C.  Nicholas  on,  111-113 ; 
Chief-Justice  Taney  on,  127;  Jus 
tice  Campbell  on,  127-129. 

Steam-engines  in  America  in  1800, 
i.  66,  68,  70. 

Stevens,  Edward,  consul-general  at 
St.  Domingo,  i.  385  et  seq.,  389. 

Stevens,  John,  i.  69,  182. 

Stewart,  Charles,  at  Tripoli,  ii.  428. 

Stoddert,  Benjamin,  i.  192,  219. 

Story,  Joseph,  his  description  of  Ful 
ton's  discouragements,  i.  71;  of 
Marshall,  193,  260;  of  Jefferson's 
dress,  ii.  366. 

Stone,  Senator  David,  of  North  Caro 
lina,  ii.  95,  157. 

Stowell,  Lord.  (See  Sir  William 
Scott.) 

Stuart,  Gilbert,  i.  127. 

Sugar,  stimulated  production  of,  and 
subsequent  glut  in  the  West  Indies, 
ii.  415. 

Supreme  Court,  the,  i.  274;  sessions 
suspended  for  a  year  by  Congress, 
ii.  143. 

Sutcliffe,  Robert,  i.  34. 

Swartwout,  John,  i.  109, 230;  his  duel 
with  De  Witt  Clinton,  332. 


TALLEYRAND,  i.  335  ;  his  colonial 
schemes,  352  et  seq. ;  becomes 
French  minister  of  foreign  affairs, 
353  ;  his  negotiations  with  the 
American  commissioners,  355 ;  his 
instructions  for  Guillemardet,  355 ; 
his  mistakes,  357 ;  obliged  by  the 
X.  Y.  Z.  affair  to  retire,  358;  re 
stored  by  Bonaparte,  359,  412 ; 
his  letter  with  regard  to  Louisiana, 
400  ;  denies  the  retrocession  of 
Louisiana,  409 ;  his  instructions  to 
Bernadotte,  ii.  11;  opposes  the  ces 
sion  of  Louisiana,  25;  proposes  it 
to  Livingston,  27;  explanation  of 
the  sale  of  Louisiana,  55;  assures 


454 


INDEX  TO   VOLS.  I.  AND  IL 


Cevallos  of  Napoleon's  opposition 
to  the  American  claims,  293;  his 
instructions  to  Turreau,  295;  re 
assures  Cevallos,  297;  his  attitude 
toward  the  United  States,  309 ;  re 
port  to  the  Emperor  on  Monroe's 
note,  310;  answer  to  Monroe,  313. 

Taney,  Chief-Justice,  opinion  of,  re 
specting  governmental  powers  in 
the  Louisiana  case,  ii.  126,  128. 

Taxes,  abolition  of,  i.  240,  270,  272. 

Tayler,  John,  ii.  177. 

Taylor,  John,  of  Caroline,  i.  143,  146, 
263,  338;  ii.  94;  his  remarks  on  the 
Louisiana  purchase,  105. 

Temperance  in  United  States  in  1800, 
1.47. 

Tennessee,  population  of,  in  1800, 
i.  2. 

Terry,  Eli,  i.  181. 

Texas,  a  part  of  the  Louisiana  pur 
chase,  ii.  256. 

Theatre  in  New  England  in  1800, 
i.  49. 

Theatres  in  Boston,  i.  90. 

Thompson,  Smith,  i.  108. 

Thornton,  Edward,  his  description  of 
the  inauguration  of  Jefferson,  i. 
198,  436,  440;  letter  to  Hammond, 
ii.  342,  388;  complains  that  deser 
tion  of  seamen  is  encouraged,  345; 
Jefferson's  confidential  relations 
with,  347;  proposals  with  regard  to 
Monroe's  mission,  351;  on  change 
on  tone  in  1804,  387,  388. 

Thornton,  Dr.  William,  i.  111. 

Ticknor,  George,  i.  63,  94. 

Tracy,  Senator  Uriah,  of  Connecti 
cut,  his  reply  to  John  Taylor  of 
Caroline,  ii.  107,  238. 

Travel  in  America,  difficulties  of,  in 
1800,  i.  11  et  seq. 

Treaty,  preliminary  between  Great 
Britain,  France,  and  Spain,  Nov. 
3,  1762,  i.  353;  ii.  7,  70;  definitive 
between  the  same,  Feb.  10,  1763, 
i.  353;  ii.  6;  definitive  between 


Great  Britain  and  Spain,  Sept.  8, 
1783,  i.  353;  definitive  between  the 
United  States  and  Great  Britain, 
Sept.  3,  1783,  ii.  90,  411 ;  Jay's,  be 
tween  the  United  States  and  Great 
Britain,  Nov.  19,  1794,  i.  348;  ii. 
316,  334,  339,  355,  421,  424;  of 
Basle,  between  Spain  and  France, 
July  22,  1795,  i.  354;  Pinckney's, 
between  the  United  States  and 
Spain,  Oct.  27,  1795,  348,  349 ;  ii. 
246  ;  between  Toussaint  and  Mait- 
land,  June  13, 1799,  i.  385;  of  Mor- 
fontaine,  between  the  United  States 
and  France,  Sept.  30,  1800,  362, 
388  ;  ii.  21,  42,  46,  47,  293,  296,  297, 
383;  Berthier's,  between  Spain  and 
France,  retroceding  Louisiana,  Oct. 
1,  1800,  i.  370,  401,  403;  ii.  43,  58, 
70,  254 ;  of  Lune'ville  between 
France  and  Austria,  Feb.  9,  1801, 
i.  370;  of  Lucien  Bonaparte  be 
tween  Spain  and  France,  March 
21,  1801,  372,  406,  409;  ii.  299;  of 
Badajos  between  Spain  and  Por 
tugal,  June  5,  1801,  i.  372;  prelimi 
nary,  between  Great  Britain  and 
France,  Oct.  1,  1801,  374;  ii.  344; 
settling  British  debts  between 
Great  Britain  and  the  United 
States,  Jan.  8,  1802,  358,  410;  of 
Amiens  between  Great  Britain  and 
France,  March  25,  1802,  59,  290, 
326,  347,  385,  414,  416;  of  claims 
between  the  United  States  and 
Spain,  Aug.  11,  1802,  21,  250,  259, 
278,  280,  293,  296,  297,  383  ;  be 
tween  France  and  the  United 
States,  ceding  Louisiana  and  set 
tling  claims,  39-49,  51,  67,  85,  88, 
92,  97,  100,  102,  105,  107,  108,  111, 
245,  275,  289,  302,  308,  355,  399- 
401 ;  between  the  United  States  and 
Great  Britain  for  settling  bounda 
ries,  May  12,  1803,  358,  383,  384, 
391,  392J  410,  420,  424  ;  between 
the  United  States  and  Tripoli, 


INDEX  TO  VOLS.  I.  AND  LT. 


455 


Nov.  4,  1796,  i.  244;  June  4,  1805, 
ii.  434,  436. 

Treaty-making  power,  defined  by 
W.  C.  Nicholas,  ii.  87,  88, 112 ;  by 
Jefferson,  89,  90;  by  Gaylord  Gris- 
wold,  96,  97;  by  Randolph,  98,  99 ; 
by  Gouverneur  Morris,  100;  by 
Nicholson,  101;  by  Rodney,  102, 
103;  by  Pickering,  105;  by  John 
Taylor  of  Caroline,  106,  107;  by 
Tracy,  108;  by  Breckenridge,  109"; 
by  J.  Q.  Adams,  111;  by  Cocke, 
113 ;  summary  of  opinions  on,  114, 
115. 

Tripoli,  the  war  with,  ii.  137,  426  et 
seq. ;  Pacha  of,  430 ;  peace  with, 
436. 

Trumbull,  John,  i.  101. 

Turnpikes,  prejudice  against,  i.  64 
et  seq. 

Turreau,  Louis  Marie,  appointed  min 
ister  to  the  United  States  by  Napo 
leon,  ii.  268;  his  domestic  quarrels, 
269;  complains  of  the  discredit  of 
France,  271;  embarrassments  of, 
272;  his  description  of  Madison, 
274 ;  receives  instructions  from 
Talleyrand,  296;  presented  to  Jef 
ferson,  405 ;  describes  General 
Wilkinson,  406. 


UNITARIANS  in  New  England,  i.  89. 

United  States,  banking  capital  of,  in 
1800,  i.  26;  credit  and  trade  of, 
27;  monetary  valuation  of,  in  1800, 
and  distribution  of  wealth,  40 ;  pop 
ular  characteristics  of  the  people 
of,  in  1800,  41  et  seq. ;  standard  of 
comfort,  42. 

Urquijo,  Don  Mariano  Luis  de,  i.  355, 
365,  368. 

Utica  in  1800,  i.  3. 


VAN  NESS,  WILLIAM  P.,  i.  109;  au 
thor  of  pamphlet  by  "  Aristides," 


ii.  73,  171 ;  carries  Burr's  demand 
to  Hamilton,  186. 

Vanderbilt,  Cornelius,  i.  28. 

Varnum,  Joseph  B.,  member  of  Con 
gress  from  Massachusetts,  ii.  123. 

Victor,  Marshal,  to  command  the 
forces  in  Louisiana,  ii.  5. 

Vincent,  Colonel,  i.  382. 

Virginia  in  1800,  i.  32;  farming  in, 
33,  131  et  seq. ;  horse-racing,  51 ; 
Washington's  views  on  the  value 
of  land  in,  135 ;  Church  and  State 
in,  136;  adoption  of  the  Constitu 
tion  by,  139;  Resolutions,  140  et 
seq. ;  law  to  prevent  extradition, 
ii.  334,  345,  398. 

Virginians,  i.  133  et  seq. ;  of  the  mid 
dle  and  lower  classes,  137;  agri 
culture  their  sole  resource,  138. 

Volney  describes  the  American  hab 
its  of  diet,  i.  44. 

Voltaire,  i.  161. 


WAGNER,  JACOB,  i.  236. 

Ware,  Henry,  i.  311. 

Warren,  Dr.  J.  C.,  his  description  of 
Boston  customs  in  1800,  i.  91. 

Washington  city  in  1800,  i.  30. 

Washington,  President,  opinion  of 
American  farming-lands,  i.  35 ;  his 
support  of  a  national  bank,  65; 
on  emancipation  in  Pennsylvania 
and  its  effects,  135;  establishes  the 
precedent  of  addressing  Congress 
in  a  speech,  247;  his  personal  au 
thority,  262,  320. 

Water  communication  in  1800,  i.  8. 

Waterhouse,  Dr.,  i.  93. 

Webster,  Noah,  i.  62,  105. 

Weld,  Rev.  Abijah,  of  Attleborough, 
i.  21. 

Weld,  Isaac,  Jr.,  an  English  trav 
eller,  describes  condition  of  inns 
in  America,  i.  46,  52;  describes 
Princeton,  129;  quoted,  136;  at 
Wilmington,  182. 


456 


INDEX  TO  VOLS.  I.  AND  IL 


West,  Benjamin,  i.  127. 

West  Indian  trade,  English  policy 
toward,  ii.  318 ;  value  of,  to  Eng 
land,  331,  413,  415. 

West  Point  Military  Academy  estab 
lished,  i.  301. 

Whitney,  Eli,  i.  181. 

Whittemore,  Asa,  i.  182. 

Whitworth,  Lord,  British  minister  at 
Paris,  Napoleon's  announcement 
to,  ii.  19. 

Wilkinson,  Jaines,  Brigadier-General 
and  governor  of  the  Louisiana 
Territory,  ii.  220;  portrayed  by 
Turreau,  406;  his  relations  with 
Burr,  408. 

William  and  Mary,  college  of,  i. 
136. 

Wilson,  Alexander,  describes  New 
England  in  1808,  i.  19;  on  North 
Carolina,  36,  57,  124. 

Wilson,  Judge,  i.  127. 

Wistar,  Dr.  Caspar,  i.  127. 

Wordsworth,  i.  94;  his  lines  on 
America,  169, 172. 

Wythe,  George,  i.  133. 


X.  T.  Z.  affair,  i.  355,  358,  359. 


YALE  COLLEGE,  i.  106. 

Tazoo  Act,  i.  304. 

Yazoo  Compromise,  ii.  210;  Madison's 
measure,  211;  vote  upon,  217. 
(See  Georgia.) 

Yrujo,  Don  Carlos  Martinez,  Spanish 
minister,  his  intimate  relations  with 
Jefferson,  i.  425;  writes  to  Morales 
with  respect  to  the  right  of  de 
posit,  427;  announces  the  restora 
tion  of  the  right  of  deposit,  ii.  3; 
protests  against  the  sale  of  Loui 
siana,  92,  252  et  seq. ;  his  anger, 
258,  389;  obtains  from  American 
lawyers  an  opinion,  259;  attacks 
Madison,  260 ;  his  affair  with  Jack 
son,  265 ;  visits  Jefferson  at  Monti- 
cello,  266 ;  publishes  his  counter 
statement  as  to  his  affair  with 
Jackson,  268;  relations  of,  with 
White  House,  362;  indiscretion, 
368 ;  at  the  White  House,  369 ;  con 
certs  reprisals  with  Merry,  373. 


END   OP   VOL.  II. 


D\SCHnl       -  This? book  is  DUE  on  the  last  date  stamped  bel 


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